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THE MILITIA OF COLONIAL MASSACHUSETTS

BY JACK S. RADABAUGH

THE Godly, grave men of Massachusetts took pains, even while still thousands of miles from the American shore, to provide in principle for the contingencies which might arise to challenge their existence in the New World. When considering the problem of defense, the founding fathers, in the Charter of 1628, took note of chief commanders, captains, and governors, and their power to rule and punish.¹ After the Puritans had arrived in New England the General Court of Massachusetts was even more specific when it said, "as piety cannot be maintained without church ordinances and officers, nor justice without laws and magistracy, no more can our safety and peace be preserved without military orders and officers."²

The flowering of the militia was not all just a matter of thought.³ Immediate and practical requirements for public safety in 1631 moved the General Court temporarily to forbid unarmed persons to travel between Plymouth and Massachusetts.⁴ Guns were a requirement for all travelers except those in

and around Boston,⁵ and colonial law called for arms in every home.⁶ Indeed, the colony's legislative body observed that, "the well ordering of the militia is a matter of great concernment to the safety and welfare of this commonwealth. . . ."⁷

The Indians living in and adjacent to Massachusetts very frequently played havoc with the white man's peace, though in the revolt against Edmund Andros, the enemy of the militia was the governor himself. The Pequot Nation in eastern Connecticut was the first tribe to feel the ire of the citizen-soldiers, and after its destruction, it was replaced by the Narragansetts, the allies of King Philip and his Wampanoags, as the ranking antagonists. However, the Rhode Island tribes were never to match the fury of the Abenakis and the Penobscots to the north. These Canadian tribes, the allies of the French, at the conclusion of King Philip's War, became the principal enemies of the Massachusetts militia.

The shifting string of frontier villages served as the battle front for these Indian wars.⁸ All along the frontier the rocky and heavily forested terrain weighed in favor of the tribesmen. Nor did the dense swamps of Connecticut make easier the task of the soldier. The bitterness of winter cold increased the militiaman's suffering in the field, but since it was Indian custom to cease hostilities during cold weather and go into winter

¹Nathaniel B. Shurtleff (ed.), *Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England*, I, 17. Hereafter cited as *Mass. Colony Records*.
²*Ibid.*

³The pedigree of the militia in America is contained in the history of the English militia from the time of the Anglo-Saxon fyrd through the Norman Conquest up to the Interregnum. *Encyclopedia Britannica*, "County," VI, 597; "Lieutenant," XIV, 42; "Militia," XV, 483-487. J. W. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, I, 12, 123, 194; II, 39, 294-295, 305, 307, 530; IV, 639-641, 888; V, 201, 229, 230, 239; VI, 38, 40, 180-183; VII, 34-35, 422-423. Of these references the article in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* on the "Militia" presents the most concise picture of pre-colonial militia history.

⁴*Mass. Colony Records* I, 85.

⁵*Mass. Colony Record*, I, 85.

⁶*Ibid.*, II, 119.

⁷*The Charters and General Laws of the Colony and Province of Massachusetts Bay*, p. 157. Hereafter cited as *Colony Records of Mass.* This collection is a codification of the *Mass. Colony Records*.

⁸Albert B. Hart (ed.), *Commonwealth History of*

quarters, the long marches through the snow provided the militia with some of its most spectacular victories.

Cultural differences lay between the two peoples. The Calvinistic convictions of the settlers caused them to view the Indians as heathens, even demons, if some of the Puritan divines were to be believed. The principles of common law so prized by the English mind made little impression on the tribes, and were regarded with bitter hostility when translated into hangings for murder. The Puritan attempts to enforce Indian allegiance to the English sovereign also met with scant enthusiasm. The unmilitary manner of the colonials caused the Indian, raised according to a warrior code, to regard the white people with little respect. And the ever expanding line of villages built by the new people menaced the Indian's land.

In view of their differences with the natives, the planters adopted the mode of military organization most proximate to their experience and resources. This was the company or trained band centered in the town. The company, usually bearing the town's name, was commanded by a captain who was assisted by a lieutenant, an ensign, three sergeants and three corporals. At first a company at full strength had sixty-four men,⁹ but later the figure was raised.¹⁰ The privates in a company were divided into two groups in which two-thirds bore muskets, and the rest carried pikes.¹¹

It was of importance to these privates that

their company be maintained at full strength. Only when he company was fully manned could the soldiers choose their commissioned officers. Otherwise the sergeant-major, the commander of the regiment, supervised the company, and company personnel could choose only their sergeants and corporals.¹²

For the older settlements at least, the matter of holding lists at full strength was no problem, since as early as 1635 the division of a company was felt to be necessary at Watertown and Charlestown.¹³ Later the General Court decreed that the company should be divided every time there were enough men to form a group of one hundred.¹⁴

Naturally this division of units raised disputes as to priority when several companies met at a regimental drill. In Boston the General Court appointed senior officers,¹⁵ but later it resorted to the unsatisfactory expedient of allowing priority in command to rotate.¹⁶ A more satisfactory solution to the problem was found in determining precedence according to priority of the commander's commission.¹⁷

But fast blossoming trained bands were only one side of the coin. In the newly established villages on the frontier the opposite was true. It was necessary to combine the company at Rowley Village with Rowley, and Piscataqua with Kittery, in order to attain sufficient unit strength.¹⁸

Like any military institution the company needed money to operate. The common way to finance military needs at the town level was by fines. The coin collected by the company clerk went for a variety of items which included anything from wood for the guard to powder for the poor.¹⁹ In addition, rum

Massachusetts Colony, Province and State, I, 533; II, 74-75. Hereafter cited as A. B. Hart, *Commonwealth History*. Hart gives an excellent sketch of frontier conditions, and the type of people defending the more advanced regions. See also *Mass Colony Records*, III, 310; V, 48, 51, 79.

⁹*Mass. Colony Records*, III, 267; *Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 158; Great Britain, Public Record Office, *Calendar State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies*, 1677-1680, 138. Hereafter cited as *Cal. State Papers*.

¹⁰*Mass. Colony Records*, III, 268; V, 16.

¹¹*Ibid.*, I, 328; II, 119.

¹²*Ibid.*, III, 267-268.

¹³*Ibid.*, I, 160.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, III, 268; V, 16.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, III, 285.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, IV, Pt. I, 246.

¹⁷*Mass. Colony Records*, III, 284-285.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, II, 42; IV, Pt. II, 554; V, 16.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, II, 119.

and tobacco appeared along with the other staples needed to operate a frictionless war machine.²⁰

Though the musketeers constituted a majority of each company, the pikemen, numbering about one-third of company strength,²¹ and occupying position on the flank,²² were the more colorful. The General Court saw the pikeman gallantly clad in corselet, head piece, sword and knapsack, but since corselets and helmets were rare, a more practical quilt or bluff coat came to be recognized.²³

Service as a pikeman was very popular in the militia. This fact can be accounted for in part by the simplified manual of arms for the pike. There were only eleven operations required of the pikeman at drill while the musketeer was required to know fifty-six different motions.²⁴ But an even more cogent reason for the thrifty Puritan to appreciate the pikeman's art was the fact that it was inexpensive when compared to the cost of providing and maintaining a musket. Furthermore, the father of a large family was responsible for arming his sons till they were twenty-one.²⁵ For a really honest and soul-searching analysis of the wish to bear the pike one must lend ear to John Dunton.

I thought a pike was best for a young soldier, and so I carried a pike, and between you and I reader, there was another reason for it too, and that was, I knew not how to shoot off a musket. But 'twas the first time I ever was in arms; which tho' I tell thee, Reader, I had no need to tell my fellow soldiers, for they knew it well enough by my awkward handling of them.²⁶

The General Court did what it could to encourage service as a pikeman,²⁷ but with the evolution of warfare into a shooting affair even the pikemen were required to carry guns and ammunition.²⁸ Within a year after the outbreak of King Philips War the pikeman disappeared from the militia scene.²⁹

In contrast to the disappearing pikeman the horse company, because of its capacity for rapid movement, developed into one of the most effective fighting organizations in the militia. The horse company developed out of horse units which operated as scouts with the foot companies.³⁰ At first the horse units were limited to thirty men,³¹ but later the number was increased to seventy.³² Often the cavalry units were organized by officers who wished to continue their activities while their regiments were not due for drill.³³

The troopers were under the command of the sergeant-majors and the general of the militia.³⁴ However, a company having forty horsemen could nominate its officers,³⁵ who were then subject to the approval of the County Court.³⁶ Later on, its own approval of cavalry personnel was required by the General Court, which was not bashful about using its power to prevent those not free men and those not taking the oath of fidelity from serving in the horse units.³⁷

To be a member of the cavalry several qualifications had to be met. First, a man or his parents must own a £100 estate.³⁸ Only the fluency of his command officer could dispense a man from this law.³⁹ The rider pro-

²⁰*Ibid.*, V, 73.

²¹*Cal. State Papers*, 1677-1680, 138.

²²Ebenezer W. Peirce, *Indian History, Biography, and Genealogy Pertaining to the Good Sachem Massasoit of the Wampanoag Tribe and His Descendants*, p. 76. Hereafter cited as E. W. Peirce, *Indian History*.

²³*Mass. Colony Records*, IV, Pt. II, 319; *Records of Mass.*, pp. 167-168. Corselet—A Small cuirass, or armor to cover and protect the body.

²⁴E. W. Peirce, *Indian History*, pp. 77-80.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 76.

²⁶*Letters Written From New England A. D. 1681 by John Dunton*, p. 140. Hereafter cited as *Dunton Correspondence*.

²⁷*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 43.

²⁸*Ibid.*, V, 47.

²⁹*Cal. State Papers*, 1675-1676, 465.

³⁰*Mass. Colony Records*, IV, Pt. I, 379.

³¹*Ibid.*, III, 265.

³²*Ibid.*, III, 398.

³³*Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, 2nd Ser., VII, 56. Hereafter cite as *Coll. MHS*.

³⁴*Mass. Colony Records*, III, 344.

³⁵*Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 164.

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 158.

³⁷*Mass. Colony Records*, III, 264.

³⁸*Ibid.*, IV, Pt. II, 97.

³⁹*Ibid.*, V, 438.

vided horse, saddle, bridle, holster, pistol or carbine, and sword; and the rider was to be fined 10s when he failed to supply himself with any one of these items.⁴⁰ However, in practice the horseman was more recognizable in his buff coat with a pistol, hanger, and corslet.⁴¹ He was required to drill six days a year, and occasionally was ordered to garrison duty.⁴²

There were soem advantages to serving in the cavalry. The horseman could not be drafted,⁴³ nor was he subject to head-rates on houses.⁴⁴ He did not have to pay for ferry service,⁴⁵ and for a time he enjoyed free pasturing on the common lands.⁴⁶ The Court, in time, rescinded some of these privileges,⁴⁷ but while in force they helped to build up the colony's cavalry.

After the horse units had been built up in the various counties it became popular for the towns to organize their own cavalry. The frontier towns of Concord, Chelmsford, Billirrikey, Lancaster, and Groton were especially encouraged.⁴⁸ However, the most effective cavalry continued to come from the groups in Middlesex, Essex, and Suffolk, and the unattached Three County Troop.

The growth of the cavalry was rapid, but not without its hour of crisis. In the war with King Philip the General Court found the cavalry quite as useless as the pikeman and ordered a draft for most riders.⁴⁹ However, subsequent performances by cavalry forced the Court to reverse this hasty decision.⁵⁰

⁴⁰*Mass. Colony Records*, III, 265; *Colony Records of Mass.*, pp. 164-165. Carbine—A short musket used more particularly by cavalry.

⁴¹*Cal. State Papers*, 1675-1676, 221. Hanger—The girdle or belt from which the sword was suspended at the side.

⁴²*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 75.

⁴³*Ibid.*, V, 70-71.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, V, 49.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, IV, Pt. I, 323.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, III, 398.

⁴⁷*Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 164.

⁴⁸*Mass. Colony Records*, III, 419; IV, Pt. II, 439; V, 254, 409-410.

⁴⁹*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 47.

Both trained bands and horse troops combined in a geographical unit called a regiment under the command of a sergeant-major. The regiment corresponded to the county in its area of jurisdiction. The men in a regiment could not be ordered out of the county,⁵¹ except in time of war.⁵²

Within the regiment, the sergeant-major and his chief company officers determined policy, but command decisions, such as orders for mobilization, were made by the General Court.⁵³ The Court also determined quotas of men in the counties in time of stress.⁵⁴

In peace time the regiments were supposed to meet once in three years for drill, and for services received the county was to pay the sergeant-major £20.⁵⁵ Later a schedule was definitely fixed for meetings from 1649 to 1641,⁵⁶ and another schedule was established for the period 1671 to 1676 when new counties were added to the colony.⁵⁷

Requests from the county to drop training were answered by the Court with explicit instructions to drill.⁵⁸ Still some of the counties managed to avoid the meetings in one way or another. Sometimes the period set aside for regimental drills was devoted to some other activity.⁵⁹

By 1680 even the regiments had grown to the point where a division was necessary. In Essex nine towns with horse units combined to form one regiment, and the remaining eight towns formed another. A similar division took place in Middlesex County.⁶⁰

As in any organization, the efficient functioning of the militia depended on the officers. From the sergeant-major-general, the chain

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, V, 70-71.

⁵¹*Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 157.

⁵²*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 70.

⁵³*Ibid.*, V, 53.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, V, 85.

⁵⁵*Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 158.

⁵⁶*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 256.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, IV, Pt. II, 486.

⁵⁸*Mass. Colony Records*, IV, Pt. II, 73.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, IV, Pt. II, 276, 333.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, V, 295.

of command rattled down through the echelons of sergeant-majors in the regiments to captains, lieutenants, ensigns, sergeants and corporals in the company. The horse unit also sported a cornet and a quartermaster, while regiments sometimes carried surgeons, commissary officers, and chaplains.

All the commissioned officers were nominated by their men and approved by their representatives in the County⁶¹ and General Courts. Those having the power to nominate included freemen and persons taking the oath of residents. Later this group was expanded to include householders and those taking the oath of fidelity. But this constituted not even a majority of the militiamen, for in 1672, of the 15,000 militiamen, only 6,000 could vote.⁶²

In the early days the regiments elected their commanding officers, and the town deputies presented them to the General Court. Towns nominated two or three men for the office of captain and lieutenant, and the Provincial Council then settled on one of them.⁶³ But in 1645 a sergeant-major was selected by votes which were sealed and delivered to the county seat. Here the votes were counted before the deputies and the winner was presented to the general for installation.⁶⁴

From 1641 to 1664 the General Court allowed the County Court to approve company nominees,⁶⁵ but after this date the General Court exercised directly its power to "nominate, choose and appoint" all commissioned officers except the general and admiral. And this passing of elected militia officers was felt in all ranks, for now the non-commissioned officers were appointed by the company com-

manders.⁶⁶ However, this situation was somewhat altered when the committee of militia sat as a recommending body when the need for officers arose.⁶⁷

Once elected or approved the protocol faced by the prospective officer was somewhat complex. To obtain for the officer a commission from the General Court, a freeman obtained a certificate of nomination from the county recorder. This was presented to the secretary of the General Court who drew up a commission. Then the eldest sergeant of the company involved delivered the commission to the governor for his seal. This accomplished, the sergeant then delivered the sealed document to the general, who gave it to the appropriate sergeant-major, who in turn gave it to the waiting winner.⁶⁸

Though the clergyman Edward Johnson claimed that the Massachusetts colonial was one who labored to avoid high titles,⁶⁹ a spectacular exception to this statement was the title of the highest officer in the militia, the sergeant-major-general. This elective position⁷⁰ was described by another contemporary, Edward Randolph, as being one of good profit and no danger because the general remained at home and shared the spoils while younger men commanded in the field.⁷¹ The office carried extensive powers. Among other things, the general could impress matériel of war. With the Council of War at Boston he could replace slain officers, and make rules for the death penalty. In war he had command of all forces in the field,⁷² and in peacetime he could call out his own regiment once a year without the Court's

⁶⁶*Mass. Colony Records*, IV, Pt. II, 368; *Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 168. *Cal. State Papers*, 1677-1680, 138.

⁶⁷*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 30.

⁶⁸*Mass. Colony Records*, III, 285-286.

⁶⁹*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., VII, 53.

⁷⁰*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 49.

⁷¹*Cal. State Papers*, 1675-1676, 465.

⁷²*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 42, 76-78.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, II, 222; *Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 168.

⁶²*Cal. State Papers*, 1669-1674, 332.

⁶³*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 187.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, II, 117; *Colony Records of Mass.*, pp. 157-158.

⁶⁵A. B. Hart, *Commonwealth History*, I, 116.

approval.⁷³ He also had the privilege of training his family,⁷⁴ which meant they were exempt from drill.

The other general officer rank in the militia was developed by gradual steps. In 1634 the Court provided for two men to check on existing supplies.⁷⁵ Two years later one of these men, John Samford, was appointed surveyor of arms.⁷⁶ In 1641, one John Johnson acted in the same capacity, and a year later was officially dubbed General Surveyor of Arms.⁷⁷ His principal duty was to account for arms and ammunition,⁷⁸ and he also could buy and sell arms.⁷⁹

The interests of the sergeant-major were more localized. At regimental drills he was cared for by £ 20 from the commonwealth treasury,⁸⁰ but later this entertainment bill was passed back to the county.⁸¹ His principal duty was to see to company drills and attend to matters of delinquency.⁸² In time of attack he was to attend to the relief of a distressed town,⁸³ and could impress goods.⁸⁴

The captain was the top commander in a town. Here, he looked after arms, and saw to it that people carried guns when they attended church.⁸⁵ At times the captain was paid by the General Court, but often his pay came from company fines.⁸⁶

In some cases it was not the captain, but the sergeant who commanded the town militia.⁸⁷ The sergeants were usually appointed to their positions,⁸⁸ though occasionally

the commissioned officers allowed the men to choose their sergeants.⁸⁹ Sometimes a sergeant would jump to the rank of lieutenant.⁹⁰

To collect money for the trained band the Court saw the need for a "discreet able man." Its understanding of the word discreet was made somewhat clearer by the 40s fine which accompanied a refusal to accept the elective honor of being company clerk. The office was not one which offered much promise of forming lasting friendships. It was the clerk who called roll at drill, and noted defects. It was the clerk who seized property in payment for overdue fines. And it was the clerk who added to the fine his traveling expenses for those who would flee his just assessments.⁹¹ But all was not gloom in a clerk's life, for he was permitted to keep for himself one-fourth of all fines collected.⁹² And on purchases made to equip those delinquent in providing themselves with knapsacks the clerk could retain any portion of the fine left over after buying the needed equipment.⁹³

Though not military officers, the selectmen held the crucial task of assessing taxes for the purpose of providing the companies with artillery,⁹⁴ powder, match and shot. To be indolent about their duty cost these civil officers £ 5 per missing item.⁹⁵

To examine the militia's officer personnel without mentioning their schooling would be to do an injustice to their best traditions. The organization for schooling officers most en-crustured with tradition was the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company. This honorary group was best known for the sermons presented to it by outstanding Puritan clergymen on "Anniversary Day." The ancient and honorable group had some difficulty ob-

⁷³*Ibid.*, III, 236.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, II, 222.

⁷⁵*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 120.

⁷⁶*Ibid.*, I, 183.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, II, 26.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, III, 398; *Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 164.

⁷⁹*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 31, 124, 222.

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, II, 256.

⁸¹*Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 168.

⁸²*Ibid.*, p. 158; *Mass. Colony Records*, II, 118.

⁸³*Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 162.

⁸⁴*Mass. Colony Records*, IV, Pt. II, 28.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, II, 38, 223.

⁸⁶*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 99, 138, 160.

⁸⁷E. W. Peirce, *Indian History*, p. 74.

⁸⁸*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 120; IV, Pt. 1, 322.

⁸⁹E. W. Peirce, *Indian History*, p. 118.

⁹⁰*Mass. Colony Records*, IV, Pt. II, 575-576; V, 75.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, III, 398.

⁹²*Ibid.*, II, 118-119; *Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 160.

⁹³*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 122.

⁹⁴*Colony Records of Mass.*, pp. 162-163.

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 164.

taining a character in 1638 because some of its proposed members, such as John Underhill, were suspected of heretical religious beliefs. There was also the fear that a military clique might seize control of the colony.

Aside from instructional and social activities of the Artillery Company the training of officers placed them in one of two groups, American trained or European. John Mason had served under Sir Thomas Fairfax in the Netherlands, and under Cromwell.⁹⁶ Lion Gardiner, an engineer, was also a Fairfax graduate, and had served the Prince of Orange.⁹⁷ Major Robert Sedgwick had been a member of the London Military Gardens, but he also had fifteen years experience in New England operations.⁹⁸ Outstanding American trained officers included Edward Gibbons,⁹⁹ Josiah Winslow and William Bradford II.

Often the duties of these militia officers were of a diplomatic nature rather than strictly military. The range of activities varied from petty meddling in local Indian affairs¹⁰⁰ to bargaining for the release of white captives.¹⁰¹ Visiting Indian dignitaries were sometimes dispatched from Boston with a noisy salute from militia musketeers,¹⁰² and in pressing negotiations one officer was reputed to have seized a haggling chief by the locks and threatened him with a pistol as a means of pressing an argument.¹⁰³ Militia diplomacy was successful as long as it had force behind it, and troops were sent to keep

the Indians quiet.¹⁰⁴ But in time, over-familiarity with the Indians finally broke down this respect based on fear.¹⁰⁵

Nor was the diplomacy of Massachusetts officers limited strictly to Indian affairs. Intercolonial relations were handled by militia officers as in mutual aid discussions between Plymouth and Massachusetts, ammunition deliveries to Connecticut,¹⁰⁶ and the recommendations of Massachusetts officers to the New England Confederation.¹⁰⁷

The well-being of the militia depended primarily on the corps of officers; but these military leaders had three jealous masters. Within the colony, two sources of authority were discernible. The first was the General Court with its subordinate commissions, councils, and committees operating on a colony wide basis, and the committees of militia which functioned in the towns. A second important group which had limited authority to call on the Massachusetts militia was the Inter-Colonial New England Confederation. And the third group consisted of the representatives of the Crown with their directives from England.

The principal master of the militia, the General Court, seemed never to tire of issuing statements of supremacy. And those statements were given concrete form as regards new appointments,¹⁰⁸ determination of duties,¹⁰⁹ and orders for supplies.¹¹⁰ In some respects this was like giving orders to itself, for approximately one-third of all administrative officers and legislators held commissions. In spite of continuous attempts to legislate the details necessary to operate a militia the General Court sometimes left actual administration of certain aspects of the militia

⁹⁶*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., VIII, 124.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, 3rd Ser., III, 132. 136-137.

⁹⁸*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., VII, 54.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 24.

¹⁰¹Edward Randolph: *Including His Letters and Official Papers From the New England, Middle and Southern Colonies in America, with other Documents Relating Chiefly to the Vacating of the Royal Charter of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay*, VI, 279. Hereafter cited as the Randolph Correspondence.

¹⁰²*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., V, 253-254.

¹⁰³*Ibid.*, 464-465.

¹⁰⁴*Cal. State Papers*, 1675-1676, 318.

¹⁰⁵*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., V, 465.

¹⁰⁶*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 160.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, II, 268.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, II, 124; V, 74.

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, I, 117.

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*, V, 69.

to commissions, councils and committees.

As early as 1634 the General Court granted authority to the governor and three other men to manage any war which might befall the colony.¹¹¹ In other circumstances, and with a slightly larger membership, the men in this group were referred to as the commissioners for military affairs,¹¹² the committee on military affairs,¹¹³ and finally the commissioners for martial discipline.¹¹⁴ It is likely that the latter of these titles is the most accurate for the men were commissioned for a definite period of time, usually till the meeting of the next General Court, and they were required to take an oath before they could execute their commissions.¹¹⁵

This commission continued to manage militia affairs until 1636.¹¹⁶ At that time it was committed to the Provincial Council, the upper house of the General Court.¹¹⁷ Now for a short time the Provincial Council was in charge of militia affairs,¹¹⁸ but it was not long before military matters were again in the hands of a small group of three men referred to simply as the Council.¹¹⁹

The close of the Pequot War marked the end of the General Court's experiments with commissions. In 1643 an advisory group of six men, mostly militia captains, was appointed to advise the General Court on preparations for war.¹²⁰ That year, while reaffirming its authority to command military forces, the General Court mentioned that a council should be set up to act in emergencies.¹²¹ The General Court also mentioned the desirability of yearly meetings by the governor, council, lieutenants of shires, and sergeant-

majors for planning a system of defense.¹²² In a more definite vein was the General Court's pronouncement in 1645 that in emergencies an assembly of assistants, regardless of number, could call out troops and seize supplies.¹²³

After this date the General Court kept the power of regulating the militia to itself. But in 1661 it did grant extensive powers to the officers in the field who composed a battle-field Council of War.¹²⁴ Two years later a special committee was set up to codify militia law,¹²⁵ and in 1676 a committee was established to hear petitions of wounded soldiers.¹²⁶

If the upper levels of military government tended to be unstable and confused this situation was balanced somewhat by the genuine effectiveness of the operation of the committees of militia in the towns. Here any three of the own's civil magistrates and the chief militia officers had authority to deal with a variety of problems.¹²⁷ Committees of soldiers and civilians could order the militia companies into action during an emergency until some higher authority intervened.¹²⁸ They executed the Court's warrants for drafts,¹²⁹ and discharges.¹³⁰ Financially they could assess estates in time of war.¹³¹ They also made recommendations to the General Court for new officers.¹³²

Another jealous but less successful contender for militia obedience during the seventeenth century was the New England Confederation. As an advisory body the confederation recommended storing of arms

¹¹¹*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 135.

¹¹²*Ibid.*, I, 129.

¹¹³*Ibid.*, I, 138.

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*, I, 143.

¹¹⁵*Ibid.*, I, 143, 146-147.

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*, I, 161, 165, 168.

¹¹⁷*Ibid.*, I, 183, 192.

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*, I, 187, 192.

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, I, 192, 197.

¹²⁰*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 39.

¹²¹*Ibid.*, II, 42.

¹²²*Ibid.*, II, 43.

¹²³*Ibid.*, II, 125.

¹²⁴*Ibid.*, IV, Pt. II, 28.

¹²⁵*Ibid.*, IV, Pt. II, 74.

¹²⁶*Ibid.*, V, 80.

¹²⁷*Mass. Colony Records*, III, 268-269; IV, Pt. II, 120; *Colony Records of Mass.*, pp. 161-163.

¹²⁸*Mass. Colony Records*, III, 320.

¹²⁹*Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 162.

¹³⁰*Mass. Colony Records*, III, 359.

¹³¹*Ibid.*, V, 48-49.

¹³²*Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 170.

both by individuals and by towns.¹³³ As a command-giving body it claimed authority to declare war.¹³⁴ It dealt with repair and sale of arms, endeavoring to control these activities by demanding that the various legislature recall the licenses of those who dealt in arms with the Indians.¹³⁵ It also picked sides among the Indians in an effort to prevent inter-tribal outbreaks.¹³⁶

But the military relations between Massachusetts and the Confederation were at best only politely frigid. The differences between the two grew out of Confederation demands from 1645 to 1650 for troops from Massachusetts to fight the Narragansetts.¹³⁷ The matter came to a head in 1653 when Massachusetts challenged the right of the Confederation to wage offensive war on the basis of the articles of confederation.¹³⁸ In this particular case the Bay Colony refused to act,¹³⁹ but subsequently, in 1675, when Massachusetts felt the Narragansett wrath, the proud colony struck a more humble pose as militiamen from Essex, Norfolk, Suffolk, and Middlesex¹⁴⁰ scurried to a rendezvous at Rehoboth at the command of the Confederation.¹⁴¹ Massachusetts also accepted Josiah Winslow of Plymouth as commander of all forces.¹⁴² But the commission issued to Winslow usurped practically all the powers which Massachusetts lawyers had been blustering about for years.¹⁴³

The third, and to the colonials perhaps

the most ominous contender for military control was mother England. That the home country was at times quite conscious of the military events in America is evident in the Lord Protector's order from Whitehall in 1655 directed to John Leveret, the occupation commander at newly conquered St. Johns, to write reports to England on the condition of the fort so that new instructions could be sent to him by Cromwell's government.¹⁴⁴ Later, after the return of Charles II to the throne, there were complaints that Leveret was subjugating the eastern parts of New England without any power from England.¹⁴⁵ And in 1664, in secret instructions to Crown Commissioners the King's choice for major-general of militia was indicated as being a Colonel Cartwright.¹⁴⁶

But along with this undercurrent of contention there was a veneer of flattery which in most cases involved sentiments of loyalty. His Majesty was pleased by New England military supplies sent to Barbados.¹⁴⁷ Nor were the colonials incapable of honeyed words. In 1677, Josiah Winslow, after writing an extremely obsequious letter to the king, accompanied the message with the gangling war trophies taken from the dead King Philip by Benjamin Church.¹⁴⁸

However, during the period of difficulties with the Dutch in 1673 Sir John Knight wanted commanders sent to America to raise colonial armies in Massachusetts.¹⁴⁹ And while the colonials were not happy to hear of English commanders, they were ready to urge aid from England at all times.¹⁵⁰ The hand of foreign advisors was felt more heavily in Massachusetts with the arrival of Edward Randolph, vitriolic agent for the Crown.

¹³³David Pulsifer (ed.), *Records of the Colony of New Plymouth in New England. Acts of the Commissioners of the United Colonies of New England*, IX, 12. Hereafter cited as *Ply. Colony Records*.

¹³⁴*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., VI, 473; *Ply. Colony Records*, IX, 22.

¹³⁵*Ibid.*, IX, 105.

¹³⁶*Ply. Colony Records*, IX, 12, 45.

¹³⁷*Ibid.*, IX, 168; *Mass Colony Records*, III, 39.

¹³⁸*Ibid.*, III, 311; *Ply. Colony Records*, V, 74-76.

¹³⁹*Ibid.*, X, 101.

¹⁴⁰*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 73.

¹⁴¹*Ply. Colony Records*, X, 357-358.

¹⁴²*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 69.

¹⁴³*Coll. MHS*, 3rd Ser., I, 66-68.

¹⁴⁴*Coll. MHS*, 3rd Ser., VII, 122.

¹⁴⁵*Cal. State Papers*, 1661-1668, 18.

¹⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 1661-1668, 200-201.

¹⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 1669-1674, 20.

¹⁴⁸*Ibid.*, 1677-1680, 109.

¹⁴⁹*Ibid.*, 1669-1674, 530.

¹⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 1675-1676, 319.

Randolph recommended that Josiah Winslow be placed in command of the Plantation's militia in 1679, and that a board consisting of Randolph nominees be set up to administer the militia and issue commissions.¹⁵¹ Later he recommended that the magistrates temporarily fulfill this office.¹⁵²

Randolph's recommendations commenced to be realities in 1685 when Joseph Dudley received his commission from James II to appoint officers and take charge of defense.¹⁵³ Sir Edmund Andros' commission gave him the additional powers of moving troops out of the colony, drafting needed personnel, and execution of martial law. This commission also had an unpleasant reference to the apprehension of "Rebells both at land and sea."¹⁵⁴ And in 1691 William Phips was pompously styled by William and Mary as "Our Lieutenant and Commander in Chief of the Militia."¹⁵⁵ Through the charter of this same year the power to appoint officers, to train and govern the militia, and to defend the colony passed from the General Court to the King's governor. However, to send troops out of the province the governor had to have Assembly approval,¹⁵⁶ and it was still the legislature who provided funds for military purposes.

As in any military institution the Massachusetts militia faced the problem of procuring men and supplies, and paying for them. The volunteer method, at one time or another, was tried in Massachusetts, but was a failure financially, and from a disciplinary point of view.¹⁵⁷ The General Court then

turned to the draft as a means of obtaining militia personnel.

Draftees generally included the men on the company lists.¹⁵⁸ But even more eligible were unemployed single males,¹⁵⁹ transients,¹⁶⁰ and smiths.¹⁶¹ In times of trouble all persons were likely candidates for duty in work gangs repairing forts.¹⁶² However, except in emergencies, the draft was a local affair, and men could not be ordered beyond the borders of the colony.¹⁶³

Nor was the art of draft dodging entirely unknown to the Massachusetts colonial. During King Philips war £ 4 and £ 6 fines were set for the evasive,¹⁶⁴ and to the town constables fell the delicate task of collecting the fines.¹⁶⁵ Yet it was not entirely impossible to defy the draft. In 1687 the men questioned the pay and the legality of the impressment with the result that few appeared for active duty.¹⁶⁶ But direct opposition was not the only means available to avoid the inconveniences of military duty. Draftees could hire substitutes,¹⁶⁷ and company drill could be avoided if a magistrate would accept 4 to 6d in lieu of marching time.¹⁶⁸ Special contributions such as firearms also tended to reduce a man's liability for service.¹⁶⁹

Edward Johnson was most optimistic in his estimate of the draft's all inclusive extent. Said he, "there are none exempt, unless it be a few timorous persons that are apt to plead infirmity, if the Church chuse them

¹⁵⁸*Mass. Colony Records*, IV, Pt. II, 575.

¹⁵⁹*Ibid.*, V, 144-145.

¹⁶⁰*Ibid.*, V, 123.

¹⁶¹*Ibid.*, II, 222.

¹⁶²*Ibid.*, V, 48.

¹⁶³W. H. Whitmore (ed.), *The Colonial Laws of Massachusetts Reprinted from the Edition of 1660, with the Supplements to 1672. Containing also, the Body of Liberties of 1641*, p. 35. Hereafter cited as *Colonial Laws*; A. B. Hart, *Commonwealth History*, I, 201.

¹⁶⁴*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 78-79.

¹⁶⁵*Ibid.*, V, 79.

¹⁶⁶*Cal. State Papers*, 1689-1692, 111, 120.

¹⁶⁷*Pub. CSM*, XXX, 683.

¹⁶⁸*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 212; III, 368.

¹⁶⁹*Ibid.*, V, 48.

¹⁵¹*Cal. State Papers*, 1677-1680, 332.

¹⁵²*Ibid.*, 1681-1685, 31-32.

¹⁵³*Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts*, II, 41-42. Hereafter cited as *Pub. CSM*.

¹⁵⁴*Pub. CSM*, II, 50.

¹⁵⁵*Ibid.*, II, 71-75.

¹⁵⁶*Ibid.*, II, 26-27; *Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 157.

¹⁵⁷*Cal. State Papers*, 1675-1676, 252; *Mass. Colony Records*, V, 71, 76; *Ply. Colony Records*, X, 360; E. W. Peirce, *Indian History*, p. 81.

not for the Deacons, or they cannot get to serve some Magistrate or Minister."¹⁷⁰ But this view seems slightly exaggerated when one examines the exemption laws.

Generally speaking, one who suffered a "natural or personal impediment" such as "want of yeares, greatness of age, defect of minde, fayling of sences, or impotence of Lymbes"¹⁷¹ was exempt from military duty. Of these plying the profession of politician the following were exempt: magistrates, deputies, officers of the General Court, treasurers, the public notary, one servant for each magistrate and elder, the Surveyor-general, and the sons and servants of the Major-general. Among the religious, the elders and deacons stood exempt. Educators free of obligation included the president, fellows, students and officers of Harvard College, ten servants for Harvard,¹⁷² and professed school teachers. Among professional people physicians and surgeons were exempt, and among the tradesmen the following were not obligated by militia laws: masters of ships over twenty tons, fishermen employed all year, constant herdsmen, ship carpenters, millers,¹⁷³ and ferry men.¹⁷⁴ Property owners of twenty acres and twenty cattle could get one man exempted. Also free from call were dwellers on remote farms, those having a ferry to cross, and those living more than four miles from town.¹⁷⁵

The military status of certain of the trades varied over the years. For example, there was an increasing tendency to make fishermen liable for service,¹⁷⁶ especially in view of the seasonal nature of their trade.¹⁷⁷

When specific exemptions were made they

most often came from the County Court. Old age was frequently cited as the reason for exemption of the individual, but family sickness and certification from a captain were acceptable reasons as well.¹⁷⁸

Next in importance to the problem of obtaining the men was the problem of securing supplies. The commissary officer was usually in charge of procurement.¹⁷⁹ Items always in demand included bread, beef, fish, pork, corn, strong water, rum, wine, nad beer. Non-edibles included shoes, shirts, canvas, and hardware.¹⁸⁰ Contracts for arms usually went to private individuals. At first, body armor of various sorts was in great demand, but in time the requirements of war shifted the emphasis to firearms and building supplies.¹⁸¹ After the colony had accumulated some degree of capital wealth the procurement problem was eased somewhat by the expedient of impressment of goods.¹⁸² Usually an effort was made to obtain goods on six month terms, but when this failed the materials were seized.¹⁸³

Not quite as arbitrary, and under more direct regulation from England was the procurement of gun powder. The home government would issue licenses of warrants to private traders through the Council of State whose enforcement agency was the Committee of Admiralty.¹⁸⁴ From the demands for security¹⁸⁵ required by England it could be assumed that the home government felt suspicious that the powder might not reach its destination, or even in doing so it might be misused.¹⁸⁶

¹⁷⁸*Pub. CSM*, XXIX, 111, 145, 147, 188, 409; XXX, 579, 676.

¹⁷⁹*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 74, 85.

¹⁸⁰*Ibid.*, II, 124; V, 74; *Cal. State Papers*, 1661-1668, 435.

¹⁸¹*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 31, 36; *Cal. State Papers*, 1661-1668, 189.

¹⁸²*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 124.

¹⁸³*Ibid.*, V, 123.

¹⁸⁴*Cal. State Papers*, 1574-1660, 335, 336, 341, 344, 348, 349, 377 400; 1689-1692, 273, 549.

¹⁸⁵*Ibid.*, 1574-1660, 336, 344, 348, 349.

¹⁸⁶*Ibid.*, 1574-1660, 335, 337.

¹⁷⁰*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., VII, 53.

¹⁷¹*Colonial Laws*, p. 135.

¹⁷²*Mass. Colony Records*, IV, Pt. I, 14; *Pub. CSM*, XV, 26, 27, 42, 43, 183, 184, 338; XXXI, 5.

¹⁷³*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 258.

¹⁷⁴*Ibid.*, V, 51.

¹⁷⁵*Ibid.*, I, 210; II, 221-222; *Mass. Colony Records*, 160.

¹⁷⁶*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 258; 119; III, 320.

¹⁷⁷*Ibid.*, IV, Pt. II, 552.

The establishment of powder mills at Neposet,¹⁸⁷ Dorchester, Milton,¹⁸⁸ and Rehoboth¹⁸⁹ reflected colonial efforts to ease the need for powder. Fines were one source of income for local powder purchases,¹⁹⁰ but a more dependable source of revenue was the powder tax levied against all foreign ships entering Boston harbor.¹⁹¹ This was most fitting for one of the principal strains on the powder supply was the common salute given to ships entering the harbors of Massachusetts.¹⁹²

Though fines bore a share of the financial burden,¹⁹³ it was necessary to find other means to pay for war activities. One obvious means was the establishment of rates¹⁹⁴ by the county governments.¹⁹⁵ This was usually done when the General Court needed money for specific campaigns.¹⁹⁶ It was possible to borrow money from merchants when land was offered as security.¹⁹⁷ Tariffs on rum, cider, and beer helped to fill a treasury depleted by wars,¹⁹⁸ and boycotts were used to conserve goods.¹⁹⁹ However, on the more cheerful side of the ledger in one instance a private contribution amounted to £ 1,000 for the purchase of artillery.²⁰⁰

To save money in time of war the economy-minded Court would indulge in price fixing to stabilize the charge for horses, billeting, and provisions.²⁰¹ Script was used to pay wages.²⁰² Massachusetts obtained money

from the New England Confederation,²⁰³ and there was a certain economy in requiring soldiers to provide their own arms.²⁰⁴

Even though the purchase of ammunitions, powder, guns, supplies, cannon, and food-stuffs all swelled the expense list, no item was so persistent in its demand for payment as the soldier for his wages. And from the very beginning the trend in wages was upward. The wage of the foot-soldier rose from a pound per month in 1637 to a pound and ten shillings in 1676. Sergeant's wages appreciated fourfold in value in sixteen years, while the pay of captains, curiously enough, dropped off by one-third. Perhaps this is explained by the fact that captains sometimes were paid by the campaign. The salary of a captain in a campaign could run anywhere from £ 5 to £ 170.²⁰⁵ But in spite of all the barrel scraping by the General Court an annual military budget for a peacetime year like 1665 amounted to £ 1,200.²⁰⁶

The arms of the militia, like so many aspects of colonial life, reflected the influence of European traditions. This was also true of the "fort psychology" cultivated by colonial military thinking. However, in either case both aspects of militia life were modified somewhat by American conditions which differed from the European scene.

In 1628 arms for one-hundred men included drums, ensigns, partizans for officers, halberds for sergeants, muskets, fowling pieces, rests, bandoleers, horn flasks, swords, belts, corselets, pikes, half-pikes, culverins, demi-culverins, and sakers.²⁰⁷ The muskets were

¹⁸⁷*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 73.

¹⁸⁸*Ibid.*, V, 51.

¹⁸⁹*Cal. State Papers*, 1675-1676, 443.

¹⁹⁰*Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 167.

¹⁹¹*Mass. Colony Records*, IV, Pt. II, 331.

¹⁹²*Ibid.*, II, 150; III, 286.

¹⁹³*Ibid.*, I, 212.

¹⁹⁴*Randolph Correspondence*, IV, 297.

¹⁹⁵*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 76; *Pub. CSM*, XXIX, 560.

¹⁹⁶*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 124.

¹⁹⁷*Ibid.*, V, 71.

¹⁹⁸*Coll. MHS*, 3rd Ser., VIII, 338-339.

¹⁹⁹*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 52.

²⁰⁰*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., xxix.

²⁰¹*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 79, 137.

²⁰²*Ibid.*, II, 124.

²⁰³*Ply. Colony Records*, X, 367.

²⁰⁴*Cal. State Papers*, 1675-1676, 221.

²⁰⁵*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 192-193; II, 137; III, 321; IV, Pt. I, 217; V, 147; *Cal. State Papers*, 1576-1660, 424; 1661-1668, 196; 1675-1676, 465.

²⁰⁶*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., VIII, 71-72.

²⁰⁷*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 26. Ensigns—flags; Partizans kind of pike; Halberd—an axe; Fowling pieces—shotguns; Rests—forked sticks to support guns; Bandoleers—ammunition belts; Culverins—sixteenth century cannon; Demi-culverins—heavy cannon; Sakers—small cannon.

of two types, bastard muskets and full muskets. The former had a spring lock and the latter a flint lock. The law required that the individual militiaman who had a musket must also provide himself with a pound of powder, twenty bullets, and two fathoms of match.²⁰⁸ Later, swords, bandoleers, and rests were added to this list.²⁰⁹ The pikemen were required to have a good pike well headed, a corselet, headpiece, sword, and knapsack.²¹⁰ In practice, the men actually were able to obtain only muskets, rests, swords, corselets, and bandoleers.²¹¹ Providing the poor with this elaborate equipment posed a problem, so a law was framed to permit the poor to present corn instead of arms at the inspections. The corn was then sold to provide money to arm the unfortunate, but failing in this the poor people were put to work by the constable till they earned the value of the arms.²¹²

The effectiveness of this heavy European equipment was questionable, and the passage of time marked the evolution of certain new types of arms. The early Massachusetts soldier was practically a walking fortress and had little to fear from the primitive weapons of the Indians if he had the strength to wear all his armor.²¹³ The Indians had difficulty in figuring where to strike the heavily armored soldier, but the soldier was no match for the Indians when it came to pursuit.²¹⁴ Gradually the use of armor was discontinued and the musket, bandoleer, powder, and shot became the popular weapons of colonial warfare.²¹⁵ But Captain John Mason could still see some value in body armor when he observed that one of his officers was

saved great bodily pain from an Indian arrow simply because he carried lumps of cheese in his rear pockets.²¹⁶

A good deal of militia fighting was done from fortified positions, and the colonials seemed to have a profound respect for forts. The settlers felt, for example, that two-hundred men could hold ten thousand at bay in a position such as Quebec.²¹⁷ Usually the committees of militia were in charge of fort building, and for this work they could use soldiers on training days.²¹⁸ And at times it was recommended that all country rates for a year be devoted to fortification of such strategic positions as Boston, Charlestown, and Salem.²¹⁹

Between Indian wars the operation of the militia in Massachusetts consisted mainly in drilling for the next conflict when it was possible to take time from business or husbandry.²²⁰ In 1631 enthusiasm for drill was sufficient for the law to require meetings once a week,²²¹ but before the year was out ardor had cooled to the point where the drill sessions had been reduced to once a month.²²² By 1637 drill was required eight days a year.²²³ In 1660 the period was cut to six days,²²⁴ and then ultimately to four days.²²⁵ Regimental drill was required once a year,²²⁶ but the time was deductible from the year's total requirement for practice. On occasion, however, there would be a sudden spurt of interest in drill. During King Philips War drill sessions were held twice a week.²²⁷

²¹⁶*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., VIII, 152.

²¹⁷*Cal. State Papers*, 1564-1660, 139.

²¹⁸*Mass. Colony Records*, IV, Pt. II, 332; V, 73.

²¹⁹*Mass. Colony Records*, IV, Pt. II, 510-511.

²²⁰*Ibid.*, I, 327.

²²¹*Ibid.*, I, 85; A. B. Hart, *Commonwealth History*, V, 570.

²²²*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 90, 102, 124.

²²³*Ibid.*, I, 210.

²²⁴*Ibid.*, IV, Pt. I, 420; *Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 159.

²²⁵*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 211-212; A. B. Hart, *Commonwealth History*, V, 570.

²²⁶*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 43, 118, 216.

²²⁷*Cal. State Papers*, 1675-1676, 221.

²⁰⁸*Ibid.*, I, 85.

²⁰⁹*Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 159.

²¹⁰*Ibid.*

²¹¹*Coll. MHS*, 3rd Ser., VI, 12.

²¹²*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 222; *Colony Records of Mass.*, pp. 159-160.

²¹³*Pub. CSM*, XII, 38.

²¹⁴*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., IV, 44; *Pub. CSM*, XII, 38.

²¹⁵*Ibid.*, XII, 39.

The scene of practice was usually at a place in or near the town. Sometimes the drills were held near the Indian wigwams.²²⁸ Regimental drills at Boston took place at Fox Hill²²⁹ or on the Common.²³⁰ The soldiers were called into close order and a prayer was recited.²³¹ Then the men might commence their practicing at marching, skirmishing, retiring, ambuskado, and forming in battalia,²³² under the direction of captains who "shewed themselves very skillful in divers sorts of skirmishes, and other military actions."²³³ Ordinarily this display of military pageantry was performed to the accompaniment of a drum.²³⁴

One of the most remarkable aspects about the militia drill was the fifty-six count manual of arms required by a book called Elton's Tactics or "The Compleat Body of Art Military."²³⁵ Crucial item number forty-three read "Give fire breast high." Though the magnificent variety of motions found in this manual may have served as an exhaustive means of discipline for soldiers at drill, it is difficult to understand how the militiaman managed to avoid the scalping knife of some reasonably competent Indian while he struggled to reach number forty-three.

Usually the drill was concluded about three o'clock with another prayer. After the prayer a meal was sometimes served for the soldiers, and to this dinner the clergy was invited.²³⁶ At other times, to the disgust of the clergymen, the soldiers would retire for a mug of rum. Nor was the holiday spirit lacking among the non-combatants on train-

ing day. By 1679 the celebrating was getting out of hand so the General Court required licenses of those selling liquor at the drill field. To enforce this law the constable needed his own force of men.²³⁷

Another curious social aspect about militia life was legal provision for training of children, Negroes, Scotsmen, and Indians.²³⁸ However, this law was reversed and Indians and Negroes were forbidden to train or be armed.²³⁹

In combat the tactics employed by the militiamen generally failed to follow any particular pattern. When under attack the men formed a single file and the musketeers fired on the enemy while the pikemen stood ready to prevent the enemy from breaking into the file. Those without a gun also kept busy gathering up the arrows shot by the Indians.²⁴⁰ In surprise attacks on Indian camps the soldiers would surround the wigwams and fire their first shot toward the floor of the shelter because they knew the Indians slept on the ground.²⁴¹ Though great guns and dogs were a terror to the Indians,²⁴² the colonials were not without their own fears as they sniped at brush full of imaginary Indians, thus wasting ammunition and giving away their own position.²⁴³ But the militia knew the art of ambush as well as the Indians,²⁴⁴ and the location of Indian positions was obtained through the use of Indian spies.²⁴⁵ Intelligence on enemy whereabouts was also sent to what was called a "flying army" but actually consisted of fast moving cavalry units.²⁴⁶

The most extensive intelligence system developed by the colony was the watch. In

²²⁸*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 90.

²²⁹*Coll. MHS*, 3rd Ser., I, xxiv.

²³⁰*Ibid.*, 1st Ser., III, 243.

²³¹*Dunton Correspondence*, p. 141.

²³²*Coll. MHS*, 3rd Ser., III, 50. Battalia—Order of battle; troops arranged in their proper brigades, regiments, and battalions.

²³³*Ibid.*, 2nd Ser., I, xxiv.

²³⁴*Pub. CSM*, XII, 39.

²³⁵E. W. Peirce, *Indian History*, p. 79.

²³⁶*Dunton Correspondence*, p. 141.

²³⁷*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 211.

²³⁸*Ibid.*, II, 99; III, 268.

²³⁹*Ibid.*, III, 397.

²⁴⁰*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., V, 252.

²⁴¹*Ibid.*, IV, 48.

²⁴²*Cal. State Papers*, 1675-1676, 253.

²⁴³*Cal. State Papers*, 1675-1676, 442.

²⁴⁴*Ibid.*

²⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 1675-1676, 351.

²⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 1689-1692, 263.

peace time the watch was a civil matter,²⁴⁷ but in time of emergency it became a military activity.²⁴⁸ Usually two men stood watch,²⁴⁹ a pikeman and a musketeer.²⁵⁰ The sentinels examined all persons who came within their watch or rounds, and had orders to fire on those who resisted investigation; but they were warned not to kill unnecessarily. If there was real danger they were to retire and give the alarm.²⁵¹

The system of alarms centered about a beacon at Boston which would signify a general alert.²⁵² Other methods of spreading a general alert were the discharge of guns or ordnance, the beating of drums,²⁵³ or the shout of a messenger "arm, arm."²⁵⁴ The messenger's shout or the shot of a musket was thought sufficient for local warnings.²⁵⁵ During those periods when military watches were maintained throughout the colony special groups of thirty men were held in readiness to go into action on a half-hour's notice.²⁵⁶

No particular system of medical treatment was maintained by the Massachusetts militia though physicians and surgeons accompanied regiments. Shelters were built for the wounded,²⁵⁷ and in the medicinal line sugar was recommended for the sick.²⁵⁸ However, the smell of an empty rum flask was recommended as a comfort for those who fainted along the way.²⁵⁹ Those who became seriously ill were sent home.²⁶⁰

Maintenance of discipline was based upon the punishment customary to the period.

The most likely place to incur a penalty was at drill or watch. Common offenses included disobedience, disorder, and contempt.²⁶¹ Other common offenses included delinquency in arms,²⁶² and firing guns after the watch was set, at drill without command, or without bullets.²⁶³ Most of these offenses were punished by fines of a few shillings,²⁶⁴ but during King Philips War many offenses were punished with great severity. For example, to resist, lift arms against, or strike an officer, to desert, engage in sedition or mutiny, or to indulge in rape, unnatural abuses, adultery, or murder meant death. Blasphemy was punished by boring the tongue with a red hot iron, but the punishment for fornication was left to the discretion of the officers.²⁶⁵ Other brutal punishments included whippings, running the gauntlet, the stocks, brandings, and wearing shackles.²⁶⁶ Of lesser severity were admonition before the company, discharge from the commissioned ranks, and jail.²⁶⁷ However, the soldier could take an officer to court if he thought he had a case.²⁶⁸

One aspect of the operating militia which cannot be overlooked is its phenomenal inefficiency. In the United Colonies troops were supposed to be under the command of officers of the colony within whose borders they were serving.²⁶⁹ Also, troops from member colonies could not be called until all aspects of the war were considered by the commissioners of the New England Confederation.²⁷⁰

²⁶¹*Ibid.*, II, 223; *Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 159, 166.

²⁶²*Ibid.*, pp. 169-170.

²⁶³*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 85, 98, 125.

²⁶⁴*Ibid.*, V, 212, 243.

²⁶⁵*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 49-50; *Cal. State Papers*, 1675-1676, 299-300.

²⁶⁶*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 85, 270; IV, Pt. II, 511; *Pub. CSM*, III, 56, 63.

²⁶⁷*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 165; II, 23; IV, Pt. II, 97.

²⁶⁸*Pub. CSM*, XXX, 1108-1109.

²⁶⁹*Ply. Colony Records*, I, 360; A. B. Hart, *Commonwealth History*, II, 74-75.

²⁷⁰*Ply. Colony Records*, IX, 27.

²⁴⁷*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 151, 224.

²⁴⁸*Ibid.*, II, 121-123.

²⁴⁹*Ibid.*, I, 120.

²⁵⁰*Ibid.*, II, 120.

²⁵¹*Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 163.

²⁵²*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 137.

²⁵³*Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 163.

²⁵⁴*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 242.

²⁵⁵*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 29, 223.

²⁵⁶*Ibid.*, II, 121-123.

²⁵⁷*Ibid.*, V, 75.

²⁵⁸*Ibid.*, II, 124.

²⁵⁹*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., VIII, 151-152.

²⁶⁰*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 93.

On the question of supply John Endicott spoke of the unfurnished state of the country,²⁷¹ and Edward Randolph used the same gloomy tone when he wrote of a possible French attack.²⁷² And on one occasion the second expedition against the Narragansetts in 1676 bogged down completely when Boston refused to send out supplies.²⁷³

On the frontier it was difficult to obtain officers,²⁷⁴ and even when present the officers had to do what they could by "persuasion and advice" because they had no authority.²⁷⁵ Also, the towns on the frontier were reluctant to help one another in times of distress.²⁷⁶

The officers were not always complimentary as regards the military talent of their charges. Lion Gardiner spoke of "twenty insufficient men,"²⁷⁷ and John Underhill mentioned "soldiers not accustomed to war," and "unexpert in the use of their arms."²⁷⁸ Men would go hunting while they were on duty,²⁷⁹ and casting away arms while in flight appeared common.²⁸⁰ And the insufficiency of training was never so evident as at the Black Point massacre where inexperienced troops attempted individual escapes when ambushed by Indians.²⁸¹ Nor was the blame all with the common soldier. William Phips, with profound hindsight, estimated that he would need one-thousand barrels of powder to carry a second assault against Quebec, after the French had repulsed his first seventy-barrel attack.²⁸²

The General Court was conscious of this

inefficiency and repeatedly sent orders to the sergeant-majors to tighten up the training.²⁸³ However, this protest by a legal body did little to influence the militiamen to change their ways. Still, in spite of its bungling and occasional heavy losses, the Machassetts militia won all the important wars undertaken during the colonial period.

The military mentality of the Massachusetts colonial can in great part be accounted for by his desire to survive the attacks of his enemies. And this aggressiveness was tempered by the annoyance engendered by the local war games. The delay and procrastination in falling out for drill lends constant testimony to this fact. But it was more than the crude requirements of physical and economic survival which shaped the colonial soldier into a passable fighting man. Part of the answer is to be found in the churches which served as a spiritual center for the growing villages.

At the time of the Puritan migration war was taken for granted like private property and the family.²⁸⁴ In fact, to deny war's legitimacy was heresy.²⁸⁵ According to Nathaniel Appleton there was no moral basis for a man contending that he was a conscientious objector, for war "is an Affair with the Prince and Councils of a Nation; and the Soldier is to presume that the Government have good Reasons to justify their proclaiming and engaging in a war."²⁸⁶ Only Cotton Mather sounded a sour note in holding that a man should bear suffering rather than serve in a conflict he knows to be unjust.

The General Court would justify fort repairs by holding that the strongholds should be ready for service "if God should

²⁷¹Coll. MHS, 4th Ser., VI, 150.

²⁷²Randolph Correspondence, VI, 300.

²⁷³Pub. CSM, XXVI, 257.

²⁷⁴Randolph Correspondence, VI, 281.

²⁷⁵Cal. State Papers, 1685-1688, 592.

²⁷⁶Ibid., 1685-1688, 591-592.

²⁷⁷Coll. MHS, 3rd Ser., III, 149.

²⁷⁸Ibid., 3rd Ser., VI, 3, 23.

²⁷⁹Ibid., 2nd Ser., V, 253.

²⁸⁰Ibid., 3rd Ser., III, 143-144; Randolph Correspondence, VI, 294.

²⁸¹Coll. MHS, 2nd Ser., VI, 634-635.

²⁸²Cal. State Papers, 1689-1692, 478.

²⁸³Colony Records of Mass., pp. 166-167.

²⁸⁴Pub. CSM, XXVIII, 68. These citations concerning religion from the *Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts* are taken from a very excellent article by Arthur H. Buffinton.

²⁸⁵Ibid., XXVIII, 71; Cal. State Papers, 1675-1676, 221.

²⁸⁶Pub. CSM, XXVIII, 79.

Call thereunto."²⁸⁷ And the New England Confederation, irked by lack of Massachusetts zeal for its expeditions, could piously barb its reluctant member with "We may comfortably Comit ourselves unto the Lord waighting upon Him in a posture of Defense and Reddiness for action as need shall Require hoping that the Lord will not suffer His people to loose by their tenderness of conscience in being slow to sheed blood."²⁸⁸ The sermons to the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company on "Anniversary Day" reflected the Puritan attitude on justification for war,²⁸⁹ and it was the first minister of Boston who donated a substantial sum of money to the colony for purchase of artillery.²⁹⁰

The principle in theology which gave the Puritan the basis for his thinking was the fact that whatever is, is so by the permission or the ordinance of God. The disorder of war was thought to be a natural consequence of sin, and like all other human ills, was the result of the fall of man.²⁹¹

One curious and egotistic twist in the Puritan interpretation of original sin was the assumption that they were another chosen people transplanted to a new land miraculously preserved and cleared of its inhabitants.²⁹² Edward Johnson stated the position with precise if wordy clarity when he said:

These souldiers of Christ Jesus, having made a fair retreat from their Native Country hither, and now being come to a convenient station, resolved to stand it out (the Lord Assisting) against all such as should come to rob them of their privileges, which the Lord Christ had purchased for them at a very high rate, and now out of the riches of his grace was minded to give them, yet would he have them follow him into this Wilderness for it. Although the chiefest work of these select bands of Christ, was to mind their spiritual warfare, yet they knew right well the temple was

surrounded with walls and bulworks, and the people of God in re-edifying the same, did prepare to resist their enemies with weapons of war, even while they continued building.²⁹³

While the chosen people prepared themselves to be "expert and fitt for such services as by the providence of God they shall be called unto,"²⁹⁴ they had the feeling that divine providence was on their side. When supplies failed to arrive in support of infantry during the Phips assault on Quebec the explanation was that God prevented the troops from advancing against hopeless odds by withholding the needed items.²⁹⁵ On the other hand, Samuel Myles called the Quebec disaster a punishment sent by the Almighty.²⁹⁶

From a purely natural point of view Cotton Mather could argue that "Men have their Lives, Liberties, Properties, which the very light of nature teaches them to maintain by stronger arms against all Forreign Injuries. Christianity never instructed men to lay down that Natural Principle of Self-Preservation."²⁹⁷ Samuel Nowell listed self-defense, recovery of property, punishment for injuries, and helping allies as causes for war.²⁹⁸ This type of thinking was particularly common to Catholic kings, and especially the King of France.²⁹⁹ Perhaps Edward Johnson was giving expression to this sentiment when he said:

Thus are these people with great diligence provided for these daies of war, hoping the day is at hand wherein the Lord will give Antichrist the double of all her doings . . . and now woe be to you, when the same God that directed the stone to the forehead of the Philistine, guides every bullet that is shot at you, it matters not for the whole rabble of Antichrist on your side, the God of Armies is for us a refuge high. Chela.³⁰⁰

²⁸⁷*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., VII, 52-53.

²⁸⁸*Mass. Colony Records*, IV, Pt. II, 27-28.

²⁸⁹*Cal. State Papers*, 1689-1692, 386.

²⁹⁰*Ibid.*, 1689-1692, 368.

²⁹¹*Pub. CSM*, XXVIII, 75.

²⁹²*Ibid.*, XXVIII, 76.

²⁹³*Ibid.*, XXVIII, 74-75.

³⁰⁰*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., VIII, 57-58.

²⁸⁷*Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 169.

²⁸⁸*Ply. Colony Records*, X, 57.

²⁸⁹*Pub. CSM*, XXVIII, 72.

²⁹⁰*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., I, xxix.

²⁹¹*Pub. CSM*, XXVIII, 73.

²⁹²*Pub. CSM*, XXVIII, 69-70.

Nor were moral considerations on the basis of natural law and scriptural theology the ultimate in the Puritan analysis of war. In weighing the factors of good and evil as regards war John Richardson write "War is an Ordinance appoynted by God for subduing and destroying the Churches Enemies upon Earth."³⁰¹ Cotton Mather also argued that God permits war to refine and purify His church,³⁰² and stated further that "there is no war for the most part, which has not some injustice on one side giving Rise unto it."³⁰³

Perhaps the ultimate in this self-confident religious attitude on war is an example of sermons which Edward Johnson claims were presented to militia troops. The "reverend Ministers" might speak as follows:

Fellow-Souldiers, Country-men, and Companions in this wilderness-worke, who are gathered together this day by the inevitable province of the Great Jehovah, not in a tumultuous manner hurried on by the floating fancy of every high hot headed braine, whose actions prove abortive, or if any fruit brought forth; it hath been rape, theft, murder, things inconsisting with natures light then much less with a Souldiers Valour; but you my deare hearts, purposely pickt out by the godly grave Fathers of this government that your prowess may carry on the work, where there Justice in her righteous cause is obstructed, you need not question your authority to execute those whom God, the righteous judge of all the world, hath condemned for blaspheming his sacred Majesty, and murdering his servants: every common Souldier among you is now installed a Magistrate.³⁰⁴

But the Puritan could bow his head as well as thunder his self-righteousness. On days of humiliation declared by the General Court the people would pray to God for a blessing on their military efforts. At such times men were "to humble or soules before God" in order to gain "a reconciliation with him, & his blessing on our forces."³⁰⁵ And the

commissioners of the New England Confederation would ask for prayers for "successe in our Indeavors for Repelling the Rage of the enemy."³⁰⁶ Apparently the prayers of the militia were answered. For although their dead were strewn along the New England trails the colonial Massachusetts militia on no occasion failed to achieve its ultimate objective.

Though it would not be correct to say that the militia was the most important single institution in the life of the early Massachusetts citizen, or that it was even as important as the Congregational Church, in view of available evidence it becomes quite apparent that the militia was a very deep rooted and organic part of colonial life in the Bay Colony. Since the need for organized military protection was genuine and immediate, the only remaining problem was to adopt the most convenient means. This was the militia system as the settlers had known it in England. Once established, the militia became important as an avenue to political and military prominence for the soldier-politician. Economically and financially the militia was annoying to most citizens who were burdened with the expense of providing themselves with arms. Socially, the militia provided a break in the otherwise grueling process of earning a living; and sometimes this break was gay and colorful. After drill a man could enjoy some rum with his fellow soldiers even though most of the ministers disapproved. But in the serious business of war the ministers could only nod their approval, for in Massachusetts the licitness of waging war was guaranteed by God as well as man. Delicately interwoven with other aspects of colonial life, the militia, as an institution, was extremely important in shaping the men who were to father the founders of a new nation.

³⁰¹Pub. CSM, XXVIII, 74.

³⁰²*ibid.*

³⁰³*ibid.*

³⁰⁴Coll. MHS, 2nd Ser., IV, 45-46.

³⁰⁵Mass. Colony Records, V, 69.

³⁰⁶Ply. Colony Records, X, 358.

WAR AS A CONTINUATION OF POLITICS

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THE THESIS that "war is the continuation of political intercourse with an admixture of other means" or, as alternately expressed, "war is an instrument of policy," is, of course, that expounded by Clausewitz. My assigned task is to discuss the meaning of this thesis, to review its application among major foreign powers, to explore the significance of this theory in American history, and finally to discuss its importance to the United States in the present-day world. All this I hope to accomplish within the next 35 minutes, so I beg your indulgence if, at times, I seem to oversimplify or to skim rather nonchalantly over vast and complex areas.

Clausewitz developed this theory in his major work *On War* which was published after his death from an incomplete manuscript in which only the first short chapter was completed to the author's satisfaction. As though anticipating his early death, Clausewitz wrote that in its unfinished form his work "may certainly be described as a hotchpotch of ideas, which, being exposed to ceaseless misunderstandings, will give rise to a multitude of hasty criticisms."¹ He was correct in predicting misunderstandings, though criticisms have been few.

His book *On War* is the most comprehen-

sive ever written on that subject. Being very much an intellectual, his work contains countless penetrating reflections and observations which require concentrated study and analysis to comprehend fully. One must also be alert to note whether Clausewitz's observations refer to tactics, to military strategy, or to national strategy and policy, as his opinions on one may not apply to the others. The book is also replete with attractive catchphrases and forceful expressions, which are frequently accompanied by less conspicuous but significant qualifications. All these characteristics make it possible, by judicious selection from among the wealth of material, to develop philosophies which can be attributed to the author but which do not reflect accurately his views. This has been done sometimes wittingly, sometimes unwittingly, and sometimes, as we shall see, with adverse effects on the destiny of nations. My remarks thus far have stressed the pitfalls which lie in the path of anyone who ventures to discuss Clausewitz. You must judge whether I become ensnared.

Clausewitz's life spanned the latter part of the reign of Frederick the Great and the period of Napoleon's campaigns. In these campaigns he served with both the Prussian and Russian armies. Believing strongly in the superiority of actual experience over book learning, he leaned heavily on the campaigns of Napoleon and next on the wars of Frederick in developing his theories. The differing nature of war in the times of these two leaders impressed him. In Frederick's era

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¹Quotations from Clausewitz used in this paper were taken from *On War*, The Modern Library, Random House, 1943.

war was conducted as a business of the government which regarded itself as the State. Armies were mercenary forces supported from the treasury. Both military forces and treasury belonged to the government and not to the people. Consequently, these forces had to be husbanded because of limited manpower and financial resources, and, therefore, the military effort which the government could exert had readily defined limits. Clausewitz remarked that in those days land armies resembled fleets, and warfare took on the nature of naval tactics—visualizing, I suppose, modest armies maneuvering through a sea of generally unconcerned humanity.

But with the French Revolution and the wars of Napoleon, war became an affair of the people. The participation of the people made available means and effort limited only by the energy and determination of nations. Of course, throughout the centuries there had been peoples organized for war—the Assyrians, the Spartans, the Persians, the Ottoman Turks, and the Mongol hordes of Genghis Khan and his successors, to mention some—but here were the modern civilized nations of the world turning to a “nation in arms” concept.

Clausewitz defined policy as “the representative of all the interests of the community.” Thus, war having become an affair of the people, it logically became intimately related to politics. The terms “policy” and “politics,” when used in this discussion, refer to foreign policy, though we must always consider the inextricable relationship of domestic politics to foreign policy. Of the relationship between war and policy Clausewitz concluded “war is nothing but the continuation of political intercourse with an admixture of other means.” His many reflections in support of this view may be summed up, generally in his own words, somewhat along the following lines.

“Over and above all means of intercourse between nations is policy. All the elements which enter into war, such as national power, alliances, and the characteristics of people and governments, are of a political nature. War is only another element of social existence, another means of intercourse between nations, comparable to trade. War is only caused through the political relations of nations, and these relations comprise the womb in which war is nurtured, in which its outlines lie hidden in a rudimentary state. War, therefore, can be nothing but the continuation of political intercourse with an admixture of other means. The phrase ‘with an admixture of other means’ is added to emphasize that political intercourse does not cease with the onset of war, but that the main lines along which the events of war proceed and to which they are bound are only the general features of policy. It cannot be conceived otherwise, for the cessation of diplomatic notes does not stop political relations between nations. War is merely another kind of writing in which battles take the place of notes. If wars were fought to the last breath out of pure mutual hatred, it might be conceivable that the political point of view would end completely when war begins. But, as wars are in reality only the manifestation of policy itself, the subordination of the political point of view to the military would be unreasonable, for policy has created the war and war is only its instrument. As war is an instrument of policy, it will take on its character; if policy is grand and powerful, so also will be war. If war is to correspond entirely with the intention of policy and policy is to accommodate itself to the means of war, the political and military direction should be centered in one person. But the military commander can demand that the tendencies and designs of policy shall not be incompatible with the means of war provided.”

Clausewitz defined war as an act of force to compel our adversary to do our will, the object of which is the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces. Possibly anticipating that the term “destruction” might be interpreted as physical annihilation, he insisted that the term be understood solely in the sense of disarming, or putting enemy forces in such a condition that they can no longer continue to fight. His views on the nature of war may be summed up thus:

“There is no artistic way of destroying the enemy’s armed forces without bloodshed. In war,

false ideas proceeding from kindness of heart are precisely the worst. He who uses force ruthlessly must gain an advantage if the adversary does not do the same. Therefore, each pushes the other to extremes to which the only limit is the strength of resistance on the other side. War in its theoretical conception is war as carried on by Napoleon—ruthlessly, without slacking for a moment until the enemy is laid low—absolute war. However, in reality the interplay of interests, circumstances, and human factors tend to make war fall short of its absolute form, making it an affair varying at times from war of extermination to a mere state of armed observation. But the theoretical conception of war must ever be kept in mind, and its standard approached where it can or where it must."

That the advance of civilization might change this, Clausewitz doubted, for he stated:

"The invention of gunpowder and advances continually being made in the development of firearms, in themselves show clearly enough that the demand for the destruction of the enemy, inherent in the theoretical conception of war, has been in no way actually weakened or diverted by the advance of civilization."

To which remarks, almost a century and a half later, we can only say "Amen."

Such, briefly, is the philosophy of Clausewitz concerning war and politics. To assess the significance of this philosophy I can do no better than to repeat the words of Major Stewart L. Murphy of the British Army who, in 1909, referring particularly to Germany, wrote:

"I would suggest that we should regard every foreign statesman, . . . as consciously or unconsciously a disciple of Clausewitz, that is to say, we should regard him as a man who, underneath everything else, underneath the most pacific assurances for the present, considers war an unalterable part of policy. He will regard war as part of the ordinary intercourse of nations, and occasional warlike struggles as inevitable as commercial struggles. He will consider war also as an instrument of policy, which he himself may have to use, and to be studied accordingly. He will consider it not as a thing merely for speeches, but for practical use in furthering or defending the interests of his State. He will regard war as the means by which some day his nation shall impose its will

upon another nation. He will be prepared to wait, to make every imaginable preparation, and finally to let loose war in its most absolute and ruthless character, war carried on with the utmost means, the utmost energy, and the utmost effort of a whole nation-in-arms, determined to achieve its political object and compel submission to its will by force.

"To talk to such a man of the 'evils of war' or of the 'burden of armaments'; or to propose to him 'disarmament' or 'reduction of armed forces,' and so forth, can only appear to him as the result of 'imperfect knowledge.' He will not say so but he will think so and act accordingly. To the partially instructed opponent of such a man one can only say, 'Let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall!'"

This was inspired prophesy on the eve of World War I. Its truth became increasingly evident in the decade preceding World War II, though the warning went unheeded. It is serious cause for reflection today.

The influence of Clausewitz's writings slowly infiltrated German military circles, becoming more pronounced during the period of his first eminent disciple, the elder Moltke, who directed the war in Austria in 1866 and with France in 1870. Their astonishing and rapid successes in these wars convinced the Germans that their interpretation of Clausewitz was sound. This interpretation proclaimed the preeminence of aggressive war, ruthlessly pursued, to secure national aims. Clausewitz continued to be the prophet throughout the chain of Moltke's successors—Schlieffen, Ludendorff, Hitler—each seeming to find in Clausewitz that which satisfied the historic Teutonic psychological urge. Ludendorff went so far as to read into the statement "war is an instrument of policy" the idea that "war is the principal instrument of policy." The disaster of World War I failed to shake the German faith in their philosophy, and even as late as April 1945, as the ruins of his country tumbled about him, Hitler, in his final testament to the German people, referred to "the great Clausewitz."

The French, seeking a reason for their colossal failure in 1870, also discovered Clausewitz. They too became obsessed with the infallibility of the offensive, and through Foch and his disciples developed the philosophy of "attack, always attack" which in World War I hurled the French armies in reckless, bloody, and futile charges against German machine guns and barbed wire.

On the other side of the world, the Japanese, attributing their success in the Russo-Japanese War largely to their German tutor, Mechel, a self-proclaimed pupil of Clausewitz, firmly embraced the German philosophy, adding oriental refinements.

The pursuit of this interpretation of Clausewitzian philosophy eventually led the Germans and Japanese into national disaster. There were, of course, many reasons for these failures, but at the root of all was the fact that both the Germans and Japanese had chosen to ignore some of Clausewitz's fundamental warnings in their enthusiasm to apply their conception of his theories. For although Clausewitz advocated audacity and aggressiveness in the *conduct of war*, he emphasized caution in *choosing war* as an instrument of policy. He warned that "the first, greatest, and most decisive act of judgment which a statesman and commander performs is that of correctly recognizing the kind of war he is undertaking, of not taking it for, or wishing to make it, something which by the nature of circumstances it cannot be." And he also emphasized, as a fundamental idea, that "every war be looked upon as a whole from the very outset. . . ." It is obvious that the Central and Axis Powers in initiating World War I and World War II did not understand the type of wars they were undertaking, and neglected to think them through to their ultimate conclusions, or, if they attempted to do so, they made serious fundamental miscalculations in both cases.

Unheeded also went the warning of

Clausewitz that in the pattern of aggression the offensive after initial gains eventually became reduced to a very disadvantageous defensive, at which time the aggressor was exceedingly vulnerable to a counter-offensive by the original defender. Clausewitz considered the defensive the stronger form of war. In this view he was influenced, no doubt, by the campaigns of Frederick in the Seven Years' War and the Russian repulse of Napoleon in which he participated. He made clear, however, that by defensive he did not mean a purely passive attitude merely to ward off blows, a strategy which in this age of science would spell national suicide. Instead, he envisaged at the bottom of all defense adequate preparations for war and the idea of retaliation, swift and strong—the flashing sword of vengeance; the defensive-offensive of modern times. In the sequel of events in World War II—first, the initial gains of the aggressor offensives, then the eventual transition from offensive to defensive, and finally the crushing counteroffensives of the Allies—we see clearly the pattern which Clausewitz described.

The basic doctrine of present-day Russian communism is greatly influenced by Clausewitz's theories. Marx rejoiced at finding in such an eminent military authority substantiation for his own theory of the relationship between war and politics. Thereafter, Clausewitz became imbedded in revolutionary doctrine. Lenin also studied the work *On War*, concentrating on the philosophy of war rather than its conduct. His highly favorable comments were published on several occasions. Between the World Wars, Clausewitz was taught in Russian military schools, and hundreds of Russian officers studied in Berlin.

However, undoubtedly irked by the prominence given Clausewitz and Lenin, Stalin repudiated them both after World War II, substituting what he termed a strictly Rus-

sian philosophy—which remained practically pure Clausewitz. We might note that this happened during that era of the diefication of Stalin, and the beginning of the campaign to erase foreign influences by suddenly discovering that various unknown Russians had invented the airplane, the X-ray, baseball, and the like.

However, Clausewitz's theory that war is a continuation of politics, and his view of the violence inherent in the theoretical conception of war, remain fundamental in Communist doctrine.

The Russians, while adopting those theories of Clausewitz which so fascinated the Germans, also displayed interest in his more subtle observations. "A conqueror," said Clausewitz, "is always a lover of peace; he would like to make his entry into our state unopposed." This remark Lenin considered very witty. And in the following quotation from Clausewitz one could well believe that he was reading an extract from current Soviet policy:

"If there are any enterprises which are particularly suited to breaking up the enemy alliances or making them ineffective, to winning new allies for ourselves, to stimulating political activities in our favor, and so forth, then it is easy to conceive how much these can increase the probability of success and become a shorter way to our object than the defeat of the enemy's armed forces."

The Russians have long excelled in political warfare, not only against the governments of neighboring states, but also directly against and through social and political groupings within these states. The "political attack" has often, and preferably, been accompanied by the threat of overwhelming military force. When war occurred, it was conducted with the political object paramount. I am sure that if Clausewitz were writing his work today, he would select as the classic example in support of his thesis on war and policy the Russian conduct of political and military affairs during World War II, wherein each

political object achieved was attained by skillful interplay of factors and circumstances with friend and foe alike. This adroitness has also been displayed since World War II, and Korea is an example of their readiness to use war as an instrument of policy where the political object cannot be attained otherwise and when the outlook for military success promises well.

In hindsight, and with the Communist-Clausewitz philosophy of war and policy in mind, their intervention after the defeat of the North Koreans should not have come as so great a surprise, for to allow large unfriendly forces along the Yalu, and adjacent to the sensitive areas of Manchuria and Siberia, would most certainly have been incompatible with Communist policy.

Mao Tse Tung's brand of Communism parallels that of his Soviet contemporaries, though it is influenced in its military aspects by the teachings of the ancient Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu. Lacking resources, Mao was forced to pursue his special course of action through lesser forms of war—stratagems and partisan activity—for many years. The advent of the Sino-Japanese War gave him the opportunity to play each side against the other to his own profit. He is said to have described his strategy as 70% self-development, 20% compromise, and 10% fighting the Japanese.

The vacuum left by the Japanese collapse, together with support from the Russians, politically and in the nature of captured Japanese weapons and supplies, greatly strengthened his military power and position. On the concurrent disintegration of the Chinese Nationalist position much has been written, and time does not allow a discussion here. It is clear, however, that politics, domestic and external, played the major role in the fall of China; war was only an incidental instrument.

Mao's lack of hesitancy to resort to war

with ruthlessness equalling that envisaged in Clausewitz's theoretical conception of war was displayed in Korea. The remark has been made that if Mao were to occupy the Kremlin, the activities of the present Soviet leaders would seem peace-loving indeed.

Our own attitude toward the philosophy of using war to further politics has been inconsistent and enigmatic. If we accept as axiomatic that a nation imbued with this philosophy would maintain armed forces proportionate to the needs of policy, then we could conclude that we have never subscribed to the theory, for, until very recently, we have always been notoriously unprepared for war. Unfortunately, this conclusion would not accord with the facts. Although Clausewitz was not translated into English until 1873, the United States, before that time and actually before his book was written, had given substantiation for his thesis.

Our very first act, the Revolutionary War, was a deliberate resort to war to further our policy of independence. At the beginning of the 19th Century, we sought to avoid involvement in war through political acts, such as the Embargo Act of 1807, yet in 1812, obsessed with the idea of conquering Canada, we declared war on England, even though a political settlement, much in our favor, appeared to be highly promising. In 1823, we promulgated the Monroe Doctrine with the expressed intention of using war to enforce our policy, though the only appreciable force available was the momentarily friendly British Navy. The Mexican War provides an excellent example of the concurrent pursuit of political intercourse and military operations, which Clausewitz considered as normal. In the Spanish-American War, as in the War of 1812, we deliberately chose war on public demand, even though Spain sought mediation and offered favorable terms.

It is difficult to understand our contradictory policies in the two world wars. In World

War I, the timely proclamation of Wilson's "Fourteen Points" provides an excellent example of the employment of sound political measures to further military efforts and to secure desired political objectives. Not only did they undermine the will to resist of the Central Powers, but, as Dr. Earle pointed out, they completely frustrated Lenin's plans for a psychological drive for world revolution based upon a "no annexation, no indemnities" people's peace.² Conversely, in World War II, our "Unconditional Surrender" policy, and the Morgenthau proposal to convert Germany into a pastoral state, stiffened the will to resist and made the conduct of military operations more difficult and costly. "Unconditional Surrender," in itself, could hardly have been considered a complete policy, for its principal effect was the creation of one political vacuum in the heart of Europe and another in the Far East, which were bound to aggravate further the problems of the world.

What our over-all policy actually was in World War II is not clear. Writings since the war lead to a suspicion that one political object might have been to coax the Soviets into the circle of peaceful nations and thus ensure a future harmonious world. If this is so, some historian writing in the distant future, with the knowledge at hand of events yet to come in our time, or that of our children, may declare that this political failure, and its aftermath, Korea, had their fortuitous effect in that, like Pearl Harbor, they awakened us to our peril and forced us to take adequate measures for survival. This may prove so, but at the moment we can only record chagrin and disillusionment.

All these political and military excursions we engaged in without the inspiration of Clausewitz. His work *On War* has never been used as a text in our military schools.

²Edward Mead Earle, *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1943), 324-325.

What recourse we have had to his theories has been in the fields of tactics and military strategy rather than in the philosophy of war. Also, I am not aware of any great preoccupation with Clausewitz among our succession of political leaders. Normally, we have been prone to overemphasize the military aspect of war with inadequate concern for the political results which follow. Whatever coordination of military and political policy was effected, was accomplished at the highest level, by the President himself. It was not until December 1944, under the pressure of acute military wartime problems, that a subordinate agency, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, was established to reconcile political and military considerations. World War II taught us the inseparableness of the major factors that go to make up our national existence—the political, military, economic, and socio-psychological factors. Our governmental structure has been reorganized to effectuate proper integration of these fields. The individual Service war colleges have broadened their curricula to include study in these related areas. The National War College has been established for the specific purpose of studying the interrelationship of these factors in the formulation of national policy, and its student body includes representatives from the State Department and other civilian governmental agencies, as well as from the Services.

My final topic concerns the importance to the United States in the present-day world of the theory of the use of war as an instrument of policy. Experience in World War II and the potentialities of modern weapons make it obvious that total war is extremely expensive in both human and material resources to victor and vanquished alike. We realize also that another general war, even though won, would result in drastic modifications of the institutions and way of life we wish to preserve, and in the degeneration of human

values throughout the world. Our policy, then, is to preserve world peace, and to attain our political aims and the settlement of international disputes through peaceful means. Unfortunately, this concept is not universal. The principle of the use of war, and the threat of war, as an instrument of policy, remains fundamental in Communist philosophy, though the implications of modern total war urge caution in its general application. We have seen in Korea a resort to limited war when the prospects for achieving aims through political measures were on the wane and the promise of military success good. Can we believe that given a similar set of circumstances on a world-wide scale the same course would not be pursued? To do so would be to discount current Communist philosophy and to fail to view in proper perspective the magnitude of the stakes involved. At no time in history have the tools existed to perpetuate world domination, once achieved, to the extent that they do today. For, paradoxically, though nuclear weapons and long-range carriers tend to discourage war, they are the controlling elements in power balance and, in the sole possession of an unscrupulous and ruthless master, they provide an immediate and relatively inexpensive means of enforcing his will by threat of or actual employment at any point in the world. The implications are clear. The loss of a general war and resultant exclusive possession of these controlling elements by the Communist bloc could well shape the course of history for the next thousand years as Hitler envisaged. So, though we strive to preserve peace, we must be prepared for war with no doubt as to our ability to win it. Peace through power—a strange marriage, but one enforced by the circumstances.

Our policy embodies the maintenance of a strong political and military posture that would make the success of current Soviet policy unlikely and the prospects of their suc-

cess in war highly improbable, with the hope that they may see no course other than to modify their policy. Some measure of our progress in this endeavor may be gained from the frequency and vehemence with which the epithet "warmongering" is hurled at us. This charge is made in all sincerity, for, in the peculiar logic that emanates from equally peculiar minds, the more we frustrate, by our political alliances and deterrant military policy, attainment of their policy objectives, the more we are warmongering. At the base of our deterrant military posture lies Clausewitz's concept of the stronger form of war, the defensive-offensive war, the essence of which is the preservation of vital areas and the guarantee of means and a base for retaliation, swift and strong—the flashing sword of vengeance.

We can also turn to Clausewitz for encouragement in our chosen course for he states:

"If . . . we picture ourselves a defensive (defensive-offensive)* as it should be, it includes the greatest possible preparations of all means, an army (armed forces) inured to war, a general (leader) who awaits his adversary not in anxiety from a feeling of uncertainty, but from choice, a cool presence of mind, . . . and, lastly, a healthy people who fears the enemy as little as he fears them. So provided, defense (the defensive-offensive), confronted with attack, will no longer play so poor a part, and attack will no longer seem so easy and infallible. . . ."

Essential to both our military and political posture is the active or sympathetic cooperation of allies. To my mind, a United States isolated under Communist encirclement could only become a garrison state, and we would have already lost freedom, as we see it now, without a struggle. In trying to attain this cooperation, patience and understanding are needed, for we cannot escape the fact that, despite the progress made in developing a world viewpoint, the paramount concern of each nation is still its own national destiny.

*Parenthetical insertions in this quotation are those of the author.

We can recall our own delay of almost three years in joining our Allies in World War I, and that in World War II we needed the precipitous push of the Japanese.

The course we follow, though the least costly we can safely pursue, is and will be expensive as long as the present threat remains. We must be careful that in laudable efforts to achieve a balanced budget and tax reduction we provide adequately for our essential military requirements. The problem is not what we can conveniently afford for our defense, but, put bluntly, what can we afford for our survival? According to recent reports, we represent 6% of the world's population, yet we enjoy 40% of the world's income. Also, our gross national product for 1953 is estimated to approach 400 billion dollars. It would appear that we could allot sufficient amounts for essential defense requirements without approaching the brink of economic disaster. While expenditures for defense are not an investment like a road or a school, they are perhaps even more important for they make secure the roads, schools, and way of life; and, incidentally, research and development to satisfy military needs have caused great advances in civilian fields, particularly those of aircraft and electronics.

In everything I have said so far, it is assumed that war has not yet reached the stage of being capable of decision by one blow or several simultaneous blows. This consideration would require a complete reassessment. All that I can do in the moment remaining is to turn again to Clausewitz and to repeat his observation that:

"If the issue in war depended on a single decision or several simultaneous decisions, the preparations for that decision or those several decisions would naturally have to be carried to the last extreme. A lost opportunity could never be recalled; the only standard the real world could give us for the preparations we must make would, at best, be those of our adversary, so far as they are known to us, and everything else would . . . be relegated to the realm of abstraction."

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NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

THE STUDY OF MILITARY HISTORY

BY PAUL M. ROBINETT
Brig. General, USA, Ret.

THE study of history is one which can be carried on without a teacher and even without access to a large library. This is indeed fortunate for officers of the military services are of necessity widely scattered and subject to frequent changes of station and, besides, no profession can benefit more directly from the study of history than the military, for as Marshal Foch has said, "... no study is possible on the battlefield; one does there simply what one *can* in order to apply what one *knows*."¹

Assuming that Marshal Foch is correct, an effort has been made to set forth a logical system of study for the self-improvement of the officers of the various grades. The works included should provide the officers with professional background *appropriate to their levels of responsibility* and eventually with an ever broadening understanding of military art and science and of the relationship of military policy to the foreign and economic policies of the United States. Thus it is that the program should help develop an

officer corps possessing the wisdom essential to the successful performance of duties in the higher staff and command positions. In the past this progressive aspect of historical study has been neglected with the result that even the serious officers have tended to prepare themselves for the role of war lord, such as Alexander, Frederick the Great, or Napoleon or, of a great military leader, such as Hannibal, Scipio, Caesar, Marlborough, Washington, Grant, Lee, or Foch, instead of preparing for their more probable assignments or fields of responsibility and the ones next above. As a result too many American military men have neglected the fighting man, basic leadership, geographical, climatic, and weather considerations, tactics, logistics, weapons, transportation, and communications.

Students of the past should consider events in light of the times and conditions under review. The geography, communications, population, education and culture, military forces and armament, resources, industry and manufactures, scientific development, and political, religious, economic, medical, and sociological

¹Marshall Ferdinand Foch, *The Principles of War*, trans. Hilaire Belloc (New York, 1920), pp. 5-6.

conditions of the period must be understood before events can be properly evaluated and lessons derived therefrom. Quite obviously this is a difficult task.

According to the best authorities man and his reactions to combat have changed less than other elements in war. Regardless of improvements in materiel man still reacts very much as he has always reacted in battle. And he probably will always react in about the same way. It is for this reason that the closest attention must be given to the fighting man and to the basic problems of leadership. These two subjects constitute the foundation upon which all other knowledge of the military art and science should be based. Accordingly, the study of the subjects begins early in an officer's career and continues in ever expanding fashion throughout his service.

The study of military history should also be solidly based on the problems of the individual, squad, platoon, company, battalion, combat team, and division. Here, where results of decisions and actions are most immediate, wisdom and a knowledge of American military operations gleaned from the pages of the past can be most readily and decisively used. Unfortunately, material dealing with these problems is rather limited. The stories of private soldiers and of small-unit commanders have been neglected. But if the Army is to benefit fully from past experience, they should not be. Otherwise, strategical decisions and operations may not be solidly based on efficient forces, adequately equipped and armed, and physically, spiritually, and tactically trained.

Finally, the military student should be familiar with the works of the military philosophers because they have had a profound influence upon military thinking and literature and, therefore, upon the operational manuals or field service regulations of nearly

all nations. The great military thinkers have not belonged to any one race or time. They have all been profound students of history and many of them have also had personal experience in war. Sun Tzu in *The Art of War*, Vegetius in *The Military Institutions of the Romans*, Clausewitz in *On War*, Jomini in *The Art of War*, DuPicq in *Battle Studies*, von Schlieffen in *Cannae*, Mahan in *Influence of Sea Power on History*, Foch in *Principles of War*, Douhet in *The Command of the Air*, Fuller in *Foundation of the Science of War*, De Gaulle in *The Army of the Future*, Kingston-McCloughry in *War in Three Dimensions*, and others have used history to distill strategical and tactical principles which affect the conduct of war. Other scholars such as Machiavelli in the *Prince and the Discourses*, Grotius in *The Law of War and Peace*, DeVattel in *The Law of Nations*, Lea in *Valor of Ignorance*, Fairgrieve in *Geography and World Power*, MacKinder in *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, and Simonds and Emeny in *Great Powers and World Politics*, have treated some of the over-riding factors, such as political, economic, and geographical, which concern the conduct of war.

A careful study of such works should enable the military student *who has mastered the basic subjects of his profession* to comprehend the lessons that are to be learned from history. When the student has made these principles a part of himself he is really prepared to acquire wisdom by reading and studying the experiences of others. This wisdom should enable him to recognize in any given situation the time and place for the application of principles to the solution of current problems and thus avoid the misinterpretation or overemphasis of certain principles which has proved so catastrophic to other nations in the past.

RIVER NAVIES IN THE CIVIL WAR*

CONTROL of navigable rivers was of primary importance during the Civil War because they were major arteries of transportation in that era. This was true in both the economic and military spheres. Closing the lower Mississippi by the Confederates, for example, prevented the normal export of grain and other products by States in the upper valley and greatly upset their economy. As for the movement and supply of large Armies, water transport was all but indispensable throughout the great region of the Mississippi and its tributaries, and very necessary along the eastern seaboard.

For these reasons the Civil War was among the greatest amphibious wars in history. In both the west and the east, the navies of North and South constantly operated in support of their armies. Troops were transported and supplied, and often given direct combat aid. The naval factor was a decisive one in some of the largest military campaigns. This applied to coastal as well as river operations, but to the latter especially.

At the beginning the Confederate States had no Navy, but were diligent in creating one from the scanty means available. They were compelled to rely principally upon the conversion of merchant ships for warfare, but in time managed to construct formidable men-of-war notwithstanding poor materials and facilities, and to devise new types of ships and weapons. Their inventiveness and accomplishment under adverse circumstances were remarkable. A great windfall to the

Confederacy was the early capture of the Navy Yard at Norfolk together with the ships there. The Frigate *Merrimack* was converted into the powerful ironclad ram *Virginia* and the great number of captured cannons permitted distribution to fortifications and ships at many distant places.

Early in the war Confederates established control of the lower Potomac with batteries erected on the Virginia shore, forcing the Union Army subsequently to embark from Annapolis for the Peninsular Campaign. Confederate naval forces also drove a Federal Squadron to sea (October 1861) from the Mississippi River's mouth, giving the South complete command of the Father of Waters nearly to Cairo, Illinois. Acting jointly a Federal Squadron and Army captured Forts Henry and Donelson, opening two great waterways—the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers—to Federal use.

The classic first duel between armored vessels—*Monitor* vs. *Virginia* (ex-*Merrimack*)—was fought (9 March 1862) where the Elizabeth River joins the James at Hampton Roads. On the previous day *Virginia* had destroyed the old frigates *Cumberland* and *Congress* off Newport News. The two ironclads fought intermittently for many hours without sustaining great damage when *Virginia* returned to Norfolk.

Depending upon the Navy to protect against the menace from the *Virginia* (*Merrimack*), McClellan landed his Army at Fortress Monroe in April 1862 and began his ill-fated Peninsular Campaign. Naval Squadrons supported his slow advance by land on both flanks, on the York and James Rivers. Finally McClellan was forced to retreat to Malvern Hill on the James where

*This is an outline of operations prepared to supplement an exhibition of the Naval Historical Foundation at the Truxton-Decatur Naval Museum, Washington, D. C. Courtesy of Commodore Dudley W. Knox.

support from gunboats contributed to the saving of his Army. His evacuation of the Peninsula by water was covered by the naval squadrons.

MISSISSIPPI VALLEY STRUGGLE

Meanwhile, Federal military-naval forces had begun the tremendous task of gaining control of the lower Mississippi River, attacking from both north and south. This would split the Confederacy apart and at the same time restore the commercial outlet for States in the upper valley. Grant's advance (south) up the Tennessee River, aimed at outflanking Vicksburg, met with severe resistance at Pittsburg Landing (Shiloh) where gunboats were a large influence in saving the day. Ultimately Grant was forced to abandon this strategy in favor of a direct approach down the Mississippi.

The most northerly great obstacle was the strong fort at "Island Number Ten," near the junction of Kentucky, Tennessee and Missouri. On a dark and stormy night Federal ironclad gunboats under Flag Officer Foote, bombarded the fort while one of them (*Coronadolet*, Commander Walke) ran past. The next night the *Pittsburgh* followed and the two gunboats below the fort then covered the Mississippi crossing of General Pope's Army from Missouri, which then advanced by land to capture formidable "Island Number Ten."

In this affair Confederate naval resistance had been lacking because their gunboats were far away assisting in the defense of New Orleans against Farragut's fleet, coming up from the Gulf of Mexico. Forcing a passage past Forts Jackson and St. Philip, Farragut defeated the Confederate Squadron under Flag Officer Mitchell and proceeded up-river to New Orleans, which, now defenseless, had no choice but to surrender (April 1862).

Soon Farragut pressed northward against little resistance to Vicksburg, where he

joined gunboats under Flag Officer Davis (Foote's successor) who had cleared the upper section of the river by defeating off Memphis (10 May) a hastily assembled force of Confederate rams under Captain Montgomery. This early opening of the Mississippi was but temporary. Without land forces in support the naval squadrons could not hold their gains, and had to withdraw, north and south. Confederates then hastily strengthened weak defenses along the river, so that the later Federal return met very stiff opposition.

Vicksburg soon became a formidable point of unique importance. Strong batteries on high bluffs controlled the river passage. Railroads ran westward to Texas and eastward to the heart of the Confederacy forming a major transport artery to sustain the war. The Federals rightly regarded the capture of this bastion as of primary consequence. A large amphibious expedition under Sherman landed (December 1862) at Haynes Bluff, just above Vicksburg, expecting a junction with Grant, marching from inland. But Grant could not get through, so both Armies withdrew for a fresh joint attempt down the river.

This new great plan which ultimately succeeded involved landing the Army on the river bank opposite Vicksburg; then marching south well past that city and crossing the river to the Vicksburg (east) side. The final phase was to strike swiftly northward across the city's eastward land communications and besiege it. Thus the Army's march would trace an enormous letter "U" with its bottom at the river crossing. All this was to be done, despite the two critical difficulties of the hazardous river crossing and keeping the Army supplied. Naval support was indispensable to overcome both of these severe handicaps.

When in January 1863, Grant's Army

began this campaign by landing across the river from Vicksburg, supplies to that city by rail from the west were automatically cut off. But there remained a route by water down the Red River to the Mississippi below Vicksburg, that was then immune from attack by the Naval Squadron above the city, now under Porter. Farragut essayed to stop this river traffic by bringing up a squadron from New Orleans. Three of his four large ships, however, were badly damaged at Port Hudson and only Farragut himself in the *Hartford* got through. Alone, she had a long and anxious time blockading the Red River's mouth.

Awaiting the coming of Spring, Grant attempted cutting a navigable canal across a neck of land so that supply craft could bypass Vicksburg and reach the lower river. This failed. Meanwhile thorough investigation was made of the possibility of attacking Vicksburg from the north on the eastern river bank. This involved extensive minor naval operations in Yazoo River Delta. Impracticability was proved. However, Haynes Bluff, on the east bank, was again occupied and a strongly held base of supplies established, which was stocked and constantly replenished from up the "Father of Waters" under naval protection. This was a key move; because the base would serve to supply the Army after it had crossed the Mississippi to the South and then moved north into a position to besiege Vicksburg on its land side. For that, no other line of supply was possible.

In April 1863 the Union Army started marching southward along the river's west bank. Acting in concert, with a view to protecting the troop crossing, Porter ran past Vicksburg with seven ironclads during darkness of 16 April, leaving the rest of his large fleet above the city to guard Army communications. The "run-past" was among the most spectacular events of the war. The

Confederates lit large bonfires and opened a heavy bombardment, the ships replying vigorously. With heavy coal barges alongside for protection the ships made little speed, while strong eddies in the swift current swung them through large angles. Some were pivoted completely around when directly under the batteries, yet all ironclads got through without serious injury.

On the 29th at Grand Gulf, Porter pounded shore batteries at close quarters for four hours, with a view to putting the Army across at that point. But the fortifications were too strong, so the Union forces proceeded down-river to Bruinsburg where Grant crossed without opposition.

At last on the Vicksburg side, the Union Army, with but scanty supplies, made forced marches northward to gain contact with the well-stocked base at Haynes Bluff. This took them across Vicksburg's land communications and the long siege of that place was begun. Thereafter, until the surrender naval forces gave vigorous combat support to the Federal Army.

During the Vicksburg siege, the only other Confederate stronghold on the great river, Port Hudson, was taken in May by Union troops and gunboats acting jointly. Thus when Vicksburg fell in July 1863 the Mississippi was finally open to Federal, military and commercial use throughout its length, although desultory fighting along its banks in Confederate hands continued for many months.

The last operation of magnitude on western rivers was the ill-fated Red River Expedition in the Spring of 1864. Its origin was defensive—a precaution against the suspected designs on Texas by Napoleon III, who had landed large forces in Mexico. Admiral Porter's strong fleet of gunboats supported General Bank's Army in an up-river advance from Alexandria toward Shreveport. The defeat and hasty retreat of

the Union Army confronted many gunboats with the urgent necessity of speedily returning down 200 miles of shallow and falling river whose banks were now strongly held by the Confederate Army. It was a hot two weeks for the Navy with many personnel casualties.

Upon again reaching the refuge of Alexandria the river level had fallen so low that the larger gunboats could not get past the "falls" at that place. Here the Federal Army saved its Navy from falling into Confederate hands. The local water level was raised sufficiently through the ingenious construction of partial dams of trees and timber cribs filled with rock, projected from each bank, under the direction of Colonel Joseph Bailey, Wisconsin Volunteers.

* * * * *

Grant's final campaign in Virginia received support of great value from the Federal Navy. His ability to repeatedly outflank Lee was based largely upon shifting his main base successively from Aquia Creek to Rapahannock River, York River and, finally James River. Without naval control of Chesapeake Bay and tributaries, such main

bases could not have been established or used.

Grant's final position south of Petersburg would have been suicidal without firm and permanent control of the lower James River by Union naval forces. The Confederates had for long maintained control of the river above their strong works at Drewry's Bluff. From here, to the last they operated a gunboat squadron against Federal forces below. Prior to Grant's arrival Butler's Union Army from Norfolk had reached City Point with strong naval support by Admiral S. P. Lee, USN, who was vigorously opposed by the Confederate Squadron under Commodore Mitchell, and later the redoubtable Commodore Raphael Semmes of high-seas raiding fame.

Marching from the Cold Harbor repulse Grant crossed the James on pontoons in June 1864. He sank obstructions in the river as an added protection against the Confederate Squadron. However, the latter repeatedly bombarded the crossing and the Federal Squadron until January 1865. With the evacuation of Richmond in April the war was virtually ended, and Semmes blew up his ironclads and abandoned the James River.

MONCADO AWARD

The American Military Institute invites attention to the fact that the current competition for the prize offered by the Moncado Revolving Book Fund closes 30 June 1954. Book length manuscripts on any topic connected with the military (including naval and air) history of the United States may be submitted to the Secretary, American Military Institute, 1529 - 18th St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C. The prize, from income of funds donated by General Moncado, will amount to approximately \$200.

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THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Editor: GEORGE J. STANSFIELD

REVIEWS

Soviet Military Doctrine, by Raymond L. Garthoff, Social Science Research Staff, the Rand Corporation. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1953. Pp. 587. \$7.50.)

As our distinguished fellow member, Dr. H. A. DeWeerd, points out in his preface, "The number of really useful books on the Red Army appearing in the English language can be listed on the fingers of one hand. Until Mr. Garthoff supplied the deficiency, there was not a single one available on Soviet military doctrine."

Garthoff's *tour de force* is significant in this respect. It is further singular in that it is the first work to deal comprehensively, analytically, objectively with the military doctrine of a nation. True, there have been many books dealing with a nation's army or covering a detailed aspect of an armed service such as its weapons, tactics, staff military policy, or its conduct of a specific war. But this is the first to treat a nation's military doctrine as an integrated whole and to trace its historical antecedents. Garthoff had no previously established pattern to aid him in this undertaking. He was in a sense pioneering in assembling, analyzing, evaluating and presenting this mass of data. He pioneered well. Others will use him as a point of comparison and departure in attempting comparable works. Garthoff will be a standard reference for some time to come.

The work itself is divided into three parts—the basis of Soviet military doctrine, Soviet principles of war, and the operational and tactical employment of combat arms.

Part one develops the relationship between Soviet political doctrine and strategy, which is based on the Bolshevik combat image of the

world and Soviet military doctrine, and shows how the latter is largely an outgrowth of the former.

Specifically, Soviet military doctrine was forged in battle—the Civil War of 1918-21—and verified and expanded by World War II experiences. Certain external influences are evident but these are secondary. Marxism and Leninism had little direct influence in military doctrine. The legacy, however, of the Tsar's Imperial Army was considerable and continuing.

Both Jomini and Clausewitz were in the Tsars' service, it will be remembered. Although officially repudiated today, the imprint of their influence is still borne by Soviet military doctrine. One final influence was the impact of German military, armament, and aviation experts on duty in Russia between World Wars I and II. Interesting enough, Fuller and Douhet were carefully studied in the top Soviet service schools and were both rejected as being too extreme and "as paying excessive attention to one arm of troops."

Military doctrine is defined as the assumptions and beliefs about military science and art accepted in an armed force as the basic guide for its conduct of war. Military science is military art plus consideration of morale, economic, and psychological-political factors. Military art comprises strategy, the operating art (the theory and practice of army and army group operations) and tactics. Russia feels that she alone won the war against Germany and consequently attributes this victory to the validity of its military science; "the sole advanced, true military science in the world" which was "the only one able to find satisfactory solutions of the problems set by modern warfare."

Soviet military doctrine has never set down a list of principles of war. However, Stalin himself

enunciated the "permanently operating factors" which "determine the outcome of war." These are: (a) stability of the rear, (b) armament of the army, (c) morale of the army, (d) quantity and quality of divisions and (e) organizing ability of the command. Stalin contrasted these with the "transitory factors" the only example of which he gave being "surprise." By further implication these "transitory factors" might be taken to mean what we know as the "principles of war."

Part two distills and analyzes these principles of war which are implicit in current Soviet doctrine and develops in detail the "permanently operating factors." Some of the principles are similar to our own; the offensive, maneuver, concentration of force, economy of force, surprise. They usually differ in emphasis, application and detail, however. Other principles are peculiarly Soviet in concept and origin; annihilation of all opposition, maintenance of strong reserves and close cooperation of combined mutually supporting arms. Lesser principles are initiative, momentum of the advance, pursuit and consolidation of gains. The historical origin and details of application of each of these principles is exhaustively traced by the author.

Possibly the greatest variance from Western doctrine is the principle of cooperation of combined arms. True, within separate Western services, this concept has acceptance but between services it is seldom recognized or practiced. The Soviets carry the concept to its logical and ultimate conclusion. Western military doctrine is thought to seek panaceas for victory in the form of "One weapon" concepts like air power or armored forces. However, the Soviets emphatically reject reliance on one type of combat force. In fact over-enthusiastic proponents of air power and armor have, on occasion, been purged. Thus the foundation of Soviet armed force is a closely coordinated combination of infantry, artillery, armor and close air support employed in mass. Naval, amphibious, airborne, guerrilla and scientific weapons merely support this effort. While primary reliance on one particular form of combat, such as strategic bombing, is considered a fallacy, no particular weapon or form of combat is rejected completely. Rather "all weapons must be used to their maximum capabilities."

Stalin's stature as a military leader has at last been placed in its proper perspective by Garthoff. While it cannot be denied that he played a definite and positive role in Soviet military plan-

ning and execution this role is shown to have been exaggerated out of all proportion to the facts. Soviet propaganda has fostered the myth of Stalin the omnipotent strategist. The author shows him to be not the infallible military thinker of the propaganda releases but a man with his failures as well as his triumphs.

Part Three is a detailed presentation of the tactics and techniques of the armed services and their branches. Ground forces are shown to have the predominant role in Russia. Infantry is considered to be the "Tsaritza" of the battlefield.

Artillery is the "main striking force" and although it supports the infantry it plays a much greater role than artillery in Western armies.

Tanks are shown to be a modern application of Russia's traditional interest in artillery, maneuver, mass and mobile mounted troops. Horse cavalry itself is kept alive in Russia on a large scale. It proved itself in World War II in long-range reconnaissance, raids, and as supplementary to mobile operations of tanks.

The mission of Soviet air power up to the present has been the support of surface forces. This concept is undergoing a re-examination, however, with the new and unprecedented situation confronting the Soviets wherein the chief enemy center of power (continental U. S.) is effectively beyond the reach of their ground-air team. This is resulting in more emphasis on the long-range bombing force.

The Soviet Navy has come in for recent emphasis with the establishment of a separate Ministry of the Navy in 1950. Although this was abolished in 1953 the Soviet press continues to stress, "Our country is a great naval power." Their concept of naval functions and missions is in general accord with Western doctrine except that they do not strive for command of the sea and naval action is subordinate to the land arm. The chief mission is defense of the army's sea flank and attack of the enemy's sea flank and rear. In spite of a lack of appreciation of sea power's wider application the Soviets have evolved a sound system of command in amphibious operations similar to our own.

Guerrilla warfare occupies a special place in Soviet military doctrine and is given its due emphasis in this study. It is deeply rooted in the Marxist approach to warfare as well as in Russian history. In or out of Russia, where the fight is against Communism, guerrilla warfare on the Soviet pattern can be expected.

Only one doctrinal area is not covered by Garthoff. Perhaps in a second edition he will outline Soviet thought on the use of nuclear weapons and on their defense against them.

Soviet military doctrine in practice is not too much different from that accepted in the West. It is fundamentally sound. However, Soviet performance has seldom measured up to the ideal standards expressed in the doctrine. German reports reveal the vast numerical superiority required for Soviet success, the lack of coordination and flexibility and the repeated tactical blunders. Nevertheless, the doctrine is indicative of standards set and goals sought which, with improved execution in the future, may be achieved. In addition this treatise is of further value in that it reveals numerous chinks in the armor of Soviet military thinking which may be capable of exploitation.

The author's cited source material covers the field: official Soviet military manuals and periodicals, former Soviet sources, German and Western sources. The bibliography is extensive and well arranged. The text is meticulously footnoted. The older sources dating from the 1920's and 30's are necessary to trace the development of doctrine. World War II sources are vital in that as Soviet authorities themselves stress, these experiences provide the basis for further development of their military doctrine. However, one note of criticism should be sounded. This further development of doctrine can only be reflected in post-World War II Soviet sources. Yet these sources seem to be exploited less than any category cited. There must be many significant post-war Soviet military manuals and periodical articles available in addition to the few listed.

All in all, however, *Soviet Military Doctrine* by Garthoff is an excellent and scholarly work. It is a must for students of world affairs and for those engaged in military intelligence and operations who would understand and interpret Soviet actions in the politico-military sphere.

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The Statesmanship of the Civil War, by Allan Nevins. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1953. pp. 82. \$2.25.

In this slim but thoughtful book, Allan Nevins centers his attention on the civilian leadership of

that struggle, and concludes that the predominant advantages in that field were all on the side of the North.

This was so, as he sees it, largely because of the pre-eminent genius of Abraham Lincoln. Of all the war leaders, only Lincoln was a true statesman. He infused a moral value into the struggle to preserve the Union, he won acceptance for that value, and the war finally came to mean a great deal more than it meant originally. It became a point of departure, a beginning rather than an ending; the inspiration that could induce men to look beyond tragedy and pain and loss to a noble future was Lincoln's—and, as it turned out, Lincoln's alone.

By contrast, Jefferson Davis failed. He was able, devoted, high-minded, courageous; yet his great task was to create a new nation out of wildly discordant and individualistic elements, and he approached that task from a narrow, legalistic point of view. President Davis became engrossed in the purely military problem, when his real responsibility was to cement innumerable divisive elements into a cohesive whole. In the end the job was too much for him.

Probably it would have been too much for anyone—except, as Mr. Nevins remarks, a statesman of genius. The South had seceded chiefly because it feared a revolution in its social and economic system—and by seceding it made such a revolution inevitable. Back of questions of strategy and military supply lay that fundamental problem. It was a problem Mr. Davis could never solve. Perhaps no one could have solved it. In any case it went unsolved, and at last the Confederacy died.

It is hardly going too far to say that this little book is vital to a true understanding of the Civil War. As Mr. Nevins remarks: "We cannot see how the South could have had grander generals than Lee and Stonewall Jackson, but we can easily see how it might have had a greater civil leadership."

It is great civil leadership, then, that ultimately determines whether a nation will come to victory or defeat. Northern statesmanship—painfully, slowly, and by a narrow margin perhaps—finally provided that leadership; Southern statesmanship somehow did not. And that determined how the war was going to come out.

BRUCE CATTON
President
Civil War Round Table
of Washington, D. C.

U. S. Navy Bureau of Ordnance in World War II, by Buford Rowland, Lieutenant Commander, USNR, and William B. Boyd, Lieutenant, USNR. (Wash: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953. Pp. 539. \$3.00.)

"Don't try to do it all yourself—organize, deputize, supervise," admonished Rear Admiral W. H. P. Blandy after his appointment to the post of Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance during the winter of 1941. This volume, containing more than 500 pages, is abundant testimony that his instructions were carried out to the letter by the Bureau.

The Navy indeed made a wise selection in assigning Lt. Commander Rowland and Lt. Boyd to prepare the record of this phase of its wartime activities. Their finesse in handling such a huge undertaking was outstanding in every sense of the word. The personalities the authors dealt with were equally as dynamic and, in most instances, could be brought to a point of high order detonation more readily than some of the explosives used in the early part of World War II. Rowland and Boyd have produced a well-organized, readable and altogether impressive volume. It constitutes an important reference book on the ordnance of World War II, in addition to supplying the casual reader with a series of interesting and instructive accounts, many of them being made public for the first time in this work.

The objective, "to make readily available a realistic account of what was done in naval ordnance and how it was done," according to the Foreword by Rear Admiral M. F. Schoeffel, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, was a difficult task for the authors, faced as they were with the necessity for choosing among the vast bulk of material covering the complex and broad scope of Bureau activities during World War II. Naturally, it was impossible to do justice to daily routine, red tape and the communiques that affected global strategy. The authors chose wisely to devote their efforts largely to the story of weapon development and production. Each chapter tells a separate and complete story covering roughly the same period. The sources were almost entirely from the files of the Bureau. "Objectivity was a goal," the authors write in the preface, "but the volume is not free of prejudice." (Authors of books aimed at a more general public might take note of this statement.)

The general reader is more or less familiar with the story of the sea arm and its contribution to victory in World War II. Now he can see how

important to his safety is the role of naval ordnance. The Bureau of Ordnance was founded in 1842 but its first century of existence is dwarfed by comparison with its scope and growth during World War II. It supplied ordnance for four wars prior to this conflict. Even in World War I its expenditures were only \$1 billion compared to the \$13.8 billion required some twenty years later. Unfortunately, development during the first world war was of little help, for in the interim years the United States reduced naval appropriations and ordnance activity became for the most part a matter of maintaining armament on the active fleet. The disastrous results for our Navy of the Washington Conference of 1922 are well known. By 1930 the Bureau had a force of only 22 officers and 64 civilians. Little but the maintenance of the existing force was possible under the meager appropriations allotted the Bureau. Retrenchment halted in 1933, however, when the Weimar Republic was drawing its final gasps. Although appropriations remained low, funds were made available through the National Industrial Recovery Act and Public Works Administration. Ordnance procurement increased about 2½ times from the 1923-32 average during the period from 1933 to 1939. Personnel was augmented at the four naval ordnance shore establishments and by 1939 contracts with private firms exceeded the cost of government production. A notable dependence on Eastern firms gave way to a spread of naval production that became nation-wide.

Much more was needed. Congressional action launched the Bureau of Ordnance on a new program. Facilities and knowledge of manufacturing were hopelessly inadequate for anticipated needs. Machine tools were in short supply, threatening a breakdown in the program at the outset. Relief came from two directions—the creation of new manufacturing plants within the existing Shore establishment, and the harnessing of private industry to the defense effort—affording an interesting compromise between private enterprise and a public venture. While government necessarily owned the facilities (too costly and venturesome for private industry to undertake), management was in the hands of private contractors.

Meanwhile, the Bureau of Ordnance moved ahead of preparedness for war and paved the way for a real wartime program of procurement. The authors pay this tribute to those in charge of the Bureau: "That the investment produced good returns is shown by the fact that despite repeated accelerations of the shipbuilding program, vessels

were never delayed for the lack of ordnance material. Nor was that due even in part to a time lag that might give ordnance an edge over shipbuilders. Defensive ordnance in the form of armor was tailored for each individual ship." To make all this possible, a reorganization and streamlining of the Bureau of Ordnance was called for. For nearly a century it had operated under a vertical organization with only nominal division organization in its 17 independent sections. Almost without exception each section was devoted to a particular type of ordnance. For example, the authors tell us that "the gun section was theoretically responsible for every phase of gun activity." Each section was coequal. This organizational set-up worked well during the first world war, but it showed serious defects in the early days of World War II. The new system, first worked out under Rear Admiral W. R. Furlong, was perfected and put into operation by the late Rear Admiral W. H. P. Blandy, who abolished the traditional sections and created in their place five divisions—Administrative, Financial, Research and Development, Production and Fleet Maintenance. "Instead of all gun activity being concentrated in one section," the authors explain, "research and development work was accomplished by the cognizant section in one division, procurement was directed by the related section in another, and maintenance by still a third." Increasing workloads forced the Chief to create a Planning and Progress Division in September 1941, to coordinate and direct functions formerly under the special assistants to the Chief.

Nonexpendable items such as armor, guns and fire control apparatus were of prime importance during the prewar period and the first months of combat. In the call for speed, weapons were produced along lines of prewar development, with research running concurrently. "Later in the war the production emphasis shifted from nonexpendables and weapons that at the beginning of the emergency had been mere dreams—or even Buck Rogers fantasies." Changes had to meet new tactics of warfare. Enemy inventions such as influence mines forced the Bureau to conduct a degaussing program for the protection of our ships. With enemy emphasis on submarine warfare, the Bureau countered with an array of anti-submarine equipment. And so the story went. As tactical changes demanded new weapons, the needed advances to bring them into existence became ever more efficient—and costly. Once production had reached the needed levels, the Bureau shifted its program to more emphasis on research and devel-

opment. Naval establishments numbering 250 and numerous universities and corporations working on the research program brought expenditures for this phase above the \$300 million mark before the end of World War II.

Authors Rowland and Boyd devote an entire chapter to the close tie-up of ordnance and science. Total war had become a new concept. Total absorption, or nearly that, with means of fighting this total war was called for. Industry, science and government put themselves to the task. "Out of that came a flood of material that amazed even a nation accustomed to the miracles of mass production. . . . Out of that effort came new, decisive weapons, and a host of improvements to conventional armament." There was no precedent. The authors trace the work of the National Academy of Sciences, established by President Lincoln in 1863; the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, chartered by Congress in 1915; the Naval Research Laboratory, opened in 1923; the Office of Naval Research and Inventions, created during World War II; the Naval Ordnance Laboratory—to mention the list in part. The indebtedness of every citizen to the agencies which contributed to our naval ordnance development can scarcely be over-estimated. But in the opinion of the authors, most of the ideas were conceived within the Bureau itself as tactical developments and the grim necessity of countering enemy weapons dictated the general course of ordnance development.

There are chapters on such spectacular ordnance achievements as the VT-fuze, guided missiles, degaussing and the mining campaign against Japan. The latter program—"Operation Starvation"—resulted in a complete and total blockade of all Japanese shipping during the last days of the war and its importance in the final surrender of Japan cannot be overemphasized.

Again there are chapters on less publicized and less glamorous topics, such as nets and booms, fire control, machine tools, contract and inspection procedures, and the utilization of personnel. These chapters show the ability of the authors to humanize and enliven a mass of information that could have been pretty indigestible.

An appendix lists the Chiefs of the Bureau, Division Directors, Section Heads and commanding officers of major ordnance establishments in the period from March 1941 to September 1945. There is also an excellent index.

This book shows the Navy played no small part in the development of three weapons—radar, the proximity fuze and the atomic bomb. If these had

been developed by the enemy rather than the Allies, Tojo might well have fulfilled his dream of dictating peace in the White House.

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Flight: a Pictorial History of Aviation, by the Editors of *Year*. (Los Angeles: *Year*; New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953. Pp. 192. \$7.95.)

The Flying Years: a Pictorial History of Man's Conquest of the Air, by Lamont Buchanan. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1953. Pp. 188. \$5.00.)

Since aircraft are nearly as photogenic as the female form, it was inevitable that the makers of picture books would seize upon the opportunity provided by the fiftieth anniversary of powered flight to issue volumes on aviation history.

Flight, which received the approbation of the anniversary committee, headed by General Doolittle, is a fine example of what an experienced research staff can turn out on relatively short notice. Although there are 75,000 words of text, it is never allowed to obtrude upon the pictures. The few errors that have crept in are largely those which have appeared so frequently elsewhere that they have become a part of accepted accounts, of that mythology which too often passes for aviation history. Emphasis is upon American development, but the reader will come away aware that other nations also made their contributions. Everyone interested in the history of aviation will enjoy this handsomely prepared volume.

The Flying Years unfortunately has too few pictures and too much text written in a sort of impressionistic style that confuses more than it illuminates the subject. There are far more errors than there is any excuse for. The author has prepared other picture histories and is obviously more at home with photographs than with words. It would have improved his volume, if he had let his illustrations tell the story.

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Battle Cry, by Leon M. Uris. (New York: G. P. Putnam Sons, 1953. Pp. 505, \$3.75.)

"The man is the first weapon of battle: let us then study the soldier in battle, for it is he who brings reality to it." With this dictum of Du Picq in mind, the late Field Marshal Wavell of-

fered some practical advice. "When you study military history," he said, "don't read outlines on strategy and principles of war. Read biographies, memoirs, historical novels. . . Get at the flesh and blood of it, not the skeleton."

Battle Cry by Leon Uris can be similarly recommended, although it cannot be classified as any of the three literary vehicles suggested by Lord Wavell. It is a novel based on the experience and observations of Private First Class Leon Uris, radioman in the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines.

Whereas the historical novel is written around a framework of accurate historical fact, the author of *Battle Cry* has drawn his background from his imagination, but apparently has reported honestly and accurately (within the limitations of the fallible human memory) the war in the Pacific as he saw it from his particular, albeit restricted, vantage point. The characters in this book are all fictional, but the author's imagination seems to have been stimulated by stories (factual or legendary) of well known service personalities when he created them, and are therefore plausible.

Unlike the purported "war novels," *Battle Cry* is not devoted to belaboring one or two of the more unpleasant aspects of war, but treats the varied facets of war experience in a reasonable perspective. The rigors of recruit training are described without glossing over any of the misery experienced; but the reason for, and efficacy of, that particularly intensive training are also pointed up. The boredom, hardships and emotional strain of the combat zone receive their due, without neglecting the rehabilitation and training period between campaigns. The dialogue is hard-lipped and an authentic record of Marine jargon of the period, cleaned up just enough to remove it from the realm of smut—not enough to render it unrealistic. Between the lines, that much discussed and misunderstood factor of combat power—morale—is revealed for what it is: the product of good leadership and organization; success; discipline and training which inspires confidence; physical fitness and enthusiasm.

All in all, *Battle Cry* is as useful and adjunct to getting "at the flesh and blood" of the particular phases of the Pacific War with which it deals, as the *Memoirs of Sergeant Bourgogue* and *The Letters of Private Wheeler* are to a study of the Retreat from Moscow and the Peninsular War.

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The Atomic Submarine and Admiral Rickover, by Blair Clay, Jr. (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1954. Pp. 277. \$3.50.)

The title of this book could well have been reversed since it is truly the story of an indomitable Admiral. It is a record of a victory over red tape, inertia, incredible engineering problems and prejudice, accomplished by a man of vision with an irresistible sense of urgency, and with lots of help.

The youthful author spent nearly two years in the submarine service. After further education following the war, he became a Pentagon correspondent of *Time-Life*. He has been diligent in his documentation. However, his obvious bias so strongly in favor of the title personality of the book casts doubt on the objectivity with which he has selected and presented his formidable array of facts and assertions. Arranged interestingly in a group near the middle of the book are sixteen poorly selected photographs. The index is complete and accurate.

The book opens with an introduction which is too long. Being also varied in topic, it tends to add to the confusion of the first of the three major parts of the book. The first part, "The Education of O²" (a somewhat coy title), covers the life and service history of Admiral Rickover. It also describes the complications and obstacles which had to be overcome before the atomic submarine could be started. This section is difficult to read because of the awkward flashback technique used, with further confusion added by the duplications found in the introduction.

The second part, "Building the Nautilus" finally straightens out the reversals of the preceding section and carries the narrative smoothly enough. It illustrates the element in the Admiral's person-

ality which made possible his tremendous accomplishment. He seems to have had a compulsive sense of urgency, which, added to his restless energy and his keen imaginative intelligence, drove him to successful completion of the task to which he had assigned himself.

"The Admirals Intervene" is a misleading title for the last part. It suggests an intervention on behalf of the atomic power project, but it turns out to be an exposition of the secret conclave method of selection used for the advancement of Naval officers. What is also involved in this, as well as in similar systems in the other services, is a disguised means of discharging officers, since retirement is an integral, if negative, part of the advancement system in the higher grades. This section reads much like an Horatio Alger story, with the hero, aided by powerful friends, finally scoring a triumph over his enemies.

The conclusion is much better than the foreword. It pulls together the scattered lines of the preceding parts and builds some unity into the book. It outlines the author's ideas of the tactical and strategic characteristics of the nuclear powered submarines now under construction and suggests future trends.

The question which seems to be raised by this story of a strong-willed introvert and his victory, is this. To what extent should credit be given to a man who refuses to be governed by the codes of manner and behavior of his social and work group, for accomplishments which could have been achieved only in the framework of the organization he rejects?

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SHORTER REVIEWS

The following books have been received for review by *Military Affairs*. Space has not permitted a more detailed evaluation of these volumes. The cooperation of their publishers is called to the especial attention of all readers.

G. J. STANSFIELD

I. *Institutions and Culture—Polar*

DUBARD, PIERRE and LUC-MARIE BAYLE: *Le*

Charcot et la Terre Adeles. (Paris: Editions France Empire, 1951. Pp. 299. 800 francs.)

This volume in French describes the three French official expeditions of 1948-49, 1949-50, 1950-51, to the Antarctic regions of Adele land. It includes photographs, sketches and maps of the expedition's activities and its popularly written French text poses little hardship for the student of the Arctic for which it is designed.

FREUCHEN, PETER: *Vagrant Viking; my life and adventures*. (New York: Julian Messner, 1953. Pp. 422. Index. \$5.00.)

The title is most apt in describing this very enjoyable autobiography of an adventurer whose experiences started with his life in what is now Thule in Northern Greenland in 1906 to Hollywood in the twenties as well as his experiences with the Nazis in Denmark during World War II to mention only a few highlights.

It is recommended for those interested in the Arctic as well as for all of those who enjoy a well narrated adventure.

FORBES, ALEXANDER: *Quest for a Northern Air Route*. Foreword by Samuel Eliot Morrison. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953. Pp. 138. \$4.00.)

In this volume Dr. Forbes describes his part in the project for the planning and establishing airfields and weather stations in the Greenland area during World War II. His interestingly narrated experiences describe his exploration and surveying for the Navy along the worst stretches of coast in North America in the Arctic region.

A distinguished physiologist, at the age of sixty, he chartered the waters of Frobisher Bay off Baffin Island and the Koksoak river and was a logical choice despite his age for such a rigorous duty since he had made a pioneer aerial survey in this region in 1931.

HENDERSON, DANIEL: *The Hidden Coasts; a biography of Admiral Charles Wilkes*. (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1953. Pp. 306. \$5.00.)

In 1840, Lt. Wilkes commanding the United States exploring expedition traversed over 1500 miles of the Antarctic coast line which formed the basis, along with the earlier discoveries of Captain Nathaniel Palmer, of our claims to this region.

During the four years of the expedition operating in wooden sailing ships, he was able to survey and correct charts not only for the polar regions, but for the Northwest Pacific coast, the South Seas Islands and the Far Eastern Archipelagoes.

As the result of his arbitrary actions and also on account of confusion over the land actually surveyed, now called Wilkes land, he was court-martialled, but was exonerated by the court. During the Civil War as a captain, Wilkes was the man who removed Mason and Slidell from the British steamer Trent. Although Wilkes became an admiral, accomplishing much during his lifetime, his great achievements have never received

the full recognition, either in his lifetime or since, that they may rightfully have deserved.

ILLINGWORTH, FRANK: *North of the Circle*. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. Pp. 254. \$4.75.)

An enjoyable description, well illustrated by photographs, of the adventures and beauties of Arctic life as seen by an English arctic expert.

II. *Institutions and Culture—Asia and Near East* BASTISTINI, LAWRENCE: *Introducing Asia*. (New York: John Day, 1953. Pp. 289. Pp. 12 notes, Pp. 4 bibli. \$3.75.)

A Yale Ph.D., the author was chief of the economic affairs division in GHQ, and later in the civil Historical Section of the SCAP in Tokyo from 1946 to 1951. Since 1951 he has been lecturing on modern history at Sophia University, Tokyo.

The volume stresses India, China, Japan, primarily and includes material on Southeast Asia and their geographical, historical, economic and cultural backgrounds as well as their current problems.

Chapter XIV describes briefly the occupation of Japan and Chapter XVI, the occupation of Korea, and the Korean War.

It admirably fulfills its purpose "in providing a concise and understandable background for those who desire a briefing on Asia, but who may not have any particular interest in more specialized reading."

Caucasian Wars

ALLEN, W. E. D. and the late PAUL MURATOFF: *Caucasian Battlefields; a history of the wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921*. (New York and London: Cambridge University Press, 1953. Pp. 636. 10 illustrations, 39 maps. Pp. 28 bibl. Index. 70s. \$14.00.)

This unusually fine example of a university press publication provides a detailed topographic and military study of the four Russo-Turkish Wars of the past century; the Russian conquest of Caucasia, 1828-29; the Caucasian theatre during the Crimean War; the War of 1877-78 and the campaigns of World War I.

It is based largely upon Turkish and Russian sources, staff histories, military journals and military memoirs and on English, German and French studies of particular campaigns. The volume's excellent maps illustrate the military topography of this region.

The authors have previously written *The Russian Campaigns, 1941-45, 1943, 1946*, and as specialists in this field have exhaustively covered

an important area of history. It unquestionably belongs in every important historical library, as well as in the private library of every military historian. Any review is inadequate since the high level of scholarship and book production techniques manifest in this volume can only be seen by a study of the book in hand.

KAZEMZADEH, FIRUZ: *The Struggle for Transcaucasia, 1917-1921, with an introduction by Michael Karpovitch.* (Oxford: George Ronald; New York: Philosophical Library, 1951, 1952. Pp. 356. \$5.75.)

This work is the author's Harvard University Ph.D. thesis and is based upon his work at the Hoover Institute, Stanford University, California. He was born in Moscow of Persian parents, thus combining knowledge of both Russian and Persian life.

FITCH, GERALDINE: *Formosa Beachhead.* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953. Pp. 267. \$3.50.)

The author, an American newspaper woman, has spent about half her life in the Far East and is an intimate friend of Generalissimo and Madam Chaing Kai Shek. The title indicates her goal that the revived island of Formosa will become the beachhead for a new "fight back to the mainland."

It presents valuable comments on American foreign policy in the Far East and supports the discussion with many specific references. It is recommended reading for all those interested in this area.

BEN GURION, DAVID: *Rebirth and Destiny of Israel, edited and translated from the Hebrew under the supervision of Mordekhai Kuroch, Minister of Israel in Australia.* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. Pp. 539. \$10.00.)

This is a collection of essays and addresses by the Prime Minister of Israel from 1915 to 1952, in which about a third of the book covers the "War of Independence." These are particularly of interest to the military student of the Middle East.

IZZEDDIN, NIJLA: *The Arab World, Past, Present and Future, foreword by William E. Hocking.* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953. Pp. 412. \$6.50.)

This volume was the History Book Club selection for January 1954, and presents the point of view of a woman who has studied at Vassar and received her Ph.D. at the University of Chicago. In her book she presents an account of the modern Arab states from Iraq to Algeria, discussing their basic economic and political situations with a brief

historical survey of developments from World War I to the present. Since Arab lands occupy such a strategic region in the Middle East those interested in this area will find here a competently written description from the Arab point of view.

PERRY, COMMODORE M. C.: *Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan under the command of Commodore M. C. Perry, United States Navy.* Compiled at his request and under his supervision by Francis L. Hakes, abridged and edited by Sidney Walloch. Foreword by Rear Admiral John B. Heffernan, USN (New York: Coward McCann, Inc., 1952. Pp. 305. \$5.00.)

The centennial of Commodore Perry's opening of Japan to the west is celebrated by this one volume editing of the 1856 edition of three volumes for the modern reader.

SCHOENFIELD, HUGH J.: *The Suez Canal in World Affairs.* (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1953. Pp. 174. \$4.50.)

The English author has previously written *Ferdinand de Lesseps, Italy and Suez*, and *The Suez Canal*, so that the background for his present work is excellent. In it he summarizes a history of the canal, including new material for World War II and he brings it up to date in 1952. The texts of important related documents and tables of canal traffic are included. For any present day reader interested in the Near East, as well as for the historian, this book is recommended.

III. Institutions and Culture—Europe

BEUKEMA, HERMAN and associates in government, *Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, 3rd edition.* (New York: Rinehart, 1953. Pp. 610. \$5.00.)

In preparing this new edition of a standard government text the authors have attempted to present an adequate though condensed analysis of all essential elements in the confused political picture of a sick world.

The main divisions include "The Study of Contemporary Foreign Governments, the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Japan" and a concluding section on "National Security and International Organization." There are questions and problems, bibliography, glossary, and an appendix of the current states constitutions.

It is a valuable and useful volume for individual reference, especially for the military student as well as for textbook use.

CZARNOINSKI, F. B.: *Can Russia Survive? An examination of the facts and figures of Soviet*

reality. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. Pp. 128. \$2.75.)

This volume was written as of April 1949, and sent to the printer in the winter of 1952. It attempts to present some of the realities behind the facade of Soviet life and later events have not entirely put this volume out of date.

HALS, HANS: *Our Love Affair with Germany*. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1953. Pp. 247. \$3.00.)

The author, an Hungarian born journalist, presents his own picture of German-American relations since Hitler's downfall. It is provocative reading and is one of the studies on post war Germany and our foreign policy which are valuable to read in understanding the American problems of the present and future.

MUHLEN, NORBERT: *The Return of Germany, a tale of two countries*. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953. Pp. 310. \$4.50.)

The German born author obtained his doctorate in political economy at the University of Munich and was an anti-Nazi for a decade. In recent years he has covered Germany for the *Readers Digest*, *New Leader*, *Commentary* and *Commonwealth*.

His excellent background for his presentation of the problems of today's east and west Germany is evident and his presentation of German problems is worth reading for the light it might shed on possible future developments.

STRAUSZ-HUPE, ROBERT: *The Zone of Indifference*. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons Co., 1952. Pp. 312. \$3.75.)

The author of the *Balance of Tomorrow* presents his views, which are based upon an examination of the American-European intellectual and moral tensions which constitute the real crises of our time. Data from the various social sciences are used in his exposition of the tasks before his readers in preserving western society intact. This book is of value to those interested in our contemporary history, particularly of Europe.

SVANDIZE, BUDU: *My Uncle Joseph Stalin, translated and with a preface by Waverly Root. Introduction by Gregory Bessedovsky, former charge d'affairs of the USSR to France*. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1953. Pp. 235. \$3.00.)

This intimate portrait by his nephew describes events in Stalin's family life as seen by the author prior to 1946.

TETENS, T. H.: *Germany Plots with the Kremlin*. (New York: Henry Schuman, 1953. Pp. 294. \$3.75.)

The author, a naturalized American of Ger-

man origin, publishes his arguments that Germany is moving toward the Soviet bloc instead of the west. Even though later events tend to discredit his line of reasoning, the volume is still worth reading since he does present a new approach as to what Germany might do.

WHITE, THEODORE S.: *Fire in the Ashes—Europe in Mid-Century*. (New York: William Sloane and Associates, 1953. Pp. 405. \$5.00.)

This Book-of-the-Month Club selection was written as of July 1953 and presents an outstanding foreign correspondent's analytical survey of modern Europe.

It is the best one volume survey of Europe from the end of World War II to 1953 that has appeared and it will continue to be of value in the future because it is concerned with longer range trends. The military man will be most interested in Chapter XIII, "The Basis of Freedom," discussing NATO. In any event, it is stimulatingly written and well worth reading at any time.

IV. National Warfare

COLBY, C. B.: *Airdrop, Men, Weapons and Cargo by Parachute; Danger-fighters, men and Ships of the U. S. Coast Guard; Ships of the Navy, Carriers, Battleships, Destroyers and Landing Craft; Submarines, Men and Ships of the U. S. Submarine Fleet*. (New York: Coward-McCoun, 1953. Pp. 48. \$1.00, each.)

These four volumes are recommended for the younger military historian since they present in large size pictures, with a long paragraph of text, the important aspects of each subject covered in these volumes.

The Engineer School, U. S. Army: History and Traditions of the Corps of Engineers. (Fort Belvoir, Va.: The Engineer School, U. S. Army, 1953. Pp. 108, apply.) (Engineer School, ROTC Special Text 25-1.)

This brief history of the corps is not intended to be definitive, but it serves as a most valuable informal narrative. Its emphasis is in telling how in crucial periods of American history when something had to be done the Corps of Engineers did it from 1775 to 1953. Thus not everything has been included and some incidents selected may not be the most important in a detailed final history of the corps.

It is recommended especially as an example of what can be accomplished in military school texts in this well illustrated account.

GREENE, LAURENCE: *The Raid, a biography of Harper's Ferry*. (New York: Henry Holt, 1953. Pp. 246. \$2.50.)

A popularly written account which will be valuable for the visitor to this historic town. The raid is, of course, John Brown's.

KEYHOE, DONALD E., Major, USMC, ret'd.: *Flying Saucers from Outer Space*. (New York: Henry Holt, 1953. Pp. 276. \$3.00.)

The author has made an intensive study of "flying saucers" and his conclusion reached upon the basis of what he feels to be introvertable evidence is that they are interplanetary in origin. He is considered to be an accurate and responsible reporter, so read the book and judge for yourself.

KIEFFER, JOHN E.: *Strategy for Survival*, cartography by H. Garver Hiller. (New York: David McKay Company, 1953. Pp. 306. \$4.00.)

Strategic problems of 1953 facing the United States in its relations with the USSR are the substance of this book. It should receive careful consideration by every military student since it represents one of the few analyses of our position from a military point of view, as well as discussing possible battlefield operations during a third World War.

KING, ERNEST J. and WHITEHILL, WALTER MUIR: *Fleet Admiral King*, a naval record. (New York: W. W. Norton, Inc., 1952. Pp. 674. \$7.50; London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1953. Pp. 482. 30s.)

Between 1941 and 1945 Fleet Admiral King served in the dual capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and also as Chief of Naval Operations which required his presence at such conferences as Casablanca, Cairo and Teheran. As C-in-C of the U. S. Fleet he was concerned with the defeat of the German submarines in the Atlantic and the Japanese Navy in the Pacific. The volume is divided into "A Sailor's Education, 1878-1917" (112 p.); "Triple Threat, 1917-1933" (133 p.); "Flag Rank, 1933-1941" (101 p.); and "Naval High Command, 1941-1945" (300 p.).

If you haven't yet read this significant historical document (which is based upon the author's memory of events as they seemed at the time) as well as his war time reports, *U. S. Navy at War, 1941-1945*, then it's time you did.

KOHE, J. MARTIN: *Your Greatest Power*. (Cleveland, O.: The Ralston Publishing Company, 1953. Pp. 61. \$1.00.)

In this inspirational little book the author discusses the power to choose and describes various areas in which it is applicable for an individual's better living.

MILLER, DENNING: *Wind, Storm and Rain*, the

story of weather. (New York: Coward McCann, 1952. Pp. 177. \$3.95.)

This volume, pleasantly written, gives the average citizen the basic interesting facts about the weather and describes them with other scientific pursuits so that learning about how nature's air mass machinery works is easily accomplished.

O'CONNOR, RICHARD: *Sheridan the Inevitable*, maps by Wilson R. Springer. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1953. Pp. 400. Pp. 30 notes. Index. \$4.50.)

A full length documented biography of one of the four greatest Union commanders based primarily upon the *Sheridan Papers* in the Library of Congress, his *Personal Memoirs* and *The War of the Rebellion . . . records*.

RICHARDSON, HELEN R., compiler: *Railroads in Defense and War*, a bibliography. (Washington: Bureau of Railway Economics Library, Association of American Railroads, 1953. Pp. 262. apply.)

This bibliography compiled by Miss Richardson, Reference Librarian, under the direction of the Librarian, Miss Elizabeth O. Cullen, covers published works, manuscripts, periodical articles and government documents dealing with railroads in defense and war from 1828 to 1953, being international in scope.

It does not include material on the U. S. Railroad Administration Publications since a 212 page bibliography was prepared in 1952 by the same author.

For those military historians who are interested in transportation this is a most valuable compilation. It is not definitive, however, since an exhaustive examination of military periodical literature was not made in its preparation. It is hoped that a supplement will be prepared to cover this area of information so that any future bibliography will need only to start where this left off.

RIKER, DOROTHY, compiler: *The Hoosier Training Ground*, a history of the Army and Navy Training centers, camps, forts, depots and other military installations within the state boundaries during World War II. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana War History Commission, 1952. Pp. Xiv, 381, maps and illustrations. \$5.00.)

This is Volume III of the series, *Indiana in World War II*, of which Volumes II and IV of the projected series have previously appeared under the general editorship of Lynn W. Turner, executive director of the commission and assistant professor of History at Indiana University.

The story of each of the military installations within the state are told by various individuals.

Miss Riker contributes over half of the accounts which vary in length and degree of completeness as material for research was available.

It is considered as an excellent example of a state historical commission's contribution to the military history of World War II.

TAYLOR, GRIFFITH, editor: *Geography in the Twentieth Century*, a study of growth, fields, techniques, aims and trends. 2nd edition, revised and enlarged. (New York: Philosophical Library; London: Methuen, 1953. Pp. 661. \$8.75.)

This is one of the most important collections of essays on geography to be published in recent years. Twenty-two authorities from the United States, England, Canada, Czechoslovakia and Poland are represented in the twenty-eight chapters. The book is divided into three parts: Evaluation of geography and its philosophical basis, the environment as a factor and special fields of geography. Among these the most important for the military reader are Chapter XII, "Geography and Arctic Lands," by A. L. Washburn; Chapter XVIII, "Geography and Empire," by Charles B. Fawcett; Chapter XXII, "Geography and Aviation," by Ellsworth Huntington; Chapter XXIII, "Geography in Practice in the Federal Government," by J. K. Rose, Chapter XXV, "Geopolitics and Geopacitics" by Griffith Taylor and Chapter XXVII, "The Geographical interpretation of Air Photography." This chapter and chapter XXVI, "Cartography," by W. W. Williams were not in the 1951 edition.

It is recommended reading for the military scholar especially since it is designed for the mature geographer.

WALLER, GEORGE M., editor: *Pearl Harbour; Roosevelt and the Coming of the War*, edited with an introduction by George M. Waller. (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1953. Pp. 112. \$1.10.)

This volume is one of the series of readings dealing with problems in American civilization selected by the Department of American studies, Amherst College. It contains seven chapters representing the leading historians and participants involved in this problem. William Henry Chamberlin, Charles Callen Tansell, Herbert Feis, Charles A. Beard, Basil Rauch, Henry L. Stimson and Cordell Hull each are so represented.

In addition there are suggestions for additional readings which discuss other books and articles directly relating to this subject.

It admirably fulfills its purpose in providing in a

form readily usable in history courses the most important facts and opinions relating to a contemporary problem and is recommended for all military libraries.

V. National Warfare—Fiction

BARKER, SHIRLEY: *Fire and the Hammer*. (New York: Crown Publishers, 1953. Pp. 339. \$3.50.)

This novel of the American Revolution is about the Doan family of Tory guerrillas that waged an independent war against its supporters in Eastern Pennsylvania and New Jersey. It is told by the heroine, Lass Marwayne, who waits ten years for the youngest of the brothers.

While many excellent historical events showing her detailed research appear it will not appeal to the masculine reader as much as to a feminine reader. In spite of the author's beautifully poetic style, it could have been a better book.

HARRIS, JOHN: *The Undaunted*. (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1953. Pp. 249. \$3.00.)

This is the American edition of the original English novel, *The Sea Shall Not Have Them*, by an author who spent six years in the service about which his novel is based, that of the Air-Sea Rescue High Speed Launches of the Royal Air Force.

The Undaunted describes the story of a total rescue operation set in motion when an R.A.F. Hudson Bomber falls into the North Sea in the fall of 1944. The characters described are those who are on the life raft, the launches' crew who finally picks them up off the German held Holland coast and the men who direct the base operations.

It is recommended for military historians as a competent portrayal of the characters and events it describes, as well as being a gripping adventure story.

HORAN, JAMES D.: *King's Rebel*. (New York: Crown Publishers, 1953. Pp. 376. \$3.75.)

Northern New York is the scene of this enjoyably written novel of the war for independence. It shows throughout the evidence of the considerable research to which the author has gone in its preparation. The hero, Captain Robert Carhampton, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, finally joins the American cause and wins his girl, but not until a detailed presentation of the border warfare in this region, including Colonel St. Leger's expedition, the Battle of Oriskany and Butler's expedition are recounted for the reader's pleasure.

It is recommended both for being a well written novel, as well as being an accurate history.

LEARY, FRANCIS: *The Swan and the Rose*. (New York: A. A. Wyn, Inc., 1953. Pp. 304. \$3.50.)

The war of the Roses and more particularly the events of the year 1471 which include the Battles of Barnet and Tewkesbury are recreated for the modern reader as well as for the student of history in this vividly written novel. The author has done extensive research into a period in which few military historians have written and the scenes evoked and the battle actions are considered historically correct. It is recommended for all readers especially for the high literary quality of the writing, as in the author's description of the Battle of Tewkesbury, from page 226 through 258.

RYAN, CHARLES W.: *Poems in a Minor Key*, illustrated by Thomas F. Penrose III. (New York: Pageant Press, 1953. Pp. 48. \$2.00.)

The title describes the 26 poems written by a navy seaman and illustrated by his shipmate.

WARD FRANK W., III: *The Ambassador*; a dramatic history of our most famous modern naval ship. (New York: Pageant Press, 1952, 53. Pp. 20. \$2.00.)

The author, a graduate of the Naval Academy in 1949, has since been honorably discharged for medical disability and is now studying at the University of Alabama. In this dramatic monologue he describes the principle facts relating to the battleship "Missouri" in free verse for the general reader.

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#Prepared by R. W. Davis and R. P. Gill.

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

ANNUAL MEETING OF AMI

The American Military Institute held its annual membership meeting in the auditorium of the National Archives Building, Washington, D. C., the evening of 22 December 1953. The president of the Institute, Brigadier General Donald Armstrong, presided. Elections were held for a new panel of Trustees for the term expiring 31 December 1956, and also for the vacancy caused by the death of Colonel Joseph I. Greene, past president and trustee. The panel for 1956 consists of the following: Colonel Frederick P. Todd, Lt. General Julian Smith, USMC, Dr. Stefan Possony, Dr. John K. Mahon, Colonel Sidney Morgan, F. W. Foster Gleason, and Sherrod East. The evening was concluded with an excellent lecture by Dr. Possony, which was well received by the not overly large but appreciative audience.

SON OF COLONEL BEUKEMA KILLED

The American Military Institute offers its condolences to its esteemed member, Colonel Herman Beukema and family, whose son, Air Force Major Henry S. Beukema, son-in-law of General Omar Bradley, was killed 19 January 1954, when his F84 Thunderjet plane crashed near Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. Major Beukema was born and reared at West Point where his father, Colonel Beukema, was Professor of History and Government. Major Beukema graduated from the Military Academy in June 1944, when he married Elizabeth Bradley, daughter of General Bradley. From 1946 to 1948, Major Beukema was assigned to the staff of General Lucius Clay in Berlin, and for the past four years he served with the Air Force Chief of Staff at the Pentagon. Surviving

Major Beukema are his wife, Elizabeth, and three small children, Henry S., Jr., 7, Bradley, 2, and Anne, 1, who until recently resided in Alexandria.

SHAW WINS \$500 PRIZE

The American Military Institute congratulates Henry I. Shaw, Jr., of Washington, D. C., and a member of the historical staff of the Marine Corps, for the merited distinction of winning the \$500 first prize in the United States Marine Corps Association's annual essay contest. Mr. Shaw, a member of the Institute, contributed the excellent article on the Penobscot Expedition of 1779, in *Military Affairs*, XVII, 2 (Summer 1953). This was the brief campaign in which the otherwise eminent Saltonstalls and Reveres were tricked by fate, and General Lovell, the contemporary militia commander, wrote in his journal, "To attempt to give a description of this terrible Day is out of my Power. It would be a fit subject for some masterly hand to describe. . ." (Esther Forbes, *Paul Revere*, p. 343.) This was the sole large scale amphibious operation attempted by American arms during the War of Independence, yet it is slighted or omitted altogether in histories of the Revolutionary Period. Mr. Shaw caught the pass from General Lovell and ran for a touchdown.

CORPS OF ENGINEERS DEDICATE MUSEUM

On 16 December 1953, the Corps of Engineers of the Army dedicated a new museum at Fort Belvoir, near Washington, D. C., with appropriate ceremonies. The museum houses exhibits of manuscripts, photographs, relics, weapons, flags, portraits, and the like, depicting the history of the Engineer Corps. Included are sketches and maps of fortifica-

tions and defensive positions built by the engineers in the Civil War and the War of 1812. Also on exhibition are gifts from allied nations which have used the training facilities of the School. The documents relate to the growth of the Engineers since 1745.

THE SIGNAL CORPS HISTORICAL DIVISION

The Signal Corps Historical Division continues as its principal activity work on the World War II history of the Signal Corps, which when completed will comprise three volumes. Volume I, *The Emergency*, by Dr. Dulaney Terrett, former chief of the division; and Volume II, *The Test*, in which Dr. George R. Thompson, the present chief of the division, Mrs. Dixie R. Harris, Miss Pauline Oakes, formerly of the division, and Dr. Terrett, have collaborated. At the same time work proceeds on Volume III, tentatively entitled *The Outcome*. Dr. Thompson and Mrs. Harris are the co-authors of this volume.

The division is in the preliminary stages of developing a contemporary historical program for the purpose of channeling historical materials to it for use in preparing the required periodical historical summaries, a volume covering the Korean War, and such supplementary histories as may be required in the future. Some liaison work in this connection has been initiated with Miss Helen Phillips of the Historical Branch and Museum at the Signal Corps Center, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.

A history of the Signal Corps insignia and a monograph on Signal Corps schools and training, the latter as a part of the general history of the Signal Corps since the end of World War II, have been initiated and assigned.

The division continues to be called upon from time to time to respond to special requests. One such, minor but interesting request was from the 13th Air Force in the

Philippine Islands for a picture of Major H. M. Clark, after whom Clark Field was named. With the help of the Army Pictorial Service, Signal Corps, and the National Archives, a photograph was located showing Clark as a 2nd Lieutenant in front of an airplane at the Signal Corps Aviation School in 1916.

Of some potential significance was the preparation for the Office of Technical Liaison, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, of a list of Signal Corps units in World Wars I and II, and in the Korean War, which would be suitable for publication and use for unit morale purposes. This survey indicated that more attention should be given to unit histories.

In response to another request, the division recently reviewed for the Office of Technical Liaison, OCSigO, a popularized history of the Signal Corps. This is intended for use, in segments, for morale and allied purposes, in Signal Corps publications.

The division, which has had no recent personnel changes, is located in the Signal Corps Intelligence Agency, Room 3054, Main Navy Building, Washington 25, D. C.

ADMIRAL NOMURA AT ARLINGTON

Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, Japan's ambassador to the United States at the time of Pearl Harbor, made an unexpected appearance at the 1953 Armistice Day ceremonies in Arlington National Cemetery, across the Potomac from Washington. The aging but erect Japanese naval and diplomatic leader was at first not recognized, but finally a reporter requested an American Legion official to escort him to a seat in the beautiful amphitheatre. The old sea dog said that he was "no longer an admiral, no longer an ambassador," just an old friend who wanted to be at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and then visit the former home of General Robert E. Lee.

HISTORICAL PROGRAM OF THE ARMY MEDICAL SERVICE*

The Army Medical Service, in keeping with its tradition of producing a comprehensive history of Army medicine for major wars in which the United States has engaged—a tradition dating from the Civil War—is preparing for World War II a history broad in scope and designed to attract readers both lay and professional. Until that war no other branch of the Army had attempted—or at least completed—any similar record of its activities, but with the formulation of an extensive historical program covering all phases of Army action during 1939-45, the entire Army is now covered by the program. The medical project has been partially absorbed in the general program, to the extent that four volumes of medical history will appear in the ninety (90) volume series, *The United States Army in World War II*, now being produced under the supervision of the Office, Chief of Military History. According to present plans these four volumes will constitute only a small part of the entire medical history which as now conceived embraces the production of numerous additional volumes. It is contemplated that the medical history will comprise 8 or 9 volumes on administrative subjects (organization and administration, personnel, training, supply, hospitalization and evacuation, research organization, and administrative aspects of professional care), plus some 27 volumes mainly on clinical subjects. The latter group will include (the figures are subject to change) 11 volumes on surgery, 6 on preventive medicine, 3 on internal medicine, and 1 each on dentistry, veterinary medicine, reconditioning, physical standards for inductees, neuropsychiatry and wound ballistics. Of the volumes planned for the clinical series, one (*Physiologic Effects of Wounds* [1952]) has so far been published. Work on the

others is in various stages of completion. Three volumes of the administrative series, dealing with organization and administration, personnel, and hospitalization and evacuation in the Zone of Interior, will be ready within the next few months for final editing by the Office, Chief of Military History, as part of its general history.

A Historical Unit, physically located in the Office of the Surgeon General of the Army, Main Navy Building, Washington 25, D. C., has charge of the project. Its staff of historians, directed by Dr. Donald O. Wagner, is responsible for the administrative volumes of the series. Its editors prepare for publication the work of contributors to the clinical volumes, who are for the most part former Medical Service officers now engaged in private practice and scattered widely about the country. The dispersion of the clinical writers and the fact that they serve voluntarily, without pay, while occupied mainly with their professional duties, raises numerous problems of coordination. Some of these have been solved by appointing subeditors in various fields who plan the contents of certain volumes and keep in close touch with the contributors. Central control, however, as well as much of the detailed supervision, remains in the hands of the Chief Editor, Col. Calvin H. Goddard, MC, head of the Historical Unit.

Within the past two years the Historical Unit has also undertaken to write a history of Army medical administration since the end of World War II as its contribution to a current history program sponsored by the Office, Chief of Military History. The ultimate size and scope of the medical portion of the history are not fully settled, but as now planned will consist of one or two general volumes together with a number of monographs on special topics. Considerable spadework has been done on this enterprise, including several monographs by a historian

*The Army Medical Service and the Signal Corps historical programs compiled by Paul J. Sheips.

in the Korean theater. Publication, however, is still some distance in the future.

The Washington staff of medical historians includes, at of December 1953, Blanche B. Armfield, Max Levin, John H. McMinn, Chester L. Kieffer, William K. Daum, Marian Francis, Zelma McIlvaine, Hubert Potter, Doris Walther, Betty-Kyle Wall, and Clarence M. K. Smith.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA VETS MAGAZINE

Eight years ago, in 1946, an ex-GI started work on a hobby—publishing a news sheet for former members of his old Army outfit which served two years in India.

Today that news sheet has grown into a slick-page magazine that is keeping alive wartime friendships of thousands of veterans of the China-Burma-India theatre of operations.

Editor Clarence Gordon reports that *Ex-CBI Roundup* magazine now runs from 32 to 48 pages, is published monthly, and has a circulation of over 7,000. It is filled with overseas photographs, letters from the ex-GI's and interesting actual experience stories contributed by men and women who once served at the end of the world's longest supply line.

A free sample copy of the magazine is available to any CBI veteran by writing *Ex-CBI Roundup*, Postal Box 1769, Denver 1, Colo.

MAJOR GENERAL JOHN H. HUGHES

Just before going to press Thomas W. Hughes of New York City advises us that his brother, a member of the American Military Institute, Major General John H. Hughes, USA Ret., of 1025 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Washington, D. C., died 6 August 1953, in the national capital. The Institute expresses its deepest regret and condolences on the passing of its honored member.

THE BUFF STICK TROPHY

The practice of rewarding the "sharpest" company in the 3d Infantry dates back to early days when the famed unit, the Army's oldest active infantry regiment, was stationed at Fort Snelling, Minnesota. Then a quarterly inspection by senior officers of the division or corps to which the regiment was assigned was carried out to determine the best company in the regiment. The winner received a trophy known as "The Banner Blue," to be displayed until won by another company. Colonel Jenna resumed the practice while in command of the unit and upon his departure for a new assignment, presented the "Buff Stick," which was inspired by 3d Infantrymen in the days shortly after the War of 1812. At the time, soldiers of the regiment used to fashion a buffer from a piece of wood to which they attached a scrap of leather and used it to polish the Buttons of their uniforms. Soon the name "buff stick" was applied to a soldier whose equipment was in exceptionally bright and excellent condition. Gradually the 3d Infantry Regiment became universally known as "the Buff Sticks" due to the continual smartness and soldierly appearance of its members.

ASSOCIATION OF MILITARY SURGEONS

The Association of Military Surgeons of the United States held their 1953 annual meeting in Washington, D. C., 9-11 November. This Association, founded in 1891 is a medical society devoted to the advancement of all phases of military medicine in all the armed forces. Its membership includes some of the world's outstanding military physicians, surgeons, and allied scientists. A number of leading medical scientists from principal foreign countries attended, and a colorful ceremony was held in the Presidential Ballroom of the Statler Hotel in honor of the distinguished delegates from abroad.



ROBERT FULTON AND THE FRENCH INVASION OF ENGLAND

By DAVID WHITTET THOMSON

IN a letter written in July, 1804, from the camp of the Grand Armée at Boulogne to one of his councillors of state Napoleon Bonaparte said: "I have just read the project of Citizen Fulton, engineer, which you have sent me much too late, since it is one that may change the face of the world. . ."

What was Citizen Fulton's great project? It was nothing less than a plan to invade England by towing a fleet of landing barges across the Channel with steam tugs. And that was not Fulton's only scheme to defeat England in the long war with France. He had also proposed to attack the British fleet with submarines and torpedoes and to blockade the British Isles with a mine barrage in the English Channel.

Fulton is familiar enough to us as a steam-boat inventor, but he is less well known in the role of international munitions salesman. His presence in France in 1797, when he began his career as a trafficker in instruments of death was purely accidental. He had left his native Lancaster, Pennsylvania, as a boy to begin his apprenticeship to a jeweller in Philadelphia. He soon abandoned his workbench to become a miniature painter. When he had made a little money he sailed for England to study art in London under Benjamin West, the president of the Royal Academy. His talents as a painter were very slender. In 1793, at the age of twenty-eight, he was forced to earn his living in some other way. With no formal training, but with a great deal of ambition, self-confidence and native ability he became an engineer.

It would seem that he was also hired by

American mill owners to make surreptitious drawings of British mass production textile machines which were prohibited by law from being exported from England. He became interested in canal construction and spent three years at "various canals in England, to obtain practical knowledge on the manner of constructing them and to make myself familiar with their advantages, and to become well acquainted with some of the best engineers." The fruit of this experience was a treatise on canal construction which was of no great value and attracted virtually no attention. In June, 1794, he availed himself of the extremely lax patent laws of the period by obtaining a patent on an invention for raising and lowering canal boats without the use of locks. This device, which was known as the inclined plane, had already been patented by an engineer named Leech. About a year or so earlier Fulton had made the acquaintance of Charles, Lord Stanhope, who was engaged in constructing a canal between the English and the Bristol channels. Fulton suggested to Stanhope that locks might be dispensed with on his canal by using inclined planes and that steamboats might be driven by paddle-wheels. Lord Stanhope had no use for either the inclined plane or the paddle-wheels.

Fulton had some idea of building a steam-boat himself—he wrote to Boulton and Watt, the great English engine-makers, asking for an estimate on the price of a marine engine, and he talked about steamboat designs with the Rev. Dr. Edmund Cartwright, the inventor of the power loom and of a new type of

engine—but he never had money enough to carry his thoughts into the sphere of reality. During his early days in England, Fulton was never more than three steps away from starvation. Not until April, 1797, when he sold a one-quarter interest in his inclined plane for about \$7,500, did Fulton so much as put his foot in the door of prosperity.

Fulton's partner decided that it was desirable to have a French patent on the inclined plane. Taking advantage of a short Franco-British armistice Fulton sailed for France in the spring of 1797. He intended to obtain the patent, return to London before Christmas and immediately sail for the United States where he had excellent prospects of being employed as an engineer by a canal company.

In Paris Fulton met Joel Barlow, the future American minister to France, and Mrs. Barlow, who became a second father and mother to him. Instead of going back to America, Fulton lived with the Barlows at No. 50 Rue de Vaugirard for a number of years. Joel Barlow was the author of reams of tiresome, uninspired verse and of stacks of dreary political essays. He was also a shrewd businessman and bond-market speculator as well as a diplomatist. He aided Fulton to complete his education, lent him money, assisted him in his various experiments and sagely advised him in his dealings with the French Government. It is not too much to say that without the help and encouragement of Joel Barlow, Fulton might be no more today than a name in some catalogue of obscure XVIIIth century artists.

When Fulton arrived in France he was a passive disciple of Adam Smith and philosophically an admirer of the French Revolution. After associating with the Barlows for a while, Fulton took a deep and abiding interest in world affairs. He became a militant free trader and an ardent revolutionist. He came to believe that if the British navy could be driven from the seas trade would flow freely and without hindrance between the nations of

the world and that an era of universal peace and prosperity would ensue. He later amended this opinion to include the destruction of all the navies of the world. To make everything really perfect, he decided that it was necessary for France to conquer England and establish an English republic in alliance with the French Republic.

During the years 1797-1801 Fulton constructed a small, manually powered submarine which worked very well and a torpedo which was reasonably effective. This submarine was built partly at his own expense and partly with the help of loans from Barlow. Fulton had a great deal of difficulty in extracting money from the French Government. Eventually, after an interview with the First Consul, Napoleon Bonaparte, he was assisted with a grant of several thousand francs.

Fulton's torpedo was a copper cannister which held a large quantity of gunpowder. He intended to tow the torpedo at the end of a long line, dive under an enemy warship in his submarine and pull the torpedo under her hull where it would explode on contact. Fulton actually tried to sink two vessels of the British Channel Squadron in this manner in September, 1800. However, this submarine, which he called the *Nautilus*, was not fast enough to overtake a brig under sail. Also, the British had been informed of his activities by spies and were very much on their guard against torpedo attack.

When this type of submarine warfare had failed, Fulton proposed that the French navy build a fleet of submarine mine layers and with them mine not only the mouths of various English harbours, but the entire English Channel as well. This scheme was rejected by the French Minister of Marine who told Fulton that it might be attractive to the Corsairs of the Barbary Coast but that it was beneath the honor of France.

Early in the year 1802, Fulton was introduced to Robert R. Livingston in Paris, "and

they formed that friendship and connection with each other, to which a similarity of pursuits generally gives birth. . . ." Livingston says that he "communicated to Mr. Fulton the importance of steam boats . . . of what had been attempted in America . . . and advised him to turn his attention to the subject."

For more than a century the Livingstons had been great landowners and political chieftains in New York. After graduating from King's College (Columbia University) in 1765 at the age of nineteen, Robert R. Livingston studied law and followed the family pattern by embarking upon a career in politics. He was one of the leaders of the American Revolution, and from 1777 to 1801 held the highest judicial office in the state of New York, that of Chancellor. His greatest and most enduring accomplishments are that he helped to write both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States. How does a personage like this become involved in the sweat, grime and heartbreak of invention? Well, Livingston appears to have been infected with the steamboat fever by his brother-in-law, Colonel John Stevens.

Stevens had his business and political affairs in Trenton, Philadelphia and New York. He was also the proprietor of the ferry between South Amboy and Manhattan. Stevens realized from personal experience that quick and convenient transportation was one of the young republic's most pressing needs. Stevens and Livingston were interested in the steamboats which were built in 1786-1790 by James Rumsey, by John Fitch and by Samuel Morey. Neither Stevens nor Livingston had sufficient faith in any one of these inventors to join forces with him. Fitch, however, had something that Livingston coveted: a monopoly of steam navigation in the state of New York.

Stevens attempted, unsuccessfully, to construct his own steamboat. Later, he assisted

Livingston and Nicholas J. Roosevelt in building another steamboat. While this vessel was still on the stocks Livingston put his political influence to work and had the New York state legislature transfer to him, in March, 1798, John Fitch's steamboat monopoly on the ground that "the said John Fitch is either dead or hath withdrawn himself from this State without having made any attempt in the space of more than ten years for executing the plan for which he secured an exclusive privilege.

While a thirty ton steamboat, called the *Polacca*, was being built at Roosevelt's engineering works near Newark, New Jersey, John Stevens suggested that she be driven by paddles at the stern; Roosevelt pleaded with Livingston to employ side paddle wheels. The Chancellor was adamant about retaining his own system of jet propulsion: "a horizontal wheel placed in a well in the bottom of a boat, which communicated with the water at its centre, and when whirled rapidly round propelled the water by its centrifugal force, through an aperture at the stern."

It was no surprise to Roosevelt and Stevens when the vessel crawled only a short distance up the Passaic river in October, 1798, at about three miles an hour. The boat was so lightly and cheaply constructed that she nearly fell apart from the vibration of the engine. Numerous changes were then made in the *Polacca's* machinery, and experiments were conducted with her until late in the summer of 1800, but since she never attained a speed greater than three miles an hour, Livingston "relinquished the project for the moment, resolving whenever his public avocations gave him leisure, to pursue it."

The following year Livingston was appointed Minister to France, where he helped to negotiate the Louisiana Purchase, and where he made the acquaintance of a young man named Robert Fulton. The meeting with Livingston was a most fortunate one for Ful-

ton, Livingston had the political influence to protect a steamship line from competition while it was struggling for existence, the money to finance it by himself without being hampered by timid partners, and a sufficient knowledge of steamboat construction to stimulate Fulton's interest in one of the most important inventions of the age.

After testing a clockwork powered model boat which was driven, in turn, by a screw propeller, a duck-foot paddle, an endless chain of paddles and by paddle wheels, Fulton came to the conclusion that the latter were the best of all. Fulton's precise mathematical calculations on steam propulsion fill many a folio page. His scientifically conducted and recorded experiments convinced Livingston that Mr. Fulton "had developed the true principles upon which steamboats should be built, and for want of knowing which" all previous inventors had failed. Livingston and Fulton entered into partnership on October 10, 1802, for the purpose of building passenger steamers in America.

To try out his ideas and in the hope of making a quick profit by selling his invention to the French government, Fulton began the construction of a side-wheel steamboat in the early part of the year 1803. An eight horsepower engine was borrowed from a French industrialist named Jacques Perier; the boiler and other machinery were made by Etienne Calla, a celebrated Parisian mechanic, at his atelier in the Rue Fauberg St. Denis. Beyond the fact that her paddle wheels were twelve feet in diameter, few details of the vessel's construction are available. The steamboat was ready for her trial run on the Seine in the spring of 1803. One night disaster struck. During a gale of wind the weight of the engine racked the hull and snapped her in two. The engine was not seriously damaged, but the vessel had to be almost completely rebuilt. Naturally, this incident did not improve the government's suspicious at-

titude towards steamboats.

While the vessel was approaching completion Fulton wrote this humorous letter to Fulner Skipwith, the American consul general, who had recently become a father: "*My dear friend*, You have experienced all the anxiety of a fond father, on a child's coming into the world. So have I . . . my little boy, who is all bones and corners, just like his daddy, and whose birth has given me much uneasiness, or rather anxiety,—is just learning to walk, and I hope in time he will be an active runner. I therefore have the honour to invite you and the ladies to see his first movements on Monday next from 6 to 9 in the evening between the Barrière des Bons Hommes and the . . . [Quai Chaillot]. May our children, my friend, be an honour to their country and a comfort to the gray hairs of their doting parents."

On August 9, 1803, Fulton's new boat, which was approximately 74 feet long, eight in beam and three in depth, steamed several times up and down a short stretch of the Seine. A French newspaper of the time hailed the experiment as a great success and mentioned that the voyage had been witnessed by a number of savants and representatives of the French Institute who would "doubtless . . . make a report which will give to this discovery all the eclat which it merits." There was no eclat so far as Fulton himself was concerned. The failure of the craft to make more than three miles an hour was a grave disappointment to him. He ordered a more powerful engine from Boulton and Watt. He was informed that no steam engine could be exported from England without a special license. While waiting for the American Minister to the Court of St. James's, Thomas Jefferson, to obtain this permit for him, Fulton made arrangements to sell his torpedo designs to the Royal Navy.

Fulton had previously sent Napoleon Bonaparte the plan for invading England by hav-

ing seagoing steamers tow a fleet of landing barges across the Channel. Bonaparte's former secretary, L. A. F. de Bourrienne, reports that the First Consul cast the papers aside, exclaiming: "Bah! These projectors are all either intriguers or visionaries. Don't trouble me about the business!"

This cavalier refusal even to look at Fulton's plan does not ring true. I doubt very much whether Bonaparte would have been so utterly contemptuous of any scheme for the invasion of England.

In August, 1807, during the first voyage of Fulton's steamboat from Albany to New York, the inventor remarked to one of his passengers, a well known French botanist named Francois André Michaux, that he would always regret that France had not made use of steamboats to carry out the "great enterprize" of invading England.

Michaux says that Fulton had presented his plan to the Minister of Marine, the Minister of War and finally to the Academy of Sciences. He was well received everywhere and everywhere he received the same answers: the government did not have money enough to build things like steamboats, moreover, no steam engine could possibly drive a boat at a useful speed. During a walk from one ministry to another, with his portfolio under his arm, Fulton went to see Carnot, the "organizer of victory" of the early days of the revolution. Carnot could offer nothing but sympathy and encouragement, for he was no longer a member of the government. "If I still had the honor to be Minister of War," said Carnot, "I would not hesitate a moment to give you the means to make your experiment, for I understand all the means of its action, and foresee the immense results for the future."

Michaux quotes Fulton as saying that "since you are about to return to France have the goodness to call upon M. Carnot for me, and tell him that I shall never forget the kind

reception which he gave me; and . . . tell him that I shall always feel the deepest regret that France did not profit by my offers for the great enterprise which her government then meditated." The Emperor, Michaux adds, "had collected together an immense army at Boulogne, and had, to effect his debarcation, built a great number of vessels of all sizes. If, then, Mr. Carnot had still been Minister of War, and twenty steamboats had been constructed in a few months by Mr. Fulton, what might we not augur for the success of the enterprise? Then, without question, would France have become the first nation of the globe."

In 1804, Napoleon Bonaparte's boast, "Let us be masters of the Channel for six hours and we are masters of the world," loomed over England like a thunderhead. But the world was spared an attempt at a further extension of Napoleonic tyranny simply because one of Bonaparte's ministers neglected to send him Fulton's steamboat invasion plan.

If Bonaparte was ill-served, Henry Addington was not. The British government had no use for a steamboat, but there were other reasons why the Prime Minister took care to be well-informed concerning the activities of Robert Fulton.

In October, 1811, because of the hostility of the French minister of Marine, Fulton had been forced to put aside his cherished plan for the submarine blockade of England and to give up his work on the submarine. Sometime after the treaty of peace between France and England was signed at Amiens in March, 1802, Fulton had written to his old friend Earl Stanhope, giving him "general Ideas of my plan and experiments." On May 13, 1802, at a secret session of the House of Lords, Stanhope spoke with great anxiety regarding the submarine. In 1803 he formed a committee which made a report to the Prime Minister on "the principles and powers" of the invention. His Majesty's Government thereupon

sent a secret agent to Fulton with an invitation to come to England and explain his theories of submarine warfare. Fulton was astonished. "There must be some mistake," he objected. It is "neither the interest nor policy of the British government to introduce such a Vessel into practice." That might be true, the agent replied, but the Ministry wished to be fully acquainted with Fulton's inventions and preferred to have him working for England rather than against her. The negotiations between Fulton and the Addington Ministry took up a full year.

By some chance Fulton's steamboat invasion plan was at last submitted to Napoleon Bonaparte at Boulogne. He at once dictated a letter, dated July 21, 1804, to Champagny, a councillor of state in the Marine Department: "I have just read the project of Citizen Fulton, engineer, which you have sent me much too late, since it is one that may change the face of the world. Be that as it may, I desire that you immediately confide its examination to a Commission. . . A great truth, a physical, palpable truth is before my eyes. It will be for these gentlemen to try and seize it and see it. . . Try and let the whole be concluded within eight days, as I am impatient."

But it was too late for Bonaparte to be impatient. Fulton was no longer in France. Prime Minister Henry Addington had enticed him into the service of King George III with the payment of a £10,000 retainer, a salary of £200 a month, and the promise of the immense sum of £40,000 (\$200,000), "for demonstrating the principles, and making over the entire possession of his submarine mode of attack."

On that morning in July, 1804, while Fulton was preparing to turn his torpedoes against France and Bonaparte was thinking of invading England with steamboats, the white tents of the Grand Armée covered the hills of Boulogne. Along the French coast

facing England, from Etaples to Boulogne to Dunkerque, 120,000 men—horse, foot and artillery—daily carried out mock landing operations from 1300 corvettes, gun-brigs, pin-naces and flat-bottomed boats. The French army of invasion was equipped, trained and ready. Could Fulton's steamboats have towed them across the Channel?

I would like to end right here with a splendid flourish by saying that but for the ignorance, stupidity, prejudice, and procrastination of Napoleon Bonaparte's cabinet ministers England could have been invaded with a flotilla of steamboats, that if England had been defeated Napoleon Bonaparte would undoubtedly have conquered all of Europe and that a Bonaparte might still rule as Emperor of the French. Unfortunately that is a completely false conclusion. It does not take into account certain inescapable facts.

It is quite probable that with the entire resources of the French Empire at his command Fulton could have constructed, within a year or less, a sufficient number of steamboats to carry Bonaparte's army across the Channel. However, to escape an attack by the Royal Navy, this operation would have had to be carried out in a few hours during a period when the sea was smooth and the winds so light and variable that no sailing vessel could engage the steam flotilla. As almost everyone knows, light winds and smooth seas do not often prevail in the Channel. But since they do exist on rare occasions it is barely possible that the steam flotilla might have been able to carry out the invasion of England while the mighty British fleet lay helplessly becalmed. But could the steam flotilla have continued to supply the French army once it had landed in England? That is less than probable. With one breath of wind the British frigates would have been among the steamboats like wolves among a flock of sheep.

A hasty appraisal of steam versus sail in the early years of the XIXth century might

lead us to conclude that a fleet of steam warships could have swept the seas of every frigate and ship of the line that opposed it. Actually, the reverse is true. The steam engines that would have been available to Fulton in France in 1804 were so inefficient that a great, heavy timbered steam warship laden with heavy guns and burdened with a huge and weighty engine would have wallowed through the ocean at a much lower speed than a sailing craft of the same size and fighting power. To invade England with steamboats Fulton would have had to sacrifice armament and protection to speed—and that, I think, would have been an invitation to disaster.

If Bonaparte had attempted to invade England in the summer of 1805 his steam flotilla would almost certainly have been sent to the bottom of the Channel and the flower of his army destroyed. Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, would have been driven from power in 1805 instead of 1815, there need have been no Trafalgar, no invasion of Russia, no Waterloo, and Europe would have been spared ten calamitous years of war. What a pity the British bribed Fulton to leave France—he might have guided Napoleon Bonaparte straight into the jaws of ruin.

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BUCHANAN AND THE CHIRIQUI NAVAL STATION SITES

BY PAUL J. SCHEIPS*

EDITOR'S NOTE: This paper will be of primary interest to readers of *MILITARY AFFAIRS* in two principal ways: one, it sets forth the interests of the Buchanan Administration in naval stations and a railroad to connect them in a region which for more than 100 years has been viewed as of strategic importance for the United States; and, two, it contributes to the history of exploration under United States naval and military auspices. In general it documents a little-known phase of the history of the Isthmian interests of the United States, interests giving rise to a separate and important foreign policy—a policy, as Professor Rippey describes it, of United States domination of the Gulf and Caribbean area “to the extent required (or deemed necessary) to prevent its domination by any other first-rate power”—which in the present dangerous age still commands considerable attention from military and diplomatic officials.

I

When the comprehensive study of the interoceanic canal sites of the American Isthmus was made from 1945 to 1947, one of the routes studied, undoubtedly to the surprise of some persons, was a route from Chiriqui Lagoon to the Gulf of Chiriqui, but detailed figures for a canal by this route were not worked out because of the excessive height of the continental divide which it crossed.¹

This is the most recent evidence of the United States Government's interest in the strategic aspects of a region to which the Buchanan Administration gave attention almost 100 years ago. After Buchanan, Presi-

dent Lincoln was greatly interested in the same region, perhaps in part for strategic reasons, but primarily as a site for colonizing freed Negroes.² Still later, when French canal interests turned their attention to Panama, there was under the Hayes Administration renewed interest in the Chiriqui region's strategic character, but there were no concrete results even though \$200,000 were appropriated for Isthmian naval stations.³

II


When President Buchanan assumed office in 1857 a United States citizen, Ambrose W. Thompson, and the Chiriqui Improvement Company (hereafter referred to as the Chiriqui Company), of which Thompson was the mainspring, claimed title to lands on both sides of the Isthmus. The claim was that

*The author is presently associated with the Signal Corps Historical Division, Department of the Army.

¹See the *Report of the Governor of the Panama Canal under Public Law 280, 79th Congress, 1st Session* (“Isthmian Canal Studies—1947” consisting of a text and folio of 8 plates, supplemented by 8 annexes and 21 appendices; Balboa Heights, C. Z., 1947), Appendix 2 (*Routes Investigated*), Pt. IX. Substantial portions of this report, exclusive of parts relating to security considerations, are available for use at the Engineering Societies Library, 29 West 39th St., New York City. The American Society of Civil Engineers has published a comprehensive summary and discussion of this report, exclusive of the parts dealing with security, for which see “Panama Canal—the Sea Level Project: Symposium: Discussion,” *Proceedings of the American Society of Civil Engineers*, LXXIV (April, 1948). James H. Stratton's “The Future and the Panama Canal,” *ibid.*, pp. 444-68, is particularly useful to the general reader. For the route of the proposed canal, see the map which accompanies this paper.

²See the present writer's “Ambrose W. Thompson: A Neglected Isthmian Promoter” (Unpublished Master's Thesis, Department of Political Science, The University of Chicago, Chicago, 1949), chap. iv; the same writer's “Lincoln and the Chiriqui Colonization Project,” *The Journal of Negro History*, XXXVII (October, 1952), 418-53; Warren A. Beck, “The Chiriqui Improvement Company and Lincoln's Plan to Colonize Slaves in Central America” (Unpublished Master's Thesis, Department of History, Wayne University, Detroit, 1948); and, also by Beck, “Lincoln and Negro Colonization in Central America,” *The Abraham Lincoln Quarterly*, VI (September, 1950), 162-83.

³See the writer's “Ambrose W. Thompson: A Neglected Isthmian Promoter,” chaps. vi-viii.



these lands met at the continental divide and thus formed "a belt . . . from ocean to ocean," enclosing Almirante Bay and Chiriqui Lagoon, now in the Republic of Panama, on the one side; and Golfito Harbor (in Golfo Dulce), now in the Republic of Costa Rica, on the other.⁴ At that time, indeed until the definitive settlement of 1941, the international boundary running through the region was disputed. Disputing it then were New Granada (later Colombia) and Costa Rica, Panama not having yet achieved its independence. At the time Thompson carried his proposition to Buchanan in 1858 he claimed that the total of the Chiriqui grants exceeded 3,000,000 acres. Although this may have been an exaggeration, the Chiriqui claims were certainly extensive; however, in the absence of careful surveys, the total acreage can never be stated with precision.⁵

In 1857 the United States Navy became interested in the Chiriqui coal deposits.⁶ In December of that year J. W. King, chief engineer of the steam frigate *Wabash*, flagship of the Home Squadron, reported to his superior, Commodore Paulding, upon the quality of the coal which the steamer *Fulton* had brought from Bocas del Toro on Chiriqui Lagoon. He tested "about five hundred pounds" of this coal, reporting that although it had been "taken from the surface" and was consequently so weathered that its "vitality" had been "nearly destroyed," it nevertheless burned "tolerably" well, "producing steam as well as some of our own coal." He found it

to be "bituminous" coal, "evidently from a superior variety, similar to the Indiana cannel," and had "no doubt of the superiority of the mine."⁷ Seven years later, after he had become Chief Engineer of the Navy, King, then in London, replied to an inquiry from Paris that his test aboard the *Wabash* had indicated that the coal in question was "of a superior order for ocean steam purposes."⁸

It is quite probable that Ambrose W. Thompson was responsible for the Navy's interest in Chiriqui coal in 1857. In any case, under date of June 1, 1858, he addressed a long memoir to President Buchanan in an effort to secure the right to carry mails between New York and California by way of the Chiriqui region and referred to certain views he had "held several months ago, when the Chiriqui route was first brought to the attention of the Administration." In this memoir he outlined the importance of the Chiriqui transit route, as he saw it, and the excellence of its harbors. One of its advantages, he claimed, was that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty did not apply to it. He consequently felt free to offer a naval-base site on Chiriqui Lagoon and one on Golfo Dulce to the United States upon good terms. If he could come to an agreement with the United States Government he proposed to make the Chiriqui crossing from the Lagoon to Golfo Dulce fit immediately "for stages or omnibuses." In this memoir Thompson went to some pains to attempt to prove that the Chiriqui route was more desirable than other Isthmian routes. After devoting several pages of his memoir to the Tehuantepec route,

⁴The Chiriqui Company's claims are shown on the map *ibid.*, Plate I.

⁵On Thompson's and the Chiriqui Company's land, road, and coal grants, see *ibid.*, chap. ii, secs. i-ii. Thompson's road grant of 1854 was for the "improvement" of the "road" from the town of David across the mountains to Chiriqui Lagoon. It appears that the next year he was authorized to extend it in a westerly direction to Golfo Dulce. The remainder of this paper largely follows *ibid.*, chap. iii.

⁶*Ibid.*, chap. i, sec. ii, contains a disinterested evaluation of the Chiriqui coal deposits, which deposits appear to be of little value.

⁷King to Paulding, December 30, 1857, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Naval Affairs, *Contract for Coal*, House Report 568 [majority report] to accompany Bill H. R. 771, May 24, 1860, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 1070, pp. 52-53.

⁸King to J. D. B. Curtis, September 9, 1864, U. S. Congress, House, *Chiriqui Grant*, Letter from the Secretary of the Navy in Response to Resolutions of the House of Representatives Relative to Certain Lands and Harbors Known as the Chiriqui Grant, House Exec. Doc. 46, 47th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 2027, pp. 77-78.

which he condemned because of its poor harbors and its unhealthfulness, Thompson rapidly dismissed the Nicaragua, Honduras, Panama, and Darién routes and concentrated upon the existing need of the United States for naval stations on both shores of the Isthmus in order "to guard and protect the property and lives" of American citizens "throughout the whole line of interoceanic communication." Only in the Chiriqui region of the Isthmus, he declared, could the United States find a combination of good harbors which could be connected with a roadway (which actually was connected, he said, by a road that only needed improvement—an exaggeration, to put it mildly); "a salubrious climate"; and "inexhaustible beds of coal." Moreover, only the Chiriqui route, he said, was free of "rival interests," which were especially notorious in the case of Tehuantepec, where the Sloo and Hargous interests were competing. Thompson said, furthermore, that the Chiriqui route was only sixty miles in length, "and its saving in distance, as between New York and California, when compared to Panama," was "over 600 miles." It even had "the advantage of the Tehuantepec route. . . ." Besides, "if the time should ever come when Cuba, Hayti and Jamaica shall belong to the United States, this must, of course, be the true route." The aggressive British were greatly interested in the Chiriqui transit and this was an additional reason why the United

States should act with dispatch. As for the French, it was said they were negotiating for the Nicaragua route. "Will the United States remain passive and indifferent to Central American affairs, while these things are transpiring there?" Thompson asked. "Now is the time to decide," he asserted.⁹

With this memoir Thompson formally carried his campaign to Washington in an effort to interest the Government in the Chiriqui holdings. Thereafter, for almost twenty-five years, he was to try repeatedly to conclude agreements with the United State Government relative to the lands and privileges which he and the Chiriqui Company claimed.

The proposals Thompson made to Buchanan in 1858 were timely. For one thing, the Panama Riot was of recent date;¹⁰ indeed, a claims convention growing out of it, the Cass-Herrán Treaty,¹¹ was pending. On July 8, 1858, it was ratified by New Granada, but only with the express understanding that it was not to include the provision for a United States coaling station in the Bay of Panama. Thompson knew that New Granada had rejected this provision and he asserted that the rejection was proof of the "immediate and absolute" necessity for obtaining coaling station rights in Chiriqui Lagoon.¹² Moreover, it was claimed, in rejecting the coaling station provision of the Cass-Herrán Treaty the New Granadian Senate suggested that the United States was free to obtain a station site on New Granadian territory through

⁹Ambrose W. Thompson, *Memoir Relating to the Isthmus Crossing at the Chiriqui Lagoon*, Addressed to the President of the United States [Buchanan], June 1, 1858 (Washington, 1858). The copy used by the writer is in the Transportation Library of the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor.

¹⁰On the Panama Riot of 1856, see, e. g., Gerstle Mack, *The Land Divided: A History of the Panama Canal and Other Isthmian Canal Projects* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1944), pp. 161-65; E. Taylor Parks, *Colombia and the United States, 1795-1934* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1935), pp. 221-24; and Hubert H. Bancroft, *History of Central America* (3 vols., Vols. V-VIII of *The Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft* [39 vols.; San Francisco: History Co., Publishers, 1875-90]), III (VIII of *The Works*), 520-22.

¹¹The text of the Cass-Herrán Treaty, as perfected, is printed in U. S. Congress, Senate, *Treaties and Conventions Concluded between the United States of America and Other Powers, Since July 4 1776 . . .* (rev. ed.; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1873), pp. 193-95. On its negotiation and conclusion, see Parks, *op. cit.*, pp. 288-300.

¹²Thompson, *Memoir Relating to the Isthmus Crossing*, p. 12n. Since this memoir is dated June 1, 1858, it appears that either Thompson's information concerned the attitude of the Government of New Granada, which had not yet been translated into formal rejection of the provision, or that the memoir was not printed on the date it carries in its title.

negotiation with private citizens who could obtain New Granadian land.¹³

Another consideration that made Thompson's proposals of 1858 timely was that the whole decade of the 1850's was one of ill relations with Great Britain over the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty,¹⁴ by which both nations agreed not to "occupy, or fortify, or colonize or assume, or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any part of Central America"; and by which they agreed "to extend their protection, by treaty stipulations, to any other practicable communications, whether by canal or railway, across the isthmus which connects North and South America."¹⁵ Both countries had hoped that this treaty might settle their differences in the strategic Isthmian region and prevent either from gaining mastery in "Central America," a term which unfortunately was left undefined. Various difficulties continued the strained relations, however, until a settlement said to be satisfactory to the United

States was announced by Buchanan in his annual message of December 1860. Meanwhile, Buchanan so strongly disliked the treaty that consideration was given to its abrogation. In such an eventuality Great Britain would have no legal ground on which to object to United States naval stations on the Isthmus. On the other hand, if the treaty were not abrogated the existing antagonism toward Great Britain might be used as motivation for securing station rights from the Chiriqui Company, whose claims derived from New Granadian grants, under circumstances different from those surrounding the United States demands in the Cass-Herrán Treaty for a station in the Bay of Panama, and, given the temper of the times, in spite of whatever obstacle the British might see in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. As noted, Thompson argued that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty did not apply to the Chiriqui region, but however that may have been, his proposals seemed worth the effort and accordingly he hurried to Buchanan with them. The reader may judge for himself in what degree the official interest of the United States revealed in these pages conflicted with her obligations under the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.

As it happened, Thompson did not get the mail contract, but after another test by the Navy of Chiriqui coal samples¹⁶ the matter was referred to Postmaster-General Aaron V. Brown, who, it was said, after "a full examination of the titles to the property held by Mr. Thompson and the Chiriqui Improvement Company, and the probable value which the route, the harbors and the coal deposits would assume to the United States," made Thompson and the Chiriqui Company an offer of \$3,000,000 for their conveyance to the United States Government. This offer

¹³See *House Report 568*, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 1070, pp. 12-13. The same statement, with slight textual differences, was also printed in *House Exec. Doc. 46*, 47th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 2027, p. 106.

¹⁴Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (4th ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1950), pp. 290-302; Richard W. Van Alstyne, "British Diplomacy and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 1850-60," *The Journal of Modern History*, XI (June 1939), 149-83; and Mary W. Williams, *Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy, 1815-1915* (Washington: American Historical Association, 1916), pp. 67-269. On the general dissatisfaction with this treaty that existed in the United States not only during the first decade of its existence but through all the following years until its final abrogation, see *ibid.*, pp. 67-310, *passim*; and Ella P. Lovett, *Negotiations for a Release from the Inter-Oceanic Obligations of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty*, A Part of a Dissertation Submitted in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Department of History, June, 1941 (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1945), entire.

¹⁵For the text of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, see *Treaties and Conventions Concluded between the United States of America and Other Powers, Since July 4, 1776*, pp. 377-80; and Henry S. Commager, *Documents of American History* (3d ed.; New York, F. S. Crofts & Co., 1945), pp. 376-27. The quotations here are from Commager.

¹⁶H. Newell to John J. Almy, September 24, 1858, *House Report 568* [majority report], 36th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 1070, p. 52.

was declined, so it was claimed, whereupon the Thompson interests were offered \$1,000,000 for a lease of coal rights and sites for naval stations and hospitals, together with the right to use Thompson's interoceanic "road" and to build a railroad. (The road was actually non-existent, but Thompson claimed the right to "improve," i.e. construct, it.) At this juncture, however, Postmaster-General Brown died and Secretary of the Navy Toucey fell heir to the matter.¹⁷

As a routine matter Toucey asked Attorney-General Jeremiah S. Black for a formal opinion concerning the validity of the titles of Thompson and the Chiriqui Company. Black's response was an unfavorable opinion, the result, perhaps, of carelessness in not providing him with all the relevant papers and documents.¹⁸ The following month, on April 8, 1859, Thompson obtained a certification of the Chiriqui Company's titles from Pedro A. Herrán, New Granada's Minister in Washington.¹⁹ Subsequently, on May 11,

1859, Black reversed his previous opinion, with the reservations, however, that the United States could not "take exclusive possession" of the properties of the Thompson interests without New Granada's consent and that Thompson's roadway grant did "not include any right to make a railroad."²⁰

Ten days later Toucey signed a conditional contract with Thompson, who acted "for himself and the Chiriqui Improvement Company," by which the United States was to have an unqualified and toll-free right-of-way over Thompson's road from Chiriqui Lagoon to Golfo Dulce for the duration of his grant, which meant that it could transport over it "officers, agents, seamen, landmen, mails, munitions, stores, troops, or any direct property of the United States. . . ." The United States was also to obtain, by its own selection, "not exceeding five thousand acres, on each side of the province or isthmus of Chiriqui as may be necessary for . . . coal depots and naval stations at the lagoon of Chiriqui and the harbor of Golfito. . . ." To these it was to secure "a good and sufficient title." There were also to be conveyed to the United States the right "to use, as harbors, the waters of the lagoons, bays, or gulfs sheltered or partially surrounded by the lands of the said Thompson or . . . Company. . . ." Finally, the United States was to secure the right "to all coal, for naval purposes, at or near the points selected for coal depots and naval stations," unless a superior coal should be found elsewhere, in which case the Government would be entitled to obtain such coal subject to a ten-cent-per-ton provincial royalty and the cost of mining and delivering it. Thompson and the Company were to receive for these grants \$300,000, but only in the event that Congress approved the contract

¹⁷"Important Considerations for Congress" [a printed document (August 9, 1861)], The Robert Todd Lincoln Collection of the Papers of Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865), 1790-1916 (Library of Congress), LII, f. 11109.

¹⁸Black to Toucey, March 14, 1859, IX *Opinions of the Attorney General of the United States* (Black) 286-91.

¹⁹Herrán represented the Granadian Confederation rather than New Granada, since from the adoption of the Constitution of 1858 until Mosquera's triumph in the revolution of 1860-62 the nation was known by the former name. For the sake of convenience, however, the term New Granada is used here in referring to the events of this era. It may be noted that Herrán has been credited with bringing Thompson and the Buchanan Administration together. See William W. Warden and Charles A. Eldridge, *The Chiriqui and Golfito Naval Stations Matter: Historical, Legal, Diplomatic, and Congressional Statement of the Case* (Washington: Gibson Bros., 1882), p. 6; and Parks, *op. cit.*, p. 274. The text of Herrán's certification is printed in *House Report 568* [majority report], 36th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 1070, pp. 32-35; *House Exec. Doc. 46*, 47th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 2027, pp. 88-90; U. S. Congress, House, *Chiriqui Commission*, Message from the President of the United States, Transmitting Reports from the Chiriqui Commission, *House Exec. Doc. 41*, 36th Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. 1097, pp. 62-64; and [Chiriqui Improvement Co.], *Chiriqui* (Washington: T. McGill & Co., Law Printers [1878], pp. 38-40.

²⁰Black to Toucey, May 11, 1859, *House Exec. Doc. 46*, 47th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 2027, p. 131; *House Report 568* [majority report], 36th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 1070, pp. 35-36; and *ibid.* [minority report], pp. 13-14.

and made "the necessary appropriations therefore at its next session"; otherwise the contract would "be void."²¹ Meanwhile, on the supposition that Congress would give its approval, the Thompson interests secured sums of money in return for assignments to be honored if the contract were approved.²²

Late in 1859 Thompson apparently decided to seek an unquestioned right to construct a railroad across the Chiriqui region, his, and apparently the Washington Government's, opinion being that such a right would not conflict with the Panama Railroad Company's monopoly of transit rights on the Isthmus of Panama, since the Isthmus in question could be said to end, it was reasoned, where the "Isthmus of Chiriqui" began.²³ As it turned out, however, Chiriqui railroad rights were denied Thompson by New Granada in 1860, probably in large part because of the influence at Bogotá of the Panama Railroad—even though Thompson had an influential friend at court in the person of United States Minister George W. Jones.²⁴

²¹English texts of this contract are printed in *House Exec. Doc. 41*, 36th Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. 1097, pp. 55-56; and in Toucey's annual report for 1859 (*Congressional Globe*, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. IV, "Appendix," p. 17). An abstract of the contract may be found in *House Report 568* [minority report], 36th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 1070, pp. 3-5.

²²For the resultant claims, which were presented both at the time the appropriation of \$200,000 for naval stations was pending in 1880 and after it had been authorized, see *House Exec. Doc. 46*, 47th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 2027, pp. 17 ff.

²³See Black to Hon. Lewis Cass, September 19, 1859, in *IX Opinions of the Attorney General of the United States* (Black) 391-92. The text of this opinion is also given in William R. Manning (ed.), *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States: Inter-American Affairs, 1831-1860* (12 vols.; Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1932-39), V (Chile and Colombia), 948, n. 1. Also see Cass to George W. Jones, May 4, 1860, *ibid.*, pp. 436-38; and Parks, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

²⁴A biographical sketch of Jones by Charles E. Payne can be found in the *Dictionary of American Biography*, X, 172-73. For his efforts on behalf of the Thompson interests and for the activities in Bogotá of the Panama Railroad's agent, Sanford, see the numerous diplomatic dispatches and notes in Manning, *op. cit.*, V, 435-36, 946-60, 984.

A more serious blow to Thompson's cause, however, was the decision of the Government of New Granada to ask the Supreme Court to annul Thompson's Chiriqui road grant of 1854, a decision it undoubtedly took partly because of resentment over the signing of the Toucey-Thompson contract by the Washington Government without at least first consulting the Bogotá officials.²⁵ The Supreme Court in Bogotá acted in accordance with the request for suspension which was made to it, and, Minister Jones being helpless although not silent, the Court handed down on May 29, 1860, a decision favorable to the New Granadian Government and the Panama Railroad Company. In its decision the Court suspended "the 2nd Art. of the law of" the State of Panama of October 6, 1855, "in as far as it adopted" the Chiriqui provincial ordinance of 1854, which had granted the road privileges to Thompson. The decision was based upon the contentions that the grant conflicted with the Panama Railroad contract in that it could not be said that Thompson's privilege was only for the improvement of an existing road, since it was the Court's belief that only "a horse trail" had existed previously and that the grant was therefore for the construction of a new road; that the Chiriqui region was a part of the Isthmus of Panama; and, finally, that the Province of Chiriqui had not had authority to make the grant in the first place.²⁶

²⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 435-36, 956-57, 959-60. It is interesting and relevant to note that the Costa Rican Minister to Washington, Luis Molina, also lodged a complaint concerning the signing of the Toucey-Thompson contract. See Molina to Seward, September 19, 1862. U. S. Department of State, *Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs* (1862), p. 899.

²⁶For the text of the appeal of Manuel A. Sanchaménte, Secretary for War and Government, to Attorney General Calvo, seeking an application to the Supreme Court for a suspension of Thompson's 1854 grant, see the English translation in Manning, *op. cit.*, V, 970-72, n. 6. An English translation of Calvo's application to the Court is printed *ibid.*, p. 970, n. 6. At that time, both Párraga, Thompson's attorney in Bogotá, and Jones, were active in Bogotá on Thompson's behalf, both of them seeking to avert the Court proceedings. See Jones's correspondence, some of it

Because of the revolutionary disturbances in New Granada, however, the court decision was not acted upon by the Senate, as required by law, until April 17, 1869, when it was finally declared effective.²⁷ There is no evidence, though, that the Thompson interests were aware of the delay. Meanwhile another chapter or two had been written in the history of the Chiriqui Company.

In face of the court decision the Thompson interests maintained that in any case they were not disturbed in their titles to the lands which had been conveyed under the road grant, since the conditions of the grant had been fulfilled in good faith; that they were not estopped from constructing a road across the lands that were indisputably theirs; and that, moreover, the decision on the road grant had "implied approval" of all the remaining provisions of the Toucey-Thompson contract²⁸—even though it was clear that the Bogotá Government did not approve of that contract. Although not pleased by Minister Jones's conduct, the Buchanan Administration maintained, even after the court decision, that Thompson's grant was valid.²⁹

enclosing communications from Párraga, *ibid.*, pp. 962-67, 968-69. The essential parts of the Supreme Court's decision are printed in English *ibid.*, pp. 969-70, n. 6; and in *The Material Facts about the Chiriqui Improvement Company's Grants. Reasons Why the Validity of the Company's Title to the Chiriqui Strip is Denied and Held to Be Void by the Government of Colombia* (n. p.; ca. 1880), pp. 15-18. Article 2 of the law of October 6, 1855, which the Court nullified to the extent that it had incorporated the Chiriqui ordinance of February 20, 1854, was a brief article containing a general declaration. Its text can be found in "Disposiciones legislativas i ejecutivas, del gobierno de la Nueva Granada, sobre creacion de el Estado de Panama," p. 79, in *Leyes del Estado de Panama, 1855-1864*. Jones informed Cass of the action of the Court in a dispatch dated May 31, 1860 (Manning, *op. cit.*, V, 969-70).

²⁷An English text of the New Granadian Senate's action is printed, with an explanation, in *The Material Facts about the Chiriqui Improvement Company's Grants*, p. 18.

²⁸See *Chiriqui Grants: Review of the Decision of the Supreme Court of New Granada* (n. p.; n.d.), Library of Congress; and *House Exec. Doc. 46, 47th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 2027*, pp. 104, 105.

²⁹Jones wrote Cass on April 4, 1860, that the Bogotá

III

On May 24, 1860, five days before the Court nullified Thompson's road grant, the House Committee on Naval Affairs, in Washington, filed a majority and a minority report on a bill to approve the Toucey-Thompson contract. The majority of the

Government was "greatly incensed at Col. [obviously A. W.] Thompson because of his sale to the U. S.," and that there also existed dissatisfaction with the United States Government for making the purchase, although he had been assured by Juan Antonio Pardo, the New Granadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, "that such was not the case" (Manning, *op. cit.*, V, 959-60). Cf. the text at n. 13, *supra*.

Cass scolded Jones on several counts. For one thing, he told him that "a more careful perusal" of the Toucey-Thompson contract would make him aware of its conditional nature. Cass also complained about letters Jones had written to various U. S. capitalists regarding opportunities in transportation in New Granada, warning him in sharp language "against the mischievous consequences which might result from making private communications to you the ground of official proceedings without the sanction of your Government. . . ." On the other hand, Cass said that Jones "was quite right in believing that the disposition of this Government is entirely friendly to the Chiriqui Company represented by Mr. Thompson." The contract which Secretary Toucey had signed was evidence of the Government's attitude. Furthermore (this was on May 4, 1860, before the court decision), the Government believed "that the Chiriqui grant" was "valid" and that the Company's title was perfect and did not, therefore, require confirmation, although it was doubtful that the road grant included the right to build a railroad. It was to secure this particular right "beyond dispute" that the Chiriqui Company, it was understood, had applied to the Government of New Granada. It was, of course, up to the latter to give or withhold its consent. In either case, Cass said, "the contract of the Navy Department with the Chiriqui Company furnishes no ground of complaint to that Republic." The President, Cass continued, hoped that a railroad would be built across the Chiriqui region; he also hoped that the Panama Railroad would continue to enjoy a "career of usefulness and prosperity" and that it would be able to secure from New Granada "all suitable facilities." It was not the duty of the U. S. Government to interfere in any conflict of interest between the two companies. Under date of November 19, 1860, some months after the court decision, Cass wrote Jones that it was Buchanan's opinion "that, upon Mr. Thompson's statement of facts, the [1854] grant [to "improve" the road from Chiriqui Lagoon to David] was a valid one regularly obtained and acted upon by him in good faith." Buchanan had therefore instructed him, Cass wrote, "to say to you that should such be your opinion upon a careful investigation of the case, you will bring the subject to the notice of the New Granadian Government and urge the fulfillment of the contract. But should the views submitted to you in reply by that Government maintain the legal objection

Committee, under the leadership of its chairman, Representative Freeman H. Morse of Maine, was enthusiastic about the project under consideration and recommended passage of the bill.³⁰ The minority of the Committee, however, composed of Representatives Charles B. Sedgwick of New York and John Schwartz of Pennsylvania, was bitterly opposed to the project, arguing, in part, that the Chiriqui Company did not hold good titles; that, in any case, Chiriqui harbor rights could not be transferred to the United States Government without New Granada's consent; that Thompson was prohibited, without New Granada's consent, from authorizing the use of his road by "the troops of any foreign government"; and that it was doubtful if the Navy would be able to obtain coal in the Chiriqui region.³¹

In the Senate, debate on the proposition to approve the Toucey-Thompson contract took place on June 18, 1860, during consideration of the Naval Appropriation Bill. The value of the Chiriqui coal deposits was questioned and attention was called to newspaper reports of the court decision nullifying Thompson's road grant. The charge was also hurled that the Chiriqui Company was a speculative concern, but in spite of opposition the Chiriqui measure passed the Senate, as the House Committee on Naval Affairs had reported it and as Senator Fessenden had offered it, with only a minor change in wording suggested by Senator Seward.³²

to this grant taken by the Supreme Court, you will immediately communicate such views to this Department and await further instructions."

The revolutionary disturbances in New Granada, however, interfered with further prosecution of the matter there. See the various dispatches in Manning, *op. cit.*, V, 435-38, 442-43, 959, 984.

³⁰For the majority report, "Contract for Coal," see *House Report 568*, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 1070.

³¹For the minority report, entitled "Contract for the Purchase of Coal," which is bound with the majority report, see *ibid.*

³²For the Senate debates at this time, see the *Congressional Globe*, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. IV, pp. 3110-12, 3113-20; and (for remarks by Senators Green,

On the following day, when the House took up consideration of the measure, Sedgwick offered a substitute for the Senate amendments to the Naval Appropriation Bill, in which form the Chiriqui measure had come from the Senate. By his substitute the Toucey-Thompson contract would be approved only upon fulfillment by the Thompson interests of certain rigid conditions, which included submission to the President of positive proof of the validity of the Chiriqui titles, of the suitability of Chiriqui coal for naval purposes, and of the construction of a railroad between Chiriqui Lagoon and Golfito. Thaddeus Stevens, like King in the Senate, thought the whole affair an attempted swindle. His proposal, that \$5,000 be appropriated so the President could appoint a commissioner to examine the route of the proposed railroad and the validity of the Chiriqui titles, as well as to report on the coal deposits and harbors of the region, set the pattern for the action soon taken.³³ Because the House refused to agree to the Senate amendments, the measure went to a committee of conference. The net result for the Chiriqui enterprise was agreement upon a proposition to appropriate \$10,000 to enable the President to order an examination and study along the lines originally proposed by Stevens.³⁴

Fessenden, and Doolittle) Warden and Eldridge, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-39, 41-44. The text of the measure reported by the majority of the House Committee on Naval Affairs, offered in the Senate by Fessenden, and then passed by the Senate, can be found in the *Congressional Globe*, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. IV, p. 3112.

³³For the House debates, see *ibid.*, pp. 3172-77. The text of Sedgwick's proposal is printed *ibid.*, p. 3172. On Stevens' attitude and proposal, see *ibid.*, p. 3173.

³⁴On the final action by the House and Senate, see *ibid.*, pp. 3177, 3181, 3191-92, 3204, 3205, 3206, 3213-14, 3215, 3221. The text of the Conference Report is *ibid.*, pp. 3204, 3215. The legislative history of the appropriation for the Chiriqui Commission was traced by Warden and Eldridge, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8. It is, however, erroneously stated therein that the sum of \$40,000 was appropriated for the investigation. The legislative authorization of the investigation, as approved by the President on June 22, 1860, is printed in the *Congressional Globe*, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. IV, "Appendix," p. 494; and is shown in an official tabulation of the appropriations made by the 36th Cong., 1st Sess., *ibid.*, p. 527.

Undoubtedly because he had failed to secure a railroad grant from New Granada and because he was aware of the Congressional interest in a railroad connecting Chiriqui Lagoon with Golfito, Thompson, through an agent, the famous Thomas Francis Meagher,³⁵ concluded a railroad contract with the Costa Rican Government on July 24, 1860, obviously taking advantage of the existing border controversy. By the terms of this contract Costa Rica granted "to Ambrose W. Thompson and his associates the exclusive right," for a period of sixty years, to build, use, and direct an interoceanic railroad, the southern terminus of which was to be "at the point most convenient between 'Punta Mala,' or 'Bahia de Coronado' . . . and the dividing line between Costa Rica and New Granada," and the northern terminus of which was to be "upon the dividing line aforesaid, in the direction of the 'Bahia del Almirante,' or the 'Lagoon of Chiriqui,' or the coast of the Atlantic, between 'Punta Uvita' or 'Caouita' [Caguita or Coaita] . . . and the dividing line

already referred to."³⁶ The termini of the proposed railroad were thus rather vaguely located. This was perhaps partly due to the unsettled nature of the boundary. It was, however, generally thought of as a railroad that would connect Bocas del Toro (or Chiriqui Lagoon, broadly speaking) and Golfito.³⁷

³⁶The decree authorizing the Costa Rican Executive Power to conclude a contract for a railroad between Bocas del Toro and Golfo Dulce, perfected July 18, 1860, is printed in an English translation in *Costa Rica-Panama Arbitration: Documents annexed to the Argument of Costa Rica before the Arbitrator Hon. Edward Douglas White, Chief Justice of the United States, under the Provisions of the Convention between the Republic of Panama, Concluded March 17, 1910* (4 vols.; Rosslyn, Va.: Commonwealth Co., Printers, 1913), II, 263; and in *House Exec. Doc. 41, 36th Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. 1097*, p. 65. It is printed in Spanish in Manuel M. de Peralta, *Limites de Costa-Rica y Colombia; nuevos documentos para la historia de su jurisdicción territorial con notas, comentarios y un examen de la cartografía de Costa-Rica y Veragua* (Madrid: Manuel Gines Hernández, impresor de la Legación de Costa-Rica, 1890), pp. 458-59; and in *Colección de las leyes, decretos y ordenes . . . de Costa-Rica en los años de 1859 y 1860*, XVI, 198. An English text of the Meagher contract is printed in *House Exec. Doc. 41, 36th Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. 1097*, pp. 66-70.

³⁷By "Bocas del Toro," as used in the decree authorizing the Costa Rican Government to enter into a railroad contract (see the n. immediately above), was probably meant the waters of Almirante Bay and Chiriqui Lagoon, or, more strictly, simply Almirante Bay, which adjoins the Lagoon. On the various applications of this geographical name, see Peralta, *Limites de Costa-Rica y Colombia: nuevos documentos*, p. 636. The geographical points of reference used in the contract were "as . . . laid down in Kiepert's map," but just which one of Kiepert's maps was not specified. Punta Coaita is shown, however, on the map by H. Kiepert, which appears in *Zeitschrift für allgemeine Erdkunde* (n.f.), II (1857), Plate 4; and in the map accompanying Manuel M. de Peralta, *Exposé des droits territoriaux de la République de Costa Rica soumis à S. E. M. le président de la République française arbitre de la question des limites entre Costa Rica et Colombia* (Paris: [Achever d'imprimer pour la Légation de Costa Rica], 1898), opp. p. 376. Kiepert, in the map of his just referred to, placed all of Almirante Bay and Chiriqui Lagoon within the frontiers of New Granada and all of Golfo Dulce within those of Costa Rica. If, therefore, he had this boundary in mind, there was some justification for the observation of Representative John S. Phelps, as he was opposing the Chiriqui project in the House, January 31, 1861, that "this [rail]road [provided for in the Meagher contract] is one which will not have its terminus at Chiriqui lagoon, but to the northwest of it" (*Congressional Globe*, 36th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. I, p. 673). One might wish that the wording of the contract had been more precise.

³⁵On Meagher's life see Claude G. Bowers, *The Irish Orators: A History of Ireland's Fight for Freedom* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1916), pp. 328-72; Michael Cavanagh, *Memoirs of General Thomas Francis Meagher, Comprising the Leading Events of His Career Chronologically Arranged, with Selections from His Speeches, Lectures and Miscellaneous Writings, Including Personal Reminiscences* (Worcester, Mass.: Messenger Press, 1892); W. F. Lyons, *Brigadier-General Thomas Francis Meagher: His Political and Military Career; with Selections from His Writings* (New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co., 1870); and the sketch by Charles D. Rhodes, *Dictionary of American Biography*, XII, 481-82. Meagher apparently made his first trip to Costa Rica in 1858, travelling with Ramón Páez, the son of the famous Venezuelan, José Antonio Páez. See Lyons, *op. cit.*, p. 23; and Francisco María Núñez, *Iniciación y desarrollo las vías de comunicación y empresa de transportes en Costa Rica: estudio historico escrito con ocasion de celebrarse el centenario Jesus Jiménez* (San José: Imprenta nacional, 1924). Meagher described his and Páez's Costa Rican travels of 1858 in a series of articles which he wrote for *Harper's New Monthly Magazine*. See his "Holidays in Costa Rica," *ibid.*, XX (December, 1859; January, 1860; and February, 1860), 18-33, 45-64, 304-25. These articles, Bowers has written, "possess a magic charm" (Bowers, *op. cit.*, p. 361). In 1923 they were translated by Ricardo Fernández Guardia and published in Spanish under the title *Vacaciones en Costa Rica* (Núñez, *op. cit.*, p. 31, n. 1).

It is unnecessary to give any more provisions of the Meagher contract here, since, although according to Peralta the contract lapsed because of the grantee's failure to comply with its terms,³⁸ actually the Costa Rican Congress failed to approve it and it was thereafter largely forgotten. The Costa Rican Congress acted through a law promulgated July 31, 1861,³⁹ some months after the report of the Chiriqui Commission had been published with the text of the contract appended.⁴⁰ It is interesting to note that although the Costa Rican Government granted a contract for an interoceanic railroad to John C. Frémont and others in 1866⁴¹ and to Edward Reilly and other United States citizens in 1869,⁴² modern railroad construction did not get under way in Costa Rica until after approval was given on August 18, 1871, to a contract with the famous railroad builder Henry Meiggs for a railway from Limón to San José and from San José to Alajuela.⁴³

Meanwhile, on August 4, 1860, following adjournment of the first session of the Thirty-sixth Congress, Thompson, again acting for himself and the Chiriqui Company, and Secretary Toucey signed a supplementary contract, which took into consideration the existing condition of the Chiriqui project. According to Representatives Phelps, who read

³⁸Peralta, *Limites de Costa-Rica y Colombia: nuevos documentos*, p. 357.

³⁹*Coleccion de los leyes, decretos y ordenes . . . de Costa-Rica, en los años de 1861 y 1862*, XVII, 51-52.

⁴⁰*House Exec. Doc. 41, 36th Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. 1097*, pp. 66-70.

⁴¹See *Coleccion de los leyes decretos y ordenes . . . de Costa-Rica, en los años de 1867 y 1868*, XVII [XXI], 7-33. A copy of this contract was sent to Secretary Seward by Minister A. G. Lawrence, February 10, 1867, but it was not published (*Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs* [1867], II, 279). The contract is mentioned in J. Fred Rippey, *Latin America and the Industrial Age* (2d ed.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1947), p. 122; and in Núñez, *op. cit.*, pp. 66, 281, 302.

⁴²*Ibid.*, pp. 66, 281-82; and Rippey, *op. cit.*, p. 122. The text of this contract, in an English translation, can be found in *British and Foreign State Papers*, LXI, 567-74.

⁴³Núñez, *op. cit.*, pp. 67 ff., 302-3; and Rippey *op. cit.*, pp. 122-24.

this supplementary agreement into the record during House debate on January 31, 1861, in the second session of the Thirty-sixth Congress, its provisions were as follows:

It having been agreed during the last session of Congress that the time limited by this contract, within which Congress should approve it and make the necessary appropriations therefor, should be extended to the end of the next session [the original contract had been conditioned upon approval at the first session of the Thirty-sixth Congress], it is now, in fulfillment thereof agreed and endorsed on both parts of the original contract, that such extension shall take place, and the time is hereby extended accordingly. And it is further agreed, that the United States shall have the full benefit, for the purpose of this contract, of any grant or contract which the said Ambrose W. Thompson or the said Chiriqui Improvement Company, has obtained, or shall obtain, from the Government of Costa Rica, for a railroad between the Gulf of Golfito Dulce [*sic*] and the Chiriqui Lagoon, or any part of the way between those places or between any other points on the Atlantic and Pacific.⁴⁴

But, like the Meagher contract, the Toucey-Thompson contract was never approved. This was not, however, the fault of the Chiriqui Commission which was sent to conduct an examination of the Chiriqui region.

IV

The investigation of the Chiriqui region, authorized by Congress, was made by a Naval expedition in late 1860. The expedition, under the command of Captain Frederick Engle, U.S.N.,⁴⁵ shipped in the *Brooklyn*, under command of Captain, soon to be Admiral, David G. Farragut. According to Loyall Farragut, the assignment was distasteful to his father, who outranked Engle in point of service, and although the elder Farragut protested the assignment the protest was not honored until the expedition had been at work

⁴⁴*Congressional Globe*, 36th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. I, p. 673. According to Phelps, this supplementary contract had not been published previously.

⁴⁵For a brief sketch of Engle's life (1799-1868), see *Appleton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography*, II, 337.

on the Isthmus for some time.⁴⁶ Rather detailed preliminary reports were submitted by December 1, 1860;⁴⁷ the final reports were submitted the following January.⁴⁸

The reports of the Chiriqui Commission were enthusiastic. Engle's own report, dated January 6, 1861, did little more than refer Secretary Toucey to the individual reports of the officers in charge of the topographical, hydrographical, and geological work of the Commission. He did, however, take the occasion to make a few observations. The Chiriqui harbors, he said, were "incomparable"; the coal deposits of the region, especially those along the Changuinola River, were "abundant, as well as of an excellent quality for commercial purposes"; and a railroad across the region between Chiriqui Lagoon and Golfito was undoubtedly feasible in the opinion of the topographical engineer.⁴⁹

Lieutenant James Saint Clair Morton, a young West Point-trained engineer,⁵⁰ was the officer in charge of the topographical and railroad-survey work of the Commission. His report, dated January 16, 1861, was the longest of the several reports submitted through Engle.⁵¹ He hired a guide and left Chiriqui Lagoon for the interior by the Guaromo route which the natives used in crossing the mountains. His object was to find the cañon or pass through the mountains which had been reported by young Ambrose Thompson, who had visited the region some months before and who accompanied the Engle expedi-

tion with the permission of the Secretary of the Navy.⁵² Although Meagher, who wrote an article for *Harper's* after making a trip across the mountains from David to Chiriqui Lagoon (apparently on his trip to Costa Rica in 1860), was enthusiastic about young Thompson's discovery,⁵³ the impression is gained from Morton's report that the region named by Thompson was found to be impracticable for a passage through the mountains.⁵⁴

It seems significant that Morton did not mention the "road" that the Thompson interests claimed they had improved under Thompson's grant in 1854. The Indians were accustomed to make the trip from Fish Creek on Chiriqui Lagoon to Caldera, over the Guaromo route, packing about eighty-four pounds, in four or five days. On the second day out, Morton said, the way led "for about four hours" along the river bed. It is apropos to note, too, Meagher's observation that the trip over the mountains was made only "four or five times a year at most," that it required "the services of competent guides," and that he found the way quite arduous in the region of the divide.⁵⁵

Morton's plan was to take his entire party into the mountains and then divide it, half of it examining the Pacific slope. On the way back to Chiriqui Lagoon he planned to verify the results of the Atlantic party, but owing to a misinterpretation of his instructions, the Atlantic party, under his assistant, Wilson, left most of its work for Morton to do. Meanwhile, however, Morton worked his way down-

⁴⁶See Loyal Farragut, *The Life of David Glasgow Farragut, First Admiral of the United States, Embodying His Journal and Letters* (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1879), pp. 200-1.

⁴⁷For these preliminary reports, see "The Chiriqui Survey Report of the Government Expedition. Capt. Frederick Engle," *New York Herald*, December 8, 1860, p. 10. A news summary of them can be found *ibid.*, p. 7.

⁴⁸These are printed in *House Exec. Doc. 41*, 36th Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. 1097.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 2-4.

⁵⁰For a sketch of Morton's life, see *Appleton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography*, IV, 433.

⁵¹For Morton's report, see *House Exec. Doc. 41*, 36th Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. 1097, pp. 4-42.

⁵²*Ibid.*, p. 5. What part, if any, the younger Thompson played in the Naval survey is not stated in the published report.

⁵³Thomas F. Meagher, "The New Route through Chiriqui," *Harper's New Monthly Magazine*, XXII (January, 1861), 208. This article, *ibid.*, pp. 198-209, is largely a descriptive account, brilliantly written, of Meagher's travelling companions and of his trip over the mountains from David to Frenchman's Creek on Chiriqui Lagoon.

⁵⁴*House Exec. Doc. 41*, 36th Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. 1097, p. 7.

⁵⁵Meagher, "The New Route through Chiriqui," *loc. cit.*, pp. 205-207.

ward and across the savanna on the Pacific slope. More than half the Province of Chiriqui, he reported, was situated in the savanna country which swept to the Pacific from an altitude of about 1,500 feet at the foot of the mountains. From Caldera he proceeded via David and Alanje to the coast, which he followed all the way to Golfito. Golfito, he thought, resembled "a mountain lake." After examining the practically impassable swampy territory lying between Golfito and the Chiriqui Viejo River to the east he returned to Golfito, where he met Lieutenant Jeffers, who was in charge of the expedition's hydrographical surveys. Morton reported that he was courteously received by the Costa Rican Governor of Golfo Dulce, whose jurisdiction, according to Costa Rica's claims, embraced all the territory as far east as a line running "from Punta Burica across the isthmus tangent to Cape Valiente, on Chiriqui Lagoon." The return trip to the Province of Chiriqui and the savanna country east of the Chiriqui Viejo River was made along the coast by canoe. Proceeding inland via the Chiriqui Viejo River, Morton landed and marched to "Bogaba" (apparently Bugaba), Boqueron, Dolega, and the Caldera cañon. Proceeding from that point he discovered a pass in the shadow of Monte Horqueta which led to the Atlantic slope. Because of the demands on his time as a result of Wilson's failure, Morton did not survey westward from the vicinity of "Bogaba" to the Chiriqui Viejo, thus leaving a "hiatus of some ten miles" in the plat of his survey.

The chief purpose of Morton's topographical survey was to determine whether or not it was practicable to build a railroad from Chiriqui Lagoon across the Isthmus to Golfito. His conclusion was that it was quite practicable, and he devoted a substantial part of his report to a description of the location of the railroad he proposed and to supporting it with a technical exposition of his plan for

a "mountain-top" road that would economically utilize steep grades and relatively sharp curves. Unfortunately, however, his map was not printed with his report and it is very difficult, if not impossible, to locate with precision on the maps available at this writing some of the key geographical points which he mentioned in describing his surveys and proposed railroad route. Suffice it to say that he proposed to run it from Golfito Harbor to a point on the Chiriqui Viejo River, from that point across the savanna via Boqueron to the Cochea River apparently just north of Dolega, and from there to the pass near Monte Horqueta which he had selected to carry the railroad to the precipitous Atlantic slope, where, he said, "in seven and a quarter miles" the road would descend "4,209 feet" to the coastal area across which it could run to the mouth of Frenchman's Creek on Chiriqui Lagoon.⁵⁶

In concluding his report Morton indicated that if the railroad were decided upon it would probably be found desirable to cut a tunnel to join the Pacific and Atlantic slopes, for by "less than four miles of excavation" 2,200 feet of altitude could be avoided. He accompanied his report with, among other documents, a map,⁵⁷ a profile, and thirty

⁵⁶An approximation of Morton's proposed railway route, as well as the route he took from Chiriqui Lagoon across the divide at the beginning of his survey, was plotted on a map from available information for the Isthmian Canal Studies of 1947. This is the principal source for the map accompanying the present study.

⁵⁷Admiral Davis apparently later searched for this map in the War Department and, not finding it, concluded that Morton had "left no map, journal or notebook in the archives" of that department. Davis nevertheless showed his "conception of the route recommended for a railroad by the Chiriqui Commission" on a map of the Isthmus with which he accompanied his report, but his map indicated that the "route would appear to cross the Isthmus west of Volcan de Chiriqui," whereas it probably "passes east of the volcano" (*Isthmian Canal Studies—1947*, Appendix 2, Pt. IX, p. 121, as cited in full *supra*, n. 1). Since the Chiriqui Commission was sent out under the auspices of the Navy Department, it would seem reasonable to look for Morton's map in the Navy archives. If a search was made while the Isthmian Canal Studies of 1947 were under way, the map was apparently not found, since no such map was used in

sketches which he had made "of the coast between David and the head of Golfo Dulce, and of the vicinity of the termini on both sides," but none of these latter items was printed with his report. Finally, he explained that any "defects of style, arrangement, and perspicuity" which might be noticed in his map and other documents were the result of the short time in which he had to complete his work. It may be said that as he had only two months for the entire survey, as he had to make practically the entire survey himself, and as the Government had not provided him with adequate funds, Morton turned in a highly creditable piece of work.⁵⁸

The hydrographic surveys were made for the Chiriqui Commission by Lieutenant William Nicholson Jeffers, U. S. N., who was afterwards, 1873-1881, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance.⁵⁹ Jeffers stated in his report to Engle⁶⁰ that, because of the reputation of the British naval officer, Barnett, who had charted Chiriqui Lagoon two decades earlier, he had thought it necessary only "to recover several of the prominent points of the [Barnett] survey, and from them fix the posi-

tions of the additional soundings," which had then been plotted directly upon Barnett's published chart. Jeffers reported that only a few changes had taken place in the entrances to the Lagoon, none of them substantial. "In short," he said, "no finer harbors than these can be found. . . ."

From Chiriqui Lagoon Jeffers proceeded to Golfito by way of Panama. He reached his destination after a delay of more than a month, and set to work to make the first regular survey of Golfito, where the United Fruit Company has built a modern harbor in recent years. He found it a "beautiful harbor," one "unsurpassed in natural facilities." Along the shore he found "one level spot sufficient for the site of a large town," while "the several valleys running back from the shore" would provide, together, "about a square mile of suitable building sites."

In his concluding remarks Jeffers reported that he had aided Morton, who had arrived at Golfito "in a state of destitution." (Morton reported that Jeffers had shared his provisions with him and lent him "\$100 out of his private funds.") Jeffers also testified to the extent of Costa Rica's territorial claims in the region and reported that the Costa Rican Governor of Golfo Dulce had requested his aid "in apprehending some lawless characters at Punta Arenitas. . . ." Finally, he wrote:

The only remaining point to be considered is the grant of land to the United States government, under the contract with the Chiriqui Improvement Company. If the road should be opened, I am of the opinion that the lands would become very valuable. Without that condition they are valueless, as large tracts of vacant land can be obtained by the process of denouncement, gratis.

The last of the three technical reports which comprised the findings of the Chiriqui Commission was made by the Commission's geologist,⁶¹ Dr. John Evans, who was an ex-

compiling the one published (see the n. immediately above). For Davis' report, see U. S. Congress, Senate, *Letter of the Secretary of the Navy, Communicating . . . a Report of Rear Admiral Charles H. Davis, Superintendent of the Naval Observatory, in Relation to the Various Proposed Lines for Inter-oceanic Canals and Railroads between the Waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans*, Sen. Exec. Doc. 62, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 1238, pp. 5-6.

⁵⁸When the Republic of Panama "completed a highway location survey from the city of David to a point approximately 1.2 miles beyond the Continental Divide" in 1945, with a view to building a highway to the Caribbean from David via the present railhead at Boquete (along the route Thompson had the right to "improve" under the road ordinance of 1854), it became evident that the line of the proposed highway would pass "west of Mount Horqueta, which is along the route recommended for a railroad by the Chiriqui Commission of 1861. . . ." (*Isthmian Canal Studies—1947*, Appendix 2, Pt. IX, p. 123).

⁵⁹For a sketch of Jeffers' life (1824-83), see the essay by Allan Westcott in the *Dictionary of American Biography*, X, 14.

⁶⁰Jeffers' report, dated January 22, 1861, is printed in *House Exec. Doc. 41*, 36th Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. 1097, pp. 42-45.

⁶¹This report, dated December 31, 1860, is printed *ibid.*, pp. 45-55; also see, for a portion of this report, [Chiriqui Improvement Co.], *Chiriqui*, pp. 24-31.

pert in his field. (He had served on the United States geological surveys of Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, and Nebraska.⁶²) It was Evans' task "to ascertain the extent and value of the coal deposits on the lands of the Chiriqui Improvement Company," but in his report he found occasion to touch upon other topics. The coal specimens which he collected he had analyzed by "Dr. Charles T. Jackson, of Boston, Massachusetts"; and he also had the fossils associated with the coal examined by paleontological experts to determine the true geological age of the deposits. The coal, he said, proved to be of better quality than he had stated in his preliminary report,⁶³ for Jackson had written him "that it is obvious, from the qualities and composition of the Chiriqui coal, that it is well suited for steam navigation and all ordinary uses, and it is a nice, clean coal for grates. It produces heat with great rapidity . . . while the coke is of good quality. . . ." As an authority, however, Jackson may have been an unfortunate choice.⁶⁴

Evans declared that this coal kindled "with ease" and that steam could be raised "in about one-third the time required in the use of anthracite." Furthermore, he said, the samples which Jackson had analyzed were surface specimens, some of which had been covered by salt water at high tide. Mining experience proved, according to Evans, that coal improved in quality as deeper veins were

⁶²For a sketch of Evans' life (1812-61) and accomplishments, see *Appleton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography*, II, 383; also see [Chiriqui Improvement Co.], *Chiriqui*, p. 14.

⁶³*Ibid.*, p. 24; but cf. n.6, *supra*, and the reference there.

⁶⁴Jackson had written Evans on December 15, 1860. See *House Exec. Doc. 41*, 36th Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. 1097, p. 45. The Jackson referred to was probably Charles Thomas Jackson, "an erratic and versatile genius," who was at once a physician, chemist, and geologist. It is not irrelevant to note that "his estimate of the possible value of the [Rhode Island] coal beds" was "vastly overdrawn." See the rather extended sketch of Jackson's life (1805-80), during the last seven years of which he was insane, by George P. Merrill and John F. Fulton in the *Dictionary of American Biography*, IX, 536-38.

exploited. Besides, he said, this Chiriqui coal was "almost entirely free from sulphur and iron pyrites." The field from which his specimens had come was "extensive and almost inexhaustible"; indeed, he was enthusiastic, for this coal field was

at the largest and safest harbor on the Atlantic coast, opposite to another harbor on the Pacific capable of receiving at safe anchorage all the shipping engaged in commerce between Europe and Asia, with a country rich in mineral resources; tropical fruits in abundance; with every variety of soil and climate as you ascend the mountain ranges; abundance of turtle and fish in the waters adjacent; plenty of game on the main land, the islands in the lagoon, and on the Pacific coast; with three practicable railroad routes across the Cordilleras, in addition to the cañon route surveyed by Lieutenant Morton, as I can state from personal observation, affording the best connexion for the commerce of the two oceans,⁶⁵ this country offers a wide field for American enterprise, and is well worthy of the patronage of the government.

Chiriqui coal fields, Evans said, had "all the marked characteristics of brown coal," and were "good illustrations of the conditions required for bituminization [*sic*] of vegetable matters, so as to make true bituminous coals." According to Evans' report specimens of coal were taken from tributaries of the Changui-nola River. The coal field in this direction, he stated, continued "further to the northwest, but no opportunity was afforded for further explorations." The coal on Pope's Island,

⁶⁵In his covering report Engle said that, "if there had been sufficient time, Lieutenant Morton would have been directed to examine and survey the other passes designated by Dr. Evans" as passes "with lower grades than the one surveyed," for Evans' "twelve years' experience" as a "government geologist and surveyor in the Rocky Mountains entitles his opinion to consideration" (*House Exec. Doc. 41*, 36th Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. 1097, p. 4). It may be noted here that Morton appended to his report some remarks concerning a more direct route between Chiriqui Lagoon and Golfo. This route, which he thought deserved a survey, was a more westerly route and was about twenty-five miles shorter than the route he actually proposed. This possible alternative route, he said, was the one used by the Terraba Indians on their travels from the Golfo Dulce region to Bocas del Toro. The Guaromo route, he thought, was the poorest of the three routes. See *ibid.*, pp. 33, 34-35; and, for the Guaromo route, the map which accompanies this paper.

where specimens were also collected, was "of great commercial importance" by reason of its accessibility. The seams dipped under water and the coal here resembled "the brown coal of the western States." He thought that, "judging from the associated rocks exhibited along the shores, the coal formation must occupy the entire island." Specimens were also obtained from other coal mines and from Cultivation Creek in Shepherd's Harbor. Interestingly enough, Morel, one of the original grantees and an agent and director of the Chiriqui Company, accompanied Evans "to the coal localities," and, as Evans reported it, "but for his information it would have required a much longer time to complete the examinations than was placed at my disposal."

It appears that an element of guesswork entered into Evans' conclusions concerning the Chiriqui coal deposits; perhaps this was not his fault, however, but a result of a lack of funds and of time to make a more thorough examination. Yet it would seem that scientific caution might have induced him to be a little more restrained in some of his remarks and might have caused him to call attention to the difficulties of mining coal in the vicinity of water. As noted, it was perhaps unfortunate that Jackson was asked to make the analysis; moreover, Morel was surely not a disinterested guide.

V

Under date of January 22, 1861, Secretary Toucey transmitted the various reports of the Chiriqui Commission to President Buchanan, at the same time calling attention to the directives which the act of June 22, 1860, had given the Commission. On the same day Buchanan transmitted the reports to the House of Representatives.⁶⁶ Meanwhile, Congressional debate on the Chiriqui project began once again, when the Senate took the matter up on January 17, 1861, and accepted

a proposition to approve the Toucey-Thompson contract while considering the Deficiency Bill.⁶⁷ The House debated the matter on January 31 and on February 1, 2, and 4, but rejected the Senate action.⁶⁸ Because of the opposition of the House it was decided in a conference committee to drop the Chiriqui rider from the Deficiency Bill. Both houses agreed to this move,⁶⁹ but Senator Green found it possible on February 25 to offer an amendment to approve the Toucey-Thompson contract, with some alterations favorable to the Government, to the pending Civil Appropriation Bill. This amendment was lost, however, when Fessenden, although in favor of the Chiriqui project, told the Senate he intended to vote against Green's proposal because the inflexible opposition of the House to the project would endanger the appropriation bill (for which he was responsible) as long as it carried a provision to approve the Chiriqui project.⁷⁰ Thus, as Buchanan's term of office expired, Congress withheld approval of the Toucey-Thompson contract.

The principal speech in behalf of the Chiriqui project in the debates of early 1861 was made by Representative Morse who spoke on February 4, arguing that the United States would derive real advantages from the Chiriqui coal deposits, from the excellent harbors of the region, and from the proposed railroad. For transporting freight between the oceans the Chiriqui route was superior to all others, in his opinion. The Panama route could never serve as more than a passenger transit because of its lack of good harbors. The United States, he explained, would first secure naval station rights from

⁶⁷For the Senate debates at this time, see the *Congressional Globe*, 36th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. I pp. 422-23, 425.

⁶⁸For the House debates at this time, see *ibid.*, pp. 671-77, 692-96, 715, 716-18, 730-35. For Morse's long speech, see *ibid.*, "Appendix," pp. 289-93.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, Pt. I, p. 946.

⁷⁰On Green's proposal, the debate it provoked, and its defeat, see *ibid.*, p. 984; and *ibid.*, Pt. II, pp. 1120-21, 1172-73, 1174-75. The text of Green's proposal is printed *ibid.*, pp. 1120, 1172.

⁶⁶*House Exec. Doc. 41*, 36th Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. 1097, p. 1.

the Chiriqui Company and *then* would apply for permission to use them. If New Granada refused to approve United States ownership of the station sites, Morse seemed to say, then the latter could secure a perpetual lease from the Company—apparently whether New Granada approved or not. Morse's address was an able defense of the Thompson interests and, in spite of the fact that he did not mention the court decision on the Thompson road grant, his address was probably the best single one ever made in Congress in favor of the Thompson interests and the Government's utilization of the Chiriqui region. Other outspoken advocates of the project in the House at this time were Representatives Sickles and Scott of New York and California, who expressed the animus felt by the mercantile interests of the East and West Coasts towards the Panama Railroad Company because of its high rate schedule. (Senators Hunter and Fessenden also favored the project because it would break the monopoly of the Panama Railroad.)

Perhaps the most interesting single development at this time was Sedgwick's announcement that he now favored the Chiriqui project, although earlier, with Schwartz (now dead), he had bitterly opposed it and had signed the minority report of the House Committee on Naval Affairs. The favorable report of the Chiriqui Commission, he said, had persuaded him to change his stand, and because of that report he now believed the Government was obliged to execute the Toucey-Thompson contract. Senator Clark of New Hampshire was also persuaded to favor the project by the reports of the Commission. Green's arguments in favor of his proposal were mostly similar to others that had been made but, in addition, he argued that the court decision (overlooked or ignored in the House) had been rendered only by the exercise of an excess of authority; however, in any case, he said, the decision had

only invalidated the right to build a railroad.

Opposition to the Toucey-Thompson contract was voiced in the Senate by Pearce, who said he was dissatisfied with the Chiriqui titles and with the reports of the coal deposits. He had obtained a copy of the court decision and, in his opinion, the land grants provided for in Thompson's Chiriqui road ordinance had fallen with the road grant, although he believed the coal rights still stood. Senator Hale thought the Panama Railroad and the Chiriqui project were both "jobs." Senator Anthony opposed the project on the grounds of the financial difficulties which the Nation faced. As a matter of fact, this objection was heard more than once in the House debates. Other objections raised in the House were that Thompson had no right to construct a railroad under his Chiriqui grant (the court decision not being mentioned), that United States troops could not be transported across any Chiriqui transit, that Costa Rica had not yet approved the Meagher contract, that the Chiriqui terrain was too rugged for railroad construction, that the President could not be trusted to provide suitable regulations to guarantee the execution of the contract, and that Thompson himself was a slippery character.

The approaching Civil War and the consequent distractions and difficulties of the period perhaps accounted for the refusal of Congress to approve the Toucey-Thompson contract in the last months of Buchanan's term. At any rate, such was the explanation which the Thompson interests gave, though it was their claim "that the virtual approval of the . . . contract by Congress was completed by the satisfactory report of the [Chiriqui] commission."⁷¹ Rapprochement with Great Britain does not seem to have been a factor.

⁷¹See A. W. Thompson's statement as enclosed with a letter from W. W. Warden, an attorney for the Chiriqui Company, to the President [Hayes], May 22, 1877, *House Exec. Doc. 46*, 47th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 2027, pp. 27-28.

THE FIGHT FOR A YOUNG ARMY

By ALBERT A. BLUM*

AS World War II progressed, John Doe, age twenty, proved more of an answer to a company commander's dream of a good soldier than did Tom Smith, age forty. The twenty-year old was more likely to be physically fit, not restrained by family ties, and of generally higher morale. The older man, on the other hand, was more likely to be beset with physical ills, troubled by family worries, morose about the present, and despondent about his future in the military service. Because of his longer experience, the older man probably was working at an essential job. A desire for a young army prompted the War Department into action. It supported the reduction of the draft age through legislation, and eventually did not accept for induction men over thirty-eight. In fact, it released large numbers of these older soldiers back to civilian life.¹

As part of this attempt to keep the Army young, the War Department late in 1942 urged President Roosevelt to stop the draft of men over thirty-eight. These men are "of doubtful military value," Under Secretary of War Robert Patterson wrote the President. "As a rule, they must undergo a longer period of conditioning, they retard the training program, and their sick and hospitalization rate is relatively high." He based his request on Public Law 360, passed on 20 December 1941, which gave the Presi-

dent the authority to defer men by age groups from military service. Two days later, President Roosevelt ordered the Selective Service System to stop the induction of this age group, and thus wiped out a possible 6.4 million men from the military manpower pool.²

Once the flow of the unwanted supply of men over thirty-eight was stopped, the War Department on 7 December 1942 made provision for the discharge from the service of those in that age group already in the service. To be discharged, the following requirements had to be fulfilled. The enlisted man

(a) [had] voluntarily requested discharge in writing to his immediate Commanding Officer.

(b) [was] handicapped by his advanced age, thirty-eight years and over, to such an extent that his usefulness to the Army [was] secondary to that of industry (c) [had] presented satisfactory evidence that he [would] be employed in an essential war industry, including agriculture, if he was discharged from the Army.³

Two months later, the War Department revised the circular to remove the qualification that men over thirty-eight had to be "handicapped" or unable satisfactorily to perform military service. The new circular also made clear the type of evidence necessary to ensure that the released soldier truly intended to return to an essential job. The appellant for discharge had to produce either a letter or statement from a prospective employer, the United States Employment Service, a farm agent, or another responsible person. The

*This article is a part of the author's doctoral dissertation at Columbia University, entitled *Deferment from Military Service*, written when serving in the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army.

¹Memorandum (Memo), Director, Military Personnel Division for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, 11 Sept. 1942, Subject: Induction of 18 and 19 Year Old Registrants in SPGA 327 General 9-11-42; Special Service Division, 24 March 1943, "What Soldiers Think About Combat . . ." in Dorr files, Army, Age of and Manpower Problems.

²Letter, Patterson to Roosevelt, 3 December 1942 in Under Secretary of War's files, Misc and Sub, Selective Service, Training, etc.; Selective Service System, Monograph No. 9, *Age in the Selective Service Process* (Washington, 1949), p. 55, hereafter cited as *Age in the SS Process*.

³War Department Circular Number 397, 7 December 1942.

more lax provisions of this circular caused the number of discharges to increase from an accumulated total of 47,588 through February, 1943 to an accumulated total of 136,462 on 31 March and 185,834 on 30 April. The number discharged during the entire year totaled 195,000.⁴

The provisions for more detailed information concerning future employment came as a result of the failure of many of the discharged men to work at essential jobs. But even with these more vigorous requirements the War Manpower Commission and others continued critical of the failure to make sure that these discharged soldiers were placed at essential jobs.⁵

As a result of such criticisms, the War Department again changed the procedures. By War Department Circular No. 92, 3 April 1943, the soldiers over thirty-eight no longer could be discharged, but instead were transferred to the Enlisted Reserve Corps. As a result, if they did not remain at their essential work, the Selective Service System, which had to approve the release in the first place, could call them back to active duty. By 31 January 1944, over 64,000 men in this age bracket were in the Enlisted Reserve Corps. But even this system did not work too smoothly. By 1 July 1944 the special program for those over thirty-eight came to an end though all applications for transfers to the reserves before that date could still be processed.⁶

By releasing more than 275,000 soldiers over thirty-eight between February and May

1943 and by not inducting men in that age group (the Director of Selective Service, Major General Lewis R. Hershey, estimated that about 400,000 men were not inducted for that reason during the same period), the "old" soldier indeed appeared to be fading away.⁷

Besides striving to rid itself of "old" soldiers, the War Department kept a steady pressure on a somewhat unwilling Congress to lower the draft age first from twenty-one to twenty, than from twenty to eighteen. "American youth is our strength," Secretary of War Henry Stimson wrote Senator Robert Reynolds, "and despite our wishful thinking or the dictates of our hearts, the virility of our war effort must take precedence." The military fully agreed with the Army's Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, when he declared that "older men ought to be in defense plants with the machines [while] . . . younger men [ought to be] in the Army."⁸

Many members of Congress, however, hesitated about lowering the draft age. Political pressure to protect the young was mixed with desire of some to keep the Army small plus the feeling that the burdens of war should not fall upon one age group but upon all. Late in 1942, a bill was proposed in Congress to lower the age of the draft from twenty to eighteen. Attempts were made to include a restriction in the bill against the use in battle of men under twenty until

⁶Memo, The Adjutant General for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, 13 Mar 44, Sub: Discharge of . . . Enlisted Reserve Corps, 38 Years and *passim*, in AG 326.22, 27 Jan 43 (1).

⁷Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, 78 Congress, 1st Session, *Hearings on S763, Married Men Exemption* (1943), pp. 41, 129, 181-182.

⁸Letter, Stimson to Reynolds, 13 Oct 42, in Stimson files, Selective Service; Letter, Stimson to May, 13 December 1941, in House, Committee on Military Affairs, 77 Congress, 1 Session, *Hearings on HR 6215, Amending the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940* (December, 1941), pp. 2-3; Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, 77 Congress, 2 Session, *Hearings on S2748, Lowering the Draft Age to 18 Years* (Oct 1942), p. 6.

⁴War Department Circular Number 39, 4 February 1943, cited in *Age in the SS Process*, pp. 59-60; Director of Selective Service, Fourth Report, *Selective Service and Victory* (Washington, 1948), p. 156.

⁵Memo, Chief, Manpower Branch for Capt. John Browne, 8 January 1943, Sub: Release of Military Personnel 38 Years of Age and Over in Army Service Forces files, Industrial Personnel Division, Selective Service Misc. In same file see Assistant Chief, Manpower Branch, for Major John Molean, 21 Jan. 43, Sub: Release of Soldiers Over 38 Years of Age; and Memo, Maj. Molean for James Mitchell, 17 Feb 43, Sub: Discharge of Soldiers Over 38 Years Old.

they had finished at least twelve months of training. This proposal Marshall condemned, and it was discarded. Members of the War Department felt pessimistic about the possibility of passage of the bill to lower the draft age until after the election was held on 3 November 1942. Their fears proved justified as Congress waited until ten days after the election returns were in before lowering the draft age to eighteen. Still, public rancor against drafting the very young was never allayed and it was often released in protest whenever a young man was killed in battle.⁹

Even after the lowering of the draft age, the average age of soldiers continued to be high—by the beginning of 1944, the average soldier was over twenty-five years of age while the average sailor was two years younger. In addition, the Army complained of being under-strength. Several steps had to be taken: young men from units in the states had to be shipped overseas; the Army Specialized Training Program to train soldiers at college had to be broken up and the soldiers sent mainly to infantry units; and the Army began to call upon the President and the Selective Service System to have those young men who were still deferred drafted into the service.¹⁰

The War Department's concern with the

age of its soldiers reached a peak just before the Army reached its authorized strength. Since all it would need were replacements, why not, the Army reasoned, induct only those below twenty-six and let the remainder continue to be deferred or move to essential jobs. Unfortunately for Army plans, nearly all physically fit men under twenty-six had been called into service except for those already receiving occupational deferments. Since local boards continually hesitated to draft farmers, the problem became one of discovering a shifting process whereby the most essential industrial workers could be separated from the less essential. It was this problem which remained of utmost concern to all the manpower agencies throughout the remainder of the war.¹¹

To Marshall, the solution to this double-edged problem was to draft young men under twenty-six. Since the only physically fit men in that age group not already drafted were those in essential jobs, Marshall wanted many of their deferments removed. He therefore sent a draft of a memorandum to President Roosevelt who on 26 February 1944 sent the memorandum under his own signature to General Hershey. Hershey, that very day, sent copies of the memorandum to all his state directors, and told them at the same time to review the classifications of all those who were deferred, paying special attention to those under twenty-six.¹²

The President, in his memorandum, told Hershey that it was "time to strike a new balance." The armed forces had asked for less men than it had wanted and could not further reduce its strength. Roosevelt, speaking for Marshall, noted Selective Service's

⁹New York Times, 18 Oct 42; Under Secretary of War files, Misc and Sub, Selective Service, Training, etc., *passim*; Copy of letter, Marshall to Wadsworth, 17 Oct 42 in Assistant Secretary of War's files, Selective Service Law; Under Secretary of War's files, 327.02 (Conscription or Draft), 1 Mar-31 Mar 45, *passim*; Memo, Howard Peterson for Patterson, 17 July 42, in OCMH: Selective Service; Memo, Lt. Gen. McNarney for Secretary of War, 3 Apr 42, Sub: Reduction of Minimum Age, in Stimson files, Selective Service.

¹⁰"Study of a Possible Plan for Reducing the Average Age of Combat Divisions" and Memo, Dorr for Secretary of War, 26 November 1942, Subject: Age of Manpower and Manpower Problems in Dorr Files, Age and Manpower Problems. One of the difficulties was that the Navy and the Marines were able to get the young men first. See Memo, Col. Sanders for Capt. A. Macondray, 5 July 44, Sub: Additional Manpower for Navy in OCMH: Selective Service; Memo, Dorr for Secretary of War, 14 and 16 April 1944, Sub: Age of the Army in Stimson files, Manpower; General Council Minutes, 15 and 29 May 44.

¹¹See Albert A. Blum's *Deferment from Military Service*, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Columbia University, 1953), pp. 132-175.

¹²Memo, Marshall for the President, 22 February 1944 and attached draft of a memo, Pres. Roosevelt for Chief, War Manpower Commission and Director, Selective Service System, Sub: Occupational Deferments in AG 327.22 (22 Feb 44).

failure to meet quotas with the result that the Army would not reach its planned January strength until sometime in April. The President consequently concluded that

The Nation's manpower pool had been dangerously depleted by liberal deferments and I am convinced that in this respect *we have been overly lenient, particularly with regard to the younger men.* The overage men, the physically disqualified, the returned soldier, and the women of the Nation must be used more effectively to replace the able-bodied men in critical industry and agriculture. Almost 5,000,000 men have been deferred for occupational reasons. Deferments for industry include over a million non-fathers, of whom 380,000 are under 26 years of age. Of almost a million non-fathers deferred in agriculture, over 550,000 are under 26. *Agriculture and industry should release the younger men who are physically qualified for military service.* The present situation is so grave that the time has come to review all occupational deferments with a view to speedily making available the personnel required by the Armed Forces.¹³

In reply to President Roosevelt's request that only the truly essential young workers be deferred, the agencies concerned with manpower mobilization, after much wrangling, decided to use a certification procedure first used to alleviate the manpower shortage on the west coast. With some variations, this procedure was used throughout the remainder of the war: first, to choose men under 26; then, when the armed forces complained that they needed more men, to choose men under 29. Under the certification procedure, an authorized representative of a procurement agency, such as the War and Navy Departments, had to certify that a worker in a given age group was vital to an essential industry. The local boards of the Selective Service System then decided whether or not to defer the worker, taking seriously into account the certification of the procurement agency representative. An inter-agency committee had

the responsibility of deciding which industries and activities were essential and which procurement agency was to be responsible for the deferments in a particular activity. For example, the Army Service Forces was placed in charge of deferments for the following programs: Manhattan Project (atom bomb); DUKS (two-and-one-half ton amphibious truck); rockets; radar; critical components for heavy and light trucks (two-and-one-half ton and heavier); and research and development work specifically assigned to the technical services.¹⁴

While developing procedures to choose young men from industrial plants, the Army placed steady pressure on Selective Service to draft young farmers and the Selective Service finally relented and started to draft these men. As a result, the Army did become younger as the following table attests:

AGE DISTRIBUTION OF SELECTEES

1944	30-37	26-29	18-25
March	36.0%	19.9%	44.1%
April	34.6	17.9	47.5
May	12.4	13.5	74.1
June	4.9	10.3	84.8
July	4.0	9.2	88.1

Source: General Council Minutes, 14 August and 18 September 1944.

Yet the many difficulties involved concerning the age of the army might have been lessened if early in the war, wiser and more definite policies had been used. If young men do make better soldiers, it was shortsighted not to have developed a system of priorities as it would be similarly shortsighted not to do so in any future full-scale mobilization.

One such priority would involve dividing

¹⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 122-127; Herman M. Somers, *Coordinating the Federal Executive*, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (Harvard University, 1947), p. 346; Memo, Deputy Director, Production Division, ASF for Section Chief, Materiel and Production Branch, 24 March 44, Sub: Industrial Deferment Instructions and attached memo, Sub: Deferment of Men in Age 18 through 25 Age Group, Inclusive, in OCMH: Selective Service; General Council Minutes, 19 April 1944; Army Service Forces files, Production Division, 327.02, *passim*.

¹³Selective Service System, Monograph No. 6, *Industrial Deferment* (Washington, 1948) I, pp. 124-125 (italics mine).

the total available manpower supply into two groups: those under twenty-six and those between twenty-six and thirty-eight. The younger men should be slated for military service; the older for industrial service. There are many reasons for this division early in the war. Young men, as we have seen, make better soldiers and are less likely to have included in their numbers the type of workers skilled enough to be deferred; older persons are in general more effective as workers than as soldiers. As a result, no person under twenty-six should be deferred except for the few with exceptional skills or ability or those few whose services would mean extreme hardship. An early announcement of such plans would prevent repetition of the manpower fiasco of the west coast aircraft industry during World War II, where the working force of the aircraft plants was made up of young men early in the war, with the inevitable result that handling deferment policies in the aircraft industry became one of the most serious problems faced by military and manpower officials.

On the other hand, not all men over twenty-six should be exempt from military service. The standards of deferment, however, should be much less severe than for the young men. Deferments in this group should be given only men working at essential jobs or in essential industries. The tradition of America in favor of dependency deferments would

probably make it impossible to ignore completely the factor of dependency in deferments. Still, it should not play as important a role as it did during the past war. The problem might be handled in this manner. All fathers should be given the opportunity to transfer to essential jobs or industries. After a suitable period of time, all registrants in this group (and the twenty-six through thirty-eight group might be subdivided into smaller age groups, such as twenty-six through twenty-nine, thirty through thirty-three, thirty-four through thirty-eight) should be drafted, as needed, in the following order:

1. Non-fathers not at an essential job or in an essential industry.
2. Fathers not at an essential job or in an essential industry.
3. Non-fathers at an essential job or in an essential industry.
4. Fathers at an essential job or in an essential industry.

Clearly, the decisions concerning what are essential jobs and industries are vital ones. These decisions should be made after careful study by a thoroughly qualified committee.

With this as one aspect of planning for a full-scale manpower mobilization, it may be possible to have a young, hard-hitting army at the same time we keep our industrial production at full force, for indeed they are both sides of the coin that will purchase us victory.

TRUSTEES APPOINT INSTITUTE OFFICERS

A special meeting of the Board of Trustees of the American Military Institute was held on 25 May 1954, in Washington, D. C., for the purpose of appointing the 1954 panel of officers, a task which had been postponed from the regular January meeting of the Board. With regret and with deep appreciation for his services, the Trustees accepted the decision of Brigadier General Donald Armstrong to relinquish the presidency of the Institute. Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, USN, Ret., was appointed president, and Colonel Herman Beukema of West Point was appointed vice president. The incumbents in the remaining offices of secretary, treasurer, provost, librarian and editor accepted reappointment.

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NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

WITH THE APACHE INDIANS DURING THE REVOLT OF 1879

BY CAPTAIN CHARLES STEELHAMMER*

IN THE 1870's the Ute Indians, one of the largest and most warlike of Indian tribes, were located in the northwestern parts of Colorado and the northern part of New Mexico. Tall and brave they were intellectually superior to other Indians.

Due to the inability of American agents to deal efficiently with them, discontent arose, and in 1879, the tribe, which had formerly been peaceful, revolted against the whites. If the Indians had realized the power of the United States Army, this uprising would not have occurred; but at that time the railways had not developed into their present state and, consequently, they were not aware that isolated American troops stationed long distances from one another were but a mere handful of the troops at the command of the U. S. Government.

During this revolt of 1879, the Indians killed their agent, Mr. Meeker, and took his daughter, Josephine, captive and tortured and killed all [other] whites within their reach. As railroad transportation was not available, troops could not be concentrated as quickly as needed to quell this uprising, and the Indians, thinking they were in power, had ample time in which to satisfy their thirst for blood and to instigate other tribes to assist them in a common massacre.

The Supreme Command of the District at

this time was held by General Hatch¹ who had his Headquarters at Santa Fé, New Mexico.

Returning to my regiment at this time,² I arrived at Headquarters and reported to General Hatch who told me he was glad I had returned as he had an important commission for me. He produced his maps and pointed out where the Jicarilla-Apaches had their camp while he explained the current Indian situation. He told me that it would take at least 10 days to muster sufficient troops to master the situation. The General knew that the Ute Indians had sent emissaries to the Jicarilla-Apaches for the purpose of instigating them to participate in the revolt, and should they succeed, the General was well aware that the consequences would be hazardous for the white settlers in the territory. He pointed out the Cimarron River where the Apaches were loitering and ordered me there immediately with instructions to do everything possible to keep the tribes at peace. "But," said he, "I have no troops to give you; there are but 10 men I can give you for an escort." At the time I declared it would be impossible, under existing circumstances, to stand ground against the whole tribe with so few men, but would en-

¹General Edward Hatch at that time was Colonel of the 9th Cav. but later was promoted to Brig General for his conduct during the Ute campaign.

²Captain Charles Steelhammer who had been on sick-leave in Sweden was returning to his Regiment, the 15th Inf., stationed in New Mexico.

*A Swedish gentleman who served in the Ute campaign.

deavor to do so. The General who understood the gravity of the situation as well as I, told me to do what I could but to try and come through safely.

One hour after our conference I was on my way and after three days' and nights' journey, I reached the outskirts of the Apache camp. Here, I decided to leave my escort and proceed alone, taking the store of tobacco that I had brought from Headquarters to aid in friendly relations. On arriving at the camp,³ alone and unarmed, I assembled the Chiefs for a talk. They informed me their agent had disappeared, leaving them without food and they were unable to get any. They said that emissaries had already arrived from their brethren, the Ute Indians, asking them to participate in the present revolt. Their young warriors were happy at the prospect of war and had already begun to paint their faces and to dance their war dances in preparation for the martial honors they hoped to gain. I told them, after distributing the tobacco among them, that I had come as a representative from the Great Father, at Washington, whose power reached from the large water of the East to the large water of the West, and that he meant well with his red children and would assist them whenever they were in need of His help, but that He would punish and exterminate them if they dared to rise up against Him. Therefore, it was their duty to calm their warlike young men and teach them wisdom.⁴ For my part, I promised to do everything possible to help them. They answered, "We have nothing to eat." I replied, noticing the fatness of their flesh,

³Captain Steelhammer, his son, Major Henry Steelhammer states, neglected to relate that, when he entered the wigwam, five of the young warriors fired at him, but the chief, recognizing him, fleetly than a flash of lightning, struck the guns so the shots did not hit him. Steelhammer unbuttoned his coat, pointed at his heart, and said: "Shoot, if you dare!" and this was enough to quiet them for a moment.

⁴Captain Steelhammer was able to speak the Apache tongue.

"You are fatter than I and ought to be able to endure for some days until I have time to get food to you. Besides you are all skillful hunters and as the forest has game and the water, fish, you should find it possible to live." Moreover, as I intended to remain with them and trust them for my own well-being, I felt they would be convinced that I intended to keep my promise to get food for them.

After this initial meeting with the Chiefs, we had "powwows" every day and gradually, by repeating my promises, the majority of the tribe calmed down. I was successful in getting some bags of flour from Maxwell's Ranch, in New Mexico, and feasts were arranged every night and dances and warlike games were performed around the large burning bonfires. This activity satisfied them and we lived together peaceably. Nevertheless, on more than one occasion when I visited the different wigwams, an arrow whistled around my ears, shot usually from the bow of a young brave who wanted to show off his skill with the bow which, for my part, sometimes was awarded with a kindly smile.

The method of communications between distant tribes was difficult to understand, but the fact remains that with speed almost equal to that of the telegraph, they got daily information from the theatres of war and when, after about a week, they learned that American troops were approaching the Ute Indians and also that a store of provisions was on its way to them, these Jicarilla-Apaches decided it was wisest to remain at peace. Some of their warriors, however, proceeded north to participate in the war.

Some time later when the question arose of finding a better camp for these Indians, a stricter and more fortified place, easier to superintend, was suggested. Their agent, who had returned after the danger was over,

wanted to move them to a distant place which the Department of the Interior had decided upon. However, the Indians refused declaring they would rather go to war alone than follow their agent. I then proposed that they go with me to the Ocate River, in the vicinity of Fort Union, where the grass

grew abundantly and where they could be supplied with cattle. This, they said, they were willing to do, and that they were ready to follow me. In any event the danger of war was now over and after having established these Indians in their new camp, I returned, without mishap, to Santa Fé.

SIGNAL CORPS HISTORICAL COLLECTION

BY HELEN C. PHILLIPS*

The Signal Corps maintains, in addition to its Historical Division in Washington, a Historical Branch at the Signal Corps Center, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. The former has no operational responsibility for the latter, which is located at the Center in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, but maintains liaison with it. Under Miss Helen C. Phillips, its chief (and only historian), the Monmouth office performs such historical research and writing assignments as may be required and maintains the Signal Corps historical collection, which includes signal equipment, memorabilia, and archival and reference materials.

The arrangement of the collection follows a generally chronological scheme starting with the Brigadier General Albert J. Myer Collection (named after the first Chief Signal Officer), comprising approximately 2,000 pages of Myer's personal and official papers,

memorabilia of the Civil War, and his signal flags. The collection includes Myer's red, white, and black muslin wigwag flags; his wooden-barreled, brass-bound telescope; a Beardslee magneto electric telegraph, a field telegraph used in the early years of the Civil War; a piece of the first Atlantic cable; and Spanish American War signal flags, uniforms, equipment, documents, and pictures. Alaskan Cable System equipment is interspersed with a score of pictures and maps. There is an exhibit dealing with the old Aviation Section of the Signal Corps with photographs and specifications of the first Signal Corps balloon and heavier-than-air flying machine (the first plane built for the Signal Corps—the *Army's* first plane—is at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington), followed by early air to ground radio equipment.

The Armstrong display includes the amplifier for the original superheterodyne radio receiver and original heterodyne. Early field equipment includes the buzzerphone EE-1,

*Miss Phillips is chief of the Historical Branch at Ft. Monmouth, N. J. Since this was written the collection has been recognized officially as the Signal Corps Museum by Hqtrs. SCC & FM GO 60, 4 May 1954.

field telephones EE-4, EE-5, and others. World War I American equipment is supplemented with original Signal Corps technical pamphlets, which explain installation and operational procedures, troubles, and remedies, and with 80 large colored posters of the World War I Army and the Signal Corps and its Aviation Section. Some World War I signal equipment of foreign armies is also on display. There are pieces of World War II German and Japanese signal equipment; captured North Korean pieces; and, finally, trophies, flags, and guidons from recently inactivated signal camps. Finally, there is a display of documents, graphs, and pictures of "Diana," the Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories' radar tower at Belmar, New Jersey, where scientific history was made on 10 January 1946, when, using a radar set specially designed for the purpose, Signal Corps scientists shot a beam of high frequency energy directly at the rising moon, from which at regular intervals it was reflected.

In the archives section, major objectives are the concentration, preservation, and exhibition of noncurrent documents of administrative value or historical interest, and the maintenance of such records so as to make them easily accessible to government agencies, scholars, and others with a legitimate interest in them. General Myer carried on a substantial private correspondence, not only throughout the Civil War years but later when his interests centered upon more rapid methods of setting up telegraph wires and a system of telegraphic storm warnings, which led to the establishment of the United States Weather Bureau. Permanently on display with significant documents bearing on the founding of the Signal Corps are some of Myer's personal

papers, accounts of his early experiments, and applications for recognition of his work by the Army and the Navy. His papers range from his "Memorial to The Honorable Senate of the United States in Congress Assembled," 20 January 1865, by which he hoped to get himself reinstated in the Corps, and a letter to Secretary of War Stanton in the same month, to the "Gossip and Surmises" of the Signal Corps written to him by many in the signal service as well as by men who had left the Army.

Among the documentary holdings are large collections of historically significant maps and charts, still pictures including a few Matthew Brady photographs, stereoscopic views, sound recordings, and facsimile reproductions of especially significant or otherwise memorable documents.

At the museum every visitor can find something of interest and can get from the historical collection a clear idea of the progress of military communications from the Myer system of flag signals to modern electronic and photographic communications requiring numerous persons skilled in many of the latest developments of modern science.

Since pride in unit or branch is one of the finest builders of *esprit de corps* among soldiers, it is clear that military history has great value in stimulating morale. The historical collection at the Signal Corps Center is therefore an important aid in acquainting personnel in The Signal School at Fort Monmouth and in the service at large with the history and traditions of the Signal Corps, which in 1960 will celebrate 100 years of labor on behalf of military communications in both peacetime and war.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Editor: GEORGE J. STANSFIELD

REVIEWS

Containment or Liberation, an Inquiry into the Aims of United States Foreign Policy.

By James Burnham. (New York, John Day Company, 1953, Pp. 256, \$3.50.)

Beyond Containment. By William Henry Chamberlin. (Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1954, Pp. 406, \$5.00.)

Liberation, The Threat and the Challenge of Power. By William S. Culbertson. (Atlanta, Tupper and Love, 1953, Pp. 208, \$3.50.)

On the basis of different approaches and experiences, these three books present the argument that the mere containment of Soviet expansionism, while preferable to appeasement of, or surrender to, the communist threat, falls far short of a satisfactory American security policy. To leave the Soviet orbit with its 800 million inhabitants and its immense natural resources undisturbed, may be to allow the communists to build up, in the long run, strength superior to that of the United States; at best, it is to acquiesce in the emergence of a dangerous imbalance of power. To permit the communists to keep free-born nations and individuals in servitude, is to violate the basic tenets of American political morality. To assume that a strong and resolute American policy would "provoke" the Soviets into a world war and, accordingly, to argue consistently for weak-kneed American concessions, is to misunderstand Soviet action principles.

The security of the U.S. and the free world requires that, ultimately, the Soviet regime be disestablished and that the peoples presently under the communist yoke be liberated. Unless liberation occurs, the United States probably will be forced to fight a cataclysmic war for survival. Until liberation takes place, the United States will be compelled to live under a continual threat of atomic war. The risks of a liberation policy do include

the risk of military conflict, but such a conflict is neither likely nor would it have to be fought under necessarily unfavorable conditions for the United States. On balance, the risks of liberation are seen to be smaller than the risks of containment. For containment does nothing to stem the onrushing development of Soviet super-weapons.

The critics of Messrs. Burnham, Chamberlin and Culbertson have argued: (a) That a liberation policy is just a milder version of preventive war strategy; and (b) that these authors have not indicated a way by which liberation can be brought about. However, before we can argue profitably about methods, we must be clear about the objective. Once the objective has been accepted—as it may have been in President Eisenhower's speech of April 16, 1953—it can be pursued in different fashions and according to various time tables. A cursory analysis of the present world situation does not indicate, by itself, the feasibility or infeasibility of the liberation concept. Any strategy requires suitable opportunities, but if the objective has not been defined, the opportunities may slip by unused, as has happened all too often in the past.

The highest goal of a liberation policy is indeed to make preventive war unnecessary although, naturally, no one can be sure that in a crisis like the one which besets our world, war can be avoided altogether. Colonel Culbertson shows, in his subtle argument, that internal American policies have a considerable bearing on the practicality of liberation. Messrs. Burnham and Chamberlin indicate how, if we had been committed to liberation in the past, some of our key decisions would have been different, with the result that the growth of the Soviet Leviathan might have been thwarted. All three authors recognize that a concept of liberation cannot be spelled out in the abstract. Nor was

the concept of containment ever defined, or otherwise translated into a set of understandable, concrete and workable propositions. The partisans of containment have yet to explain what they propose to do in order to halt or balance the rapid growth of the Soviet power machine, or how they want to preserve democracy against a perpetuated and increasing atomic threat. Possibly there are answers to these questions; but they have not been given. By contrast, the concept of liberation has logic and reality on its side; although it may not be comforting to the hopefuls and the fearfuls.

Liberation simply means that each concrete policy decision would aim at reducing and ultimately eliminating Soviet power rather than granting it its inviolate zone of influence. A statesman working for liberation would not hesitate to permit the "hot pursuit" of hostile aircraft. He would quote back to Molotov, as Mr. Dulles did at Berlin, the former's pro-nazi utterances of 1939-40. And he might take a strong attitude concerning the American prisoners-of-war not yet returned from communist captivity. But he doesn't need to argue for preventive war.

If we think of the Monroe Doctrine, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, the independence of Panama, the two world wars and American attitudes on "colonialism," liberation can be described as the classical concept of American foreign policy. Liberation would be a reasonable objective even if it were impossible at this time, to present a concrete plan for the termination of the Soviet threat. Continued world tensions may force the U.S. into adopting the liberation objective in any event. Liberation is a long-range undertaking which must be pursued step-by-step just as a policy of international cooperation, which does not lend itself to implementation by one grandiose strategic concept, must be executed in practical decisions. In this domain of political strategy, blueprints are of little use, but Napoleon's wise dictum is fully applicable: "*On s'engage, et puis on voit.*"

Colonel Culbertson views liberation as just such a practical though complex working philosophy—the danger, as he sees it, is in failing to recognize that we no longer can espouse the moral foundations of our way of life without also embracing liberation. We cannot turn our backs on a world that is half slave and hope to retain our own freedom. Such an attitude does not necessarily entail global war. Colonel Culbertson would keep his powder dry first and foremost, but he also visualizes a step-by-step use of all our vast strengths—moral, economic, political, spiritual and legal—in

a gradual and controlled manner. Nor is he wanting for means to employ these strengths: trade, dollar power, education, cultural intercourse, technology, nuclear energy—all these and many more would be used to improve the lot of underdeveloped peoples, to promote industrial expansion and to counter the threat of communism at home and abroad. In this respect Colonel Culbertson must qualify as one of that small but distinguished group who anticipated President Eisenhower's atomic peace fare program.

Today, the vast resources of the free world await but the statement of such an objective in order to assume the offensive. What is needed is a psychological tour de force which can place world communism on the defensive—and no ideological-dictatorial system can survive long when on the defensive.

In essence, the question is whether the free world and the United States, without undue risk to their way of life, can afford the continued survival and the continuing growth of communist military power and whether the United States should accept the permanence of the Soviet regime. A second question is whether the United States should tie its security to the hope of a spontaneous and evolutionary improvement of the Soviet system or rather take action to bring about desirable changes. These questions are so basic that it will not do to ignore them and to disparage the bold authors who put them before the American public. Granted, Messrs. Burnham, Chamberlin and Culbertson do not know all the answers. But do the apostles of containment? I strongly recommend that these books be read with an open mind.

STEFAN T. POSSONY
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A Hundred Years of War. By Cyril Falls. (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1953. New York: Macmillan, 1954. Pp. 419. \$6.00.)

Cyril Falls has undertaken the supremely difficult task of surveying the military aspects of war from 1850 to 1950, and he has done it with superb skill. Probably no other military historian could have presented the characteristics, strategy, tactics, weapons and administration of the wars of these hundred years with such clarity and authority.

The book will meet the need of military men for a concise account and a reasoned interpretation of the variety and change which have characterized modern warfare. But it is to be doubted whether it will fulfill the author's purpose of giving to the educated public a military history

which will be widely read. By deliberately confining himself to the purely military features of war Cyril Falls has sought to correct the impression created by political historians that "wars are fought by politicians." In so doing, however, he has conveyed the equally erroneous impression that war is exclusively the soldier's province. Wars are politico-military in nature requiring military leadership and statesmanship in equal parts, and until military historians write with this in mind, laymen will continue to receive their works with something less than enthusiasm.

This is particularly unfortunate in the case of *A Hundred Years of War*, for it is filled with information of importance to the general public as well as to the professional soldier. Most startling in its implications is "the growing power of primitive peoples to face the forces of civilized countries." First noted a generation ago when close to a quarter of a million Franco-Spanish troops had to be employed in Morocco, this tendency came of age in Korea where "an army of hardy, frugal, and fanatical Asiatic peasants, armed almost entirely with weapons carried on the man . . . routed the forces of civilized industrial powers, inferior in numbers but armed with the most modern weapons and enjoying complete command of the air." In Malaya and Indo-China, under different circumstances, the result has been the same: lightly armed, heavily indoctrinated native peoples have held the great nations at bay.

The significance of this fact is unmistakable as long as the possibility exists that limitations may be imposed upon the new weapons of mass destruction or that such missiles may not be decisive. Professor Falls makes no confident predictions in this regard, but he deliberately raises the question and asserts that the atomic bomb will not necessarily transform warfare completely. If a future war is not thus to be ended overnight, and troops, ships and air bases have to be dispersed to avoid annihilation, the tendency of great wars to approximate irregular or guerrilla wars becomes apparent.

Guerrilla-type warfare is not of course confined exclusively to undeveloped countries. In urban societies underground resistance can in part replace bombing as an effective method of waging war. Indeed, "industrial development is often an invitation to partisan or peoples' war," because a nation's industrial complex is particularly vulnerable to sabotage. Modern means of communication between underground forces and the outside world, plus the spread of a Communist ideology more

potent than national patriotism, combine to make this new type of secret warfare a dangerous threat to the free world. Killing by stealth and killing by indiscriminate mass bombing are twin features of our times; together they illustrate that modern warfare is degenerating into the older type of primitive conflicts waged for extermination.

These are some of the reasons why the chapters devoted to partisan and small wars are of special interest. Moreover, these conflicts are manageable in scope making possible an adequate discussion of their distinguishing features. Out of these accounts emerge special problems in the realm of transportation, the search for objectives, the need for unflagging, aggressive leadership, and the tactics of terrorization and political propaganda employed in peoples' wars. Similarly, the "*sequelae*" and "aftercrops" of great wars, those bitter secondary conflicts which spring from the confusion and void left by world upheavals, provide significant lessons. Here again peasant armies are found accomplishing prodigies of fighting under skillful military leadership; techniques are unorthodox and tactics are adapted to abnormal conditions.

It is in these chapters that Cyril Falls most successfully achieves his purpose of raising tactics to its proper place beside strategy as a major factor in determining the outcome of wars. "Strategy," he maintains, "is habitually over-estimated at the expense of" tactics, and is "rarely the decisive element." In short, for Professor Falls, the battle is the payoff, and the small wars give him the opportunity to discuss this point most forcefully. On the contrary, the magnitude of the American Civil War permits him to say little more about the art of fighting than that a study of Grant's tactics fails to support the customary thesis that he was a butcher of men. The reader may be willing to accept this statement by an eminent authority, but some illustrative material would not be amiss.

Omissions in a work of this kind are inevitable as the author himself admits, but in view of his plan to restore the balance between tactics and strategy, the failure to discuss the development of amphibious doctrine in the 1930's and its subsequent employment in the Pacific must be considered a glaring oversight. The Central Pacific strategy which is praised so highly could not have been implemented and would not have been formulated without prior tactical developments in assaulting island fortresses. On other grounds the advance of MacArthur's forces from New Guinea to Luzon also merits some attention.

In addition to chapters devoted to wars them-

selves are those dealing with the transformations of the last century. Here the thesis is a denial of 'revolutionary change in the conduct of war. The methods of warfare have "made continuous and, on the whole, fairly even progress." Those who say otherwise are ignorant of "technical and tactical military history." Prophets of air power, in particular, have been reckless in their assertions. All of "Billy" Mitchells' major principles were invalidated in the conditions existing in World War II. Today similar extremists, making claims for the decisive role of air power, are doing great disservice by convincing the public that land and sea forces are ancillary elements in warfare, if not relics of the past. Instead, a third world war, if waged in our time, will more likely be "fought with all the forces of land, sea, and air," and will probably last long enough for victory to go to the side with the greater industrial potential.

GORDON B. TURNER
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Hitler's Defeat in Russia. By Lieutenant General Wladyslaw Anders. (Chicago: Regnery Company. 1953. Pp. 282. Pp. 3 bibl. \$4.00.)

Like many officers of the World War I Tsarist Army, General Wladyslaw Anders has had a colorful military career. As a General Staff officer the author served as chief of staff of a Russian division and later as chief of staff of a Polish army during the Russo-Polish War 1919-20. He commanded a Polish brigade in World War II when the Wehrmacht destroyed the Polish Field Army in the first Blitz campaign of the war. After Stalin cashed in on Hitler's success and occupied eastern Poland, General Anders was captured by the Red Army and remained in captivity long enough to witness the far-reaching effects of Hitler's campaign in Russia carrying the German armies to the outskirts of Moscow. In the fall of 1941 General Anders and some 120,000 Poles were released by the Soviets under the Soviet-Polish agreement of July 1941. By way of Iran these remnants of the once proud Polish Army that had fallen into Soviet hands were brought to the United Kingdom and thus saved from a terrible fate later shared by millions of German and Axis prisoners of war. Under General Mark Clark's army in Italy General Anders commanded the Polish II Corps that distinguished itself in many battles, most notably at Monte Cassino.

As a student of military history the author shares with many his deep interest in the Russian

Campaign waged by the Wehrmacht from June 1941 to May 1945. This four-year battle will no doubt continue to be the subject of serious study not only by historians, but also by statesmen and military leaders of the West who, on the basis of events since the end of hostilities in 1945, have to take into consideration the possibility of a future conflict between the Soviets and the free nations of the West.

The reader of *Hitler's Defeat in Russia* should, however, keep in mind that the author was not a participant in the battles fought in the East. He draws his information from documents and secondary sources that have become widely accessible since the publication of the proceedings of the International Military Tribunal, that tried the German major war criminals at Nuremberg, and numerous publications that have appeared during the last eight years. This fact constitutes one of the major weaknesses of the book. The selection of sources and their use appears at times incomplete and arbitrary.

The author's professed intention is an analysis of the reasons that led to Hitler's defeat in Russia. Instead of settling on an analytical approach to his thesis, General Anders chose to present a rather detailed chronological description of the campaign in the East (up to the fall of Stalingrad, 1 February, 1943) that takes up almost two-thirds of the book.

In his account of the tactical operations the author relies largely on a single source, the diary of General Franz Halder, whilom chief of staff of the German Army. Despite the fact that Halder's conscientious daily entries are of great interest and accuracy, it is felt that General Anders should have made greater use of other documents to achieve a more balanced presentation. Probably due to the lack of Soviet sources, the author has chosen to present this narrative almost entirely from the German side.

General Anders enumerates the blunders which, in his opinion, led to Hitler's defeat in Russia: involving Germany in a two-front war; gambling on a blitzkrieg in the East instead of adopting a strategy of attrition; unpreparedness for winter warfare; Hitler's estimate of the relative unimportance of Moscow and the failure to capture the Soviet capital in 1941 and again in 1942; demoralization of the Wehrmacht by depriving it of its able leaders; faulty planning of the 1942 campaign; the avoidable catastrophe of Stalingrad; the refusal to revert to elastic defense (after the tide had turned); squandering the

precious armored reserves in the Kursk counter-offensive in the summer of 1943; and, finally, clinging to a strategy of no-retreat.

It is obvious that some of these blunders were of great consequence for the operations in the East. The effect of others can be disputed. Still others the author disregarded altogether. Hitler's mistakes could be classed in three categories, political, strategic, and tactical. The author does not deal with political aspects. We know, however, today that many of Hitler's military decisions were motivated by political considerations. Thus, for instance, his aim to capture Leningrad was influenced by the wish to gain a land corridor to Finland; and the reason behind his refusal to evacuate the Crimea in 1944 was Hitler's fear that the withdrawal would cause political repercussions in the Balkans. In the fall of the same year he clung to positions in the Baltic States for fear of losing control of the Baltic Sea and Soviet diplomatic pressure on Sweden.

It is easy to state that the decision to attack the Soviet Union was a strategic mistake since the venture failed. The opinion of critics would have been different in the event of success.

The unfortunate dearth of information regarding Soviet operations and the true situation of the Soviet State makes it exceedingly difficult to give an accurate estimate of the degree of disintegration and confusion caused by the early phase of the German attack. There are those who believe that the capture of Moscow, then the center of communications and industry and government of the U.S.S.R. would have decided the campaign. The German General Staff thought so. Hitler did not. Hence the operation plans for the various phases of the 1941 and 1942 campaigns were compromises and their execution resulted in dispersion instead of concentration of effort. General Anders correctly pointed out that the conflict between the Army and Hitler came to a head on 21 August 1941, in Hitler's Directive No. 34 in which he bluntly overruled the Army High Command stating: "... the principal objective [of the operation] is not the capture of Moscow . . .," but to seize the Crimea, cut off the Caucasian oil supplies and establish contact with the Finns, thus isolating Leningrad. While the Army High Command clung stubbornly to the concept of capturing Moscow, Hitler diverted the bulk of the armor to the south for the battle of Kiev that resulted in an impressive tactical success. However, precious weeks had been wasted (as earlier in the Balkan Campaign),

and the Army's sword, the panzer divisions, had been seriously weakened so that in the end the strategic prize was lost.

It was then that Hitler's strategy of no-retreat was born. As the Soviet strength increased over the years, it became the only strategy. In reality it was merely a tactical device to postpone defeat, especially after Hitler had declared war on the United States. In this connection it seems appropriate to point out what was perhaps Hitler's most serious political blunder: he failed to forge a military alliance with Japan that would have inflicted upon the Soviet Union a war on two fronts. Instead, the Japanese struck against the United States and fought a separate war that brought no relief to the hard-pressed German Armies in the East. Worse still, the Soviet-Japanese Nonaggression Pact, signed on April 13, 1941, permitted Stalin to draw on his last strategic reserve, his far eastern army, and ship numerous well-trained units to European Russia. These divisions that had not experienced defeat, were committed at the very moment when the "invincible" Wehrmacht had exhausted its strength and, unequipped for mud and winter warfare, found itself immobilized at the gates of Leningrad and Moscow. With the resulting setbacks the German Army experienced its first serious crisis of the war.

The exigency was aggravated by Hitler's mass firings of experienced high-ranking generals. He thus took another step in the direction of destroying the morale of the Army by replacing those who had dared to dissent with more pliable commanders. The reason was of course too obvious to be overlooked: to find scapegoats for the disaster was to confirm Hitler's infallibility. In 1938 the dismissals of Field Marshal von Blomberg, Generals von Fritsch, and Beck, and others had paved the way.

Since the end of World War II there has been a noted tendency, eloquently voiced in numerous postwar publications by former German generals, to place all the blame for the failures of the German Army at Hitler's doorsteps. We also find this tendency in this book. The myth needs to be corrected. Criticism of Hitler's conduct of the war should take into consideration Hitler's objectives and not those of his critics. At the political and strategic level the critic may ask, what was Hitler's war aim in Russia. We know that it was the destruction of the Soviet Union by seizing that portion of European Russia extending west of a general line Archangel—Astrakhan. After this phase was achieved, Hitler

assumed that his conquest could no longer be challenged by the remainder of the Soviet State. After the failure of this objection had been sealed at Stalingrad Hitler banked on a split in the Allied alliance. He could no longer hope for victory. In the pursuit of this negative strategy Hitler applied his no-retreat tactics. He needed to gain time by trading space. However, he also knew that his capital was limited and would not increase. It is from this viewpoint that Hitler's strategy makes sense.

Hitler's critics, notably the generals who fought under him, and the author too joins their ranks, maintain that elastic defense would have offered a more expedient tactical course of action in coping with the situation in the East. These critics fail, however, to take into account the prerequisites for mechanized warfare essential to elastic defense. Needed for operations of this type is a high degree of mobility based on motorization and powerful air support. The Wehrmacht, of 1943 and later, could not command these basic aids. A point carefully avoided by these critics also is the question what solution they wished to substitute for Hitler's objective. Lacking a constructive war aim, elastic defense could have been only a tactical maneuver without an aim.

The failure of Hitler's occupation policies in Russia are analyzed in the second part of General Anders' book. On the subject a great amount of material was gathered for the Nuremberg Trials. All the evidence points to a gigantic failure of the Nazis in this department. It all boils down to this: The vastness of Russia makes it impossible to govern her territory without the cooperation of the people. The complete absence of a constructive occupation policy, the exploitation and oppression inflicted upon both prisoners of war and the native population, resulted in a deep disappointment of the Russian peoples who had hoped to gain freedom or at least partial independence.

How Hitler expected to keep his hold on the conquered territories without the support of the population remains a mystery. Hitler never utilized the great military and economic potential of these areas to achieve his aim of the destruction of the Communist regime. It could not be achieved on the battlefield alone. Communism as an ideology and Stalinism as an incarnation of brutal dictatorship can only be weeded out by offering in their stead friendly guidance toward a way of life governed by the principles of democracy. This, however, was not contained in the

book of Nazi doctrine, although a handful of men in the Army and in the Government made a few futile attempts.

An account of military operations would certainly be incomplete without devoting some space to the problem of supplies of modern armies. General Anders devotes the third part of his book to the Allied aid granted Russia and the effect of Allied strategic bombing. Under Lend-Lease, the U.S. as the arsenal of democracies together with the U.K. shipped almost twelve billion dollars worth of supplies to the Soviet Union. While we lack accurate figures on the production of the U.S.S.R. during the war years, there can be no doubt that these shipments contributed to a very large extent to saving the Soviet economy from collapsing at a time when major portions of the industrial areas of European Russia had been conquered by Germany. Later, after the tide had turned, it appears that the quantities of equipment, strategic materials, and other goods, were no longer needed as badly as the leaders of the Kremlin wished to make believe. German prisoners of war observed vast stockpiles of U.S. shipments still in their original crates—unopened. Some of the equipment, the author claims, was sold by Stalin to the Japanese. Be this as it may, the stream of Lend-Lease and the effects of Allied bombing played a major part in enabling the Red Army to reach the Elbe and Berlin as early as it did.

Hitler's defeat in Russia is too great a task to be tackled in a volume of some 250 pages. Up to this date an authoritative and detailed history of the four-year campaign in Russia based on contemporary documents has not been published. Until that time, the writings of historians and military men, even those of the highest qualifications can only reflect their own opinions and present their conclusions. This, General Anders has done. The book does not attempt to add anything new to the history of these bloody battles; but it is stimulating and should stir discussion in the search for the underlying reasons for defeat.

CHARLES V. VON LUETTICHAU
Washington, D. C.

From Down Under to Nippon, The Story of Sixth Army in World War II. By General Walter Krueger (USA-Ret.). (Washington, D. C., Combat Forces Press, 1953. Pp. xv, 393 maps, photographs, index. \$6.50.)

Here is another volume concerning the history

of the war in the Southwest Pacific Area to be written by one of General MacArthur's famous "Klan"—Kenney, the air commander, Krueger, the principal ground force commander, and Kinkaid, the naval commander. With Kenney and now Krueger in print, one can but hope that Admiral Kinkaid will soon add his bit to the memoirs of this triumvirate which so successfully executed General MacArthur's plans.

In his forward General Krueger states: "Instead of publishing my personal reminiscences of the events in which I participated, I decided to write the story of Sixth Army. . . The result is an unadorned narrative of the long trek . . . 'from Down Under to Nippon'. . ." In this purpose General Krueger has succeeded admirably, tracing the operations of the Sixth Army from the activation of the army headquarters in Australia in February 1943 to its inactivation in Japan at the end of January 1946.

The volume, while not great literature, is generally well-written and the narrative is usually easy to follow despite the strictly chronological approach with which most of the overlapping battles and campaigns are treated. It is a valuable addition to the annals of the war in the Southwest Pacific Area if for no other reason then because it makes available to the public in a single volume a summary of the Sixth Army story, concomitantly providing a condensation of the Sixth Army's wartime after action reports of each campaign and battle in which that army engaged. A few minor errors of fact do not in any way detract from the essential soundness of the book.

Although *From Down Under to Nippon* provides a generally excellent narrative summary, there are some important omissions, some of which involve aspects of operations with which General Krueger was intimately concerned. For instance, on p. 99, the general states that he did not believe that the Japanese would reinforce Biak Island in June 1944, but he neglects to mention that they did indeed reinforce that island with some 1,200 troops. And in telling of non-combat jump injuries incurred by the 503rd Parachute Infantry at Noemfoor Island in July 1944 (pp. 110-111), the general fails to make it adequately clear that the jump was actually unnecessary. He could also have gone on to say that if reinforcements had really been required at Noemfoor, then the entire 34th Infantry could have arrived in a single over-water shipment from Biak before all the 503rd, scheduled for dropping on three successive days, could have reached the island.

The account of starting the XIV Corps down the Central Plains of Luzon in January 1945 (pp. 227-28) also leaves something to be desired. Describing a conference of 12 January with General MacArthur, General Krueger states that he opposed a rapid drive down the Central Plains to Manila, pleading an exposed left flank, while General MacArthur urged a more rapid advance. "But though it was obvious that General MacArthur did not share my views, he did not direct me to change my dispositions or my plans." On the 17th, General Krueger goes on, he received a radio from General MacArthur again emphasizing the necessity of a rapid advance. He does not point out, however, that this message actually amounted to a directive to change dispositions and plans. The contemporary documents clearly indicate that General MacArthur was getting impatient and may have felt that General Krueger was being over-cautious.

It must also be made clear that *From Down Under to Nippon* never really comes to grips with the problems facing Sixth Army. For example, supply problems loom large—the reader is told what they were and how they developed—but the story of how such problems were solved seldom emerges. It is not enough to say—as is said often—that the Sixth Army's G-4, Quartermaster, and Transportation Officers did an excellent job in solving the problems.

Thus *From Down Under to Nippon* is a disappointment. It throws practically no new light on matters of strategy, tactics, or logistics in the Southwest Pacific Area. And it is also disappointingly non-autobiographical. It provides little insight into what really went on in the general's mind, nor is it possible to distinguish Krueger the man from Krueger the senior officer at an army headquarters. For the most part the volume omits any forcible expression of the general's views. Disagreements, controversies, and arguments are either absent or glossed over. Criticism is hardly more than implied, and that but once or twice, yet the basic records show that General Krueger was far more often and more deeply dissatisfied with the conduct of operations under his command than is indicated in *From Down Under to Nippon*.

After seven years' work on the history of the war in the Southwest Pacific, the present reviewer knows only too well that a major difficulty is the task of pinning down the role General Krueger played. Inevitably, he emerges as the real "hero" of the story. But it is impossible to personalize

his role, impossible to do more than pinpoint him as the *deus ex machina* of an almost coldly efficient combat apparatus known variously as Headquarters, Sixth Army or Headquarters, ALAMO Force—the Sixth's operating "alias" for over a year and a half. *From Down Under to Nippon* does not help—Krueger's own story remains to be told.

Perhaps the answer is simply that General Krueger is too good a soldier. To him, manifestly, settling a point of controversy or solving a tactical problem, whatever its magnitude, was only his job—the problems and the controversies had no importance in themselves, whatever importance they might later have to historians or to military educators who seek for "lessons learned." General Krueger was trained to settle controversies and solve problems. That he did his job well is evident in the record of the Sixth Army, no matter who writes about that Army and its operations.

From Down Under to Nippon reflects the same outlook. In the beginning the general said, "I decided to write the story of Sixth Army." In the end it must be stated that this job he also accomplished.

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Destroyer, United States Destroyer Operations in World War II. By Theodore Roscoe. Research and Technical Editing by Rear Admiral Thomas I. Wattles, USN (Ret.). Designed and Illustrated by Lt. Cdr. Fred Freeman, USNR. (Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute. 1953. Pp. 481. \$10.)

Here is an interesting, worthwhile, and splendidly composed book. It is also only a poor imitation of *Submarine*, the story of submarine operations in World War II. This is neither the fault of the author nor of the record. It is just that destroyer operations do not lend themselves to being recorded in the pattern in which they are set down in this book. The preface says that this work "presents the dramatic story of the United States Navy's Destroyer Service." In reality, there is no destroyer service, there are only destroyers and destroyer-men. Destroyers do not fit into any sort of fighting pattern as do submarines or carriers, they are the most ubiquitous type of fighting ship. Destroyer-men, while in a class by themselves, are not a separate clique within the sea-going guild.

Their only distinguishing work is their cheerful devotion to duty which is mostly hard work and uncomfortable living. Destroyer officers are the best of the general service line group who have to identify themselves in this age of specialization with the appellation "garden variety." Destroyers' sailors carry no insignia but they can easily recognize one another. It was this recognition which inspired a group of officers to compose this book.

Destroyers is beautifully done, copiously illustrated with good photographs and meaningful drawings and it has simple but complete charts of every important major action in which destroyers participated. The innumerable other actions in which destroyers took part are all recounted. Many of these were minor to the general effort, but they were mighty important to the participants. This alone makes the book a worthy addition to World War II literature.

The unique contribution of the U. S. Navy to modern warfare has been the task-type system. This is the method by which mobility, speed and other complex capabilities of naval forces can be controlled and used and is best symbolized by the destroyer for there is always a task for this type. There are never enough destroyers for the varied jobs they have to do.

The destroyer tale of World War II may just be too big to be told in any one book. How is one author going to catch in words the spirit and work of destroyer men and the ships to which they gave life when, like Mossbrugger's people, they may on one night be fighting the classic destroyer action of the war and the next day be wallowing along at 8 knots over a glassy Coral Sea, escorting a group of empty liberty ships? Richard Voge, Edward Beach and this author have caught the tone and spirit of the submarine in their classic works. Doing the same for destroyers is a much harder job.

While no classic, this book is both a literary bargain and a necessity for the military profession and those interested in it. Above all, the publisher, the U. S. Naval Institute, is to be congratulated for the splendid composition of this book and and in making another worthy edition to its publishing record.

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Logistical Support of the Armies, by Roland G. Ruppenthal (Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953. Pp. 616. \$4.50.)

The world had been awaiting for more than two years the announcement on 6 June 1944 that the invasion of the Normandy Coast of France had finally been launched by the combined American and British forces under General Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander. The contemporary accounts informing the public of the successful landings and the subsequent operations on the Continent, gave but little indication of the tremendous planning effort which preceded this great military operation in history. The story of the build-up of forces and the accumulation of supplies and means to support this gigantic effort, is told in the recently published volume, *Logistical Support of the Armies*. This is the latest edition in the European Theater subseries of the *U. S. Army in World War II* published by the Office of Military History, Department of the Army. This volume, the first of two under the same title, covers the period from the meager but significant beginning in May 1941, when the Special Observer Group of eighteen officers and eleven enlisted personnel was sent to the United Kingdom to "observe" the war in Europe, to September 1944, when tactical operations reached a point of stability following the liberation of Paris.

The literature of military history is replete with accounts of the course of strategy and the conduct of tactical campaigns, but there is a great dearth of published writings which recount that less glamorous aspect of modern warfare which we have come to know as military logistics. As the reader progresses through the chapters of this volume, he will be impressed with the full meaning and significance of logistics and its interdependence with strategy and tactics.

The prodigious task of planning and coordinating the great build-up of men and material for the OVERLORD operation was largely the responsibility of the Theater Services of Supply (SOS), commanded from its inception in May 1942, by Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee. This book is therefore basically the history of the operations of that command.

The magnitude of the task which confronted the SOS is partially illustrated by the fact that approximately 1,750,000 troops arrived in the United Kingdom prior to D-Day, and over 17,000,000 measurement tons of cargo were re-

ceived by the same date. *Logistical Support of the Armies* relates in considerable detail the meticulous planning and delicate coordination of effort which were prerequisite to this great movement of men and supplies across the expanse of ocean from the zone of interior to a small and already overcrowded island. As expressed by the author "In England every service and facility groaned under the burden of wartime demands and was subjected to the closest control."

This volume further tells the story of how the complex logistic organization grew to maturity in the United Kingdom to fulfill its ultimate role of mounting the invasion forces for the D-Day assault, and to provide continuing support for operations on the Continent. It vividly portrays the necessity for extreme flexibility in planning, as was so clearly evidenced by the fortunes of war which followed in the wake of the cross-channel assault. The narrative account tells of the alterations in plans occasioned by the failure to expand the Normandy lodgement area as scheduled, and then of the almost insurmountable problems of maintaining a flow of supplies following the "explosion" from the lodgement area at the end of July 1944 as the Armies raced toward Paris and across northern France. The critical shortage of gasoline, the precarious ammunition situation, and the operation of the fabled "Red Ball Express" are all authoritatively narrated.

Considerable space in this historical account has been devoted to the command and organizational complex within the Theater. The reader will find, however, that this bears a very intimate relationship to the entire problem of logistic support for the OVERLORD operation. General Lee brought with him to the SOS a preconception as to how his task could best be accomplished. His role as a principal assistant to the Supreme Commander became even more anomalous with his appointment as Deputy Theater Commander.

Those who read this account of logistics in action, its accomplishments and even its failures, will be well rewarded by acquiring a further insight into the problems and complexities of the "business end" of contemporary warfare. It is in no sense an exhaustive study of the detailed technique and operational problems of the individual supply services. To the contrary, it is an integrated narrative account viewed from the higher planning level, of the whole complex of logistic support for the greatest military operation in history.

The author of this volume, Dr. Roland G. Rup-

penthal, a Reserve Lieutenant Colonel on duty with the Office of Military History, Department of the Army, has waded through a great mass of published and unpublished material to shape the story which is told in this book. While some repetition of subject matter has added to its length the author may readily be forgiven because the nature of the subject has made it necessary to maintain chronology while following a topical treatment. Any student of military history will find this a fascinating account and a valuable addition to the ever growing library of works recording the accomplishments of our armed forces.

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Middle East and Far East. By Allan S. Walker. (Canberra: Australian War Memorial; New York, Anglo Books, 475 Fifth Avenue, 1953. Pp. XVI, 701. Maps, photographs. 35 shillings.)

This is the second volume in the Medical Series of the official Australian History of World War II. The first volume, which appeared last year, was entitled *Clinical Problems of War*, and consisted of an over-all picture of the Medical and Surgical problems of the Army during the whole war period. Diseases and Surgical problems were considered individually, and there was an interesting section on Medicine and Surgery in captivity.

This second volume is different in character and scope, from the first. Like the third volume, which has not yet been published, it is a history of the operational activities of medical organizations in the Australian Army from 1939 to 1945.

Since this volume is concerned more with military operations than with clinical work, it contains much material on organization and administration. There is a useful and informative discussion in the first chapter on the Inter-War Period, 1919-1939. It is little consolation to see that the Australians, like ourselves, did not make full use of all the lessons pointed out but not taken to heart by the events of World War II.

Part I of the volume covers the pre-war period, the initial organization for war in Australia and overseas, and a chronological account of the activities of the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Divisions of the Australian Imperial Force and the I Australian Corps in the Middle East. Dr. Walker tells the complicated story of the difficult period in a direct

narrative style, and if the reader is occasionally confused by the numbers of units and organizations under discussion it is not the fault of the author, but rather of the enormous amount of information which he is presenting in compact form. A useful guide to abbreviations is provided at the beginning of the volume. Exciting events followed swiftly one after another, successes as Allied troops from Egypt advanced to Benghazi, defeats as they were pushed back and besieged at Tobruk. Still more anxiety and stress were endured as the Australian forces were deeply involved in the unhappy reverses in Greece and Crete. The occupation of Syria was a more satisfying experience, and one where organization and methods were stabilized and medical officers began to contend with such important diseases as malaria and dysentery as well as with the surgery of war wounds and to realize the part they play in military successes.

Part I is concluded by the story of El Alamein. Chapter 18 is a concise summary of lessons learnt in these campaigns. 'The first of these' was concerned with the selection of recruits, and the 3 types which proved unsatisfactory under the stress of war, namely 1) the unfit who should have been excluded by proper initial examination, 2) those who were unable to stand continued physical and psychological stress, and 3) the over-age. One of the chief handicaps to the Australian Medical Forces in the M.E. was lack of adequate transport.

Part II covers the return of the I Australian Corps to the homeland, the campaign in Malaya, and the experiences in Timor, Ambon, and New Britain. As the reader follows these momentous events it is well that he should be reminded again of facts which may have slipped away from his mind—of the heroic and tragic part which our Australian colleagues were forced to play in these early years of the year. All too much of this volume has had to be concerned with medicine in captivity, in Germany, in Changi, on the Burma-Thailand Railway and other camps in the Far East.

Dr. Allan Walker is again sole author of this volume. He has covered an enormous amount of material in a straightforward and simple style and he has contrived to lift this official history which is by nature impersonal into a narrative which arouses a genuine feeling of personal concern for those whose history is being told. The style is restrained and dignified but occasionally lightened by comments and quotations which bring humour and relief into a somber story. Dr. Walker is again to be congratulated on the fine quality of his second volume.

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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume V, the Pacific; Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945. Prepared under the editorship of W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate by the Air Force Historical Division (Chicago, the University of Chicago Press, 1953, Pp. 878. Ill. \$8.50.)

This fifth and final volume dealing with combat operations in the Air Force's seven volume account of World War II is a worthy companion to its predecessors. Revealed for the first time is much of the Air Forces' experience in the closing months of the war; the development of the VIR or B-29 program first in China and later from the Pacific islands and the part which strategic bombing played in bringing Japan to capitulation, the problems of air power in China-Burma-India and the part the AAF played in the recapture of the Philippines.

This reviewer finds most interesting the section dealing with the problems of supplying the China-Burma-India theatre with air power, and the discussion of the differences in employment of air power embodied in the personalities and doctrines of Generals Stillwell and Chenault.

Equally as interesting is the section dealing with air support of the Campaign to recapture the Philippines. One has the feeling after finishing these chapters that the problem of close support of ground operations was never quite faced in the campaign, nor is it ever quite faced in this work.

Finally, mention must be made of two of the highest points of the entire volume, the subsections dealing with the development and employment of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki Atom-bombs and the discussion of the capture of Iwo Jima and the relation of this island to the AAF's strategic campaign against the Japanese homeland.

The volume is certainly a must for any World War II library and a prime example of perhaps the hardest military history there is to write, good accounts of air warfare.

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Bull Run Remembers . . ., by Joseph Mills Hanson. (Manassas, Va.: National Capitol Publishers, Inc., 1953. Pp. 194. Paper. \$1.90.)

Major Hanson, lately Superintendent of the Manassas National Battlefield Park, has summarized in this book the history, traditions, and landmarks of the two Manassas (Bull Run) campaigns of the American Civil War. This material has been acquired by him in the years he has been associated with the area of those battles.

Without recourse to footnotes, which so often scare away the non-professional reader, Major Hanson has nevertheless adhered closely to published sources, primary and secondary. In addition, he has included various sections dealing with local lore otherwise unavailable and has pinpointed local landmarks for the reader who uses the book as a guide book, as, indeed, it actually is as well as a history. Strengthening its utility as a guide book are its 7 maps and 27 photographs, including 18 identifying currently existing landmarks.

In a study involving so many details it would seem inevitable that some few errors would creep in. The reviewer, conscious of Major Hanson's preeminence on the Manassas campaigns, nevertheless feels obliged to question several details. In telling the story of Ricketts' and Griffin's Regular Army batteries being put out of action on the Henry Hill, the number of killed and wounded is given at 54 officers and men in Volume 2 of the *Official Records* whereas the revised table of casualties given in Volume 51, Part I gave 48 killed and wounded and 8 captured. In mentioning the armament of the two batteries (page 18) the author slips and mentions "eleven Parrotts" on the Henry Hill. Actually Captain Ricketts took up six 10-pdr. Parrotts to his disastrous position while Captain Griffin had three 10-pdr. Parrotts and two 12-pdr. howitzers.

It was hoped that in the organization tables of the Confederate Army the author would include Capt. Francis B. Schaeffer's independent provisional battalion, attached during the first battle of Manassas to Cocke's brigade. This battalion consisted of the "Beauregard Rifles," captained by Schaeffer, a District of Columbia and Maryland unit, Capt. McGavock Goodwyn's company of Crescent Blues Louisiana Volunteers, and Captain Henry N. B. Wood's company of Virginia Volunteers, some estimated 180-200 men who were stationed at Lewis' Ford. But this omission has been universal as even the accounts of the first battle

in *Battles and Leaders* and in Johnston's *Bull Run: Its Strategy and Tactics* also omit this unit.

On page 33 the author states that the Manassas fortifications were commanded by Colonel Terrett "whose troops included his own brigade of three Virginia regiments . . ." Terrett was originally a brigade commander for three Virginia regiments, the 1st, 11th, and 17th Regiments, but on or about July 2 (page 82) they had been given to the newly arrived Brig. Gen. James Longstreet and so were not with Terrett in the fortifications at the time of the battle.

The credit for selecting the line of Bull Run and Manassas Junction for the defense of Northern Virginia is given to Gen. R. E. Lee as it has been elsewhere. The reviewer, after having inspected the papers of Brig. Gen. Philip St. George Cocke, CSA, the officer first placed in charge of the line of the Potomac, is of the opinion that Cocke, and not Lee, originated this strategic plan although this is not apparent in the usual sources.

Bull Run Remembers . . . is a "must" for a student or prospective serious visitor of the battlefields of Manassas and is recommended as a valuable addition to any library on the American Civil War.

The book is issued with paper binding only which tends to increase its scarcity in future years. The proof-reading has been done carefully, and the text is noticeably free from the irritating errors which frequently mar the publications of the smaller printing houses. The index (7½ pages) is pleasantly detailed and is an asset to the book.

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The Lady for Ransom. By Alfred Duggan.
(New York: Coward-McCann, 1954. Pp. 274.
\$3.50.)

Military disintegration of any civilization is always a provocative subject for historical novelists. The action of Alfred Duggan's *The Lady for Ransom* is based on the Turkish invasion of the Anatolian provinces of the Eastern Roman Empire during the eleventh century after Christ.

The story is told in retrospect by Rober fitzOdo, a man of mixed Norman and Greek blood who possesses an understanding of both cultures. Orphaned by war at the age of twelve, he attaches himself to the household of a Norman knight, Roussel de Balliol, and his ambitious wife, Matilda. After several years of fruitless campaigning in Southern Italy, de Balliol leads his company of

heavy cavalry into the service of the luckless soldier emperor, Romanus Diogenes.

The superb Byzantine army, a victim of treachery and poor leadership, is almost annihilated at Manzikert by the horse-archers of the Turkish Sultan. Spared by a fortunate accident, de Balliol and his retainers ride through Asia Minor, hoping to found a feudal state on the ruins of empire. This ambition is thwarted by Byzantine guile, Turkish duplicity, and ill-conceived military ventures.

The Eastern Romans evolved an almost modern concept of field discipline and the principles of "fire and movement." Students of military history will find Mr. Duggan's accurate descriptions of Byzantine bow and lance tactics of particular interest. This is also true of his discussion of the sophisticated philosophy of civilized warfare developed through centuries of conflict by the Christians of the Eastern Mediterranean.

This novel is burdened with a complicated plot and a multiplicity of historical detail but, *The Lady for Ransom* can be recommended to any person with some knowledge of mediaeval history or an interest in the development of tactics and the ethics of war. It is not a novel for the casual reader.

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

CWRT HONORS COLONEL HENRY

The Civil War Round Table of Washington, D. C., held its Second Gold Medal Award Dinner, in honor of Colonel Robert Selph Henry, the evening of 14 April 1954. The gala occasion of the year was held in the National Press Club Ballroom, with a capacity attendance of a couple of hundred diners on hand, ready and eager to pay their homage to the locally popular and nationally-known Civil War historian and biographer who doubles in harness as a noted railroad executive.

Bruce Catton, president of the Round Table and himself a multiple award winner (recent recipient of the Pulitzer Prize) graciously presided as master of ceremonies. The Honorable George A. Dondero, Member of Congress from Michigan, was presentation officer for the award. And completing a memorable evening was Dr. Allan Nevins of Columbia University, the guest speaker whose characteristically thoughtful and challenging paper, entitled, "Some Unsolved Problems of the Civil War," was received with merited acclaim.

In his acceptance speech, Colonel Henry asked "Why the interest in the Civil War?" His answer is "Because it's interesting. It was a local, home-made war . . . the great common ancestral memory of people in both the North and South. And because it's fun—a lot more fun than it was during the war." Furthermore, "You would think that the global wars since then would have obliterated its memory, but precisely the opposite effect has taken place. The fact is," stated the

award winner, "that the greatest factor in the world today is the existence of the United States. And the central fact of this is that the Civil War preserved the United States."

Dr. Nevins challenged historians to make good the neglect of the vitally important logistical and administrative phases of the Civil War. Had it not been for the fortunate emergence of highly skilled military administrators like Montgomery C. Meigs, quartermaster general for the Union Army, the war could not have been won nor the nation preserved to emerge from a protoplasm to a cohesive continental giant. "It is a story as yet untold," Dr. Nevins declared.

Amongst the many distinguished guests was Mrs. James A. Longstreet, a vital and smiling little white haired lady, widow of one Lee's famous corps commanders, General Longstreet. Not to be outdone on the other side of the fence, present also was Major General U. S. Grant III, popular Washington city planner and grandson of Lee's main adversary. Program Chairman Ralph Donnelly and his coadjutors did themselves proud in the planning and execution of this brilliant affair which is, following last year's first award dinner for the late Douglas Southall Freeman, by way of becoming a tradition.

JOHNNY REB AND BILLY YANK

The eminent author of the lives of the above titled characters, Bell Irvin Wiley of Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, and long-time member of the American Military Institute, was the guest speaker at the March 9th dinner meeting of the Washington Round Table. The popularity of Dr. Wiley and his

works were attested to by the capacity turnout at the Army Navy Club that evening to hear him recount "On the Trail of Jeff Davis and Company." The announced title amiably confused some diners who came thinking they were to get the last word on the Confederate President's famous flight from Richmond (and, more importantly, what happened to the lost treasure), but the speaker quickly disposed of such misconceptions by confessing that the title masked his researches on the history of the Southern Confederacy. Dr. Wiley gave an absorbing account of the historian's work in stalking clues to sources, and the kneading of his material into recognizable literary form. He adverted to the speculative hazards every historian runs, as also does every inventor, in that prior to the culmination of his extensive research labors an excellent and, perhaps, definitive work may appear on the self-same subject authored by a fellow vintner. In his case this was poignantly illustrated when Wiley held aloft a volume he had just received, published by the Macmillan Company, authored by Clement Eaton, and entitled *A History of the Southern Confederacy*.

CWRT MAY MEETING

The month of May usually ushers in dynamic military operations. So the District CWRT displayed unusual activity in this culminating period of its winter and spring program. With a fine sense of point counterpoint the May 11th dinner meeting harked back to that of March, with F. Earl Lutz, president of the Richmond, Virginia, Civil War Round Table, presenting a talk on "The Literary Achievements of Billy Yank and Johnny Reb." This had to do with soldier newspapers in the Civil War. Mr. Lutz, a former newspaperman and retired Army officer, who served in both World Wars, has devoted much time to this new and unique field of research. Billy Yank's urge to break into

print is evidenced by more than 100 different camp newspapers established during the war by Union soldiers. Johnny Reb, for understandable reasons, was not as journalistically prolific as his brethren across the line. Mr. Lutz illustrated his highly interesting talk with an exhibit of original publications as they appeared during the Civil War.

The annual election of officers for the District CWRT was held at the May 11th meeting and resulted in the following selections: President, Rear Admiral John B. Heffernan; Vice President, Colonel Karl Betts; Secretary, Colonel Eugene Gempel; Treasurer, Maurice Blackwell. In addition, the following persons compose the Executive Committee: General Carl A. Baehr, Lewis Cook, Congressman George Dondero, Ralph W. Donnelly, General U. S. Grant III, Colonel Sidney Morgan, Bruce Catton, Bert Sheldon, and Kermit Sloan.

The May program was concluded with the spring field trip, Saturday, May 22d, which covered the area of the Second Manassas Campaign, including points such as Thoroughfare Gap, Bristoe, Manassas, Groveton, and Chantilly. A special staff of experts was assembled to guide the party through this famous and picturesque country: James B. Myers, Manassas Battlefield Park superintendent; Major Joseph Mills Hanson, his distinguished predecessor, and author of the recently published work on the subject campaign; Frank B. Sarles, Jr., National Park Service historian; and Historians R. Jack Ratcliffe and Frank Nicholson.

BREVITIES

Robert W. Davis of the *Military Affairs* staff, and formerly of the Organizational History and Honors Branch, Office of the Chief of Military History, has transferred to a position in the Army Medical Museum, Washington, D. C.

QUARTERMASTER CORPS HISTORICAL PROGRAM

The Historical Branch of the Office of The Quartermaster General has responsibility for the historical program of the Quartermaster Corps. It is presently engaged in four major tasks—completion of the volumes assigned to the Corps in the official series, U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II; preparation of a much needed history of the Quartermaster Corps, 1775-1939; writing of a detailed study of the Graves Registration Service, 1945-1951; and execution of the current history program.

The Quartermaster Corps has been allotted four volumes in the World War II program. One of these, *The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services*, by Erna Risch, was published early in 1953. It deals with administrative organization, and research and development, procurement, storage, and distribution problems in the Zone of Interior. The second volume, completing the story of activities in the Zone of Interior, is now in press. Written by Erna Risch and Chester L. Kieffer, it treats of the procurement and training of Quartermaster officers and enlisted men and the training of Quartermaster units; animals for military use; reclamation and conservation activities; laundry operations; the care of the dead; and industrial demobilization. A third volume, by Alvin P. Stauffer, which discusses Quartermaster Corps activities in the War Against Japan in the Pacific, is undergoing final revision following review by the Office of the Chief of Military History. The manuscript of a fourth volume by Irving Cheslaw, devoted to the War Against Germany, will shortly be submitted to the Office of the Chief of Military History for review.

Erna Risch and Charles F. Romanus are now engaged in research for a general history of the Quartermaster Corps from the American Revolution to the outbreak of World

War II. Edward Steere and Thayer M. Boardman are writing a history of the Graves Registration Service, 1945-1951. This work, dealing with the main events and problems connected with the recovery of the bodies of World War II dead and their return to the United States, will be Number 22 in the Q.M.C. HISTORICAL STUDIES, a series begun in 1943, which covers most of the major wartime activities of the Corps in the Zone of Interior.

The recently established current history unit, headed by Herbert R. Rifkind, is engaged in the preparation of monographs on subjects of special interest to the Corps in the period since World War II. William H. Peifer is at the half-way mark in the writing of a study of "Supply by Sky: The Quartermaster Airborne Development, 1950-1953," and Arthur G. Stewart is nearing the end of research for a monograph on "Quartermaster Operations in Korea: Supplying and Serving the Soldier, 1950-1953." These monographs, along with others to be produced in the Office of The Quartermaster General and in four major field installations, each of which has a historian working under the current history program, will serve as the basis for an over-all history of the Quartermaster Corps since 1945, emphasizing the Korean War and the problems of the ensuing partial mobilization.

The chief of the Historical Branch is Dr. Alvin P. Stauffer, and the assistant chief is Dr. Erna Risch. Offices of the Branch are in the Office of the Quartermaster General, Tempo B, 2d and T Streets, S.W., Washington 25, D. C.

BREVITIES

Dr. Harry B. Yoshpe recently succeeded Chester C. Wardlow as Chief, Historical Research Office, Office of the Chief of Transportation, Department of the Army.

GENERAL HOLABIRD'S LIBRARY

The library of General Samuel B. Holabird, one-time (1883-1890) Quartermaster-General of the United States Army, was given to the Fort Sheridan officers' club about twenty years ago. Consisting of some 15,000 volumes, it was housed in a room designed for it at the club; however, recent events made its longer retention at the post inconvenient, since the Army had not provided for its maintenance. The heirs consenting, the collection was transferred to the Newberry Library in Chicago, according to *The Newberry Library Bulletin* for April 1954. The volumes not already duplicated in the Newberry holdings, together with the bronze plaque marking the original gift, now have a permanent place in the Newberry Library, while the others have been given to De Paul University.

GENERAL GUDERIAN

Colonel General Heinz Guderian, credited with masterminding the creation and employment of the lightning attack German panzer divisions which proved so successful during the first half of World War II, died from a liver ailment at Schwangau, Germany, 14 May 1954. General Guderian's tank forces crushed Poland at the start of the war, broke through the Allied forces in France in 1940, and raced to the sea near the memorable British evacuation point at Dunkirk. In the initial penetration of Russia, some of his light tanks reached the suburbs of Moscow in December 1941, but the successful Soviet counterattack caused his displacement from command until 1943, when he was re-instated as inspector general of tank divisions. General Guderian was captured by American forces on 10 May 1945. Since the war, living in an old people's home, he attracted wide attention as the author of several military books.

NAVAL HISTORICAL FOUNDATION EXHIBIT

On Friday, May 14, 1954, a new exhibition, "CARRIER WARFARE," opened at the Truxtun-Decatur Naval Museum, 1610 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., to continue until October 31, 1954. A small scale model of the United States Navy's newest Aircraft Carrier FORRESTAL is shown for the first time. By means of other ship models and miniature aircraft, as well as relics, manuscripts, photographs, prints and paintings, The Naval Historical Foundation depicts the World War II and Korean War history of Naval Aircraft Carriers. It shows how the integration of air and sea power turned the tide of war in the Pacific and how hunter-killer tactics using the same combination of carrier air and sea power defeated enemy submarines in the Atlantic.

This is the fourteenth exhibition shown in the Truxtun-Decatur Naval Museum since May 18, 1950, when The Naval Historical Foundation opened its doors. Attendance has passed the 104,000 mark, and visitors from all over the country have availed themselves of this historic and interesting museum, remodeled from the old carriage house of historic Decatur House on Lafayette Square, just two blocks from the White House.

BREVITIES

Dr. Donald W. Mitchell recently replaced Clarence Smith, and Dr. Charles L. Wiltse (Calhoun fame) was added to the Army Medical Corps history staff.

Lt. Col. David W. Matheson has succeeded Col. John P. McWhorter as Chief, Historical Division, Office of the Chief of Engineers.

David Latt, formerly a historian with the Engineers, has transferred to the Aberdeen Proving Grounds.

THE HISTORIAN OF THE BRITISH ARMY

BY HENRY I. SHAW, JR.*

CONSERVATISM *Revisited*, the title of Peter Viereck's recent book, serves as an apt summation of a study in the works of the Honorable Sir John William Fortescue. An avowed admirer and hereditary member of the English aristocracy, Fortescue consciously infected his writings with a defense of the English social system. Without the help of highly-placed friends, he would never have been able to accomplish the work which has led to his being considered the foremost British military historian. It was the help of "friends" as he admits in his autobiography, *Author and Curator* (1933), that obtained for him his positions as private secretary to two royal colonial governors, his editorship of the Colonial series of the Calendar of State Papers, his authorization to write *The History of the British Army* (1899-1929), and his position as Librarian to the King at Windsor. Naturally Fortescue's own talents for organization, for writing, and for research played a great part in his selection, but it is obvious that talent was not enough; his birth as the son of an earl certainly removed many obstacles from his path. He found in the system that nurtured him the answer to England's greatness. Men of his own class, the

officers of the British army, were to him the saviors of the British empire. He has stated the outstanding bias of his histories in one sentence. "It is not too much, I think, to say that we owe our national existence to our regimental officers."¹

The suspicion of change, a tremendous respect for old traditions, the finding of solace in the past rather than the future might be said to mark Fortescue's conservative outlook. It would be foolish to say that he was completely resistant to improvements of any sort, but he certainly did not entertain with pleasure thoughts about certain aspects of the social scene in his time. He viewed with distaste the effects of popular education upon the countryside in which he had been raised. The reformers who had put through the Education Act of 1870 imagined, as he wrote, "that if men be not actually created equal, then education will make them equal; but this," said Fortescue "is the most lamentable of all fallacies."² And the situation which was responsible for bringing this comment down to us was Fortescue's vain attempt to find suitable domestic servants among the country-folk up to the par of his noble father's day. It seems that everyone was too educated to see the value of engaging in domestic service, and the youth of the countryside must needs engage in some higher level of work. Fortescue lamented also the passing of the English agricultural scene as

*Editorial Note: The author, staff member of the U. S. Marine Corps Historical Division, states as a prefatory note, "It is an impossible task for the student of early American military history to avoid the pen of Fortescue. Times without number the only source to which one can turn are the volumes of *The History of the British Army*. As an aid to better understanding of the man who has rightly been called *The Historian of the British Army*, this historiographical analysis of his various writings is presented."

¹"The Vicissitudes of Organized Power," *The Romanes Lecture*, (Oxford, 1929), 39.

²*Author and Curator*, (London, 1933), 81.

he had known it. His historical commentary upon the advent of free trade with the repeal of the Corn Laws signified his belief that it was the death knell of English farming. His adverse criticism of the commercial class as that "vast body of self-seeking men who desired cheap food in order that they might obtain cheap labor and make large profits," and who therefore were "the majority which imposed Free Trade upon the nation,"³ rings with the sentiment of the true country gentleman.

The changing times in which he lived had a pace altogether too rapid for Fortescue. There can be no doubt that he did not approve of the political reforms that took place within his lifetime. His aristocratic bias creeps into his writing again in this biting observation on representative government:

The ideas that so-called education can make men good, that the possession of a vote can make them intelligent, and that the lowering of the franchise means both "liberty" and "progress" are exploded. Biological science tends to show that an hereditary aristocracy may be better qualified to govern than a democracy, and that careful breeding is preferable to popular election.⁴

As a military historian Fortescue carried his views on hereditary worth quite as far as he did in the above comment. In an analysis of the reasons that make men follow an officer more readily than a non-commissioned officer he emphatically stated as his experience "that men will follow a commissioned boy of eighteen fresh from Eton more readily than they will the non-commissioned veteran."⁵ His reason for this was given as an indisputable "fact" that the men do not regard the fortunate officer as a competitor in their struggle for existence.

In the historical field, especially in the historical field of military operations, Fortescue

has made other observations which deserve inclusion if only to show that the man was certainly controversial in his thinking and writing. He held the novel view regarding the American Revolution quite contrary to the theses of many present American historians that, "the task of bringing America to submission by force of arms was a military operation beyond the strength of any nation in the world at that time."⁶ This is certainly not keeping company with the school of writers who believe that the United States would have perished except for France's help. Yet it comes from the pen of the man who is credited with knowing more of the history of the British army than any other, living or dead. Another viewpoint he held relevant to our history, not sufficiently recognized by American scholars, is that it was the campaigns of John, Duke of Marlborough, in the early 1700's that made possible the successes of Amherst and Wolfe in the French and Indian War. Fortescue was quite emphatic on this point for he believed that, "but for the amazing genius of the said John, North America would now be predominantly French, not English, and the United States (if any) French and not English speaking."⁷

As proof of his divorce from many popular views of his day, it is interesting to note that Fortescue regarded what Britain called the free enterprise system as an exact parallel in commercial fields of the military principle of the conquest of the inferior by the superior. He even went so far as to state that "the casualty lists filled by commerce" were hardly "lower than those filled by war."⁸ Certainly not a popular view in a commercially-minded nation. He further regarded the warfare of commerce as every bit as vicious and destructive as that of military forces.

³*History of the British Army*, (13 vols., London, 1899-1929), XIII. 7.

⁴*Author and Curator*, 174.

⁵*Military History*, (Cambridge, 1914), 147.

⁶*Ibid.*, 81.

⁷*Author and Curator*, 166.

⁸*Military History*, 16-17.

It is fortunate that we have the volume of the lectures Fortescue delivered at Cambridge when his university called him to take a position as its first lecturer in military history. Within the pages of the lectures we find his attempt to define and evaluate such history and also a critical summation of his *History of the British Army*. His own definition is so concise that any attempt to paraphrase it would surely lead to a destruction of its content. Military history "is the history of the strife of communities expressed through the conflict of organized bands of armed men."⁹ Fortescue wished the definition to be brief and exclusive because he believed that military history could be expanded as a field to include almost the whole of known human history, which he thought was essentially a history of strife. In direct opposition to many contemporary historians who disregarded war as far as possible as a factor in history, Fortescue believed that the study of military history had a definite value in its portrayal of the merits of devotion to duty. To each reader he wished to come "the remembrance of the proud history of our soldiers," which might "brace each one of us, no matter how humble his sphere, to discipline himself in the self-denial and self-control which triumph over adversity."¹⁰ Following this line of reasoning he felt that no one could justly say that military history was not a subject worthy of study for he believed it to be a history "of moral force, perhaps almost the triumph of moral over purely physical force."¹¹ He went below the surface veneer of battles and campaigns to reach the level of moral discipline of the individual which he felt was the outstanding lesson to be learned from a study of military life and actions.

Fortescue felt constantly the lack of mone-

tary reward which attends the efforts of the historian. He was never rich and often found it necessary to procure grants in order to write some of his historical works. His observation on the material awards proffered to a historian for his labors would no doubt pluck a sympathetic chord in the breast of many scholars today. "The writing of such a history [*The History of the British Army*]," he said, "is an expensive matter, which in these days of grinding and oppressive taxation becomes almost impossible. Moreover, even a successful history nowadays (I speak of real history, not of the post-humous gossip which is palmed off as such) brings in little money."¹² One would think that a man who found himself in a position to fulfill a lifelong interest in military history by writing the accepted version of the history of his nation's army would look at his work with parental affection. Such, however, is not the case. When looking back over his life's work he found occasion to say;

If I had realized at the outset what my work was going to cost me, I should never have dreamed of undertaking it. Perpetual interruptions and distractions forbade my history to become an agreeable companion. I would fain have made it so, but I could not. It haunted me for more than thirty years at every instant of freedom.¹³

Since Fortescue could not abide the idea of abandoning a task once begun, he did discharge his commission and write the volumes that are the basis of his reputation. His consolation, and this is evident throughout his autobiography, was in the solid recognition of his talents and of the contribution he had made to a field far too often neglected by serious students.

Fortescue's ideas on the subject of historiography in general are found in his small booklet, *The Writing of History* (1926). It is worth reading just for the single purpose of

⁹*Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 46.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 45.

¹²*Author and Curator*, 262.

¹³*Ibid.*, 263.

obtaining a successful historian's viewpoint on several popular doctrines regarding history. For scientific history of the school that says that the writer must hold himself aloof from his material and present it in as cold and factual a manner as possible, he has a quiet smile of derision. Since to him all history dealt with human nature, the attempt of a human to examine the subject of history scientifically was impossible. He felt that "the science of human nature is a thing the best human brains have struggled for centuries to found in vain."¹⁴ Aloofness was not one of his writing characteristics; he plunged wholeheartedly into the vast amount of original documents he consulted, traveled extensively to get the feel of the battle-grounds he wrote about, and earnestly tried to recreate in his own mind the personalities of the men who had led Britain's troops. To maintain the thread of narrative, he relied upon his own creative imagination. How many contemporary historians would agree with him that the most necessary talent of the historical writer is imagination? He said that "the historian, whose business it is to recreate or interpret the past, must rely upon the only medium that is capable of producing that effect—imagination primarily, and not the generalizing intellect."¹⁵ Because he regarded history as primarily the record of human nature in action, he had a profound admiration, shared by few scholarly historians, for the historical romance. The novelist's recreation of a living personality from the pages of history was to him great writing. He felt that "every really great romance-writer made is a great historian lost."¹⁶

Fortescue was not a great admirer of objectivity in the writing of history. His own histories resound with frequent evidences of

partisanship; his heroes, Marlborough and Wellington, are treated in a very favorable light and his enemies, all politicians who did not favor the army, receive very rough handling. There was no such thing as the author not intruding his opinions in Fortescue's history. He was unsparing in his criticism of men whom he considered to have blundered in the performance of their duties. As an example of how scathing his judgments could be, here is an excerpt from one of his many unfavorable commentaries on Canning, Governor-General of India during the Mutiny. "Thereby Canning showed his utter unfitness for high command. . . . But to shift the responsibility for correcting that decision [not to disband mutinous Bengal regiments] upon a subordinate was not only wrong, it was contemptible."¹⁷ Fortescue was an iconoclast in the highest sense and believed implicitly in his right to pass judgment and mete out rewards and punishments in the pages of his history.

The cooperative history seen so often today received little commendation from him. Believing as he did that background and social station irrevocably mark a man, he felt that even men of equal intellectual capabilities could not produce similar work if they came from different ways of life. Each historian left, Fortescue believed, his own indelible mark upon his writings formed in the milieu of his individual struggle for success. He felt that no group of men could effectively give to the reader an understandable comprehensive history. Fortescue believed that it was impossible for the reader "so to adjust his mental focus as to take the mean of a dozen men."¹⁸ His plea then was for individuals who were willing to devote years to the production of a work on a great historical subject. The only reward he promised these

¹⁴*The Writing of History*, (London, 1926), 28-29.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 37.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 39.

¹⁷*History of the British Army*, XIII, 292-93.

¹⁸*The Writing of History*, 50.

men and women was that found by "every conscientious worker, artist, or craftsman," who was motivated by "the joy of his work."¹⁹

When one opens a history by Fortescue and begins to read it for the first time he will be variously annoyed and pleased according to his previous acquaintanceship with his historical writings. Very few quotations will be found, because the author believed in paraphrasing all but the most important statements. The number of footnotes is minute when compared with the vast amount of little known facts introduced in the text. Those that are included introduce a wealth of organizational and anecdotal detail. A very sparse bibliography is the rule rather than the exception. Many of the mechanics of modern historiography are ignored or given short shrift. Because, however, Fortescue literally spent his lifetime immersed in the annals of the British army, he has achieved a unique position in British military historiography. Without reading Fortescue, no student of British military history can begin to get anything but the barest foothold in the subject. From the jacket to Volume XIII of his *History of the British Army* (1929), a quotation from a review in *The Spectator* best sums up his position as an historian: "The author has no rivals as a student of military history, and we question whether he has any living superior as an historian." A strong statement,

surely, but one which reflects the esteem in which he was held.

Since Fortescue himself believed that the only way to understand history was to understand the writer and the peculiar idiosyncrasies that he held, it seems perfectly legitimate to detail again for emphasis the major beliefs that he held and which color his writing. He believed in the aristocratic system into which he had been born, and he instituted on many occasions a defense of its tenets. He believed that it was to members of his own social stratum, personified in the British officers, that the empire owed its salvation. He considered that a history written without the benefit of imaginative deduction on the part of an author was worthless in giving the reader a grasp of the events of the past as they had happened. His style of writing is a constant reminder of the fact that he believed the historian should make himself an intricate part of the history he wrote. Perhaps the author himself had best sum up the conception of history the reader will find in his pages. When one understands what he says here, he can turn to Fortescue and read with understanding and it might be approval.

What the historian needs is unflagging industry and unswerving honesty in seeking out the truth, imagination to interpret it aright, literary art to bring it home not only with conviction but with welcome to men's minds and bosoms.²⁰

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 51.

²⁰*Ibid.*, 72.

AMI LAPEL INSIGNIA AVAILABLE

Beautiful lapel emblems or buttons of the American Military Institute are still available from a pre-war stock. It is the oval seal of the AMI, in red, gold, and black, 15mm high by 10mm wide. Only *one dollar* as long as supply lasts. Thereafter it will cost three times as much. Order from the Secretary, American Military Institute, 1529 18th St., N W., Washington 6, D. C. Send check or postal money order.

LOCAL DEFENSE IN THE CONFEDERATE MUNITIONS AREA

BY RALPH W. DONNELLY

I

THERE was one limitation of the Confederate control of its munitions producing area which constituted a considerable handicap to the Nitre and Mining Bureau and which seems to have been largely overlooked by those who have dealt with the functioning of the Bureau. This limitation was that much of the territory from which the raw materials for munitions came was not pro-Confederate in sentiment during the war. The prevailing sentiment, once crystalized after the early flush of patriotism expired with the institution of conscription as the national policy, ranged from isolationism through anti-Confederate to the extreme of pro-Union.¹

The munitions producing area was located largely in the mountainous regions of Southwestern Virginia, Eastern Tennessee, Northern Alabama, Northwestern Georgia, Northwestern Arkansas, and Southwestern Missouri. As the war continued it was in many of these same areas that bands of deserters, draft-dodgers, bushwhackers, and outlaws compounded the troubles of the Confederates

with the Unionists.² The nitre workmen were, according to Gorgas, "... generally from those subject to militia duty in the mountains beyond where disaffection existed," He described the assignment to nitre duty as

"... a rude sort of service, and the officers in charge of the districts, especially in East Tennessee, North Carolina and North Alabama, had to show much firmness in their dealings with the turbulent people among whom, and by whose aid they worked. ... Much of the work too, lay in Union districts where our cause was unpopular, and where obstacles of all kinds had to be encountered and overcome. It was no holiday duty, this nitre digging although the service was a good deal decried by such as knew nothing of its nature."³

As the Federal blockade closed more Southern ports and as trade with Europe became more risky, the dependence of the Confederate armies upon home produced munitions (nitre, lead, iron, sulfur, copper, etc.) became more pronounced. This dependence in turn made the production of these munitions areas more imperative. Unfortunately

¹For a study of this attitude, see Georgia Lee Tatum, *Disloyalty in the Confederacy*, (Chapel Hill, N. C., 1934).


²For troubles in Virginia, see *The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, (Washington, 1881-1901), Series IV, Vol. 2, pp. 721-22 (Hereinafter cited as O.R. with Roman numerals prefixed for the series and followed by volume, part, and page numbers, e.g., IV O.R. 2, 721-22.) Also see IV O.R. 3, 802-20, *passim*. For Tennessee, see *Revolt of the Unionists in East Tennessee*, I O.R. 4, 230-51; *Confederate Policy of Repression in East Tennessee*, II O.R. 1, 823-931; also I O.R. 16, Pt.

2, 953; I O.R. 20, Pt. 2, 405; I O.R. 52, Pt. 2, 209; IV O.R. 2, 138, 140, 367-71, 563-64, 800, and IV O.R. 3, 802-20, *passim*. Disaffection, secret Union organizations, and conscription resistance in Alabama are covered in I O.R. 7, 840; IV O.R. 1, 1149; IV O.R. 2, 141-42, 207, 258, 638, 680-81, 680-81; IV O.R. 3, 393-98. For similar troubles in North Carolina, see I O.R. 47, Pt. 2, 1270, 1312; I O.R. 51, Pt. 2, 818, 824; I O.R. 52, Pt. 2, 209-10, 214; IV O.R. 2, 460-61, 619, 674, 721-22, 741, 765, 783-86; IV O.R. 3, 802-20, *passim*.

³Josiah Gorgas, "Ordnance of the Confederacy," *Army Ordnance* (now *Ordnance*), (Jan.-Feb., 1936), 215.

for the Confederates their growing dependence upon domestic production was paralleled by increasing Union pressure upon the field armies, placing the burden of their defense upon second-rate troops. The increased threats of Federal raids upon the various Nitre and Mining Bureau installations soon ceased to be a matter of academic speculation and became a stern reality.

conscription a worker could leave his employment at will; after being conscripted and detailed he became, technically, a deserter from military service if he should leave his post of detail. Pro-Federal men were usually willing to work as nitre diggers and iron furnace helpers for the Confederates but would draw the line at firing a gun against Union soldiers. Conscience could accept the manufacture of



Compounding the opposition of the civilian population and the active opposition of Yankee bushwhackers, guerrillas, and organized bands of local volunteers was the antagonism of many of the workmen themselves to the Confederate cause. This feeling was intensified by the introduction of conscription and the detailing of enlisted men as workers subject to occasional military service. Prior to

munitions but not the shooting in a day when the concept of total warfare had not yet been reached.

The earliest difficulties of the Confederate government were in East Tennessee, and the steps taken there are of interest.

The Tennessee vote cast in June, 1861, on separation from the Union was significant as indicating the attitude of the area toward

the Confederate cause. The vote cast in the extreme northeastern counties on the question of separation was as follows:

COUNTY	FOR	AGAINST
Johnson	111	787
Sullivan	1586	627
Carter	86	1343
Washington	1022	1445
	2805	4202 ⁴

A considerable number of the iron furnaces of pre-war Tennessee were located in these counties. Sullivan County had five, Carter County had seven, and Johnson and Washington Counties one or two each, some fourteen of the State's seventy-one. Of the State's seventy-five forges and bloomeries, fifteen were in Johnson County, ten in Carter, six in Sullivan, and three in Washington, or thirty-four in all.⁵ A pro-Union sentiment in these four counties was very definitely a factor to be considered by the Confederates in operating the iron industry of Northeastern Tennessee.

The sentiment was as equally confused in the southeastern portion of Tennessee. The same June vote on separation in Polk County, the site of the important Ducktown copper mines, showed 738 votes for separation and 317 against. Yet in the adjoining Bradley County, the site of the copper rolling mills at Cleveland, the vote was 507 for separation and 1382 against.⁶

In Eastern Tennessee the call for the militia by the Confederate state government and then the passage of the Confederate Conscript Act of April 16, 1862, made it necessary for the Unionists of that area either to be conscripted, run away to join the Federal forces, or to hide out. Numerous conscripts

of Union inclinations apparently served as detailed conscripts in the iron works of Johnson and Carter Counties. The plant of Taylor, Turley & Company and the furnace on Stoney Creek offered employment for some attempting to avoid service, but there were not enough iron works to accommodate all the unwilling.⁷

The exposed position of the nitre works of Tennessee early became a matter of concern to superintendent St. John of the Nitre and Mining Bureau. In December, 1862, he reported that the nitre works in Tennessee and in Upper Alabama were subject to frequent interruption and even loss of life. At this time St. John supported the organization and arming of the workmen, each group to guard its own works. He visualized an organization similar to a corps of sappers and miners.⁸

It was the opinion of the Confederate War Department in February, 1863, that the conscript law could be judiciously applied in Eastern Tennessee to the majority of the disaffected workmen at the iron and nitre works. The alternative for those deemed obstinate in disloyalty or unworthy of trust was to send them to Tennessee regiments serving at distant points. Such transfers were not to be allowed to bring about a reduction in the total force of workmen as more faithful men, conscripts, or even detailed soldiers, were to take their places.⁹

The militarization of the force of workmen was forced by the pressure of economic conditions and provided the means by which the Government could control and discipline the workmen. Economic conditions had changed in the munitions producing area of

⁷Samuel W. Scott and Samuel P. Angel, *History of the Thirteenth Regiment Tennessee Volunteer Cavalry, USA*, (Knoxville, 1903), pp. 97-98.

⁸IV O.R. 2, 223: Report of Major I. M. St. John to Secty. of War Jas. A. Seddon, Dec. 3, 1862.

⁹I O.R. 23, Pt. 2, 651-52: Ltr. Secty. of War James A. Seddon to Maj. Gen. D. S. Donelson, Comdg. Dept. E. Tenn., Feb. 27, 1863.

⁴J. S. Hurlburt, *History of the Rebellion in Bradley County, East Tennessee*, (Indianapolis, 1936), p. 48.

⁵James M. Swank, *History of the Manufacturer of Iron in all Ages*, (Philadelphia, 1892), p. 289.

⁶Hurlburt, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

the Confederacy since the outbreak of the war. Back in August, 1861, Governor Warren Winslow of North Carolina, in commenting on the reopening of the Silver Hill Mine, observed that "... labor is now so cheap..."¹⁰ But by November, 1863 prices were high and labor was scarce. Wages were so high as to practically preclude the employment of free white labor at mines and saltpetre caves. Such laborers as were available were usually older men with families and homes who hesitated to take employment at the distant and frequently dangerous locations where mining and saltpetre digging were carried on. The alternative was the use of detailed men with the possibility of extending the draft age, primarily to secure a priority on the labor of older men and indirectly an increase in the number of combat troops by the possible release of detailed younger men.¹¹ President Davis incorporated this proposal in his message to Congress of December 7, 1863, when he asked that the age limit for compulsory military service be raised to forty-five.¹²

It was in September, 1863, that plans were matured for the use of the men detailed to the Nitre and Mining Bureau in the local defense of their areas. A memorandum was prepared for the organization of such units in Nitre and Mining District 7, Eastern Tennessee, commanded by Captain Thomas J. Finnie. The avowed purposes were the better control of the district's operations and preparation for possible field service in the event of further raids or to meet any attempts at the permanent occupation of the country by the enemy.

The organization was to be under the exclusive control of Captain Finnie until such

time as it would be required for field service, when the men would serve under the commanding general of the department. After the emergency had passed the units would be ordered back to duty with the Nitre and Mining Bureau. The essentially local character of the organization was guaranteed by the proviso that the battalion (or regiment) should not be ordered out of East Tennessee unless the men volunteered to go into another state or into the general service.

The memorandum is somewhat contradictory as to the proposed methods of choosing officers for this defense unit. It first states: "The Battalion or Regiment so organized shall be officered as other Battalions or Regiments are officered, . . ." Then comes the contradiction: "... Capt. Finnie may, with the approval of the Chief of the N[itre] & M[ining] Bureau and the sanction of the Secretary of War, appoint the officers, who shall act as assistants to Capt. Finnie in the discharge of his duties in the Nitre and Mining department." These officers were to be commissioned and ranked as infantry officers and considered as on detached service. Rank in the defense unit was not, in any way, to affect the rank of commissioned officers in the Nitre and Mining Bureau.

The proposal was approved on September 30, 1863, with instructions that any troops so organized would be under the Law of August 21, 1861, entitled, "For Local Defense and Special Service." Organized under this law they would be apart from all state authority and subject only to that of the President. The act itself authorized the President "... to accept the services of volunteers of such kind and in such proportion as he may deem expedient, to serve for such time as he may prescribe, for the defense of exposed places or localities, or such special service as he may deem expedient."¹³

¹⁰IV O.R. 1, 555: Memo. from Major J. Gorgas to C. S. Congress, Aug. 12, 1861.

¹¹IV O.R. 2, 997-98: Report of Secty. of War James A. Seddon to President Davis, Nov. 26, 1863.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 1041: Message of President Davis to Congress, Dec. 7, 1863.

¹³IV O.R. 1, 579: Act of Congress approved Aug. 21, 1861.

After the memorandum had been approved, Lt. Col. Isaac M. St. John, Chief of the Nitre and Mining Bureau, endorsed upon it the names of these officers to be authorized to organize such local defense troops:

Capt. T. J. Finnie, Tenn. [District 7, W. Va. & East Tenn.]

Prof. D. K. Tuttle, Abingdon [District 1, S. W. Va. & Lead Mines]

Lt. R. C. Morton, Christianburg [District 3, W. Va.]

James B. Noyes, Union [District 4, Valley of Va.]

Capt. J. F. Jones, Staunton [District 4½, Valley of Va.]

Capt. W. B. Gabbett, Alabama¹⁴ [District 9, Upper Ala.]

At the same time this memorandum was being formulated the Adjutant General issued a general order to the effect that nitre workmen were to be called on for local defense duty only "in cases of extreme military urgency." Even these calls could only be made by the general commanding the district. It was further ordered that workmen would be returned to their work in those areas lately overrun and operations would be resumed with the assistance of the various military officers.¹⁵

By the spring of 1864 the need for troops was pressing the Confederacy on all fronts. Grant opened his campaign in the Wilderness; Sheridan's cavalry raided Richmond; Butler made his stab at Petersburg; Sherman began his drive into Georgia; Sigel (replaced later by Hunter) was advancing up the Shenandoah Valley, while Crook and Averell (and later Stoneman, Burbridge, and Gil-

lem) slashed at Southwestern Virginia with its railroad, salt wells, and lead mines. The oft-used device of shifting troops from quiet to active sectors, facilitated by interior lines of communication, was rendered obsolete by the Federal strategy of simultaneous, concerted attacks in all sectors. Then, too, the quality and quantity of the Confederate troops were beginning to decline. This coupled with a decline in the efficiency of the transportation system made the defense of the Confederacy an increasingly difficult problem. In an attempt to help solve this problem the Confederacy began to prepare reserve and local defense units for active service.

In April, 1864, some 162 detailed conscripts of Nitre and Mining District 7 (Tennessee) were organized into a two-company battalion. These men were organized as local defense units in Sullivan County, close to the Virginia line in Northeastern Tennessee, by First Lieutenant John W. Pearce¹⁶ of the Nitre and Mining Corps, Assistant Superintendent of the Seventh District. Pearce assigned himself as acting captain of Company A with C. C. Frasier and J. M., and Caleb Morrell as the three lieutenants. B. W. L. Holt was assigned as captain of Company B with Joseph R. Kuhn, George W. Richards, and Zebidee McCarny serving as lieutenants. These companies were accepted for service by the War Department, but the Department called for elected captains. There is no record to show that they were ever elected in conformity with the Department's desires.¹⁷

¹⁴Personal file of Major Thomas J. Finnie, Nitre and Mining Bureau (hereinafter abbreviated as "N. & M. Bur."), Carded Record File, Confederate Archives, U. S. National Archives (hereinafter cited as "CSA Carded Records").

¹⁵IV O.R. 2, 834: General Orders 127, Adjutant and Inspector General's Office (hereinafter cited as "A. & I.G.O."), Sept. 29, 1863.

¹⁶John W. Pearce went South from Georgetown, D. C., where he had worked on the Washington Aqueduct. He first served as a second lieutenant of Engineers, Virginia Forces, at Gloucester Point, Va. In June, 1862 he entered the Confederate Nitre Corps, serving as a subordinate (second lieutenant), first lieutenant, and captain in Southwestern Virginia and Eastern Tennessee. When he applied for a pardon after the war, a petition of nine Unionists of Jonesboro, East Tennessee, was presented on his behalf, speaking well for his treatment of Federal sympathizers.

¹⁷Organization records, Detailed Conscripts, Nitre

The average age of the men in Company A was 33 years with 32 of the men being between 36 and 45 years old. These men were apparently from an iron producing area, according to their occupations as given on the muster roll. Some 17 were wood choppers, 7 were colliers, 8 were laborers, 7 were wagoners, and 5 were overseers. There were also among the 69 members of the company a hammerman, furnace keeper, forge tender, blacksmith, and ore digger.¹⁸ Company B consisted of some 93 men with an average age of 30 years, but, unlike Company A, most were in the 21 to 35 age bracket (56 men), while only 27 men were in the over-35 age bracket. Most of the men were listed as farmers (70), while the remaining ones had such occupations as those of a carpenter, cabinet maker, and shoemaker.¹⁹ These were the nitre men.

It was probably of this group that St. John was speaking in October, 1864, when he commented that "the Tennessee force has served for some weeks under General Vaughn."²⁰ In any event, the entire force of iron workmen in Tennessee was in the field during the last quarter of 1864 with a consequent suspension of iron production.²¹

The organization of the workmen from the

and Mining District 7, Tennessee, CSA Carded Records. See also invoice letter of Lt. John W. Pearce, N. & M. Corps, to Maj. Richard Morton, May 1, 1864, and letter from A. & I.G.O. to Lt. John W. Pearce, N. & M. Corps, June 16, 1864, filed with muster rolls of Companies A and B, Detailed Conscripits, N. & M. Bureau, District 7, Record Group 109, Confederate Archives, U. S. National Archives.

¹⁸Muster roll, Co. A, Detailed Conscripits, N. & M. Bureau, District 7, Tennessee, enlisted April 27, 1864, Record Group 109, Confederate Archives, U. S. National Archives.

¹⁹Muster roll, Co. B, Detailed Conscripits, N. & M. Bureau, District 7, Tennessee, enlisted April 30, 1864, Record Group 109, Confederate Archives, U. S. National Archives.

²⁰V. O.R. 3, 697: Report of Col. J. M. St. John, Chief N. & M. Bureau, to Secty. of War James A. Seddon, [Oct. 1, 1864].

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 989, note "d": Report of Lt. Col. Richard Morton, Actg. Chief N. & M. Bureau, to Secty. of War James A. Seddon, Dec. 31, 1864.

nitre works in and adjacent to the Valley of Virginia into a regiment of local defense troops was carried out promptly by Captain James F. Jones, Superintendent of District 4½, stationed at Staunton. The regimental organization was completed on October 2, 1863, although the muster rolls for seven companies were not turned over to the War Department until February 24, 1864. The rolls for three additional companies were promised for the near future. The regiment thus constituted was designated the "1st Regiment Virginia Volunteers, Local Defense Troops" by the War Department,²² and Captain Jones was appointed colonel of the regiment, his rank dating from October 2, 1863.²³ Unfortunately, no muster rolls or records of this regiment are among the Confederate Records in the National Archives.

II

The Valley of Virginia became the scene of battle service for these nitre men in June of 1864. General J. D. Imboden, commanding the Valley Department, sent orders on June 1, 1864, to Captain James F. Jones, commanding Nitre and Minute District 4½ at Staunton, to gather his command and report for active duty in the field. According to Jones's report, couriers were dispatched immediately to the works within the district. Although the works were scattered over several counties, some 130 men had been collected by Friday, June 3, 1864. These men were organized into a provisional battalion of two companies, one captained by W. L. Clark, the other by F. P. Clark, A.Q.M.,

²²Personal file of Capt. James F. Jones, N. & M. Bur.: Ltr. of Lt. Col. J. M. St. John, Chief N. & M. Bur., to Gen. S. Cooper A. & I.G., Feb. 24, 1864, CSA Carded Records. The rolls for companies A, B, C, D, E, G, and H were originally sent in with the letter. Their present whereabouts are unknown, and they are presumed to have been destroyed.

²³General Orders 61, A. & I.G.O., Series of 1864. Jones's commission as colonel was back-dated to Oct. 2, 1863.

who volunteered to serve until the arrival of N. R. Heaton, superintendent of the Bath County Government Nitre Works located at the Kirkpatrick Cave.

Captain Jones appointed the other officers, procured altered smoothbore muskets without bayonets or cartridge boxes from the Staunton ordnance depot, and then began the march to join Imboden's forces. The next day, Saturday, June 4, the Nitre Provisional Battalion arrived at the camp near Mount Crawford where it was assigned to Major Richard H. Brewer's command, chiefly dismounted cavalry.

The next morning the battalion was marched about twelve miles to New Hope, Augusta County, and upon its arrival on the left was immediately assigned to an advanced position in support of a battery and a line of skirmishers. This position was held for about an hour and a half, being subject to heavy artillery and musketry fire for at least an hour. Successive withdrawals of the right and center forced by enemy pressure gave the left no alternative but to follow suit. Hovering cavalry on the left flank of the Nitre Battalion nipped off several prisoners during the retrograde movement.

Reaching the hastily entrenched main body, Jones's provisional battalion took post on the extreme left of the small army, adjacent to the Thirty-sixth Virginia Infantry. Utilizing the brief interval before the assault of the Federal forces, the unit threw up a rough line of breastworks. The Federal cavalry drove into the skirmish line but were unable to dent the line. Two infantry drives then followed without the achievement of any tangible success. While being subjected to harrassing artillery fire from two guns at the short range of 500 yards, the battalion became aware of increasing pressure on its right. The Federal forces, having driven a wedge into the Confederate center, created an

untenable position for the Nitre Battalion by subjecting it to fire from its front and from either flank. Following the example of veteran troops in abandoning their position, the battalion left the field after suffering a loss of five killed, fourteen wounded, and eight captured.²⁴

After the battle of New Hope or Piedmont the battalion was consolidated into a single company under Captain N. R. Heaton and placed in Colonel William H. Harman's regiment of reserves. In this capacity it participated in the resistance to General Hunter's advance upon Lynchburg and in the pursuit of his forces on their retreat into Western Virginia. By June 30, 1864, the reserves had been excused and the nitre workmen had returned to their munitions work.²⁵

The various workers at the nitre caves of Nitre and Mining District 3 were organized into a loose battalion originally designated as the "First Nitre Battalion." Upon the more detailed organization of the various local defense units the battalion designation was changed to the "Seventh Battalion Virginia Infantry, Local Defense Troops." With Captain Robert C. Morton, Nitre and Mining Corps, superintendent of the district acting as major of the battalion, three companies were organized in November, 1863. Company A was enlisted on November 2, 1863, at Eggleston Springs, Giles County, with W. B. Gassaway as captain, H. C. French as first lieutenant, and A. F. Croy as second lieutenant. Company B was enlisted on November 14, 1863, at Jackson, Virginia (county not identified), with George H. Johnson as captain and sole officer. Company

²⁴A loss of nine killed and sixteen wounded out of some 200 engaged was later given as the unit's loss. See IV O.R. 3, 697: Report of Col. I. M. St. John, Chief N. & M. Bur., to Secty. of War James A. Seddon, [Oct. 1, 1864].

²⁵I O.R. 51, Pt. 1, 1225-27: Report of Capt. James F. Jones, N. & M. Corps, to Major Richard Morton, N. & M. Corps, June 30, 1864.

C was enlisted on November 21, 1863, at Christianburg, Montgomery County, Virginia, with Captain J. T. Trolinger as the only officer. The organization records in the War Department files gives the names of only 131 members of the battalion.²⁶

The redesignation of the battalion as the Seventh Battalion, Local Defense Troops, may have taken place on May 5, 1864, as Captain Morton's rank as major of that unit carries that date.

No record has been found specifically crediting any of these companies with participation as units in any engagements or campaigns.

On May 28, 1864 another Virginia local defense unit was organized. This was known as "Tuttle's Battalion." The term "Battalion" may have been a misnomer as only the records of Company A have been located. It derived its name from the officer in command, Professor David K. Tuttle, a member of the Scientific Arm of the Nitre and Mining Corps, and in charge of Nitre and Mining District 1 and the Wythe Lead Mines.²⁷ The forty-four nitre workmen comprising the company were organized at Abingdon, Virginia, with David G. Thomas as captain, Abram A. McConnell as first lieutenant, and

Joel Rosenbalm as second lieutenant.²⁸

In Upper Alabama the question of the proper guarding of the nitre caves required attention by the winter of 1862. A first step was the authorization given one John Dilliard to raise a company of sixty-four men of non-conscript age to be detailed as a guard for the government property at the Santa Nitre Cave.²⁹

On the very next day Major and Superintendent Isaac M. St. John of the Nitre Corps outlined his difficulties in a report to Secretary of War James A. Seddon. The enemy incursions into the nitre cave territory were characterized as serious, having been accompanied by work interruption, the destruction of establishments and equipment, and the killing, capture, or dispersal of the bands of workmen. In commenting directly on Dilliard's authorization of the day before, St. John entered a remonstrance against non-conscript guard companies and submitted that arming the workmen to guard their own works under an organization similar to the sappers and miners would better protect the government interests. He suggested that the order be reconsidered in view of the important precedent involved.³⁰

St. John's objection was taken to heart by the War Department which promptly cancelled the original order and issued a new authorization for Dilliard to raise a company of sixty-four men to guard and *work* the government nitre caves "under the direction of William Gobbet [sic], district superintendent of nitre service." It was further ordered that the company must be raised, as far as practicable, from non-conscripts, and that

²⁶Muster rolls of Capt. S. B. Gassaway's 1st Co., Capt. Geo. H. Johnson's Co. B, and 1st Lt. J. T. Trolinger's Co. C, 1st [Va.] Nitre Battalion, Local Defense and Special Service [later 7th Bn. Va. Inf., Local Defense Troops], Box 569, Record Group 109, Confederate Archives, U. S. National Archives.

²⁷David Kitchell Tuttle was in charge of the Department of Practical Chemistry at the University of Virginia at the outbreak of the war. Early in 1862 he left the University to become superintendent of Nitre District 1 with headquarters at Abingdon, Va. On or about September 1, 1863 he received an appointment in the Scientific Arm of the Nitre and Mining Corps with the equivalent rank of captain. As the duties of the Bureau were expanded, the general supervision of the Wytheville Lead Mines was added to his activities. After the war he was engaged in business in his field of industrial chemistry followed by government service as melter and refiner at the Carson City, Nev., mint, 1886-1888; a similar assignment followed at the Philadelphia mint beginning in 1888. He died in Philadelphia on April 8, 1915, at the age of 79.

²⁸Organization records, Tuttle's Battalion (Nitre) Virginia Infantry, Local Defense (Detailed Nitre Men), CSA Carded Records.

²⁹Special Orders 282/10, A. & I.G.O., Dec. 2, 1862. A War Department memo erroneously gives the authority as granted to "I. I. Dillard."

³⁰IV O.R. 2, 223: Report of Major and Superintendent I. M. St. John, N. & M. Bur., to Secty. of War J. A. Seddon, Dec. 3, 1862.

those privates who were to be employed as laborers would be enrolled first, and then detailed, receiving pay as extra-duty men.³¹

The guard company was originally on duty at Larkinsville, Jackson County, Alabama, where it was mustered in on December 26, 1862, under the captaincy of James H. Young, but on April 13, 1863, it was transferred to the Santa Nitre Works near Larkinsville. It remained here until the evacuation of Northern Alabama by the Confederate Army under Bragg. The company then rendered valuable assistance in the guarding and removal of government stores and laborers south of the Tennessee River to the vicinity of Town Creek Falls. During the first nine months of its existence the company was variously engaged in arresting deserters, gathering conscripts, and guarding the nitre works of the district. There was also considerable service performed by members of the company as detailed laborers at the various nitre works.³²

The company continued to perform its duties during the last three months of 1863, being divided into squads for convenience. Additional duties assumed included the guarding of subsistence and ordnance stores, the guarding of prisoners, the picketing of the Tennessee River, and assisting the officers of the Conscript Bureau in carrying out their duties. In December, 1863, the company headquarters was at Guntersville, Alabama.³³ Between February 2 and 9, 1864, Lt. Bolling A. Stovall of the Nitre and Mining Corps visited both the Little River Nitre Works, Cherokee County, and the Fort Payne Nitre

Works, De Kalb County, Alabama. He assisted in moving the effects of both caves on the east bank of the Coosa River out of danger from the raids of the enemy and in paying off part of the Guard Company, presumably employed at both nitre works.³⁴

This Alabama Nitre and Mining Guard Company originally enlisted 63 men and 4 officers, adding some 15 more men during its existence. The greatest single cause of attrition, according to the muster rolls of the company, was desertion, some 42 separations being recorded for that cause alone. Yet there is some question whether some of these may not have been captured by the Federal forces when the various installations were overrun. Some of these desertions took place during the 40 days between August 1 and September 9, 1863, inclusive, when the company was stationed near Guntersville, Alabama. This was a period of discouragement for the Confederacy as July had marked the twin disasters of Gettysburg and Vicksburg. September 9 marked the day the Federal troops occupied Chattanooga after Bragg's evacuation; it also marked the day when the first of Longstreet's Corps entrained at Orange Court House, Virginia, on their way to reinforce Bragg. Six desertions are listed for the single day of February 16, 1864, from near Cedar Bluff, Alabama. Some 9 men were captured in the year from July, 1863, to July, 1864. Yet in spite of these losses 20 men were present for duty as late as June 1, 1864.³⁵

By mid-summer 1864 the activities of the Federal forces in Northern Alabama had so disrupted the activities of the Nitre and Mining Bureau in that area that the superintendent of the combined Districts 8 and 9, Capt. William Gabbett, reported himself and a

³¹Special Orders 285/15, A. & I.G.O., Dec. 5, 1862. Italics mine to emphasize changes from the original order.

³²Excerpt from Muster Roll for Dec. 26, 1862-Sept. 15, 1863, organization records, Young's Guard Co., Nitre and Mining Corps, Alabama, CSA Carded Records.

³³Excerpt from Muster Roll for Sept. 15-Dec. 15, 1863, organization records, Young's Guard Co., Nitre and Mining Corps, Alabama, CSA Carded Records.

³⁴Personal file Lt. B. A. Stovall, N. & M. Bur., CSA Carded Records.

³⁵Personal files, Young's Guard Co., Nitre and Mining Corps, Alabama, CSA Carded Records.

group of his unemployed men to Brig. Gen. Gideon J. Pillow on June 18, 1864, for orders as a local defense force.³⁶

The Alabama men organized under Captain Gabbett evidently performed active service of a satisfactory nature as St. John later commented on the favorable reports he had received of their service upon being called frequently from their work to resist hostile incursions.³⁷

At the same time grave concern was felt for the safety of the various iron works of Alabama. At one of the major plants, the Shelby Iron Works, fortifications commanding the entrance to the works were begun by the company management. In January, 1865, the wisdom of this action was confirmed by an Ordnance field circular from Major John Racle ordering the erection of such fortifications.

For the last nine months of the war some 100 workmen at Shelby spent part of their time in erecting fortifications and drilling, but these efforts were largely wasted as no real resistance was offered to the Federal attack of March 31, 1865. On that day the advance of Brig. Gen. Eli Long's 2d Division of Maj. Gen. James H. Wilson's cavalry corps slashed across Shelby County, destroying the Bibb, Columbiana, and Shelby Iron Works. At Shelby the Federals contented themselves with incapacitating the works by removing vital parts of the machinery without destroying the physical property of the works. But at this late date the war was over to all intents and purposes.³⁸

The exigencies of the times in early 1864 led to the following letter from Lt. Col. Isaac M. St. John, Chief of the Nitre and Mining Bureau, to Capt. William Gabbett, Superintendent of Districts 8 and 9 with headquarters at Blue Mountain, Alabama. Its flavor is best retained by reproduction *in extenso*:

The attention of district superintendents of the nitre and mining service is called to General Orders Nos. 18³⁹ and 26,⁴⁰ current series.

In all districts exposed to the enemy a military organization, with simple drill for an irregular force moving rapidly, will be arranged by each superintendent, to embrace all workmen who can be conveniently assembled on short notice.

To retain unquestioned control over the men it is essential that each superintendent should command as field officer, always bearing in mind that "military orders must be subordinate to work." Beyond this the organization will conform as closely as possible to the "local defense act." Arms will be furnished on requisition.

When such organization is completed the superintendent will report the fact to the general commanding district or department, and, representing the urgent requisitions for ordnance stores upon the nitre and mining service, will state the wish of the Secretary of War that their force shall only be called off in extreme cases and returned at the earliest moment.

³⁶Personal file of Capt. William Gabbett, N. & M. Bur.: Ltr. from Capt. William Gabbett to Brig. Gen. Gid. J. Pillow, Comdg. Dept. N. Ala., June 18, 1864, CSA Carded Records.

³⁷IV O.R. 3, 697: Report of Col. I. M. St. John, Chief N. & M. Bur., [Oct. 1, 1864].

³⁸For the story of the Shelby Iron Works in war-time, see Joyce Jackson (Mrs. Stewart Carlton), *A History of the Shelby Iron Company, 1861-1868*, unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Alabama, 1948; and Frank E. Vandiver, "The Shelby Iron Company in the Civil War: A Study of a Confederate Industry," *Alabama*

Review, I (1948), 13-26, 111-27, 203-17. For Wilson's raid, see Major Elbridge Colby, "Wilson's Cavalry Campaign of 1865," *The Journal of the American Military History Foundation* (now *Military Affairs*), II (Winter, 1938), 204-21.

³⁹IV O.R. 3, 94-95. G.O. 18 provides, in part, for the organization of Nitre and Mining Corps workmen into local defense units as a secondary assignment. It again prohibits interference with the workers at mines, furnaces, or nitre works.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 178-83. G.O. 26 is a distribution of the draft act of February 17, 1864. It also deals with the functions and operation of the Conscription Bureau.

All interruptions of work in violation of General Orders No. 18, will be promptly reported for the action of the Secretary of War, with a concise statement of names, dates, and facts. To the officer so offending, if claiming to act under superior orders, a calm protest will be made, if possible, in writing, fixing a distinct responsibility upon his actions for damage thereby inflicted upon the service. At the same time all reasonable aid will be extended to officers of the enrolling service acting in the proper discharge of their duties.

Special attention is directed to the absence of restrictions upon the labor of the nitre and mining service in the act "to organize forces of the war."

The officers of this service, thus placed upon honor, are expected to exercise unusual vigilance in sending to the Army every man that can possibly be spared by substituting therefore exempt and negro labor. Clerical work must be performed by those who cannot render field service, special care being taken to employ, where practicable, refugee ladies in needy circumstances.

In all these arrangements results must first be studied. Returns of material must be increased, not diminished. Where this can be done by substituted labor especial credit will be awarded, but until the Secretary of War shall see proper to recall the conscript labor at present employed usefully and effectively, the superintendent can continue existing arrangements rather than risk a deficient supply.

The charge indicated in these instructions calls for a peculiar degree of devotion and personal forbearance. While the frequent misappreciation of labors so important is deeply to be regretted, yet, under the orders of the Secretary of War, it remains for the corps to press on quietly,

resolutely, and most earnestly in the effort to do double duty during the present critical campaign.⁴¹

But the campaigns of 1864 went against the Confederacy. Grant had pinned down Lee in the trenches of Petersburg and Richmond; Sherman had brushed aside the Army of Tennessee and was poised for his march north through the Carolinas, and the Valley of Virginia had been eliminated as a significant factor in the food supply of the Confederacy. In addition, the salt wells at Saltville, Virginia, had been put out of operation as had been the Wytheville lead mines. The year 1865 opened on a pessimistic note.

In the spring of 1865 a depressing report on the use of nitre employees in military organizations was voiced by William M. Hill, assistant superintendent of Nitre and Mining District 7 at Abingdon, Virginia. Hill complained to Lt. Col. Richard Morton that his workmen, having been called on for military service twice in the ten days prior to March 13, 1865, were still on military duty as of that date with a resultant stoppage of nitre production. He estimated that out of his 140 men the larger portion was thoroughly worthless to the Army. To make things worse, besides stopping the production of nitre, each call for military service caused a further depletion of his force by men running off to Kentucky to escape military service. Perhaps one-fourth would respond to the call while the remainder would remain at home, frightened, discouraged, and discontented. At each suspension of work the nitre works were left unprotected, the earth and ore wasted, and the materials, teams, etc., scattered. It had been his intention to organize into a separate and independent command such of his men as were available for military duty and as could be spared, but this permis-

⁴¹*Ibid.*, pp. 195-96: Ltr. from Lt. Col. I. M. St. John, Chief N. & M. Bur., to Capt. William Gabbett, March 5, 1864.

sion had been very shortly refused by General Echols.

It was assistant superintendent Hill's opinion that if his men were continually called out to resist the constant and continued raids which could be expected for the duration, then it followed that the men would be rendered more and more unfit for work and less productive of nitre. As a body, they would not fight, but they would work if let alone.

It was Hill's belief that a decision should be made as to whether to put the workmen regularly in the Army, or to leave them, uninterrupted, at their nitre works, and he requested that Colonel Morton give prompt and vigorous attention to this matter while District 7 waited quietly and inactively.⁴² He was undoubtedly reflecting the effects of the fading war effort. The problem was settled in less than a month by the surrender of Lee's Army and the collapse of all organized opposition in Virginia to the Federal forces.

Assistant superintendent Hill's opinions of the nitre workmen as soldiers were at variance with those of his former chief, St. John, whose report of October 1, 1864, some six months previously, probably expresses a fair opinion of their true worth before the hopelessness of the spring of 1865 was reached. St. John stated:

The military organization of the nitre workmen has been attended with gratifying results. Assembled rapidly on call, they go into action on their own ground and with home instincts fresh upon them, and under these influences they have invariably done well. . . . The danger over, these men return to their work generally unaffected by camp habits; and clothing and feeding each one himself soon again returns each his quota of niter. One regiment and a

half of niter workmen cover all details from the Potomac to the Mississippi and insure a full supply of ammunition for our armies in the field. To break up this organization would be to inflict a double blow on the service.⁴³

The story of the local defense of nitre areas in the Trans-Mississippi Department can only be touched upon because of the paucity of available source material.

The fairly early occupation by Federal troops of Northern Arkansas resulted in the loss of the area before defense units for works operated by the Nitre and Mining Bureau were extensively organized. Sparse records have been found, however, of one such defense unit, the so-called Nitre Guard of Marion County, Arkansas, Captain Patrick S. McNamara.

In August, 1862, McNamara was ordered by General Hindman to go to Marion County, Arkansas, and take possession of the nitre works of Greenlaw and Company. McNamara demurring at confiscation, Hindman agreed to allow a fair price. McNamara was originally offered a commission as a captain of a company of conscripts, but he refused, intending to try to raise a group of men, repair the works, and recommend competent persons for officers. Failing to get a group of conscripts to work without authority, McNamara, who had been functioning as an Ordnance agent, returned to Little Rock and received his captain's commission from Col. John W. Dunnington.⁴⁴

Shortly thereafter McNamara was captured along with twenty-two of his men at a saltpeter cave on the White River on December 13, 1862, by Capt. Milton Burch, 14th

⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 697: Report of Col. I. M. St. John, Chief N. & M. Bur., to Secty. of War James A. Seddon, [Oct. 1, 1864].

⁴⁴Personal file of Capt. Patrick S. McNamara, N. & M. Bur.; Ltr. from Capt. Patrick S. McNamara to Provost-Marshal (USA), Dist. of Missouri, Apr. 2, 1863, CSA Carded Records.

⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 1165: Ltr. from William M. Hill to Lt. Col. Richard Morton, Chief N. & M. Bur., March 13, 1865.

Missouri State Militia Cavalry. This was an inglorious capture as the Federal troops, arriving at lunch time, were mistaken for an expected Confederate company. The Federals were within half pistol shot before the mistaken identity was discovered, and the unarmed men had no choice but to surrender.⁴⁵

While details are sparse, there are traces of another Nitre and Mining company in the Trans-Mississippi area. The records show that a Capt. William S. Davis, of Little Rock, Arkansas, was the commanding officer of "Davis' Unattached Nitre & Mining Co." Davis was paroled on July 26, 1865 at Austin, Texas,⁴⁶ indicating the company was serving in the Trans-Mississippi Department at the close of the war. Whether Davis' company was a Texas or an Arkansas unit is not clear, nor is it clear whether it was a company of workmen or a guard company.

In Texas itself there do not seem to have been any separate units organized from Nitre and Mining Bureau personnel. During part of 1863 various elements of McCord's Frontier Regiment were detailed for the protection of the nitre works on the Frio River and in the northwest section of Burnet County. But on August 4, 1863, these elements were ordered to rejoin their regiment at Harrisburg, Texas.⁴⁷

It was a reference to the protection of this same area which had prompted Capt. R. H. Temple of the Nitre and Mining Bureau to write the headquarters of the Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona District on April 9,

1863, suggesting a plan for the utilization of conscripts for local defense. He requested an order requiring the furlough of conscripts subject to military duty in the frontier counties as in other counties upon the application of the proper Nitre and Mining Bureau officers. It was Temple's opinion that a force of conscript workmen located at the nitre works in Uvalde County up on the Frio River, thirty miles northwest of Dhanis would be in a strategic position to repel Indian raids as they would be commanding the pass through which the Indians frequently approached the settlements.⁴⁸

Whether a local defense unit such as apparently contemplated by Temple was organized is not known, but the fact that the enemy involved were Indians instead of Federal troops introduces a novel element into the study of the local defense of the Confederate munitions areas.

In conclusion, the organization of the local defense of the munitions areas by the officers of the Confederate Nitre and Mining Bureau is another example of the successful operation of that bureau in spite of overwhelming difficulties. The high estimation of this bureau and its operations held by the War Department was expressed in late 1862, in General Order 99, and remained unchanged throughout the war:

Resignations in the nitre and mining corps must be placed upon the same footing with resignations in the line in front of the enemy. Faithfully executed, this service is second to no other engaged in the public defense.⁴⁹

⁴⁵I O.R. 22, Pt. 1, 160: Report of Capt. Milton Burch, 14th Mo. State Militia Cav., USA, Dec. 18, 1862.

⁴⁶Personal file of Capt. William S. Davis, N. & M. Bur., CSA Carded Records.

⁴⁷Special Orders 217/20, Dept. of Texas, N. Mexico, and Ariz., Chapter 2, File 105, p. 115, Record Group 109, Confederate Archives, U. S. National Archives.

⁴⁸Personal file of Capt. R. H. Temple, N. & M. Bur.: Ltr. from Capt. R. H. Temple to Capt. E. P. Turner, AAG, April 9, 1863, CSA Carded Records.

⁴⁹IV O.R. 2, 228: General Orders 99, A. & I.G.O., Dec. 5, 1862.

WARTIME ROLE FOR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

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I

SOME ASPECTS OF MANPOWER

MOBILIZATION

THIS paper is an effort to determine the role which colleges and universities should play in an all-out war.

Review of past experience in this field emphasizes the need to develop a clear-cut policy for wartime utilization of our institutions of higher learning. Instead of waiting until the emergency arises, and then groping through fog in belated effort to determine the best way to enroll them in the struggle, prudent leaders will study the problem while there is yet time for careful analysis and debate. Once determined, the policy should be explained to all interested parties—to the military, to our civilian leaders, and to our educators. Each must then do necessary advance planning. Only thus can acceptable efficiency be obtained. Today Mars rides in jet planes, impatient at delays and lost motion which past isolation permitted.

It is necessary first to determine what kind of war is being discussed. Next, histories of past wars to be studied, that past mistakes may be avoided and past successes exploited. Passing from past to future, certain military requirements for college training and facilities will exist; these require analysis. Finally, non-military educational requirements need to be anticipated.

Much discussion and debate will be required before a final policy can be determined. Despite its very real importance, the subject has been sadly neglected. It is hoped

that this paper will stimulate and, in some small way, guide this necessary discussion and debate.

What will the next war be like? Will we be faced by a true struggle for survival, as Great Britain after the fall of France in 1940? Or will we be able to provide both guns and butter, as we did following Korea? To a major extent, the role which our colleges and universities should play depends upon the answers to these questions.

War has a nasty habit of defying prediction. Campaigns seldom go "according to plan." Axioms proved in one war, as the power of the defense was proved in 1914-18, may turn out to be false in the next.

There do, however, seem to be several features of the next war which can be predicted with reasonable certainty. One is the mobilization of manpower if the early attacks are not decisive and an all-out struggle ensues.

As mobilization progresses, there are very important changes in the nature of military manpower requirements; these affect the role of colleges and universities. During the first few months, the greatest need is for trained individuals to bring existing units up to strength. As an illustration, the typical National Guard division has most of its officers and key noncommissioned officers, but less than half of its total enlisted strength. In normal times, each Regular Army division is several thousand short of full strength. With proper management, the trained reservists mentioned above should fill the most urgent portion of this early requirement.

In addition to the early demand for trained replacements, there comes a demand to pro-

vide new units—either by calling in units from the civilian components, or by creating new ones. Properly managed, the 155,000 trained reserve officers immediately available to the Army, and corresponding reservists in the Navy and Air Force, should fill much of the officer demand during the early part of this build-up phase. Many enlisted spaces can be filled in a similar manner. Extensive programs will, however, be necessary to retrain those out of the service more than a year, and to train new technicians. In a technological war, the military must have men able to operate and to repair complicated equipment in the mud and rain and snow and dust of combat.

After about two years of war, the build-up phase will end. Officer spaces and technician spots will be filled. The training problem will change radically at this time, as emphasis shifts to the training of men to replace battle casualties. The bulk of these casualties will come in the ground forces, and normally some eighty percent of ground force losses are infantry losses. Thus, after about two years of war, military requirements for new manpower will find infantry platoon leaders and infantry privates preponderating. There will be surprisingly little demand for additional technicians. This fact is hard to get across to laymen, but no college training program can claim to serve military requirements unless it fits into this situation.

Thus we see that, in all probability, the next war will find both the United States and her enemies scourged by atomic attack. Our survival as a nation will depend upon the skill and speed and determination with which we recover from this destruction. Past experience gives little to guide us as we contemplate the "survival economy" which will result. Our institutions of higher learning can make very important contributions; none can doubt that they will devote themselves whole-heartedly

to the struggle. The present need is to determine how best they can serve.

II

PAST WARTIME EXPERIENCES

In studying the role to be played by colleges and universities in this kind of war, the next step is to review past experiences,

Histories of the Civil War tell vividly about whole classes marching en masse to serve the Confederacy. In the North there were few such cases. At Princeton, for example, the orderly procedure of college exercises was not materially affected during the four years of war. Male enrollment at Oberlin College fell off 40% during the first two years of the war, but rose thereafter.¹

Prior to and during the Civil War there was a movement to improve opportunities for higher education in the newly formed western states. On July 2nd, 1862, the famous law was passed establishing what are now known as the land grant colleges. This law provided for "the endowment, support and maintenance of at least one college in each state to teach such branches as related to agriculture and the mechanic arts . . . and including military tactics . . . in order to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions of life." This was supplemented by the act of July 28, 1866 which authorized the detail of Army officers as instructors at those colleges for the purpose of "promoting a knowledge of military science of the United States." These two acts form the statutory base both for the State University and for the ROTC as we know them today.

The first World War found the colleges playing a more important part. As early as 10 February 1917, they organized in Washington an Intercollegiate Intelligence Bureau to

¹Kolbe, Parke, R., *The Colleges in War Time and After*. (New York, 1919.) p. 38.

help locate trained men for government jobs.

Declaration of war, on 6 April 1917, found the country without a definite military policy. For the initial period, volunteering was the only possible means of raising an army, and thousands of high-spirited college men rushed to the colors. Later, the War Department took steps to recover these trained men from the ranks, and public statements by the President and others urged against depopulation of the colleges.

A general meeting of college representatives was held in Washington, on 5 May 1917, and full support was pledged the war effort. Use of college facilities to train men for the military commenced 17 May 1917, with initiation of aviation cadet training, and grew steadily thereafter. Beginning 4 September 1917, five enlisted reserve corps (medical, engineering, veterinary, signal, and quartermaster) were organized by the Army. By the summer of 1918, more than 34,000 enlisted men were being trained by the colleges in some 20 basic trades. This training was of a vocational and trade nature, rather than collegiate level. Most of these courses lasted two months. Nearly 95,000 received this training. Despite the vocational level of the courses, the colleges gave whole-hearted support.

On 6 May 1918, the Student Army Training Corps (SATC) was announced. It was formally inaugurated at more than 400 colleges on 1 October 1918, and ultimately included some 516 units. The program had two parts: Section A covered collegiate work, Section B covered the vocational training described above. All students were enlisted in the Army; provision was made to call them away from the colleges for active service in the same proportions and at the same periods as other men of like age were drafted. On 26 November 1918, the War Department announced its decision to demobilize the

SATC within two months. It should be noted that during its short history the SATC was handicapped by the influenza epidemic.

With regard to research and development, college and university facilities were not fully utilized. Inquiry by the Bureau of Education elicited the fact that only about 40, from a total of 216 institutions replying, were carrying on research work of any sort on war problems.²

Again in World War II the colleges and universities were prompt to offer their services. In 1940 a National Committee on Education was organized under the auspices of the American Council on Education and the National Education Association. In October 1940 the colleges were called upon to provide training in specific fields. For a population scarcely recovered from long years of depression, short courses in Engineering, Science, and Management Defense Training (ESMDT) were authorized. Students were given free tuition but provided their own subsistence and supplies. Participation was limited to public or tax-exempt, degree granting, institutions. Students were required as a minimum to be high-school graduates. In practice, a large majority took these courses as a form of in-service training.

Later renamed Engineering, Science and Management War Training (ESMWT), this program trained more than 1,300,000 men and women by January 1944. Some 12,500 short courses were offered in 1,000 towns and cities by over 200 colleges. Students took courses as follows: 356,000 in engineering, 14,000 in chemistry, 9,000 in physics, and 120,000 in production management. Twenty one percent of the students were women.³

On the 3rd and 4th of January 1942, with Pearl Harbor still a fresh memory, the col-

²*Ibid.*, p. 91.

³Kandel, Isaac L., *Impact of the War Upon American Education*. (Chapel Hill, N. C. 1948) p. 136-151.

leges and universities sent representatives to a conference in Baltimore to discuss the problems involved. This conference was sponsored by the National Committee on Education and the United States Office of Education. The conference pledged the total strength of the colleges to support the war, and recommended that courses be accelerated. Some 600 colleges changed their schedules to implement this recommendation. Mostly they went to a 48-week year, with a 6-day week. The general result was to make graduation possible in three years or less. Some qualified high school students were admitted before graduation. Students and faculties experienced some difficulties as a result of acceleration. Students depending upon vacation earnings found themselves in financial difficulties; faculties found their work load greatly increased with little or no increase in salaries.

In the spring and summer of 1942, when the draft age was still 20, many requests were made to the War Department to expand the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC). This was opposed by those training our combat soldiers, because the need for officers and noncommissioned officers was acute at that time. ROTC graduates would not become available until after the period of acute shortage.⁴ ROTC units continued to operate throughout the war, but the basic ROTC, covering the first two years of college without specialization in technical fields, was all that survived. Numbers of cadets dropped to a fraction of pre-war figures.

In September 1942, lowering of the draft age from 20 to 18 was anticipated. The Secretary of War then approved plans for the specialized training of selected enlisted men, using the resources of colleges and universities. This program, known as the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP), was

established primarily to ensure a continuous flow of technically and professionally trained men. At first, it was contemplated that most of these men would become officers.

The program did not match a specific need for such men at the time they would complete their training—a fatal error, as events were to prove. It was strongly opposed on strictly military grounds by Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, who commanded Army Ground Forces and was responsible for training combat soldiers. General McNair argued that it would take key, high-grade men from units needed in combat, and would compete with the Officers' Candidate Schools (OCS). He expressed the feeling that the Army had enough college trained men to last until 1944.⁵

Formal announcement of the ASTP, and of the corresponding Navy College Training Program (NCTP), came in December 1942. Selected candidates were to be in uniform, receive pay, and be subject to military discipline. They were to receive basic military training before starting college work.

Curricula for the ASTP were prepared with the immediate objectives of the Army in mind. They included mathematics, physics, chemistry, premedical and medical, engineering, area studies, and similar subjects. After preparation, these curricula were subject to review by an advisory committee of six college presidents.⁶

The academic year included four 12-week terms. At the end of each the disposition of men in the program was considered, with some continuing their studies, some going on to OCS, and others going back to the troops.

Selection tests were first given 12 April 1943. Initial requirements called for a score of at least 110 on the Army General Classi-

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 28-36.

⁴*United States Army in World War II. Army Ground Forces* (Washington, D. C. 1948) v. 2, p. 94-95.

⁶"Higher Education and the War." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*. vol. 231, p. 18.

fication Test (AGCT), for graduation from an accredited high school, and for completion of a minimum of nine weeks of basic military training. Age limits for the basic ASTP course were 18 to 21 inclusive. Candidates for the advanced course had to be at least 18 years old, and to have at least two years of work in a recognized college or university. Later the required AGCT score was raised to 115, and arrangements made to accept the results of tests administered by the College Entrance Examination Board.⁷

The ASTP reached its peak in December 1943, when 380,000 trainees were enrolled in 489 institutions. Men began to return from the ASTP to troop units in the late summer of 1943. By that time the major build-up of the Army was over, and most officer and specialist jobs were already filled. Except for engineers, these graduates were too specialized for exact assignment in the combat arms, yet the need for intelligent combat leaders was too great to permit their assignment exclusively to service troops. There was a grave shortage of combat replacements to make good the battle casualties being experienced. At the same time a crisis existed in the infantry units being readied for movement overseas—a crisis caused by draining off high-score men for ASTP and other training programs, and by wholesale transfer of infantry privates to the replacement stream. Under these conditions, the ASTP was cut to 35,000 by 1 April 1944, leaving mostly those in advanced medicine, dentistry, and engineering. A total of 64,332 men were graduated by ASTP between April 1943 and December 1945.⁸

The ASTP made positive and worth-while contributions to victory, but in balance it fell short of possible achievements. The basic

fault was failure to supply the type of man needed at the time he was needed. Instead of determining the number of officers the Army would need during future periods, designing curricula to prepare for those specific positions, and limiting enrollment to the numbers required, the program undertook to train technical men who "ought" to be needed. Just as the hunter who fires at a flock of ducks, with no specific target, often goes hungry, so did ASTP miss its target in many cases. When the replacement crisis arose, the program was vulnerable, and became a casualty. It should be noted that the language area studies, engineering courses, and medical courses, did in most cases fill specific military needs.

For many of its trainees, ASTP resulted in disillusionment. They were given at least implied promises of commissions, yet were suddenly withdrawn to serve in the ranks. Had they not been sent to college, many would undoubtedly have gone to OCS and become officers. Understandably, civilian educators participating in the program found it difficult to understand the abrupt termination of their efforts.

These failures, if failures they be, should serve as a lesson that training programs adopted in time of war will surely fall unless they meet directly an urgent, specific, wartime need.

As a successor to ASTP, the Army Specialized Training Reserve Program was announced 3 March 1944. It was a program for training 17-year-old civilian high school graduates.

The Navy College Training Program (NCTP), often spoken of as V-12, was announced at the same time as the Army's ASTP. It took over those men in the enlisted reserve already in college in civilian status under the V-1 and V-7 programs. Admission was open also to qualified enlisted men on

⁷American Council on Education. *Utilizing Human Talent*. (1950) p. 11-13.

⁸Sargent, Porter. *The Future of Education*. (Boston, Mass. 1944.) p. 41-43.

active duty, and to civilians who could meet requirements. In April 1943 a total of 123,206 applied; only 16,000 were accepted.

The V-12 program became an integral part of the Navy's long-range program to procure Naval Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve commissioned officers. It sailed a course more steady than that followed by ASTP, though there was a progressive 25% cut-back in 1944. A total of 219,150 men were graduated under NCTP.⁹

An idea of the magnitude of these two programs—ASTP and NCTP—can be gained from the fact that, during its three years of existence, the Joint Army-Navy Board for Training Unit Contracts expended more than 300 million dollars.¹⁰

As the war progressed, draft deferment policies for students became tighter. By 1943-44, deferment was limited to students taking courses directly preparing them for critical occupations in essential industries. In general, students in scientific or specialized fields such as engineering, chemistry, physics, and medicine, were the only ones being deferred. Civilian male enrollment dropped to about 30% of the 1939-40 base.¹¹ Much, if not all, of this drop in undergraduate enrollment was made up during the post-war GI bulge. However, one lasting effect of deferment policies was the drop in numbers of graduate students. In 1945, for example, only 40% as many science doctorates were granted as in 1941. This loss has not been made up during the post-war years, and a recent study¹² concluded that the loss from World War II was at least 10,000 doctor's degrees in science. In our present technologi-

cal race with the forces of communism, this is a serious shortage indeed. In 1950, the United States had only 40,000 men and women with such training.¹³

In the important field of research and development, the colleges and universities were far better employed than in World War I. Many crucial developments had their genesis in university laboratories—witness, for example, the atomic bomb. A survey made toward the end of 1942 by the National Academy of Sciences, at the request of the War Production Board, showed that university laboratories had all but 28,000 hours per week of research workers' time, or the equivalent of 700 men at 40 hours per week, already engaged in war work. This was substantially full use of available facilities.

In summary, our institutions of higher learning played an important role on the stage of world conflict in the years 1941-1945. They gave generously of their time and facilities to meet the training and other demands of the armed services. Certain fundamental mistakes in emphasis on the part of the Army kept this contribution from reaching its full potential value; this experience should serve as an important guide in any future emergency. Training for the Navy did not suffer as much from such mistakes as did the Army program.

The services rendered by our institutions of higher learning were, for the most part, *short-range* services, designed to contribute directly to the early defeat of a great opposing military force. Enduring educational objectives were, of necessity, subordinated to the life-and-death struggle of the time.

On the 25th of June, 1950, the clouds of war muttered ominously as open conflict broke out in Korea. For months it appeared that World War III might well be under

⁹Kandel. *Op. cit.* p. 38.

¹⁰American Council on Education. *Educational Lessons from Wartime Training.* p. 209.

¹¹National Manpower Council. *Student Deferment and National Manpower Policy.* p. 25-26.

¹²Scates, Douglas E. "Recent Production and Distribution of Highly Educated Scientists in the U. S." in *Symposium on Scientific and Specialized Manpower.* p. 67-82.

¹³Trytten, M. H. "Scientists." *Scientific American.* Sept. 1951. p. 73.

way. Once again the colleges and universities sprang into action. The American Council on Education called a conference in Washington 9 July 1950. In attendance were representatives of national organizations concerned with higher education and having headquarters in Washington. Present also were representatives of the Department of Defense, National Security Resources Board, Office of Education, and Selective Service. Steps were taken to study the possible effect of mobilization upon colleges and universities, and to call another meeting within a month.

At this second meeting, steps were taken to increase the membership of the Committee on Relationships of Higher Education to the Federal Government, and to convene a national conference of representatives of higher education and of government. This latter conference was held in Washington, D. C., 6-7 October, 1950, and was attended by approximately 1,000 educators, representing some 600 colleges and universities. Their General Resolutions, repeating the declaration made at the 1942 Conference on Higher Education and the War, pledged to the President of the United States their total strength—their faculties, their students, their administrative organizations, and their physical facilities.

The question of student deferment policies received very lively attention at the conference. On the day before the conference opened, six Scientific Advisory Committees, appointed in the autumn of 1948 by the Director, Selective Service System, to advise concerning deferment policies, had submitted a set of recommendations. Out of these came the deferment policies still (April, 1954) in effect, under which talented students are deferred until completion of their studies, without granting permanent exemption from military service, and without regard

to the courses being taken. Many of the members of these committees were present at the conference, and the committee recommendations were incorporated in the conference report. In his address to the conference, Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, Director, Selective Service System, referred to the committees as "your scientific advisory committees."¹⁴ The first *declaration* in the General Resolutions expresses the strong feeling of the educators that a properly safeguarded student deferment policy is in the national interest, and their strong opposition to any policy basing student deferment on courses or curricula leading to specific professions or vocations.¹⁵

Events proved unfounded the fears of 1950 that a new, all-consuming world war might already be under way. The colleges and universities have continued, albeit with some difficulty, to serve long-range, enduring educational objectives. They have continued also to render important service through ROTC programs and in their laboratories. The magnitude of their contribution in the field of research and development is indicated by the fact that approximately 150 million dollars were paid them during Fiscal Year 1952 for work on research contracts for the Department of Defense. The status of their contribution in the educational field is indicated by the fact their enrollment in the fall of 1953 stood at 2,250,000 as compared to 2,456,000 in the fall of 1950, though large numbers of veterans were still present in 1950.

III

WARTIME NEEDS FOR COLLEGE TRAINED PERSONNEL

In moving from past to future contributions by colleges and universities, we must

¹⁴Amer. Council on Education. *Higher Education in the National Service*. p. 84.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 3.

keep in mind the near certainty that this future war will be a struggle for actual survival. Death and destruction will strike our homes, our cities, and our factories. Nothing short of all-out effort will suffice.

Under these circumstances, it seems certain that our colleges must, once again, accelerate their schedules to permit concentrated study twelve months a year. Soldiers in their fox-holes and workmen in factories will cast aside the 40-hour week, and the scholar must needs equal their effort.

Education can survive under future wartime conditions only as it meets definite requirements for trained men—yes, and for trained women. There are such requirements. The armed forces have certain needs, predictable with reasonable accuracy. The country as a whole has certain additional requirements; these we must foresee as accurately as possible.

First, let us discuss military requirements. In considering them, the time element is of prime importance. Even with accelerated schedules, a student entering college after war starts cannot become available to the armed forces for 30 to 36 months. (Those already in college will, of course, become available sooner.) As stated earlier, the greatest military requirement for additional trained men comes in the first 24 to 30 months of the war. Probably the greatest military need is for trained and competent leaders.

TRAINED COMBAT LEADERS

Armies, navies, and air forces provide the severest possible test of leadership. This is true particularly in small units, where a single officer must personally lead a group of tired, often scared, men through the smoke and confusion of battle into direct personal contact with the enemy. The natural leader is the real specialist of the armed forces. The man who can control and develop his platoon

or crew or squadron under training conditions, and then take the same element into battle and conserve its powers with complete efficiency, is the most important man in the service.

Many efforts have been made to define leadership, and to describe the training needed by military leaders. One of the best is the following statement by General C. B. Cates, then Commandant of the Marine Corps:

"Leadership is intangible, hard to measure and difficult to describe. Its qualities would seem to stem from many factors. But certainly they must include a measure of inherent ability to control and direct, *self-confidence based on expert knowledge, initiative, loyalty, pride, and a sense of responsibility.* Inherent ability obviously cannot be instilled, but that which is latent or dormant can be acquired. They are not easily taught or easily learned. *But leaders can be and are made.* The average good man in our service is and must be considered a potential leader." (Author's italics).¹⁶

Here is a useable outline of the objectives which must govern the bulk of college level wartime education for the armed forces. Potential students must be screened to select those with inherent ability to control and direct other men. Those who qualify must be given an education which will develop this inherent ability, and which will also impart the other ingredients of leadership. Except for specialized training, to be discussed later, college level education which fails to meet this requirement cannot argue that it has direct military value.

The prescription is far easier to write than to apply. Selection procedures of today leave much to be desired in their ability to identify and measure inherent leadership qualities. Much additional research is, then, needed in this field.

Present college curricula serve many diverse ends; few place major emphasis on

¹⁶U. S. Dep't. of Defense. *Armed Forces Officer*. 1950. p. 93-94.

leadership as an end by itself. Most college students aspire in a vague way to ultimate positions of leadership in their community, but with some exceptions their immediate goals are jobs as engineers, lawyers, teachers, and so on. Probably the two service academies, at West Point and Annapolis, have given more thought to this requirement than any other institutions of higher learning; educators should study their wartime curricula as guides for their own mobilization planning.

Many volumes have been written discussing the relative merits of general education and specialized education. The ideal objectives of general education have been best stated, by the Harvard Committee on the Objectives of a General Education in a Free Society, as the developing of abilities in effective thinking, communication, the making of relevant judgments, and the discrimination of values.¹⁷ These are remarkably similar to the leadership requirements quoted above, though they do not mention the ability to direct and control other men.

Specialized education in today's complicated world tends to teach more and more about ever narrower fields. In its ideal form, it does a splendid job of training engineers, scientists, doctors, lawyers, and other specialists. With many shining exceptions, scientists and other specialists do not as a class excel in inspirational leadership of men.

Thus it appears that the military requirement for trained combat leaders can be filled better by the product of general education than by specialists; requirements for technical specialists are discussed under the next subtitle.

Essential combat skills do not lend themselves to study on the college campus. An infantry platoon leader, for example, must fire many types of high-powered weapons,

and go on many practice patrols under simulated battle conditions, before he is qualified to lead men into battle. This part of his training must be given at Army camps under strict military discipline.

This raises the question whether combat officers should come from OCS or from ROTC.

During the build-up phase of a mobilization, additional officers must come first from already trained reserve officers, and next from OCS. Time will not permit the use of colleges, which require more than 30 months to complete a training cycle, as the major source of officers during this phase. The present Army OCS covers a total of 968 hours of instruction. Experience has demonstrated that when this course is taken under the grim compulsion of war, with death, or rather survival, as a factor in learning, and with an officer's commission as the immediate reward for success, graduates are superior as combat leaders. In contrast ROTC graduates, with 480 hours of campus instruction, spread over the entire college course, plus 288 hours in summer camp, require additional training before they can be sent into battle. One very important factor is the difference in psychological tension between an OCS camp and a college campus.

This dependence upon OCS has the additional advantage that it gives qualified enlisted men the opportunity to compete for commissions.

Full dependence upon OCS, without any utilization of colleges to train potential officers, would ignore the very real advantages of a college education as preparation for life in the world of today. In wartime, the services can use large numbers of junior officers whose abilities are limited to the battlefield, but they must have a very substantial leavening of officers whose horizons extend beyond actual combat. Today less than half of the

¹⁷Harvard Committee Report, *General Education in a Free Society*. (Cambridge, Mass. 1945.) p. 73

Army officers on active duty are college graduates. (A study of officers on active duty 27 March 1953, prepared by the Career Management Division, Office of The Adjutant General,¹⁸ showed that 25% of all Army commissioned officers on active duty had no college education, and 30.2% had attended college but not graduated.) This proportion is particularly low in the infantry, armor, and artillery, where only 42% are college graduates. Addition to this base of large numbers of OCS graduates—predominantly not college men—would leave this vital portion of the Army dangerously low in this respect. Air Force figures are even lower than those for the Army, because for years the flying training program has accepted applicants with two years or less of college. The Navy has a higher proportion of college graduates.

In an ideological war, this shortage of all-around officers in the Army and Air Force would be serious, because as a rule the broader background of the college graduate gives him a better understanding of the ideological issues involved.

Thus sound personnel planning will call for wartime education by the colleges of large numbers of potential combat troop leaders. In selection of men for this training, leadership must be the paramount requirement. Other qualities normally required for college admission must follow. Some way must be found to eliminate financial means as a requirement—we cannot afford to limit our selection to the sons of well-to-do parents.

ENGINEERS, SCIENTISTS, DOCTORS AND TECHNICIANS

This emphasis upon combat leaders must not obscure the requirement for large numbers of engineers, scientists, and doctors. In this technological war, the armed services will

have a tremendous requirement for professionally trained men. In the process, recognition must be given the fact that technical service officers are troop leaders as well as technicians. Leadership training must be emphasized, along with technical subjects.

Traditional peace-time curricula cannot be accepted without change, even in such technical fields as engineering. Men being trained for the armed services will, in large part, be deferred from combat military service on the basis that they are being trained for the military. To meet military requirements, curricula need certain changes. For example, an Army engineer must know how to use Bailey and other military bridges. He must know field expedients not widely used by civilian engineers. He must know how to lay out fortifications, and how to blow up bridges and other structures. Many other changes in emphasis will appear on close comparison of present curricula with specific military job requirements.

The numbers enrolled for both types of college level training must be limited to specific military requirements; otherwise the 1944 ASTP experience will surely be repeated. In 1941 the Army had no real experience on which to base forecasts of personnel requirements. Today, with World War II and Korea as background, the armed services should be able to predict their needs with acceptable accuracy.

In addition to trained officers, the armed services have a tremendous requirement for enlisted specialists. This need will be particularly large during the two years or so of build-up; thereafter it will drop to a level matching losses.

The armed services are already training such specialists, and have well-developed curricula and training procedures. Much of this instruction could if necessary be given on college campuses.

¹⁸U. S. Adjutant General's Office. *Civilian Education Level, Army Dep't. Commissioned Officers, as of 27 Mar. 1953.*

In many cases, present mobilization planning contemplates opening additional schools to handle expected increases in student loads. Each additional service school will require overhead personnel on a ratio of about 650 staff per 1,000 students. These additional instructors, mess and supply personnel, and administrative personnel must be organized and trained at a time when the overall training and personnel loads are most critical. Most of them will be released for other duties as the training load decreases.

The colleges should be asked to assist in this training, as they did in previous wars. Though naturally reluctant to change drastically their type of instruction, there is every reason to believe that, as a patriotic service, they would meet military requirements. Military leaders like to keep such training under their own control; the extra manpower and other costs of such a policy cannot be condoned in an all-out emergency.

ROTC vs. ASTP

In World Wars I and II, college training programs involved bringing students into the service, giving them certain military training, and then sending them to college in military status.

This procedure is exceedingly expensive, with its real cost little understood. The total of all personnel costs, including such items as pay, allowances, food, clothing, medical care, and so on, is in the neighborhood of \$5000 per man per year. Mere dollar cost is bad enough, but these figures are only one indication of the real cost in manpower and natural resources to keep a soldier in uniform. To this must be added the very real cost in later years of various veterans' benefits.

Is this cost necessary? To answer, it is necessary to review the training objectives and the arguments for military status.

The primary objective is, of course, to train potential officers or enlisted specialists. This

must be done under heavy pressure, with maximum use of the motivation resulting when students see the direct application of things being learned. It must be done in a way that will keep morale high. It must avoid discrimination in favor of boys from well-to-do homes. In the process, colleges are entitled to fair reimbursement, both for tuition charges and for overhead costs. All these objectives can be met by placing students in uniform.

For officer candidates, they can be met also by a variation of the Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps (NROTC) plan, sometimes called the "Holloway Plan." This might take the following form:

Students could be enrolled after competitive tests similar to present NROTC tests. They could be required to sign an agreement to serve on active duty after graduation, even though the war might end while they were in school. Their tuition could be paid, and an additional payment made to cover overhead costs. A subsidy (currently \$50 per month for NROTC) could be paid the student, to cover food and other expenses. Uniforms could be furnished, as for NROTC, and if deemed necessary students could be required to wear uniforms at all times. Students failing, or dropped for other reasons, could be reported to Selective Service as available for induction. It should be noted that this plan would require new legislation.

Such a plan would meet essential objectives. It would hold costs to a reasonable minimum. It would permit major savings in overhead to handle cadet administration, releasing some overhead personnel for combat duty. By holding cadets to the terms of their agreement, the services could gain some protection against loss of key personnel in hasty demobilization following any sudden end to hostilities.

This plan would also facilitate the main-

tenance of academic traditions, and would offer some safeguard against arbitrary action to cancel the program and call students into the ranks, with consequent waste of talent.

The chief drawback of such a program would be the indisputable fact that military authorities would have less control over students, and less freedom to use them elsewhere in case of emergency.

For enlisted technicians there does not appear to be any acceptable substitute for military status. These students are required to meet certain military prerequisites before they can qualify for such training. Their stay will be much shorter than that of officer candidates.

Any program training college students for the military must be policed, to see that each service gets an equitable portion of the most desirable students. There is at least a suspicion that, in World War II, many steps in the establishment and administration of the ASTP and NCTP programs were influenced by competition for high-grade men. In recent years, there has been constant argument over the relative needs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force for such men. Unless firm control is established from the start, the program will be torn by dissension over this point.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Though vitally important to victory, the role of college laboratories and of the scientists on college faculties is so widely recognized and acclaimed that lengthy discussion here would be redundant. It is mentioned only to complete the listing of college contributions. Research agencies of the Department of Defense are already making extensive use of available college facilities. In war it can safely be assumed that both the colleges and the military would expand this program to the maximum.

In summary, the military requirements to

be met by colleges and universities in the next war are very large and very important. Leaders must be trained; scientists, engineers, and other specialists must be given professional training under heavy pressure; enlisted specialists must be trained during the build-up phase of mobilization.

Present planning for this requirement is disjointed and unimaginative. Neither the Department of Defense nor the educators have prepared realistic plans for the employment of colleges and universities during a full-scale war. Without such planning, inexcusable confusion and waste motion would surely exist in the vital opening months of conflict.

LONG-RANGE NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

The basic reason for fighting a war at all is our determination to preserve American ideals, standards, and "way of life." Our kind of political, social, and economic system is on trial today; open warfare will be merely a further stage in this trial. Probably it will not be the final stage. Unless we can preserve those things essential to achievement of our long-range objectives, there is little reason for fighting.

What are these long-range objectives, and how important are the institutions of higher learning in their pursuit.

In declaring our independence, we held that all men are created equal, and listed "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness" as among the inalienable rights of men. We are dedicated to the continuation of a form of government based on free elections and free expression of opinion. We seek honesty and efficiency in all governmental units, as well as in our private lives. We also strive to reach two goals typically and uniquely American: equality of opportunity for *all* the youth of our nation, and maximum social mobility and fluidity—opportunity for those born into one occupational group to shift to

another, without social distinction between groups.

In order to preserve our kind of democracy, we have long realized the importance of an informed electorate. Today, as we battle for people's minds, it is even more important than in the past that we maintain a strong educational system. Colleges and universities are the keystone in such a system. We simply cannot permit them to be crippled, even in a struggle for survival. Education must and will continue; the only valid question concerns its form and size.

One critical type of education which must continue is graduate training for scientists. Gone are the days when four years of undergraduate work could produce a competent scientist. The amazing progress being made in many scientific fields can continue only as we continue to produce adequately trained scientists. In this day of technological war, such training and such progress are truly essential to victory, though we do not put uniforms on our research workers.

Deferment policies must, then, permit qualified students to continue graduate work in essential scientific fields. Such deferment needs to be tied strictly to aptitude on the part of the student and to essentiality of the scientific field.

Many educators will argue against the latter limitation, contending that *all* fields of advanced study are important to our long-range objectives. This argument has much force, and should be sustained in any struggle short of all-out war, but under the conditions being considered here it must be overruled. In a stern struggle for national life itself, popular clamor will demand abolition of *all* deferments for graduate study unless such deferments are tied closely to victory.

Demands for doctors and nurses will be unprecedented, and they must be trained at a rate differing radically from peacetime prac-

tice. With millions of civilian casualties, plus heavy military casualties, a new approach must be found to production of medical practitioners. Most civilian casualties will involve burns, wounds caused by flying debris, or radiological injury. Modern industry breaks down production jobs to permit use of semi-skilled workmen. So must the medical profession prepare for mass production and utilization of partially trained healers.

Biological warfare may complicate the problem with artificially induced epidemics among men, animals, or crops. These will be concentrated in narrow fields, and must be fought with similar mass-production methods.

Another field which received little emphasis in past wars will demand attention in the future. As a result of the unprecedented post-war rise in the birth-rate, a tremendous flood of children is now engulfing our schools. Today, for example, the number of students in elementary and secondary schools is 5,600,000 higher than it was only four years ago. By 1960 a further eight million students must be provided with teachers and schools. These prospective students are already born; not even war can stay their advance to school age. Colleges must train increasing numbers of teachers, even in wartime. An aggressive campaign will be needed to persuade students to shift to teacher training. Major emphasis should be placed on women teachers. But this task of providing trained young teachers must not be overlooked.

Adult training, along the general lines of World War II Engineering, Science, and Management War Training program, is another important task which colleges and universities should prepare to meet.

Throughout the war, many students not involved directly in the war effort must continue their education. Women must be encouraged to continue their studies. Youths

below military age must be given the best possible preparation for service to their nation. The need for inspirational teaching, for training which will impart understanding of the problems of modern living and world leadership, and for emphasis on high ideals and high standards, will be even greater than in peacetime. With proper leadership the colleges can and will amply justify their survival in any future crisis.

THE EDUCATORS SPEAK

What do educators say about the role their institutions should fill? Probably the best indication of their feelings lies in their resolutions, adopted at the October 1950 conference in Washington. Their General Resolutions were briefly referred to earlier in this paper.

To appreciate fully the importance of this conference, it is necessary to re-create the atmosphere of the time. The communists attacked in Korea in June, 1950. By that fall many sincerely advocated full-scale mobilization, feeling that all-out war was almost certain. In early October communist forces in Korea were on the run, but still the atmosphere was one of real crisis. Those present had the feeling that war was a strong possibility.

In the absence of contrary information, it can be assumed that these General Resolutions, plus the more detailed resolutions

adopted in the ten Section Meetings, represent the considered stand of those present regarding their role in a major war.

Two points stand out as one peruses the conference report.¹⁹ One is the willingness of colleges and universities to serve to the maximum of their ability. The other is their feeling that they did not have the information they needed to serve effectively. This lack of information still applies, as far as wartime plans are concerned.

With regard to student deferment policies, the conference expressed a strong feeling that such deferment should not be based on courses or curricula leading to specific professions or vocations, though it did leave a loophole in case such deferment were later judged necessary in the national interest. The conference also expressed a feeling that there is an obligation for deferred students to serve in the armed forces or in other work of national importance once their education is completed. If war unhappily comes again, many educators can be expected once more to urge against policies limiting student deferment to those taking specific courses.

Everything said or written by our educators, either at this 1950 conference or elsewhere, indicates their sincere desire to serve the nation in time of war with the total strength of their institutions.

¹⁹Amer. Council on Education, *Higher Education in the National Service*.

DECEMBER JOINT MEETING AMI-AHA

Members and friends of the AMI are invited to attend the Annual Joint Meeting of the American Military Institute and the American Historical Association.

PLACE: Room A, Hotel Commodore
New York City, N. Y.

DATE: Wednesday, 29 December 1954

HOOR: 10:30 A.M. EST

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Editor: GEORGE J. STANSFIELD

REVIEWS

New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944-August, 1944. By Samuel Eliot Morison. (History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. VIII.) (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1953. Pp. 435. \$6.00.)

In this, the eighth volume of his monumental and exciting history of American naval operations in the second World War, Dr. Morison has two separate but related stories to tell. The first is of General MacArthur's leap-frogging progress up the coast of New Guinea from Hollandia, through Wakde-Sarmi, Biak, and Noemfoor to Cape Sansapor near the western tip of the island. The second is of Admiral Nimitz's daring push into the Marianas which resulted in the capture of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, and in the trouncing of the great Japanese Mobile Fleet in the Battle of the Philippine Sea.

Of the two, the first is obviously the less important in the mind of the author and occupies only about a third of the book. The balance is justified here, if for no other reason than that the Navy's role in MacArthur's New Guinea drive was not nearly so important as it was to be in the Central Pacific.

Supported by ships of his own Seventh Fleet under Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, and never out of range of General Kenney's Fifth Air Force bombers, MacArthur's troops completed the 550 mile advance in a little more than three months, captured three important Japanese airbases on the way, isolated thousands of enemy troops, and found themselves poised at last on the threshold of the Philippines. Relying heavily on the official Army volume covering the same operations, (Robert Ross Smith, *Approach to the Philippines*, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, 1953), Morison covers the land campaigns succinctly,

clearly, and for the most part, accurately. He gives full credit to the wisdom of MacArthur's leap-frogging tactics and acknowledges in full the debt that Nimitz's Central Pacific forces owed to MacArthur's invasion of Biak.

It is to the land, sea and air battles developing out of the invasion of the Marianas that Dr. Morison devotes most of his attention, and rightly so. As before, ground operations on the three invaded islands are treated with as much detail as the scope and purpose of the volume warrant.

In regard to the famous Smith-Smith controversy on Saipan, Morison "entertains no doubt that [Marine] General Holland Smith was right." (pp. 332-333). Whether or not this judgement is the correct one, certain pertinent details are inaccurately presented. In the attack of 23 June into Death Valley, which featured so largely in Holland Smith's decision to ask for the relief of Ralph Smith, the three battalions of the 27th Infantry Division did not, as stated here, start "the attack 55 minutes, 2 hours, and 3 hours 15 minutes late, respectively." (p. 330). Only one battalion, the 3d Battalion, 106th Infantry, was late getting into line that morning, and then only by 55 minutes. Also, the author repeats that old and discredited saw that "the Army and the Marines were trained to different tactics." (p. 331). As any informed Army or Marine Corps officer knows, the Army and Marine Corps use the same field manuals and attempt to follow their precepts in the same fashion. There are of course many important differences between the two services, but they do not lie in tactical training.

Other errors of fact have crept into the account of the battle for Saipan—surprisingly so since Dr. Morison had on hand the very accurate and detailed official Marine Corps monograph by Major Carl W. Hoffman, USMC, (*Saipan: The Begin-*

ning of the End, Historical Division, HQ USMC, Washington, 1950). The landing formation during the ship-to-shore movement of the 2d Marine Division is described (p. 190) as though it obtained as well for the 4th Marine Division, which it did not. Agingan Point was not taken on D-day (p. 199), but on the day following. These are minor, however, and do not mar the generally accurate picture of the fighting on the island.

It is when he comes to the Battle of the Philippine Sea that Morison spreads himself. In a hundred and some pages of tightly packed narrative, he has written a brilliant description of one of the classic sea battles of modern times. The sinking by American submarines of the carriers *Shokaku* and *Taiko*, the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot" in which Admiral Mitscher's ships and planes shot down almost 250 Japanese carrier-aircraft, and the final (and only partially successful) pursuit of the escaping Japanese fleet on 20 June, are depicted with what can only be called loving care.

As to the great debate over whether Spruance was or was not overly cautious in forbidding Mitscher to keep his course on the night of 18 June and close with the Japanese fleet, Dr. Morison places himself unequivocally on Spruance's side of the argument. In so doing, he "out-Spruances" Spruance himself. Whereas the latter now admits that "going out after the Japanese and knocking their carriers out would have been much better" (p. 315), Morison thinks otherwise. By remaining in a defensive position, he believes, Admiral Mitscher's planes were in a position to do greater damage to the attacking enemy aircraft than had they closed with the Japanese carriers. At the same time, he argues, Mitscher's own ships were rendered almost completely immune. (Ibid.)

It is doubtful that many naval aviators will agree with this position. In any case, it seems to this reviewer unnecessary to go to such extreme lengths to defend Admiral Spruance's action. His fear of a Japanese "end run" against the landing force at Saipan was legitimate enough to warrant his caution, and he needs no other excuse.

Whether or not his final conclusions in regard to this particular issue are sound, Dr. Morison's description of this great sea-air battle will and should endure for a long time as one of the great classics in the annals of naval warfare.

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Brassey's Annual. The Armed Forces Year Book, 1953. Edited by Rear Admiral H. G. Thursfield. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1953. Pp. 506. \$9.50. Printed in Great Britain by William Clowes and Sons, Ltd.)

The Nation and the Navy. A History of Naval Life and Policy. By Christopher Lloyd. (London: The Cresset Press, 1954. Pp. 288. \$3.75.)

War in the Eastern Seas, 1793-1815. By C. Northcote Parkinson. (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1954. Pp. 477. \$6.75.)

The Royal Navy, despite its present twilight, still continues to be a rich source for British writers, publishers and presumably readers. The Navy holds a fascination for Britishers as it does for Americans but the fascination is of a different kind. In the United States the Navy finds its popularity in novels, plays and movies. But it is the history of their Navy that is a source of continued interest to Britishers. This interest is not unlike that of Americans in the Union and Confederate armies. This is understandable for in their respective countries these military elements are connected directly with great periods of national life.

On the other hand there has been little definitive or analytical writings about the pre-World War I British Army and there is practically nothing on the navies in the American Civil War. This reflects a difference in outlook of the two countries that is just beginning to be realized. In Great Britain, problems of security are thought of as maritime whereas in America they are viewed from a continental point of view. For three hundred years, England has lived by the seas; for one hundred and fifty years Americans have been developing a continent.

All this is by way of introduction to the books from Great Britain to be reviewed here. One of these is devoted to the three military services, the others to the Royal Navy alone. *Brassey's Naval Annual* became *Brassey's Annual* in 1950. This publication is now in its sixty fourth year. It started when the modern concept of sea power was just being formed and it has now shifted to the concept of integrated military power. That there is no similar publication in the United States is a distinct handicap to our military thinking and hence our military efforts. The material in *Brassey's* deals with the relation of the British military

services to international affairs but today the destiny of the free world is in the hands of the U. S. military forces. Nowhere are U. S. military problems similarly treated nor are U. S. military writers yet able to achieve the objective and detached attitude of their British brothers.

This book has a general section of eleven chapters and special sections devoted to each of the three services. Many chapters in the general section and not a few in the special sections should interest American readers. The lead article, "The Officer and His Hire," by the editor, Admiral Thursfield, is one of the best written on this subject of vital concern in both countries. The appendix contains three and one half pages on dependent's pensions that could be a guide for the U. S. legislation that will eventually have to replace the unsatisfactory Uniformed Services Contingency Act of 1953.

In the Air Force section, the dean of writers on air power, Dr. J. M. Spaight, continues his moderate approach to this subject. The Navy section has an article on the Fleet Train which shows that the British Navy is now giving attention to mobile logistic support. Two articles by Brigadier Barclay, "The New Warfare of the 1950s," and "The Strategic Deployment of British Forces," contain lessons badly needed by U. S. Army officers whose experiences have been in continental wars.

The Nation and The Navy is claimed by its author, the senior lecturer at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, to be a history of naval life and policy. He puts such a history from the time of the Tudors to World War I within less than three hundred pages. Obviously he can only "hit the high spots" and then not very hard. The best chapters are those on the Tudor, Stuart, Georgian and Victorian Navies.

All this does not detract from the general excellence of the book which represents a brave attempt at a gigantic task. It is interestingly written and is a good primer for those not familiar with naval history or naval strategy.

The last book is of the opposite type. It is a definitive history and fulfills one great need. *War In the Eastern Seas, 1793-1815*, treats of a limited period in a vast but nevertheless special area of British sea power. Mahan gave considerable treatment to the Indian Ocean and Eastern Seas in the first of his famous works, *The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1665-1783*, perhaps because he was attracted by the genius of Suffren. The sequel, *The Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolu-*

tion and Empire, gives this area practically no attention. Mr. Parkinson who is Raffles Professor of History at the University of Malaya, points out that Mahan ended his writing with Trafalgar and that no definitive naval history has been written for the period from 1805 to 1815. This is unfortunate for these were times like ours when the stress was on using the control of the seas rather than of gaining such control.

Professor Parkinson has done a thorough job that will not need to be done again for a long time. His book will be of interest primarily to naval scholars. For the general reader the detail often becomes confusing although there is a fascination about this long and involved story that makes it hard to put the book down. One finds here, not Nelsons and Hawkes, but typical British admirals doing a typically British job. British naval history is not all Niles, Trafalgars and Lady Hamiltons. For most of the officers and men of 1793-1815 naval warfare was the same as it was described a century and a half later in another great struggle for sea power—"long periods of boredom, interspersed by short periods of intense fear."

The Macmillan Company is doing a service to this country in importing such excellent additions to our all too limited military literature.

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The Arabian Peninsula. By Richard Sanger. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954. Pp. 309. 2 maps, bibl., index. \$5.00.)

This book will surprise readers familiar with older classics dealing with the Arabian Peninsula such as Doughty's *Arabia Deserta*, Lawrence's *Seven Pillars* and Burton's *Personal Narrative*. This area has come a long way since those observations were made. The present author wisely devotes little space to the ageless background of the region, choosing to stress instead elements which have virtually revolutionized the pattern of life in the last two or three decades—even King Solomon's Mines now have running water, air cooling, pie à la mode and the "enormous American breakfast." Though not a "handbook," and written in an easy informal style, this volume is a most useful introduction to the modern face of the various countries involved.

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Strategy for the West. By Sir John Slessor, Marshal of the Royal Air Force. (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1954. Pp. 180. \$3.00.)

The threat of Soviet atomic air power constitutes the single most important challenge in history. It is a little understood threat, and it is a subject about which there is hardly any competent literature. The voices of those from whom we could expect guidance—the senior airmen of the Western world—have been all but silent. Western statesmen and political scientists have done practically nothing to close the gap.

In *Strategy for the West*, one of the world's airmen has attempted to fill the void. For the attempt alone, Sir John Slessor, Marshal of the RAF, deserves the gratitude of the military reader. Let us hope that his book will initiate a shift from the current flood of antiquated military literature.

Slessor's undertaking is ambitious and has all the qualities and limitations of a pioneer venture. As the work of a professional airman, it is provoking; as the plea of an Englishman, it has a characteristic political flavor; as an appreciation of Soviet communism, it is sometimes wishful and confused; but as an analysis of the military experience of the past and its implications for the future, the book is first rate and truly instructive.

The author's thesis is essentially simple, and to my mind, correct: Atomic air power has become the supreme force of our times; its use or misuse will determine whether the free world will continue to exist and to remain free. Slessor's thesis, not so novel perhaps in America but essentially novel overseas, is based on an assessment of the nature of modern war, coupled with an analysis of the enemy we face and of the situations which he may impose upon us, especially in Europe. The author stresses that the free world will have to meet the Soviet threat, including the threat of Soviet atomic power, over the "long haul."

Marshal Slessor discusses a very wide variety of political and military problems and is not reluctant to express opinions about them: He slams the philosophy which calls for "unconditional surrender"; he defines the purpose of war as the creation of "world conditions more favorable to yourself than if there had never been a war;" he discusses the urgency of formulating convincing free world objectives; he scores the widespread and often irresponsible penchant toward anti-colonialism and points out the good features of colonialism as well as the dangers of granting premature self-government to backward areas; and he excoriates the fallacious concept of a world police force.

In the strictly military field, he suggests that the organization of military forces around the atom would allow many economies, yet he also believes that in some situations, particularly in "small wars," air power may not be decisive by itself and that, therefore, there remains a need for highly mobile, well-armed ground forces. The Marshal thinks that it is impractical to invade Russia with ground forces and proposes instead maximum reliance on tactical atomic defensive operations. In his opinion, airborne forces are of very limited use and extraordinarily costly in proportion to their effectiveness. Naturally, Sir John presents scintillating arguments both for and against expensive aircraft carriers.

Other topics discussed in this brief but encyclopedic book include the future of air freight, as well as the critical strategic demand for it; the "co-existence" of several air forces within the United States which the author considers a dangerous extravagance; the concept of military "parity" between the East and West and its inadequacy as a basis for security planning; and the possibility of still another pact between the USSR and Germany. Sir John's involved and rather complicated condemnation of EDC is balanced by a series of alternate proposals for the rearmament and future "air control" of Germany in the event she should threaten the peace of Europe once again.

The courageous Marshal will find much criticism and praise for his efforts. In my opinion, the major weaknesses of his book is in his failure to come to grips with the real nature of the enemy. Marshal Slessor believes that the USSR can be contained and confined within its borders. He believes this to be a satisfactory overall objective, i.e. temporarily live and let live regardless of the ultimate consequences. Unfortunately, what Slessor does not appear to appreciate is that unless the continuing process of communist power accumulation is interfered with, interrupted, or halted, the security posture of the free world cannot fail to deteriorate. I am sure he would reject his own ideas if he held stronger convictions concerning the unflinching aggressiveness of the Soviet leaders; but he is inclined to doubt their resolution and their willingness to assume extreme risks.

In the author's view, atomic air power is of little avail in limited or small war situations unless ground forces are present to undertake the *main* fighting tasks. Whether this is true or not, there

does not seem to be available adequate information, let alone experience, to justify any firm conclusion on this point. Surely, in view of the very great progress which weapons technology has made during the past few years, premature conclusions on what atomic air power can or cannot accomplish do not seem to be justified.

Nor can I agree with the author's views on trading with the Red bloc. In my opinion, any and all trade with the communist orbit has a strategic and military implication. The trading in so-called "non-strategic" materials would relieve the Soviets of the requirement of producing civilian goods as against military items and thus inevitably must lead to impairing the security of the free nations.

The idea of an air "Locarno" in which the security of all nations against aggression would be guaranteed by British-U. S. atomic air power bears close scrutiny. The prerequisite for such an agreement, according to Slessor himself, would be the evacuation of U. S. and British military power from Europe, along with a similar evacuation of Soviet forces from East Germany. This proposal fails to appreciate the added vulnerability which such a move might impose on European as well as on Anglo-American security. Moreover, there is implicit in the Marshal's thesis the view that successful negotiations with the USSR can be accomplished. This is to ignore free world experiences with communism since 1917. Not only is it extremely unrewarding to negotiate with the Soviets but even suppose an agreement were obtained: what else would you have but a piece of paper?

Despite these reservations, *Strategy for the West* stands out as a clear warning to those statesmen who fail to appreciate the significance of modern air weapons to our security. One of the most telling, though briefest, arguments in the book touches on the need for technological superiority over the USSR. Within the technological race, one particular danger looms especially large: "Unless the world political climate is far different to what it is today," it would be very dangerous "to have a gap in which the manned bomber is neutralized and the long-range missile not yet available." What the Marshal is saying is simply that the free world had better make more strenuous exertions if it wants to maintain a secure technical lead. Sir John Slessor's message should be read carefully, especially by those who still have difficulty in visualizing the nature of future war.

The time has come when the free world must turn to its air soldiers as our primary advisors on military security.

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I Flew for the Fuhrer. By Hans Knoke. Introduction by Lt. General E. R. Quesada, USAF (Ret.). (Henry Holt & Co., 1954. Pp. 213. \$3.00.)

I Flew for the Fuhrer is a most interesting personal diary of a Luftwaffe fighter pilot who, though wounded several times, survived World War II. This book is especially interesting to me for much of its action takes place in areas of Europe where I was in operation with American fighter units. The reader's interest is held throughout the book.

I am surprised that Heinz Knoke, the author, used this title for, although he followed German leadership unquestionably, in the latter pages of his book he states: "Despotism without conscience has been revealed among the Nazis in the background around Hitler"; and "These criminals . . . have dishonored the name of Germany"; and "The Allies ought to leave the criminals to the German fighting soldiers to bring to justice."

In the closing pages, Knoke makes some very interesting observations concerning Communism. He states: "The only true measure of victory is lasting peace. I do not see how there can ever be lasting peace in the world as long as Bolshevism continues to exist. It will have to go on one day to conquer the world, according to the Communist theories of world revolution. The price to be paid for a peace of that sort is the enslavement of every nation and all mankind." He suggests several times that what is left of the German armies should join forces with the Allies against the Communist hordes. His closing paragraph is a doubtful forecast of peace: "The war is lost. The armistice is signed. Does this mean that there will be peace?"

Brigadier General B. M. Hovey, USAF
Industrial College of the Armed Forces

Advance to Barbarism. By F. J. P. Veale. (Appleton, Wisc.: C. C. Nelson Publishing Company, 1953. Pp. 305. \$5.00.)

Advance to Barbarism is a brilliant indictment of the failure by the Western World to recognize the danger inherent in an abandonment of the

rules of civilized warfare evolved through centuries of human experience. Mr. Veale recognizes the anomaly of the term civilized warfare. He also points out that the most successful answer to the problem of war has been brought about by peoples accepting a common code of ethical behavior. Then, and only then, has war been brought within the discipline of civilization.

Tracing war from its origins in the rivalries of primitive folk groups, the author follows the slow evolution of the concept of limited warfare to its apogee in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe. However, the most telling chapters of this book deal with the terrible re-emergence of wars of annihilation in the supposedly enlightened twentieth century. This development is considered along with the principle of *vae victis* (woe to the conquered) established in the war crime trials of German and Japanese military leaders. In Mr. Veale's opinion the war crime trials represent an absolute departure from the ideals of civilized jurisprudence.

War, according to the author, can be divided into primary and secondary warfare. Primary warfare takes place between antagonists in different stages of civilization, secondary warfare among peoples possessing similar or parallel cultures. Secondary warfare is, therefore, essentially civil war. All European wars from the beginning of the eighteenth century up to American intervention in the First World War have been European civil wars.

Russian and American participation in the Second World War introduced a new moral element into the European pattern. The Russians, after their Revolution of 1917, repudiated European mores. The Americans were conditioned by two hundred years of frontier conflict with savage peoples to accept primary warfare as the norm.

It is here that some American scholars may disagree with Mr. Veale's conclusions. He cites Cromwell's siege and capture of Drogheda in 1649 as an example of religious war at its worst and forgets that America's cultural roots lie in the Puritan revolution of the seventeenth century. Cromwell's Drogheda and King Philip's War of 1675-76 as described by Cotton Mather have much in common. The American Civil War was fought with singular ferocity, both sides being convinced of the absolute righteousness of their cause. Such an attitude may be unsophisticated in European eyes, but the element of righteous wrath against the unrighteous coupled with moral condemnation

of amoral conduct was very much in evidence in this country during both World Wars and in the present crisis as well.

However, "the beam in our own eye" is also an important consideration. For that reason, *Advance to Barbarism* should be read by every thinking American interested in putting his own house in order. It is an important book, a courageous book, and a very timely book. Whether one agrees wholly or in part with its conclusions is immaterial. It most certainly deserves a thoughtful reading.

HENRY LUMPKIN
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U. S. Grant and the American Military Tradition. By Bruce Catton. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1954. Pp. 200. Index. \$3.00.)

When Mr. Catton writes with his usual grace and artistry in behalf of General Grant, the result is inevitably persuasive. When he draws on his profound knowledge of the Civil War to assess Grant's generalship, Civil War strategy is effectively illuminated. When he examines Grant's actions and reactions in the important as well as in the trivial circumstances of his life, the general's character and individuality are accurately and vividly portrayed. The only regret in reading this biography is that Mr. Catton does not put his rare ability and understanding of the man and his epoch to work to give us a really comprehensive biography. This does not yet exist, as Mr. Catton points out in an excellent survey of available sources. Perhaps he will some day write the definitive biography of General Grant that is still needed. Few are better qualified to do it.

In the meantime we can be grateful for this brief interpretation of General Grant's life. It is the first biography in a series edited by Professor Oscar Handlin of Harvard and if the standard established by Mr. Catton is maintained, the series will be of major importance.

According to Mr. Catton, General Grant has not been presented to posterity either fairly or accurately. He insists that Grant's "greatest campaign was built on speed and deception and military brilliance, but he would be written off as a man with a bludgeon, a dull plodder who could win only when he had every advantage and need count no cost. An organizer and administrator as good as the best, he would be spoken of as a man too impractical to earn his own living. He was

determination and strength of will incarnate, and legend would claim him as a weakling who could not steer a straight course past the nearest bottle of whiskey. Few men of his day thought harder or straighter about the war and what it meant, but he is commonly supposed not to have thought at all, except on military matters, and then only briefly and without inspiration."

Mr. Catton pleads his case brilliantly and succinctly, even if there may be encomiums which might be questioned. He offers Grant's views and his actions in war to explain the American military tradition, but this is only incidental to the course of the biography. In many ways it is a good tradition and one that today's soldiers will do well to understand and to emulate.

For example, Grant's letter written just before Shiloh to Congressman Washburne is characteristic. He wrote: "So long as I hold a commission in the army I have no views of my own to carry out. Whatever may be the orders of my superiors and the law, I will execute. No man can be efficient as a commander who sets his own notions above law and those whom he has sworn to obey. When Congress enacts anything too odious for me to execute, I will resign."

His magnanimous treatment of a defeated enemy is in the American military tradition. But Mr. Catton reminds us of one aspect of our military tradition that we shall do well to discard as quickly as possible. That concerns the meaning of victory in war. "Victory," he writes, "becomes an end in itself, and 'unconditional surrender' expresses all anyone wants to look for, because if the enemy gives up unconditionally he is completely and totally beaten and all of the complex problems which made an enemy out of him in the first place will probably go away and nobody will have to bother with them any more."

There is much in this book in spite of its brevity that is significant for the student of military history. It is an appealing and entertaining biography of one of our great soldiers that has many lessons for the present generation.

DONALD ARMSTRONG
Brig. Genl. USA (Ret.)

The March of Empire: Frontier Defense in the Southwest 1848-1860. By Averam B. Bender. (University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, Kansas, 1952. Pp. 328. \$5.00.)

This volume deals with the development of frontier defense against the Indians in the vast region of the Southwest acquired from Mexico,

covering the period between the Mexican and Civil Wars. The author begins with a brief chapter reviewing the character of the region and the distribution of the Indian tribes. There follow two chapters on defense (more precisely, Indian) policy and the system of military posts and garrisons; three chapters on military explorations and the improvement of communications by roads and by rivers; and a chapter on the life of the frontier soldier. These chapters carry the reader past the middle of the volume. Of the remaining seven chapters, four review the course of hostilities with the Indians in different parts of the Southwest; and the last two, save one of conclusions, deal with Indian reservations in Texas and California. Some 1,100 footnotes cover 65 pages of fine print at the end of the text. There are also a bibliography, an index, four pages of illustrations and two maps. Neither of the last-named are nearly as useful as they might be to the reader; the map serving as a frontispiece is scarcely useable without a magnifying glass.

The March of Empire is not an easy volume either to read or to review, for all its brevity and the effort to attain a sprightly style. Despite the heavy documentation, one comes away from its reading with confidence neither in the main outlines of the picture presented nor of the conclusions reached. Indeed, in many of the matters considered, the reader is left either with unresolved issues or with rather facile generalizations which do not always draw convincing support from the evidence cited. Often there is a striving for effect which leads one to wonder which governs, the idea to be expressed or the language employed. The title of the book is itself a misnomer since our imperial march to the Pacific coast was completed with victory in the War with Mexico. Doubtless, too, Indian tribes which bulk so large in this story regarded the comprehensive measures taken against them as something more than defensive in character. The details of the story of the army's role in expansion and settlement through the Southwest are presented with considerable realism but the overall assessment of the accomplishments of the military arm takes on the character of uncritical glorification. Although this study contributes a considerable body of interesting information about the subject in hand, it makes only a rather limited contribution to an understanding either of the processes of westward advance or of the army as a social and political institution.

LOUIS C. HUNTER
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Combat Actions in Korea: Infantry, Artillery, Armor. By Captain Russell A. Gugeler. (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1954. Pp. 253. \$5.00.)

It is not often that a book of military history can be recommended without reservations. But an exception must be made in the case of Captain Russell A. Gugeler's *Combat Actions in Korea*. There is no better example of that recent school of military historical writing which deals with small-unit actions on the basis of interviews with the survivors.

"History," it has been remarked, "consists of the lies men have agreed upon." But even if this cynicism were acceptable, it would scarcely apply to the twenty combat narratives of Captain Gugeler's book. Not only are they based on "painstaking interviews," as he explains in his introduction, but these interviews took place "soon after the fighting was over."

The participants, in short, did not have time to agree upon fictions which might be more palatable and even more convincing than the actualities just encountered. As a result, we have first-hand accounts of combat which come as close to the truth as the historian may hope of approach. So close, in fact, that a great deal of past military historical writing seems romantic moonshine in contrast.

The narratives are supported by good operational maps and documented by chapter notes. Most of them are followed by "discussions"—brief professional comments and criticisms.

Combat Actions was written "primarily for the junior officers, noncommissioned officers and the privates" of the U. S. Army, according to the foreword by Major General Orlando Ward, USA (now retired), Chief of Military History from 1949 to 1952. A fairly typical chapter, "Attack Along a Ridgeline," records the repulse of two U. S. infantry platoons during the Naktong Bulge operations of August 1950. The first few paragraphs limn a depressing big picture of Eighth Army troops battling for a foothold in southeast Korea. The confused fighting of the Pusan Perimeter is summed up by an American regimental commander in these words:

"There are dozens of enemy and American forces all over the area, and they are all surrounding each other."

This is one of the quotations in *Combat Actions* that a professional writer might envy for its simple and direct adequacy. Consider, too, the descrip-

tion by an enlisted man of the moral shock and numbness he experienced upon leaving his foxhole and advancing into the bullet-swept open.

"It was just like jumping into ice water," he said.

Several outstanding instances of bravery distinguished the attack. But there was neither much direction nor co-ordination of efforts, and the two platoons had to be withdrawn after taking grievous casualties.

The remaining nineteen narratives are devoted to similar small-unit operations, some of them successful and others serving as object lessons. But whether dealing with victory or defeat, *Combat Actions* never swerves from its approach of professional realism. War is not a pretty business and thousands of American youths soon became a match for Asiatic peasant soldiers in the hardihood and guile of combat. Thus in the chapter "A Rifle Company as a Covering Force" we learn that Corporal Pedro Rodriguez of the 7th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division, zeroed in his light machine gun on a point along a trail used by the enemy in the Chorwon area. Squeezing off a round at a time, he allowed several Chinese soldiers to pass unharmed before firing again at a range of 300 yards. "Because he was not greedy," we are informed, "the Chinese kept using the trail and Rodriguez hit a total of fifty-nine enemy soldiers during several hours of firing."

Such incidents are the stuff of a book devoted to war on the firing line. For in these pages the decisions of a platoon leader awaiting an enemy night attack on an isolated hill-top are of vastly more importance than the plans of staff officers at a corps headquarters.

Captain Gugeler shares the credit with nine Army officers, members of historical detachments, who were his colleagues in Korea. He acknowledges also that General Ward had much to do with the planning of a book worthy of a place beside the other distinguished works brought out by U. S. Army historians since World War II—works which have set a high standard of scholarship in the field of military history.

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The Compleat Strategyst. By J. D. Williams. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1954. Pp. 247. \$4.75.)

The Compleat Strategyst is another in the series of splendid research studies being conducted by the RAND Corporation and is, as described by the author, "a primer on the theory of games of strategy." It's much more than that, however, for it is a completely comprehensible primer and represents the first book in the field that can be read and digested with profit by the non-mathematician.

Employing nothing more than plain arithmetic and amusing illustrations the author takes a complex subject, heretofore understandable only by a handful of experts, and reduces it to a clear and sound introduction to a fascinating and useful field of knowledge. Obviously, author Williams had a great deal of fun writing it for his barely concealed exuberance for his subject easily infects the reader early in the book. After this is accomplished the reader finds himself reading for amusement and for pleasure, two very painless routes to the acquisition of knowledge.

The book deals primarily with the many variations of two-person, zero-sum games—those situations in which there are only two conflicting interests. The methods defined and described are equally useful in any situation involving conflict from the friendly poker game to the grim serious business of warfare. While some of his explanations fall short of the clarity he intended, as is only natural with such a subject, for the most part Williams "lays it on the line" in a fashion worthy of emulation by would-be authors of less detailed scientific works.

No one could possibly read *The Compleat Strategyst* without learning considerable about the Theory of Games. While it will probably never replace the Service Schools as the source of strategic training, it may be read with great profit by all military men and, it should be. To the serious student of strategy it offers the answer to the wide gap existing between theory and practice; to the casual reader it represents a new approach to a heretofore baffling and obscure field. *The Compleat Strategyst* should become popular with all those who are faced with analyzing and finding solutions for the many conflict-of-interests problems facing the United States today.

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The Fremantle Diary. Editing and commentary by Walter Lord. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1954. Pp. 304. \$4.00.)

This is the first reprint since 1864 of Lt. Col. Arthur James Fremantle's "Three Months in the Southern States," long considered a Confederate classic.

This is not a photographic offset reproduction of an 1863 or 1864 edition but a new edition from a new type setting. The editor has divided the text into logical chapters, has reparagraphed the text as an aid to readability, and in some cases has broken long compound sentences into smaller sentences. Some minor changes have been made in capitalization, notably "Negro" instead of "negro" as in the 1864 edition.

It would be gratifying to say that this is a verbatim reproduction, but certain references by Fremantle to a Jewish traveler have either been revised or omitted (1954 ed.: pp. 11, 22, 31, 33, and 35; 1864 ed. comparable pages: 14, 29, 41, 43, and 45), and the Yankee deserters' reason for enlistment (p. 70, 1954 ed.) was stated considerably stronger in the 1864 edition (p. 89).

The editor has been oversensitive at these points and detracts from the value of his reprint, not so much for his omission as for an unjustified failure to indicate the changes and omissions in his introduction, by footnotes, or by ellipsis. He has not played fair with the innocent purchaser.

The editor's notes, some 56 pages, are explanatory and interesting although not critical. The end pieces are maps to illustrate Fremantle's travels and are an addition to the book.

The editor would have added to the effectiveness of the reprint had he prepared biographical identifying footnotes for the minor officers mentioned. The omission to supply an index detracts from the utility of the book.

Mechanically this edition is quite satisfactory in relation to its cost. The typography is legible, printing is excellent as to register and inking, and the binding is adequate though plain.

In spite of its defects the student of the Civil War cannot afford to pass this book by in view of the scarcity and cost of an original edition. It does not, however, measure up to the level of an adequate reprint of a military history classic.

RALPH W. DONNELLY
Civil War Round Table of
Washington, D. C.

The Army Air Forces in World War II.

Edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. Volume III, *Europe: Argument to V-E Day. January 1944 to May 1945.* By Arthur B. Ferguson, Alfred Goldberg, Albert F. Simpson, Joseph W. Angell, John E. Fagg, Robert T. Finney, Robert H. George, Martin R. R. Goldman, David G. Rempel, and Harris Warren. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951. Pp. xxxix, 948. \$8.50.)

This is the volume for which persons interested in the air phases of World War II have waited with greatest anticipation, for it covers the Air Forces's greatest effort—the climatic months of the war in Europe.

In an exceptionally well-written foreword the editors have provided a lucid and concise summary of this 900-page-plus work. They explain its scope as follows:

The present volume begins with the winter bombardment campaign of 1943-1944 and ends with the German surrender in May 1945; it tells of air's contribution to the slow drive up the Italian peninsula; it describes the activities of the strategic bombers as they beat down the Luftwaffe and, turning to other targets, ruined the German war economy; it tells how tactical forces prepared for and supported the landings in Normandy and then spearheaded the Allied sweep across France and, after a check and a serious counterattack, across Germany. The volume contains then the climax of air operations, and the denouement too—for before the armistice the strategic bombers had run out of targets and the Eighth Air Force had begun its redeployment to the Pacific, while tactical forces had little to do beyond policing duties.

In covering all of this the authors have been thorough in their research and generally have maintained a lively style in presentation. For the most part they have been successful in avoiding the monotony so common to air reports in relating repetitious accounts of sorties flown and tonnages of bombs dropped. Indeed as far as I am concerned several passages sustained my interest as well as anything I have read in recent military history. One objectionable feature is that a great deal of interesting material is hidden away in discursive footnotes grouped at the end of the book.

Although the volume covers well both the tactical and strategic air operations in Europe, one

easily gains the impression that strategic bombing was the "main show." Yet in recording and appraising the results the authors have not failed to take into account the various reports of the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey and the German records which have become available, and they are frank in correcting false impressions and in admitting disappointments in certain results.

One of these was the so-called "Big Week"—the result of the ARGUMENT operations in February 1944. Here it is frankly stated (p. 45), "Unquestionably the Big Week derived much of its importance from . . . errors in intelligence." The account further explains (p. 44):

In short the February bombings had the effect of galvanizing the aircraft industry into feverish action.

Thanks in part to that activity, directed as it was with considerable resourcefulness, the effects of the February bombings were substantially mitigated. Damage, moreover, proved on more careful investigation to have been proportionately less severe in the vital category of machine tools than to buildings; in fact a very high percentage of the former was salvaged. Dispersal was especially successful in the airframe and final-assembly branch of the industry (the one singled out for priority attack) since it was possible to carry on most of the necessary operations in roughly constructed frame shelters, many of them well concealed in wooded areas. As a result of these several factors, aircraft production recuperated very rapidly.

Yet while the German aircraft industry was able to restore and even increase its production after the "Big Week," the Luftwaffe never was quite able to overcome the defeat which it suffered in the skies as it rose to defend that industry. It appears that success in direct air combat did more to establish the Allies' air superiority than did the bombing of industrial plants.

What turned out to be the most critical target of all in permanently weakening German air power in particular and the military effort in general was the oil industry. For the support of OVERLORD General Spaatz urged that the strategic air forces be turned to two vital target systems—oil and rubber—which might be expected to injure Germany positively. Spaatz maintained that air attacks could cut German gasoline supplies by 50 per cent within six months. But, convinced that it was the only way of making a direct and effective contribution to the lodgement in

Normandy, General Eisenhower decided in favor of the plan for bombing the transportation system. Actually the Fifteenth Air Force, operating from Italy, opened the oil campaign inauspiciously in April 1944 with raids against Ploesti—ostensibly against the marshalling yards, but with greater actual effect against the nearby oil refineries. But the oil campaign was delayed in becoming top priority until 8 June 1944. In the end the attacks against oil resources probably were more nearly decisive than those against any other strategic target. Results suggested that the oil campaign should have been begun sooner and kept up more intensely—with fewer bombs going into blind attacks on industrial areas. Better intelligence might have singled out for destruction five plants producing ethyl fluid—with possibly catastrophic results for the German war machine.

The volume goes into the analyses of the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey which disclosed a surprising increase in German war production, in spite of the bombings, until it reached a peak in 1944. Nevertheless it quotes with emphasis the conclusion: "Allied air power was decisive in the war in western Europe"—a statement which might be made with equal truth of many other elements—shipping, armies, armor, transportation, etc.—of the combined forces. Moreover the conclusion begs the really significant question of the relative contributions of the tactical and strategic air forces.

This work brings together a great deal of informative and interesting detail on the air war. One episode, for example, relates to the shuttle-bombing from Russian bases—which, after a pair of devastating German air raids and unsatisfactory results otherwise, proved to be too costly to justify its continuation.

Still a number of questions are left unanswered. The failure of such spectacular mass bombings as those at Cassino, Caen, and Cherbourg are attributed, in part, to a "misuse" of air power. The major criticism is at putting heavy bombers to tactical work. Referring to Cassino it is stated, (p. 370): "Tactical's mediums put on a superior performance because the mission was the sort to which they were accustomed; the poorer showing of the heavies was the result primarily of undertaking a job which was out of their line." Yet the special plea of the Air Forces had been on the "inherent flexibility of air power." But the lesson was not learned. Five and six years later we

witnessed the ludicrous development in Korea where B-29 *Super* forts were being pressed into service as medium bombers on tactical missions! One cannot help but wonder whether victory in Europe might have come even more swiftly had a greater share of resources—and training and development—gone into tactical rather than into strategic air forces.

The volume gives a convincing account of the vital role which air power played in helping stop the German's Ardennes offensive. But in this connection it may be of some significance to note that tactical air power was able to help blunt that counteroffensive within a few weeks; yet two years of strategic bombing had not been sufficient to prevent the Germans' assembling the troops, equipping them, and moving them, to launch that major offensive action.

A specific question which remains without a full answer is the one posed with some bitterness by General Bradley (*A Soldier's Story*, pp. 330-340) relative to the carpet bombing near St. Lô preparatory to Operation COBRA. This was the action in which bombs fell short and caused serious casualties among American forces. Bradley had insisted that the heavy bombers come in parallel to the Périers road, i.e., perpendicular to the front so that there would be little danger of short bombing. Instead, without warning him, according to his testimony, the Air Forces gave the order for the planes to go in over the heads of the friendly troops—with exactly the results which Bradley had feared. This controversy is not mentioned as such in the Air Forces history. Here the authors are careful to point out that the orders as issued were carried out, and it is explained that the attack was delivered at right angles to the long axis of the target area (a designated area five miles wide by one mile deep) "in order to reduce the grave problem of flying more than 1,500 heavy bombers over the target within the space of 60 minutes." (p. 231).

One final consideration pertains to the moral questions involved in aerial bombing. Before the entry of the United States into the war, American leaders had spoken out repeatedly against the bombing of civilian populations. Later those ideals apparently were lost sight of, and the official history gives little weight to moral considerations. In noting that air raids on cities "brought death to perhaps 305,000 Germans and serious injury to 780,000, and approximately 25,000,000 had been subjected to the terror of the bombings," (p. 801)

justification against humanitarian protests is sought by "pointing out the far more fatal effects to civilian populations of the naval blockade of the first world war!"

Certainly as serious humanitarian objections could be raised against the bombing of Allied towns and cities. Why were towns such as St. Lô, Coutances, Avranches, and Lisieux destroyed? They were not important rail centers, they had no major industries, few German troops were there. But they were designated "chokepoints" (p. 193), and on the night of D-Day (6-7 June) some 800 Frenchmen died in St. Lô (population: c. 12,000) that their houses, shops, hospitals, churches, and schools might become rubble to spill out into the streets, for this might possibly delay for a bit the movement of German forces through that area—in a country where high hedgerows and sunken roads canalized every vehicular movement, where craters almost anywhere might have been as effective for that purpose as were those in town. But, "c'est la guerre."

Read in connection with the volumes of the Army's series on the European War, this gives a most complete picture of the American war effort in Europe. Now all this material requires the thoughtful attention and analysis of many students, for it has much to offer at a time when the shaping of national security policy seems to be based as much on intuition and wishful thinking as on the record of experience.

Finally it should be noted that the University of Chicago Press presents the book in very pleasing format. While the paper and binding appear to be of cheaper quality than that used by the GPO in the Army's series, the flexibility, and probably the wearability of the binding, is much superior.

JAMES A. HUSTON
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How Strong Is Russia? By George B. Cressey.
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1954.
Pp. 140. \$3.00.)

Dr. Cressey, Maxwell Professor of Geography at Syracuse University, offers his latest effort as a geographic appraisal of the Soviet Union with the hope that "this analysis of Soviet strength is presented with the same objectivity that one would wish on the part of a Russian geographer evaluating the United States." With this optimistic foreword, Professor Cressey has taken his 1952 Hill Family Foundation of St. Paul Lectures, given at

St. Olaf College, Minnesota; dressed them up with an impressive number of photographs, most of them from Soviet propaganda organs; and produced a compact little 140 page book entitled "*How Strong is Russia?*" Unlike many of his contemporary evaluators, the author endeavors to answer his own question in his ultimate paragraph by awarding this area the grade of "A" minus thus leaving a narrow but optimistic margin of hope for those of us who believe Russia to be a menace to world peace.

Between his hopeful preface and not too comforting conclusion, the author attempts, in a not too convincing fashion, to expose the geographic sources of Soviet strength, based upon his travels in Russia in 1923, 1937 and 1934, and "two decades of research and two previous volumes." For the first 120 pages the reader is treated to a non-technical discussion of Soviet geography, physical, economic and political, which adds little to what has been previously written by other authors. In fact, one receives the general impression that even Professor Cressey has written some of this material in an earlier and better effort and that the current volume is a rehash of his previous works.

In the remaining 20 pages the author makes the unforgivable mistake, so common to brilliant scientists and to geographers in particular, of abruptly assuming one can change from geographer to geopolitician by the simple inclusion of a chapter on Soviet Foreign Policy. Many of his assumptions and conclusions are open to question or are controversial at the best. As a reflection of Soviet Foreign Policy, this chapter is definitely not in keeping with the general acceptability and occasional brilliance of the rest of his book, leaving the reader, as it does, with the feeling that a better effort would have been achieved if the work had been terminated on page 120.

For general reading and information on Russia, Professor Cressey's book is worthwhile owning and reading. As a reference work for geographers, geopoliticians and other professionals in the field it does not begin to equal his former works and is surpassed by a number of others now available. All in all, it is bound to be somewhat disappointing to his many admirers who have come to expect a consistently brilliant flow of words and facts from one of America's foremost geographers.

JOHN E. KIEFFER
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Washington, D. C.

The American Revolution, 1775-1783. By John Richard Alden. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954 .Pp. 294. \$5.00.)

It would be hard to improve upon this book as a concise one-volume history of the political and military events of the American Revolution.

Scholars no longer believe this period to be as simple and uncomplicated as it was regarded by Fiske and other historians at the turn of the century. Yet Professor Alden has managed to write a competent and well-balanced summary in just 268 pages of text.

The book is part of the New American Nation Series, edited by Henry Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris, and published by Harpers. It is planned to bring out more volumes by other historians to cover the entire field of American history.

The author of *The American Revolution*, a professor of history at the University of Nebraska, is eminently well qualified for his assignment. He was editor of the late Christopher Ward's two-volume *War of the Revolution*; and he has written three books of his own which deal with this period—*John Stuart and the Southern Colonial Frontier*, *General Gage in America*, and *General Charles Lee, Traitor or Patriot?*

Perhaps "judicious" is the best word to describe the present study. Although Professor Alden steers clear of controversial subjects on the whole, he handles all the main issues with a scholarly selection of material.

Here and there, unfortunately, a few dubious interpretations may be charged to the book's relentless brevity. The author contends, for instance, that historians "have exaggerated the difficulties of the patriots" in 1780. As evidence, he cites two successful offensive operations—Wayne's attack on Stony Point, and Light Horse Harry Lee's raid on Paulus Hook. But these events, as he says, took place in the summer of 1779. There were no such silver linings to the difficulties of 1780, the black year of the war.

But these are minor and perhaps carping criticisms. On the credit side of the ledger, the half-tone illustrations are well chosen, the operational maps are better than ordinary, and there is a good bibliography.

Altogether, the book serves its purpose admirably and may be highly recommended as a condensed account of the Revolution.

LYNN MONTROSS
Washington, D. C.

The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim.

Translated by Count Eric Lewenhaupt. (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1954. Pp. 540. \$6.75.)

No more clear warning to a vacillating and divided West can be imagined than these *Memoirs* of Baron Mannerheim, Finland's Commander-in-Chief and one of her central political figures through the most trying period in modern Finnish history. This book covers the period of Mannerheim's entrance into the military schools of Finland and Russia, his subsequent graduation and service in the Russian Army, his return to his native Finland during her War of Liberation in 1918, and his services to the political organization and military defense of his country.

In his service in the Russian Army, Mannerheim's rapid rise to positions of responsibility were indicative of his military qualities. His observations on Russian military techniques and political interests during his Russian service, though occurring in the days of the Tsars, are valuable today because they demonstrate that the fundamental Russian objectives have not materially changed with the change in political complexion. In commenting on the Russo-Japanese war, he shows that the Russian fascination with the East was primarily stimulated fifty years ago, just as it is today, by diplomatic setbacks which she received in the West.

But it is the account of the Finnish-Russian series of conflicts, and the lessons which they can teach us for dealing with the Russians, which makes this volume of particular interest and of unquestionable value to the free peoples today. Finland's gallant fight for freedom in her War of Liberation demonstrates to all freedom-loving people that no cost is too great which allows a people to escape the yoke of tyranny. Provoked by Russia in 1939, Finland again demonstrated in the Winter War of that year, which won the admiration and the approbation of the whole free world, that no cost is too great to prevent that yoke's being replaced.

Finland's campaign against her natural enemy, the U.S.S.R., during the Second World War, when she was ostensibly an ally of Germany, made her the target of much Western censure. But Finland's choice during her dilemma, when she was deserted by her Scandinavian neighbors and by her Western friends, was a natural one; for Germany alone was willing to supply Finland

with the necessary food and materials to ward off the third Russian attack in less than thirty years, assistance upon which Finland owed her very existence. Was Finland to bite the hand that fed her and take the side of her natural enemy to fight against her only friend?

In commenting on the lack of political and military collaboration in Scandinavia as a contributory cause to Russian invasion, Mannerheim points up our inability in the West to collaborate in the face of a threat of the same nature. In defending Finland's shortsightedness in matters of military preparations and foreign policy he cannot excuse those who discouraged military appropriations, and he says that "an absolute prerequisite for an independent foreign policy is the existence of a strong defense force," a necessity which Finland overlooked while concerned with party interests prior to 1939. Concerning foreign policy, we in the larger Western nations can feel the shoe pinch when Mannerheim says that "it is perhaps per-

missible to remind [detractors of Finnish foreign policy] that even great nations . . . have been guilty of mistakes and wrong decisions in this field to at least as great an extent."

For his accurate insight into the Russian character, for his acute observations on Russian military techniques and shortcomings, resulting from his lifelong experience in fighting with the Russians and against them—and for his penetrating criticism of the inadequacies of an undecided and appeasement-seeking people, this book will appeal to all those who must deal with the Russians in anyway. It will also be enjoyed by all those who admire the determination of a freedom-loving people or who desire an account of an almost unparalleled example of the heroic defense of national values.

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SHORTER REVIEWS

The following books have been received for review by Military Affairs. Space does not permit a more detailed examination of their value. The cooperation of their publishers is called to the attention of all readers.

BAKER, NINA, B.: *Pike of Pike's Peak*. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1953. Pp. 140. \$2.50.)

A brief biography designed for the younger reader which should be considered for Christmas giving.

BATTISTINI, LAWRENCE H.: *Japan and America*, from earliest times to the present. (New York: John Day, 1953, 1954. Pp. 198. \$3.00.)

The author, who had served in Tokyo in responsible War Department positions from 1946 to 1951, is now lecturer in Modern History at Sophia University of Tokyo. The book is designed as an introductory scholarly text emphasizing the political aspects of Japanese-American relations and adequately fulfils that goal. His chapter footnotes and short bibliography provide for additional reading similar to his earlier *Introducing Asia*.

BREWINGTON, M. V.: *Chesapeake Bay*, a pictorial maritime history. (Cambridge, Md.: Cornell Maritime Press, 1953. Pp. 229. \$6.50.)

This excellent volume is only what one might expect from the author, well known maritime historian and editor of *The American Neptune*. Chapters VI, "Privateering, Piracy and War" and XIII, "The Bays' Maritime Museums" are of most interest to the general military historian. The rest of the volume with its carefully selected illustrations provides hours of pleasure for readers ranging from the old Marylander who had sailed in ships shown on its pages to anyone interested in maritime affairs.

BURNHAM, JAMES: *The Web of Subversion*; underground networks in the U. S. (New York: John Day, 1954. Pp. 248. \$3.75.)

This volume is a most significant popular summary of the mass of hard-to-read testimony buried in Congressional Hearings and summarized in their reports. The committees involved were the Senate Sub-Committee on International Security and the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and the House Committee on Un-American Activities. While the subject discussed is not primarily military history, but espionage, it should be of great interest to the military historian and should be read not only by the specialist for its summary, but by the general reader who otherwise

would not read such important data in any form. The author is a well known anti-communist and the web described was most widespread.

CLARK, WILLIAM BELL: *The First Saratoga*, being the saga of John Young and his Sloop-of-War (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1953. Pp. 199. \$3.50.)

This is the fifth study by Mr. Clark who retired from being a Vice President of the Advertising firm of N. W. Ayer and Son in 1950 to develop his avocational interest in American Naval History into a full time pursuit.

In this scholarly volume he gives Captain John Young recognition long overdue and acknowledges the naval heritage of the *Saratoga*, the first of a half dozen American naval vessels to bear that name. His sailing career from 1768 to 1781, when the *Saratoga* was lost with all hands without a trace, is readably described and is clearly based upon a thorough examination of all available sources of information as the "notes" show.

Mr. Young has continued to uphold his well earned reputation as the "outstanding authority on our Navy of the Revolution" in this rewarding study, and both author and publisher are to be commended for the final product.

DEWITT, HARRY M., JR.: *Comptrollership in the Armed Forces*; a summary and comparative evaluation in industry and the department of defense with special reference to the army comptroller. (Washington, D. C.: Institute of Engineering, 1952, 1953. Pp. 146. \$1.50.)

The development of Comptrollership in industries and the various Departments of Defense and management engineering functions are examined in this pioneer study. A bibliography is appended for further research into this new area of Budgeting.

HUIE, WILLIAM B.: *The Execution of Private Slovik*; the hitherto secret story of the only American soldier since 1864 to be shot for desertion. (New York: Boston: Duell Sloan Pearce, Little Brown, 1954. Pp. 247. \$3.50. New York: New American Library, 1954. Pp. 152. 35c.)

The author narrates all the available information on the life and death of infantry replacement Private Eddie Slovik who was shot for desertion on January 31, 1945. Mr. Huie seems primarily

concerned with the problem of individual morale in facing up to the duties and sacrifices required by the United States in facing its enemies which is brought out in his description of this tragedy. It is recommended reading for all military historians.

GELBER, LIONEL: *The American Anarchy*; Democracy in an era of Bigness. (New York: Henry Schuman, Inc., 1953. Pp. 212. \$3.50.)

The Canadian born author, who has lived in New York since 1946, critically discusses the loss to democratic principles coincident with the growth of a large scale economy here.

MOSHER, FREDERICK C.: *Program Budgeting*, theory and practice, with particular reference to the U. S. Department of the Army. (Chicago: Public Administration Clearing House, 1954. Pp. 258. \$5.00.)

This authoritative monograph by the associate professor of Political science at Syracuse University merges the two areas of inquiry of public budgeting and military administration. It includes introductions by Major General W. O. Reeder, USA, ret'd, and Dean Paul Appleby of Syracuse University. The chapters are: the Study of Budgeting, the Setting of Military Budgeting, Plans, Programs and Budgets, Military Performance Budgeting, the Budget Process, Military Comptrollers and the Budget and Conclusions. There are excellent charts, chapter footnotes, but no bibliography similar to that prepared for the George Washington University course on this subject with a Navy usage slant. This volume is a must for anyone interested in the "budget process."

NEAVE, LT. COL. AIREY, British Army: *They Have Their Exits*. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1953. Pp. 275. \$4.00.)

The exciting World War II experiences of this distinguished young British officer are well told in this volume. His most notable adventures were as the first man to escape from the notorious "Escape Proof" Colditz prison in 1942, and later in rescuing Allied personnel stranded behind enemy lines for which services he has been decorated.

RODICK, BURLEIGH C.: *American Constitutional Custom*, a forgotten factor in the founding. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. Pp. 244. \$4.75.)

A scholarly exploration into the purely American backgrounds of our constitutional thinking. Only about half the volume is text; the rest is notes and bibliography. The author's brief comparison of the military problems of Cromwell and of Washington (pp. 47-53) are worth examination by the military historian.

SAPIN, BURTON M. and SNYDER, RICHARD C.: *The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy*. (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1954. Pp. 84. 95c.)

This is the most important volume to military historians of the new Doubleday short studies in political science series whose consulting editor is Richard C. Snyder, Associate Professor of Politics, Princeton University.

The five major areas discussed in this volume are the expanded role of the military, military organization for foreign policy making, military participation in foreign policy making, the problem of an appropriate role for the military and necessary, effective and limited military participation, with conclusions. Sixty-four footnotes and 2 pages of bibliographic notes completes the study. It is highly recommended for its purposes in providing a scholarly up-to-date summary suitable for text use.

STEWART, GEORGE: *These Men My Friends*. (Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1954. Pp. 400. \$6.00.)

This American author became a Presbyterian minister after his World War I service in which he rose from private to battalion commander. His experiences with the British Army and Royal Air Force personnel over all the world during World War II are recounted in short vignettes. As an official interpreter of the American scene to many units his opportunities to meet people was unparalleled.

THOMPSON, LAURENCE: *A Tune to Laugh*. (New York: Julian Messner, 1954. Pp. 191. \$3.50.)

The author, who served with the British Army Sudan service corps during the North African campaigns humorously narrates the trials and tribulations of the incompetent son of an African chief during his military service with the Buna service corps and his final return to his village. Although somewhat confusing for the American reader because of its British Army slang, it makes for an enjoyable evening's reading.

BOURNE, PETER: *Twilight of the Dragon*. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1954. Pp. 371. \$3.95.)

This very readable novel describes the Boxer rebellion and the siege of the foreign legations in Peking during 1900. In the development of his plot involving two Chinese and two Anglo-Saxon lovers we are able to watch developments from the perspective inside the Forbidden city of the Dowager Empress and from that of the legations. It is well worth reading as a good story, but is especially important for the historian since it evokes for the general reader the feeling of those times in the recent past in which anti-foreign elements were strong in China. It thus also expands our understanding of contemporary problems facing America in the Far East.

CROCKETT, LUCY H.: *The Magnificent Bastards*. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1954. Pp. 296. \$3.50.)

A novel of the Marines and Red Cross women in the Pacific in World War II by an author who spent five years in the Red Cross service in the area about which she writes. The period is 1943-1944 and the principle characters are the Married Colonel Colin Black and the Widow Lee Ashley, the Marine Eddy Dubinsky and "Mom" Rosie McClavock.

VAN DORP, JAN: *The Sable Lion*, translated by Clarissa S. Cooper. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1954. Pp. 314. \$3.50.)

Justifiably a European best seller, this very readable historical novel dramatically describes the life of the De Boer family of Flemish corsairs in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The last section deals with exploration in India. Highly recommended as enjoyable reading the publishers will not have to make good their money back guarantee going with this book.

RYAN, DAN: *The Devil's Brigadier*. (New York: Coward McCann, 1954. Pp. 312. \$3.50.)

This novel is based on the lives of the notorious Harpe brothers, who are here named Heath, and who terrorized and killed the members of the Loyalist-hating Regulator group who slew their father just after the American Revolution. The story moves from North Carolina to the Mississippi, but has little to interest the military historian other than being a fair story.

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MARUYAMA, MICHIO: *Anatahan*; tr. from the Japanese by Younghill Kang. (New York: Hermitage House, 1954. Pp. 206. \$3.50.)

MASTERS, DAVID: *Epics of Salvage*; wartime feats of the marine salvage men in World War II. (Boston; Little, Brown, 1952. Pp. 244. \$3.50.)

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

COMMENTS ON "GENERAL EMORY UPTON— THE ARMY'S MAHAN"*

In the Fall 1953 issue, Dr. Richard C. Brown in an excellent and helpful documented article, compares the effect of the writings of General Emory Upton on the modern American Army with those of Mahan on the modern American Navy. He calls Upton, "The Army's Mahan." Actually Upton was a precursor of Mahan and, through the great Stephen B. Luce, indirectly responsible for Mahan's work.

Admiral Luce, founder of the Naval War College, asked Mahan in 1885 to lecture at the new College. Mahan accepted but it was more than a year before he arrived, a year spent in intensive preparation. Four years later the first of his Sea Power series was published. Mahan had difficulty in finding a publisher and Luce also gave him aid in this.

The connection of Emory Upton with the Naval War College and his indirect influence on Mahan is disclosed in a letter which Luce wrote to William C. Church, editor of the *Army and Navy Journal*, in 1882 asking his help in getting the College started. "I used to talk to my old and lamented friend Genl. Upton about it a great deal," Luce wrote to Church. "He was enthusiastic and urged me to make a move in regard to it."

From 1875 to the time of Upton's death in 1881, Luce commanded first the *Hartford*, flagship of the North Atlantic Squadron, and later, as a Commodore, the Training Squadron with his broad pennant in the *Minnesota*. During much of this period these ships op-

erated from Hampton Roads and as Upton was at Fortress Monroe, these kindred spirits were able to discuss together the professional betterment of their respective services.

The establishment of the system of advanced military education which Upton advocated had to await the Secretaryship of Elihu Root and so the Naval War College predated its sister institution by almost twenty years. But the influence of Upton through Luce and Mahan had its effect. Luce's contacts with Upton and with General William T. Sherman during the Civil War had convinced him that there should be an Army officer on the faculty of the Naval War College. Fortunately First Lieutenant Tasker H. Bliss was so detailed and he served for several years at the College. He arrived before Mahan and for a time was the only permanent member of the faculty besides Luce, for the powers that were in the Navy Department gave the new institution a chilly reception. Bliss went on to a brilliant career. Following duty at the Naval War College he studied the military educational systems of Europe and later was first President of the Army War College.

Recently there has been a revival of interest in Mahan, his writings and the unchanging principles he expounded. A similar interest in Upton's great work is overdue. Let us hope that Dr. Brown has started something.

MILITARY LIBRARIANS DINNER

The Washington, D. C. Chapter of *The Military Librarians Group*, affiliated with the Special Libraries Association, enjoyed a very successful dinner meeting at the swank Kennedy-Warren in the National Capital,

*Contributed by Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, President, American Military Institute. See *Military Affairs*, XVII, 3, pp. 125-131.

Wednesday evening, 16 June 1954. The highlight of the evening was the address of the guest speaker, Bruce Catton (*Stillness at Appomatox*), the winner of the 1954 Pulitzer Prize for History. Mr. Catton spoke feelingly of a favorite topic, "Billy Yank" and The Army of the Potomac." A short business meeting concluded the evening.

JOINT AHA-AMI MEETING

This year's Joint Meeting of the American Historical Association and the American Military Institute will be held as usual, at the end of December, at the AHA Convention in New York City. Details of date and meeting place are not available at this time. The Institute, however, will present three participants who will present papers on the topic of "The Role of Air Power in Recent History." The following three papers are scheduled: "The Impact of Air Power on the International Scene 1933 to 1940," by Dr. Herbert S. Dinerstein, Rand Corporation; "The Impact of Air Power on the Second World War and the Cold War to the Korean Armistice," by Brig. Gen. Dale O. Smith, USAF; and "Soviet Attitudes toward Modern Air Power," by Dr. Raymond L. Garthoff, Rand Corporation. Dr. Stefan T. Possony will act as moderator.

LORD ALEXANDER ON STRATEGY

Field Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis, British Minister of Defense, while in British Colombia during the past summer stated his views on the current strategic posture of the West: first, early war is unlikely provided there is a reasonable unity of effort amongst the Allies; second, defense policy and armament programs must be designed for the "long haul," as the period of international tension called the "cold War" will continue for a long time; third, the primary aim of the West must be to help S.E. Asian countries maintain their internal security and national

independence; fourth, the West must continue to develop atomic deterrents; fifth, if hot war should come it will open with an intense phase of several weeks in which both sides use atom bombs; sixth, if this phase is not decisive there will follow an intermittent struggle during which both sides will rebuild their fighting strength to carry the struggle to final conclusions on a global scale; seventh, every effort must be made to build-up deterrents so strong as to avoid the ultimate phase. Lord Alexander went on to say that $\frac{1}{3}$ of Britain's gross national product is now devoted to defense, and she is maintaining close to a million men under arms.

NECROLOGY

EDWARD MEAD EARLE
1894-1954

Before most U.S. citizens, Edward Mead Earle understood that in an era of total wars, military affairs are a concern of us all. His distinction lies in the ways in which he as a scholar, teacher, and consultant brought this to public attention. As a citizen of conviction, he urged the strengthening of U.S. defenses before World War II. During the war itself, first with O.S.S., then as Special Consultant with the Air Force, he put his own knowledge to the service of the nation. He participated at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and helped draw up the German Surrender terms. He was a man much honored. He received the Medal of Merit (1946) and was made a Chevalier of the Legion of Honor. He was given honorary degrees by Princeton, Colgate, Union and just before his death on June 24, 1954 by his alma mater, Columbia University. The many articles he wrote, and the books he edited, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, *Modern France*, etc., remain as a measure of the breadth of view. However, as is true of all great teachers, his influence over the long run will be measured less in terms

of his influence on policies than on people. Through his seminars at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, where he was Professor of History from 1934, as guest lecturer at Yale, Princeton, Harvard, Oxford and at military colleges both here and abroad, he gave those of us who listened a broader concept of the implications of defense policy. No man contributed more to establishing a sense of responsibility among historians, political scientists and citizens to come to grips with the problems, political, material, and spiritual, which military policy always has and always will raise for society. Indeed, because the work of so many has so much of his thought and enthusiasm in it, it is simple truth to say that his life work is only beginning.*

GENERAL FRANK R. MCCOY

A distinguished former trustee of the American Military Institute, Major General Frank R. McCoy died at Walter Reed Hospital, Washington, D. C. 3 June 1954. His death at the age of 79 followed a long illness. A native of Lewistown, Pa., General McCoy graduated from West Point in 1897, served in Cuba and the Philippines, and in 1906 was military aide to President Theodore Roosevelt. He saw action again in 1916 on the Mexican border, and became director general of transportation in France in 1918. Following the war General McCoy was given various administrative and diplomatic assignments: Bureau of Insular Affairs, 1925; director of elections in Nicaragua, 1927; chairman of the Bolivian-Paraguayan Border Commission, 1928; duty with the League of Nations in the Manchurian Inquiry, 1932; various high military commands, 1935-38; and retirement 31 October 1938. General McCoy was very much interested in the Institute's work and lectured at meetings after

his retirement. His historical researches led him to the conviction that the genesis of the American Revolution lay in the untoward relations developed between the officers of the Royal American Regiment and British Regulars during the expedition to and the siege of Havana in the French-Indian War.

CAPTAIN RUSSELL GRENFELL, R.N.

Naval and military history also suffered a great loss with the recent death on July 8th, 1954 in Salisbury, England of Captain Russell Grenfell, Royal Navy. Captain Grenfell retired from active service in 1937 to devote himself to writing. He was author of *Nelson The Sailor*, *Sea Power*, *The Bismarck Episode*, *Main Fleet to Singapore* and the recent controversial *Unconditional Hatred*.

Russell Grenfell was a poignant and forceful writer who did not spare his literary punches. The *Bismarck Episode* is perhaps his greatest work although his *Main Fleet to Singapore* gives a crystal clear picture of the twilight of British sea power. In his later work he tended toward revisionist historical writing, perhaps the first of such World War II historians. Churchill was his particular target. His last work, *Unconditional Hatred*, was published in the United States but not in Great Britain.

Russell Grenfell will be missed in that all too small group of professional officers turned historians. With his contemporary and perhaps literary superior, Sir Herbert Richmond, he carried on a long tradition of British officers who write about their profession with a searching and analytical pen. The U. S. military services seem unable to produce such officers and they are badly needed today.

Captain Grenfell will be missed on both sides of the Atlantic. But he will be long known to future scholars.*

*Bv Dr. Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University.

*By Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, USN, Ret.

BILLY YANK AND THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

BY BRUCE CATTON*

SOLDIERS are soldiers, wherever you find them.

It seems likely that if one could somehow get an enlisted-man's-eye-view of life in Caesar's Legions, one would find that except for minor differences in weapons, uniforms, drill and G-I slang, the men involved would look, sound and act very much like the soldiers we ourselves know today.

The similarity would be remarkable. But there would be certain differences, too, and unless these differences were carefully noted and always borne in mind we would probably come up with a badly distorted picture.

The historian of an army, therefore—the man who tries to describe an army's career, not in terms of military strategy or politics but simply in terms of the enlisted man who had to do the fighting and stand the gaff—has to describe the basic similarities against the background of those differences.

His problem—if his book is to be worth a few hours of any reader's time—is to get into the ranks of his army without forgetting that although his soldiers lived and died very much as soldiers have done in all times and places, they had to meet and endure their unpleasant experiences with the emotional

and intellectual equipment provided by their own particular period in human history.

So the writer has to get acquainted with his soldiers at first hand. He has to find out what they themselves had to say about things when they were saying what they really thought and were not just trying to paint a pretty picture for innocent stay-at-homes. He knows how their battles and campaigns look from a distance; it is up to him to find out how they looked, felt and smelled to the men who were actually involved in them.

In my own case—and I have to talk about my own case, for it is the only one I know anything about—this presented a slight problem, because I proposed to write the story of the Army of the Potomac in our own Civil War, and there are no longer any survivors of that army. There is nobody left to talk to. However those men met the challenge which army life in the 1860's levelled at them, they are all gone. The suffering, the heroism, the boredom, the thousand-and-one little dodges by which uninspired men tried to make military life endurable—all of these are over now, and only the echoes survive.

To get acquainted with these men, I had to hunt up what they themselves had put down on paper.

It was not enough to read what other people had written about them, because writers in that era had a way of coloring their accounts of army life according to what they believed their readers wanted to hear. It certainly was not enough to read what the generals had had to say—and in most cases they had had a good deal to say—because Civil War generals were mostly a jealous and

**Editorial Note:* This paper was presented by Bruce Catton at the dinner meeting of The Military Librarians Group of Washington, D. C., 16 June 1954, G. J. Stansfield, Institute Librarian of the AMI, presiding. Readers will recall that Mr. Catton was formerly president of the Civil War Round Table of the District of Columbia and, with the completion of his notable trilogy on the Army of the Potomac (*A Stillness at Appomattox*, *Glory Road*, and *Mr. Lincoln's Army*), he received the Pulitzer Prize of 1954. Mr. Catton is the new editor of the enlarged *American Heritage*.

self-centered lot, each one anxious to show that his own command endured more and accomplished more than any other command. When they took pen in hand these generals usually managed to put themselves in a very good light, but they did not often tell a great deal about the state of mind of the men they commanded—if, indeed, they ever knew very much about it to begin with.

Fortunately, the soldiers themselves had had a good deal to say, too, and it was only necessary to find it and read it.

Most Civil War regiments were recruited locally. The typical regiment would be composed of men from one town or city, or from one county, or in any case from a particular section of one state. That meant that after the war most of the veterans were within easy reach of one another. Eventually, in a great many cases, they would form regimental associations, which would meet once or twice a year for a banquet, for speeches and for a general exchange of reminiscences.

The Civil War soldier usually identified himself first of all with his regiment. In most cases his brigade and his division got only a little of his loyalty. He thought of himself first as a member of such-and-such a regiment, and secondarily he was apt to think of the army corps to which his regiment was attached. If he took pride in his service—as all good soldiers did—he thought of it in terms of his own particular regiment: the 5th New Hampshire or 8th Ohio or 24th Michigan, or what-not.

So as the peace-time years passed, and the veterans began to realize that even old soldiers do not go on living forever, most of these regimental associations decided that there ought to be a formal printed history of the regiment. Along in the eighties and nineties, then, these associations began to appoint committees or individuals to see to it that such histories were written and published. And there are today, on the shelves of the

Library of Congress, hundreds upon hundreds of regimental histories, quietly gathering dust in the hushed twilight of the stacks.

Now it must be said that in the great majority of cases, these regimental histories are very poor books indeed. Most of them were privately printed, by subscription. The regimental history that got regular commercial publication and distribution was very exceptional. As histories, these books are all but worthless, partly because their authors had no training either as historians or as writers, and partly because, spurred by an intense pride in the regiment—which the passage of time tended to increase rather than diminish—they were forever trying to show that *our regiment* was chiefly responsible for winning the war. (I can remember one such book which described Pickett's charge at Gettysburg simply as an assault by the Rebel army on "our regiment's position.") A history of the Civil War, or of any campaign in that war, which relied solely on the regimental histories would be a very odd work indeed.

And yet in their own way these regimental histories are invaluable. For most of the authors did their best to get diaries, letters and the like which had been written by soldiers during the war. They recalled homely little incidents of camp and field life. They discussed such things as rations, army hospitals, the arts of the forager, stragglers and bounty men, and the foibles of certain generals, with the kind of unvarnished frankness that carries conviction. They preserved innumerable anecdotes: stories, very often, which may or may not actually have happened, but whose very existence as anecdotes tells a great deal about the state of mind of the men who told them.

Along with these histories, of course, there is a great mass of similar material which never did find its way into print—the manuscript letters and diaries preserved in grand-

father's trunk up in the attic, or deposited with some library or historical collection. A surprising number of veterans' descendants seem to have taken the trouble to have these faded old papers typed and put in order; and my experience has been that these folks are extremely generous about letting one borrow the manuscripts and quote from them.

Thus there exist these two ways in which one can, so to speak, get at the veterans of the Army of the Potomac; the regimental histories, and the original manuscripts preserved by individuals and by libraries. If you read enough of these, you do finally make the soldiers' acquaintance. As you do, you are apt to be struck by the two oddly-conflicting points I mentioned earlier—the fact that the GI of the Army of the Potomac is the unmistakable blood brother of the GI of today, and the fact that at the same time the two were in some ways very different.

The difference comes mostly from the fact that this was a very unsophisticated country in the 1860's. The recruits then were innocent, in the original meaning of the word: There was a tremendous lot about war and about life in general that they simply did not know, and nothing in their former experience had prepared them for it.

A patriotic high school youngster may, today, lie about his age in order to enlist when the country goes to war, but he will simply swear that he is 18 instead of 16 and think no more of it. You could not conceivably find today what was commonplace in 1861—underage lads going to the trouble of writing the figure "18" on a slip of paper and putting the slip in a shoe so that they could stand before the recruiting officer and in all truthfulness assert: "I am over 18."

They went off to war, those volunteers, with a wide-eyed enthusiasm that seems almost incomprehensible today. Neither the country nor the country's young men knew what they were getting into. They did learn,

in time, to be sure: but in 1861 and to some extent in 1862 men enlisted in the spirit of young bloods who set out on a carefree lark.

Indeed, for a little while it *was* a lark.

I think, for instance, that it would have been very fine to have been a member of the Pennsylvania Bucktails during the first two weeks of that regiment's existence. It was recruited in the northwestern part of the state. When it left for Harrisburg, it simply built rafts and floated down the Susquehanna river, camping on the shore at night, taking a week or more for the trip, and clearly having a marvellous time.

Not all regiments were that fortunate, to be sure. But they got off to a free and easy start, almost without exception. Quite typical is the remark of the historian of a Massachusetts regiment, describing his outfit's first weeks in camp: "Our drill, as I remember it, consisted of running around the old town hall in West Newbury, yelling like devils and firing at an imaginary foe." A survivor of the early days in an Illinois regiment speaks of his time in camp as "an awful lazy life," and a recruit's letter home at that time remarks on how good it is "to be where a fellow can lay around loose with sleeves up, collar open, hair unkempt, face unwashed and everything un-everything. It beats clerking ever so much!" A New York soldier recalls how one of his mates, feeling that company drill had gone on quite long enough, broke it up by calling out to his captain: "Say, Tom, let's quit this darn foolin' around and go over to the sutler's!"

Now it is quite obvious that an army with beginnings like that was going to grow up with something in its subconscious that no present-day army ever has. It is equally obvious that the soldiers who have enlisted in such an army are little more unsophisticated than is their government itself.

For a distinguishing mark of the Civil War armies was the high degree of infor-

mality that attended their early days. Almost without exception, at the very start, company officers were elected by the men. There were a few regiments, as a matter of fact, that were organized precisely like clubs: If a recruit tried to enlist he would not be accepted until his prospective company had voted on his candidacy. Many of the early regiments were mustered in without any physical examinations whatever—except that an officer would walk along the line, looking at the men to make sure no outright cripples got in.

On paper, regular army discipline was supposed to prevail in those regiments; in actual fact, during the first couple of years of the war, the discipline in most regiments was, by modern standards, extremely lax, particularly in the western regiments. There was a general feeling in those early days that volunteer soldiers ought not to be subjected to exact discipline. The historian of an Illinois regiment candidly remarks:

"While all the men who enlisted pledged themselves to obey all the commands of their superior officers, and of course ought to have kept their word, yet it was hardly wise on the part of the officers in the volunteer service to demand absolute obedience in such service, and later on it was abandoned."

The Civil War armies had no cooks' and bakers' schools, nor did they at any time actually enlist men as cooks. In most of the camps where recruits were assembled to await completion of their regiments, meals were provided by contract—that is, civilians would undertake to provide hot meals, at so much a head, paid by the government. Just incidentally, an Iowa veteran recalled that the meals his outfit got in that way consisted principally of fresh beef (usually boiled) and white bread; and he remarked that this rich diet made many of the men ill—they came from the frontier and at home never saw either fresh meat or soft bread!

In any case, once a regiment was mustered into service it had to improvise its own cooking arrangements. Usually, two men were detailed as cooks in each company. Only very rarely were the men thus chosen men who knew anything about cooking; they were just soldiers who had been assigned to an unpleasant, unfamiliar job.

One New England soldier wrote indignantly that if a man was too stupid to learn the drill and too dirty to appear at inspection his company commander would invariably make a cook out of him. That complaint bears all the earmarks of being a standard army gag of 1862: but consider how much the army must have suffered from atrocious cookery, to give such a canard currency!

When the army was on the march every soldier did his own cooking. Marching rations usually consisted of salt pork, hardtack, and coffee. Often enough, the salt pork was eaten raw: The veterans recalled that it tasted just about as good that way, and was a lot less trouble. One delicacy consisted of a hardtack, soaked in water and then fried in pork fat. When one reflects on the nature of a steady diet of salt pork, hardtack, and coffee, one finds it a little easier to understand why the Union soldier was such a pilferer of hen roosts and vegetable gardens.

As a general thing, there was less of this foraging and looting in the Army of the Potomac than in the western armies; the Army of the Potomac was on the whole better disciplined than the westerners, and its commanders made more of an effort to restrain the men. Yet its company and regimental officers seem to have aided and abetted the foragers most of the time. It is common to read of a colonel telling his regiment, with mock sternness: "I don't want to see anyone in this regiment stealing any of the fine sheep I see on that hillside over there." Having given this tip, the colonel

would not infrequently go into his tent and tie the flaps behind him so that he would be sure *not* to witness any thievery.

Now of course the general looseness and informality of army routine did not actually mean that the gay lark of the first few weeks continued right on through. In the long run the enlisted man paid heavily for his amateur status—paid in physical discomfort and, in far too many cases, in death itself.

Officers who neither knew how to enforce discipline nor understood how to run a military camp simply could not keep their men healthy. Army camps were poorly policed. Even the most elementary sanitary precautions were ignored—until time taught its lessons, or until some regular army officer was able to make his presence felt. Perhaps the commonest complaint in the soldiers' memoirs is that army camps all stank to the high heavens. As often as not there was no system for the disposal of garbage. Even the establishment of proper camp latrines was often overlooked. Drainage was not understood, and any rain was apt to flood all of the tents—with double pneumonia for a certain percentage of the men who got flooded.

On top of all this, medical science was sadly imperfect. Men who lived on fat pork and hard bread suffered fearfully from digestive complaints. No one knew about the importance of having a supply of uncontaminated water. All anyone asked was that it be not too muddy. Winter quarters usually consisted of pits in the ground roofed with canvas. Not until Joe Hooker took charge of the Army of the Potomac did anyone bother to have these squalid pens and their bedding properly aired at regular intervals. Hospital tents in winter were likely to be unheated. The hospital attendants were apt to be the worst loafers in the regiment, detailed to look after the sick because their colonels wanted to get rid of them.

As a result, disease took a far greater toll of the men than Confederate bullets. Of some 350,000 Union soldiers who died during the war, only about one-third were lost by enemy action. The rest died of disease, most of which should have been prevented. In addition, thousands were sent out of the service on medical discharges. Every regiment in the army was subject to a steady, remorseless attrition regardless of whether or not the regiment was fighting.

For example: Between November 1, 1862, and June 1, 1863, the 15th Massachusetts Infantry lost 437 men. During those seven months the regiment was in only one battle—Fredericksburg—in which its losses were comparatively light, 31 men. But 275 men were discharged for physical disability. A few were lost by promotion or transfer to other units, and a handful deserted. The rest died in hospital.

Anyone who studies the condition under which the average Civil War soldier had to exist is bound to marvel that any of the men survived at all. Just being in the army was very dangerous. That soldiers could endure that routine, could maintain their morale under it, and could go through such terrible battles as Gettysburg and The Wilderness and acquit themselves heroically, is a matter for never-ending wonder.

Indeed, morale in the Army of the Potomac was surprisingly good. For one thing, there was a solid comradeship among the veterans. Perhaps the fact that most of the men had known one another before the war, and knew that they would be back in the same neighborhood after the war, was a help. Another incentive to morale was the pride men took in their regiment's combat records. The regimental flag, bearing the names of the regiment's battles, always went into action beside the United States flag.

The color bearers had the most dangerous

jobs of all, since enemy fire was always concentrated on the flags. It is not uncommon to read of battles in which a regiment would lose five or six color bearers in rapid succession. Yet there was rarely any difficulty about finding men willing to carry a flag.

In one New England regiment, in The Wilderness, the color bearer was shot down, and the colonel beckoned to a corporal and told him to carry the flag. The corporal demurred.

"Not me," he said. "Too many corporals have been killed already carrying the flag."

"All right," said the colonel, "I promote you to sergeant, right here and now."

"That's business," said the promoted non-com. "I'll carry the flag."

The hardest strain on the morale of the Army of the Potomac veterans undoubtedly came in the late winter and early spring of 1864, when hordes of men scooped up by the bounty system began to come into camp.

The bounty system was perhaps the queerest feature of the whole Civil War military system. When enlistments slowed down the government offered cash bounties. States, cities, and counties added their own bounties. By 1864, in many parts of the North, a man could get as much as a thousand dollars in cash just for joining the army.

The inevitable result was that a disgraceful racket came into being. Bounty brokers, so-called, set up in business—agents who would round up drifters, tramps, ne'er-do-wells of any description, get them to sign away their bounty rights for a small amount of cash in hand, and ship them off to the army. The worst criminals in the land took to enlisting, collecting their bounty, deserting, going to some other place and re-enlisting under another name, deserting again—and so on, as long as they could get away with it. Since the army never worked out a good system for catching deserters they could usually get away with it about as long as they wanted

to. Some men deserted a dozen times in the course of a few months.

General Grant remarked, in the summer of 1864, that not one in eight of the high-bounty men ever did any useful service at the front. If, in spite of himself, the bounty-jumper did get shoved into battle, he would usually surrender to the enemy at the first opportunity. Veterans repeatedly wrote that a regiment which was trying to digest two or three hundred bounty men would actually be weaker, in combat, than it would have been if it had had no reinforcements at all. The utter unreliability of the bounty men pulled down the effectiveness of the veterans.

Taking all of this into consideration, one is compelled to admit that one of the most remarkable things in American military history is the magnificent combat record which the Army of the Potomac did finally make in the terrible campaign of 1864.

Every regiment was far under strength. It seems as if everything that could be done to make the men sick of their jobs was done, systematically and repeatedly. When reinforcements came in they consisted largely of stragglers and rogues who did more harm than good. The veterans who had three years of combat behind them had to do all of the fighting, and they knew in advance that they were going to have to do it. How they were able to do the desperate fighting which came their way, once Grant led them across the Rapidan and into the hideous tangle of The Wilderness, is beyond comprehension.

And the most amazing fact of all about the three-year veterans who bore the brunt of that 1864 campaign is the fact that they went into it as volunteers—veteran volunteers, in the proud lingo of that army.

In the spring of 1864 the term of enlistment of the three-year veteran was expiring. Under the law, the government could not compel these men to remain in service. The

draft could not touch them. Back home there were many thousands of able-bodied men who had slipped through the loose meshes of the draft, and the veterans were very well aware of it. If the veterans demanded their own release, as they were legally and morally entitled to do, then perhaps those stay-at-homes might be forced into the army; otherwise, they would probably continue to go scot-free.

And in the spring of 1864, just when the veterans had most reason to be fed up with the war—just when the influx of bounty-jumpers and hired substitutes was most likely to persuade the veterans that patriotism was for suckers, and that it was up to a smart man to look out for himself—precisely at that moment, the government had to go to the three-year men, hat in hand, and beg them to re-enlist for three years more.

I know of few facts in American history more remarkable, or encouraging, than the fact that approximately half of the veterans who were entitled to their discharge—close to 30 thousand men, in all—voluntarily signed up for the coming campaign and refused to accept the ticket home that they were so abundantly entitled to take.

There is an indomitable quality to men like that that goes beyond praise.

And, in the end, it is that indomitable quality possessed by the Army of the Potomac that makes the story of the army worth re-telling. There is something magnificent—magnificent beyond words—somewhere in the makeup of the ordinary American. The fidelity, endurance, and simple, uncomplaining bravery which those soldiers had and kept are qualities we cannot analyze or explain. They were just there. Because they were there, we are still one country.

To my mind the most significant of all the stories about the Army of the Potomac is one which is told about events on the night of May 7, 1864. The army had just finished a

two-day fight in The Wilderness—in some ways the worst fight it had ever had, a battle in a smoky jungle where men fought blind, without even seeing their enemies, and where hundreds of helpless wounded men were burned to death in a forest fire. As far as the ordinary soldier could see, the army had taken a bad licking. Certainly the battle had been as much of a defeat as the disastrous battle of Chancellorsville, fought a year earlier on almost the same ground. By logic and by past performance, the army would now retreat across the Rapidan. It would spend a month resting and reorganizing, it would then start a new campaign—and the war would go on and on, with no end in sight.

On the night of May 7 the men were pulled out of their trenches and put on the road. The head of the column came, at last, to a fork in the road. One fork would lead back north, to rest and safety; the other fork went south, to more fighting.

The army took the southern fork; and as it did so, General Grant himself, a stooped and uninspiring figure, came trotting along with his staff, going to the head of the column. The tired, beaten men saw him in the dusk, saw that they were taking the turn in the road that would lead to more fighting, more hardship, more killing—and suddenly they broke the silence of the night with a wild, exultant cheer.

Most of them were not going to survive the campaign which that turn made inevitable, and they knew it perfectly well. But they knew, too, that that turn was ultimately the road to victory. And so they cheered, and followed that road, and most of them were shot.

And even at this date, ninety years afterward, it is hard to hear the echo of that quivering cheer in the night without taking off one's hat to the heroic, nameless, bone-weary soldiers who raised it. Beyond any question, they were very great men.

NAVY POLICY TOWARD THE LABOR RELATIONS OF ITS WAR CONTRACTORS*

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PART I

THE Navy traditionally has been reluctant to intervene in the labor relations of its contracting firms; and to take the drastic step of seizing and operating the property of a contractor has been particularly distasteful, both to the civilian Secretaries and to the naval personnel assigned. Such a duty, taken only as a last resort and upon the express orders of the President, has been thought of as comparable to butting in on a family quarrel, pistol in hand.

Yet the necessity for a prompt and uninterrupted flow of military supplies is so great in time of war that the Government cannot be expected—and especially its military agencies—to sit idly by when production of vital ships, planes and ordnance is halted by a dispute between labor and management, or halted, for that matter, by any other cause.

In peacetime, the Navy can cancel a contract, where deliveries are insufficient, or not according to specification, and can place its order elsewhere; but in wartime, this remedy is not available. There are no alternative contractors looking eagerly for government orders. It is a sellers' and not a buyers' market. The Navy's remedy for failure of procurement in midst of war is not to cancel contracts, but to exploit existing ones more efficiently.

This means that the usual procedures of inspection must be supplemented by the post-

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ing of a separate watch over the delicate and explosive labor situation of contracting firms. In two World Wars, the Navy held back from this task as long as possible. In both, it saw the Army take the lead in setting up labor-relations sections designed to warn of impending trouble. In both, it finally set up its own labor sections, with excellent results that exceeded the most optimistic expectations.

WORLD WAR I

At the outbreak of World War I, the importance of employer-employee relations was underestimated generally. There was insufficient appreciation of the unusual pressures to which the industrial worker is subject in war-time: (a) rising costs of living; (b) unfamiliarity with war jobs, lack of adequate housing, lack of transportation and schools, and other problems incident to the moving of workers and their families into new areas and occupations; (c) tensions created by longer hours of work, and by night and Sunday work; and (d) the cajolery and promises of union leaders seeking to expand their organizations during the war boom.

An outbreak of strikes soon brought these facts home to the military authorities charged with housing, clothing, and arming both a vast new army and the personnel for an expanding fleet. Secretary of War Baker entered into an agreement with Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor. The paper was written shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War as the introduction to a proposed history of Navy Department seizure and operation of industrial properties in war-time (now semi-completed and filed in the Division of Naval History (Op-29), Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D. C.)

of Labor, on June 10, 1917, for the setting up of a bipartite agency¹ to adjust disputes in the construction of Army barracks—the Cantonment Adjustment Commission. This was “the first time in our history that the United States Government entered into an agreement with labor unions.”²

The agreement proved so successful that two months later, on August 17, 1917, Secretary of the Navy Daniels made a similar agreement with Mr. Gompers extending the jurisdiction of the Cantonment Adjustment Commission to cover all work of construction by private contractors for the Navy.³ By the terms of this agreement, strikes were outlawed, and all disputes were to be referred to the Commission for final settlement. The Commission was to adopt the wage scales agreed to by the building unions and the contractors’ associations in each area. Its jurisdiction later was further extended to cover most other building work for the Army, and its name was changed to the Emergency Construction Wage Commission.

The composition of the Commission was somewhat curious, and worthy of note, for it consisted of one member representing the “public,” one representing labor, and one rep-

resenting the procurement agencies, but none representing the employers. The lack of employer representation was offset, however, by three circumstances: first, the Commission’s custom of adopting the wage scales that were agreed to by the contractors and unions in each area; second, the contracts were arranged on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis; and third, the contracts also included a clause by which the employers agreed, in event of a dispute with the unions, to notify the Government and to accept the instructions of its representative in relation thereto.⁴

Any disputes, therefore, were referred either to District Examiners, employed by the Commission, or to the Commission itself, and the decision made ultimately by Army representatives. This was so because the Examiners were usually Army officers, and the Commission comprised two appointees of the Secretary of War—a civilian representing the “public” and an Army officer representing procurement—and only one appointee of Mr. Gompers. There is no evidence that the Navy was represented other than indirectly through the War Department’s appointments, although in the Hampton Roads District, Rear Admiral F. R. Harris, USN, was chairman of a District Board of Control which assisted the Examiner and sought to coordinate the numerous Government agencies competing for scarce labor in that area.⁵

The method of voluntary arbitration by industry commissions appealed so strongly to the Navy that it took part in setting up another bipartite labor agency, the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board, on August 20, 1917. Assistant Secretary Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the agreement which constituted this Board to adjust disputes in all private shipyards engaged on contracts for the Navy, the Shipping Board, or the Emergency Fleet

¹The term “bipartite” is used in this paper for adjustment boards, representing government and unions only, even where the government’s representation is subdivided. The term “tripartite” is reserved for adjustment boards representing employers, unions, and government.

²A history of the Cantonment Adjustment Commission will be found in Alexander M. Bing, *War-Time Strikes and Their Adjustment*, Dutton, 1921, pages 14-19, 297-298. A short description will be found in National Archives, *Handbook of Federal World War Agencies and Their Records, 1917-1921*, Government Printing Office, 1943, page 57. Labor’s view of its “collective agreements” with the Government will be found in Samuel Gompers, *Seventy Years of Life and Labor*, *An Autobiography*, Dutton 1925, Vol. II, pages 373-374.

³This is based upon a brief synopsis of Navy labor relations during World War I, in Bureau of Industrial Research, *How the Government Handled Its Labor Problems During the War: Handbook of the Organizations Associated with the National Labor Administration*, Washington, 1919 (48 pages), page 30. See also Bing, *op. cit.*, pages 16, 18; and Gompers, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, page 374.

⁴Bing, *op. cit.*, pages 314-316; includes sample of labor clause.

⁵*Ibid.*, page 18, note.

Corporation.⁶ Other signers were top officials of the Shipping Board, the Emergency Fleet Corporation, the American Federation of Labor, and all of the relevant unions except the carpenters. There were three members of the Board, one representing the public, one labor, and one procurement. In this case the public representative, V. Everit Macy, was named by President Wilson, and the labor representative, as before, by Mr. Gompers. The procurement representative was chosen first by the Emergency Fleet Corporation, with the Navy entitled to special representation when its interests were involved, but under a revision of the agreement on December 8, 1917, he was selected by the Navy and the Emergency Fleet Corporation jointly. Louis A. Coolidge and Leon C. Marshall served successively as joint representative.⁷

Before the Board had made a single award, it was confronted with a challenge to the finality of its decisions. Top officials of the Shipping Board and the Emergency Fleet Corporation refused to be bound by the Board's decisions in reimbursing their contractors. Although these officials had signed the agreement of August 20, they contended that they could not delegate to another board their responsibility for the cost of ships. The Navy, however, accepted the Board's authority as final from the first, as did the A. F. of L. The issue therefore was taken to President Wilson, who decided that the

Board's awards were to be final and not subject to review by any of the parties signatory to the agreement.⁸

Thereafter, the Board proceeded to issue awards for the various sections of the country. Compliance by the workers followed until the armistice, except for the carpenters. Compliance by the Government proved to be a little uncertain, due to the novelty of collective bargaining procedures to established Federal agencies, especially the Navy. At one point, the Navy refused to make any retroactive payments on the ground this would be double payment for work already fully compensated. There were complaints also that the Navy was slow in giving assurance of reimbursement to yard owners when asked about specific changes. But compliance by the employers proved to be the most uncertain of all. They were not represented on the Board, and often regarded its decisions as impractical. While some of the older firms, having lump-sum contracts, tended to underpay or underclassify their workers to keep down costs, the newer firms, having mostly cost-plus contracts, tended to overpay to attract workers from other firms or vocations.⁹ In view of these difficulties of enforcement, it is remarkable that labor showed such restraint right up to the armistice.

Thus by the end of August, 1917, the Navy had intervened in the labor relations of its contractors to the extent of signing two agreements with the unions involved, and participating in a bipartite system of voluntary arbitration and wage stabilization in the fields of shipbuilding and general construction—a system, incidentally, that was run jointly by the unions and the government. Clearly, the success of the system in curing strikes and in reducing wage disparities depended, in part, on the acceptance of the unions as full partners in the operation.

⁸*Ibid.*, pages 12-13.

⁹*Ibid.*, chaps. 8, 9, 12, espec. pages 68-69.

⁶Bureau of Industrial Research, *op. cit.*, page 30. Bing, *op. cit.*, pages 20-26, 298-299. National Archives, *op. cit.*, page 515. The official history of the Board is given in Willard E. Hotchkiss and Allen R. Seager, *History of the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board, 1917 to 1919*, Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin No. 283, Government Printing Office, 1921; reprinted as House Document No. 1034 (Vol. 83), 66th Congress, 3rd Session. (See especially at this point, page 10.) For text of agreement of August 20, 1917, see Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Monthly Labor Review*, October 1917, pages 26-29. For text of revised agreement of December 8, 1917, see Hotchkiss and Seager, *op. cit.*, Appendix A.

⁷Hotchkiss and Seager, *op. cit.*, pages 11-12, 15, 60.

LABOR SECTION OF BUREAU OF ORDNANCE

Labor relations among the ordnance contractors afforded a sharp contrast with that in the construction trades. Munitions manufacturers frequently discriminated between union and non-union workers in hiring and promotion; many of them would fire any employee who joined a union, despite the Government's publicly expressed opposition to this practice. Strikes were numerous, and were accentuated in bitterness because of the hostility of employer associations to union activity. One authority believes this attitude on the part of munitions manufacturers is the reason no system of arbitration was set up by the Government in this industry.¹⁰

In any case, the War Department took belated action to cope with the situation by setting up an Industrial Service Section in its Ordnance Department in January 1918. A Mediation Branch was constituted the next month, within the Industrial Service Section, for the adjustment of labor disputes.¹¹ Also, early in 1918, the Navy's Bureau of Ordnance ("Bu Ord") created a similar Labor Section in its Industrial Division, charged with keeping in touch with all manufacturing plants and industrial sections where naval ordnance material was being manufactured.¹²

These agencies faced unusual difficulties. They had to rely almost exclusively on the prestige of the War and Navy Departments, and on patriotic appeals, since the manufacturers had resisted inclusion of the labor clause in their contracts, and no boards of arbitration had been set up to which either side had agreed to submit disputes. To be sure, they were able to refer some cases to

the National War Labor Board, after its creation by Presidential proclamation on April 9, 1918, but this Board, having been created by decree, lacked any pledges from either labor or management to abide by its recommendations. The Board was useful, therefore, only when the parties to a particular dispute were willing to accept its award; and since it was established by a proclamation setting up the open shop as one of its "principles," its decisions were not likely to be acceptable to contractors committed by long tradition to an anti-union closed shop.

The Labor Section of Bu Ord, therefore, brought the Navy into its most intimate contact with the labor problems of its contractors. The Bureau assigned to this Section officers "of mature age with more or less legal experience."¹³ Apart from a headquarters staff, they were sent out into the districts to become acquainted with the union and company officials of the ordnance manufacturers. They were able frequently to warn the Navy Department of impending labor disputes, and in many cases, to act as unofficial mediators or to be of assistance in correcting conditions that might have led to interruptions of production. They became the Navy's first specialists in labor-relations problems.

The official history of Bu Ord says:

It is a noteworthy fact that at no industrial plant, where Navy ordnance material was being manufactured, did any strike or walkout last more than 48 hours, and in many cases walkouts were prevented, or the men returned to work almost immediately after walkouts, by the Bureau's representatives after a thorough investigation of conditions, and mutual understanding was established between the contending parties.¹⁴

The Army was about equally successful, but in one case was obliged to take possession of a plant (Smith & Wesson Co., Springfield, Mass.) and to operate it for the duration due to the refusal of management to comply with a "recommendation" of the

¹⁰Bing, *op. cit.*, pages 65-66.

¹¹*Ibid.*, page 66. A good account of Army activities will be found in War Department, Office of the Secretary, *A Report of the Activities of the War Department in the Field of Industrial Relations During the War*, Government Printing Office, 1919.

¹²This and other references to the Labor Section of the Bureau of Ordnance are from the Bureau's *Navy Ordnance Activities, World War, 1917-1918*, Government Printing Office, 1920, pages 241-244.

¹³*Ibid.*, page 241.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, page 242.

National War Labor Board. The Army and Navy ordnance officers worked closely together in cases involving all the plants in a city, and in such situations the Army often bore the brunt of the responsibility. In the Newark dispute, for example, Major B. H. Gitchell, head of the Industrial Service Section, came to Newark with authority from both War and Navy Departments to settle the strike. He did so by issuing what amounted to an arbitration award.¹⁵

The effectiveness of the Labor Section of Bu Ord caused it to be called upon to assist other Bureaus of the Navy; and the general inspector in charge of the Industrial Division, Commander A. L. Norton, USN (Ret.), acted as liaison for the Department with several of the numerous government agencies which sprang up in the last few months of the war. It is noteworthy, however, that the Bu Ord historian comments as follows:

The Labor Section was only well under way upon the signing of the armistice, but from the excellent results obtained during its short period of existence, it is believed that in a few more months its influence would have been much more strongly felt.¹⁶

During the war, Assistant Secretary Roosevelt represented the Navy Department at many conferences dealing with labor problems. One of the most interesting was an interdepartmental conference called by the Council of National Defense on December 13, 1917, to review the labor policies of the procurement agencies. The conference reported back on December 20, criticizing the existing system.¹⁷ Each department, it was reported, was dealing with its own labor problems in its own way, irrespective of what the others did; each department was competing with the others for skilled labor; no ade-

quate system existed for dealing promptly and uniformly on a nationwide basis with disputes affecting war work. Out of this report came a national labor-management conference, summoned by Secretary of Labor Wilson, as a result of which the President on April 9, 1918, created National War Labor Board I.

There is no evidence that either Secretary Daniels or Assistant Secretary Roosevelt appointed any special assistants in labor relations. On the other hand, in the first months of the war Secretary of War Baker appointed Felix Frankfurter as special assistant for labor matters, and shortly thereafter designated Walter Lippmann in a similar capacity. Later still, Stanley King and Ernest M. Hopkins succeeded Mr. Frankfurter and Mr. Lippmann.¹⁸

WORLD WAR II—DEFENSE PERIOD

The approval by Congress of President Roosevelt's plans for a two-ocean Navy in September 1940 started a vast rearmament program that continued for almost five years. Under its terms, a great expansion of shipyard activity resulted, especially of private yards. Thousands of new workers were hired. Although the country was still at peace, the program brought gradually the economic effects of a war-time boom—scarcity of skilled labor, rising wages and prices, movement of labor to industrial areas, increased activity of unions, and a number of strikes.

The Navy sensed the importance of a stable labor situation in the expanding shipyards but embarked upon two separate labor policies, one of which later had to be modified. The first policy was full participation in the stabilization of wages in private shipyards of the four shipbuilding zones—the Atlantic Coast, Gulf Coast, Pacific Coast, and Great Lakes. The other policy was the traditional Navy "hands off" of labor-management disputes, an attitude based on the

¹⁵Bing, *op. cit.*, page 69.

¹⁶Bureau of Ordnance, *op. cit.*, page 242.

¹⁷Bureau of Industrial Research, *op. cit.*, page 30. Bing, *op. cit.*, pages 62 note, 311, 314. Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin No. 287, *National War Labor Board, A History of Its Formation and Activities*, Government Printing Office, 1922, pages 29-30.

¹⁸Bing, *op. cit.*, page 66 note.

comfortable illusion that the civilian mediation agencies were adequate to protect the procurement program from the rising tide of labor strife.

The entire subject of labor relations was left to the Office of Assistant Secretary Bard, who was responsible for shore establishments and civilian personnel. The Shore Establishments Division, headed by Captain (later Rear Admiral) C. W. Fisher, USN, had no labor-relations section, as such, but it carefully watched over the industrial work of a dozen Navy yards and had an efficient Civilian Personnel Division, headed by Captain L. M. Atkins, USN, which was concerned with wages and working conditions of the Navy's civil-service employees. And since wages in Navy Yards and in private shipyards each affected the other, the labor problem was given to the Assistant Secretary.¹⁹ The role of the Assistant Secretary is stressed because labor on the premises of Navy contractors is also a matter of procurement, and could with equal appropriateness have been handled by the new Office of the Under Secretary, who was charged with coordinating the procurement of naval material, including ships.²⁰ Wages may be regarded not only as income for the worker, but as a cost of procurement. A dispute that may shut down a shipyard has a direct bearing upon the flow of military supplies. However, it was not until the responsibility for procurement was

moved from the Under Secretary's to the Assistant Secretary's Office (February 1945), that the labor problems of the Navy's contractors were treated as a matter of procurement.

The Assistant Secretary's Office participated in the establishment of a Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee on November 27, 1940, and cooperated in the work of this Committee for more than three years; in March 1944, the Navy's representation on the Committee was decentralized to the Bureau of Ships and the Bureau of Yards & Docks.²¹ The purposes of the Committee, like its counterpart, the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board of World War I, included the stabilization of wages in shipyards, but went further in extending the uniformity to four principal zones so as better to prevent the pirating of workers by rival shipyards.²²

The Committee differed in form from its World War I predecessor in that it included representatives of management as well as of

¹⁹An excellent account of the policy of the Civilian Personnel Division toward contractors' labor problems will be found in Captain Samuel H. Ordway, Jr., USNR (editor), *United States Naval Administration in World War II, Office of the Secretary, Civilian Personnel, First-Draft Narrative Prepared under the General Supervision of the Director of Naval History* (3 vols., typescript; in the Office of Naval Records and History), Vol. I, chap. 9 (pages 423-494), "Labor Relations for Contractors."

²⁰The role of the several Secretaries are clearly set forth in Lieutenant Commander R. H. Connery, USNR, "Organizing the Navy's Industrial Mobilization," *Public Administration Review*, Autumn 1945; reprinted in *The Navy: A Study in Administration*, Public Administration Service Publication No. 95, Chicago, 1946 (pamphlet).

²¹The work of the Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee and the two Shipbuilding Commissions of World War II is described in three published and two unpublished sources: (a) *The Termination Report of the National War Labor Board, Industrial Disputes and Wage Stabilization in Wartime* (3 vols., Government Printing Office, 1948-49), Vol. I, Part II, chap. 16 (pages 831-889), "The Shipbuilding Commission," and Vol. III, Appendix CC (pages 114-203); (b) Paul R. Porter, "Labor in the Shipbuilding Industry," in *Yearbook of American Labor, War Labor Policies*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1945, chap. 15; (c) Frederic C. Lane, *Ships for Victory; a History of Shipbuilding under the U. S. Maritime Commission in World War II*, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951, chap. 9; (d) Ordway, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pages 443-446, 469-478; and (e) *An Administrative History of the Bureau of Ships, First-Draft Narrative Prepared by the Historical Section, Bureau of Ships* (5 vols., typescript; in the office of the Chief of the Bureau of Ships), Vol. III, chap. 16, "Industrial Relations." See especially at this point: Porter, *op. cit.*, pages 346-347, 350-351; Ordway, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pages 477-478; and *History of Bu Ships*, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, chap. 16, page 14. Also see at this point *Navy Procurement Directives*, Navy Department, 1943-45 (cumulative, loose-leaf service, printed for the Navy Department by Commerce Clearing House, Inc.; referred to hereafter as NPD), Paras. 13,531; 13,541.

²²Termination Report, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, page 840. Porter, *op. cit.*, page 346. *History of Bu Ships*, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, chap. 16, page 13.

labor and government. The government members again represented the procurement agencies,—the Navy Department, the Maritime Commission, and the Office of Production Management (afterwards the War Production Board). The Navy's Representatives in 1941 were Captain Fisher and Captain Atkins.²³ The Chairman was Paul R. Porter, of OPM.

The Committee agreed very early upon another difference from World War I—they would not function as an arbitration board for the settlement of disputes, although they would approve and interpret zone wage agreements and subsequent changes therein. In effect, the procurement agencies became third-parties in continuing collective bargaining conferences on a zonal basis. They sat in on the original bargaining sessions for each of the four zones, signed the agreements, and then sat in on all future sessions at which these agreements were either changed or interpreted.

The justification for this kibitzing by the government agencies was that the agencies paid all the bills. In this industry, every firm was under contract to the government for its entire output. The contracts were cost-plus-fixed-fee, and by law the agencies decided what expenses of the contractors were reimbursable. Under these circumstances, collective bargaining would have been futile if labor and management had found, after reaching an agreement, that the government would not reimburse the companies for the new arrangement. There was a further reason for the procurement agencies being tolerated on the Committee—they were expected by labor and management to see that the zonal agreements were complied with by all shipbuilding firms having government contracts, which meant by *all* shipbuilding firms, whether taking part in the con-

ferences or not.

The four zone agreements were drawn up in the spring of 1941 and became effective between April 1 and August 1 of that year. Although subject to several revisions and to dozens of interpretations, they appear to have accomplished their main objective of uniformity of key wages in each zone. Other wages were established by collective bargaining on a local basis. Zone agreements also kept strikes to a minimum. Only in 1941 were there serious strikes, one on each coast. After December 7, 1941, there were only minor stoppages of the wildcat variety, soon ended with the help of national union officials, except for one local on the West Coast whose steady defiance throughout the war finally resulted in seizure and operation by the Navy Department of 104 machine shops, largely doing work for shipyards, and in seizure of one relatively small ship-repair yard. In addition to this, the persistent non-compliance by the management of a small shipyard on the East Coast in 1943 resulted in its seizure by the War Shipping Administration.²⁴

SERIOUSNESS OF DISPUTES

In the defense period, prior to Pearl Harbor, several new mediatorial agencies were created by the President to cope with the growing wave of labor disturbances. To supplement the permanent conciliation services of the Department of Labor and the states, President Roosevelt established in 1940 a labor division in the Office of Production Management, and in March 1941 a National Defense Mediation Board.

The Navy Department, at first, sought to refer all labor disputes between its contractors and their employees to these agencies. The Inspectors of Naval Material were warned to be especially circumspect in avoiding involvement in such disputes, and to refer

²³Porter, *op. cit.*, page 350. Ordway, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, page 443.

²⁴Termination Report, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pages 883-886. Porter, *op. cit.*, pages 351, 360.

all of them to the Department of Labor or to OPM.²⁵ Although the Assistant Secretary of War had set up a labor section in his office as early as October 18, 1940, none of the Navy Secretaries engaged any labor-relations specialists at this time. The Shore Establishments Division kept an eye on the labor situation in a general way, but was concerned primarily with government, not private, employees.

The hands-off rule, of course, was consistent with the new contract policy of not including the World War I labor clause in which the contractor had agreed to accept arbitration by the procurement agency in case of a serious dispute with his employees. It was founded, however, on the incorrect assumption that the civilian agencies did have such a binding arrangement with labor and management, or that, lacking it, they had the power to enforce government decisions. Actually, no industry had agreed to arbitration, such as marked the work of the Cantonment Adjustment Commission and the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board in the previous war period; and the National Defense Mediation Board was patterned more after National War Labor Board I, which acted only in cases of voluntary submission by at least one of the parties. Hence, any party which did not submit to the Board's jurisdiction could reject the decision if it believed—and it often did—that it could gain more by continuing the dispute.²⁶

In June, 1941, a serious strike in San Francisco demonstrated the impotence of the mediation agencies. Two union locals, one A. F. of L. and one C. I. O., called a strike in the shipyards against the provisions of the

Pacific Coast Wage Stabilization Agreement. The strike was declared illegal by the international officers of both unions. Important shipbuilding and ship-repair work was held up. The Navy was obliged to intervene. In cooperation with leaders of the non-striking unions, the Commandant of the Twelfth Naval District transported union workers through the picket lines in Navy and Marine Corps trucks for several weeks until the strike was called off.²⁷ The final blow to the maverick unions came when the Navy began recruiting civilian workers for the shipyards.

Again, in August 1941, the Navy was brought into a labor dispute—in this case because of the refusal of management to accept a decision of the National Defense Mediation Board. In protest of management's non-compliance, a strike was called, which tied up the big yard of the Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., a subsidiary of the United States Steel Corporation, at Kearny, N. J. By executive order of the President, Secretary Knox took possession of the plant, removed its President from his duties, and operated the company through a naval officer-in-charge for more than four months.²⁸

It is a curious anomaly, in view of the policy of referring all disputes to the civilian agencies, that the recommendations of the Mediation Board were not enforced by the

²⁷Ordway, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pages 429, 464-465.

²⁵Ordway, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pages 427-430. NPD, Para. 13,471.

²⁶The problems of the Mediation Board are described in *Report of the Work of the National Defense Mediation Board, March 19, 1941, to January 12, 1942*, by Louis L. Jaffe and William Gorham Rice, Jr., Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin No. 714, Government Printing Office, 1942.

²⁸Principal sources of information on the seizure of the Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. are: (a) *Report on the Work of the National Defense Mediation Board, op. cit.*, pages 185-192, 265-266; (b) *Termination Report, op. cit.*, Vol. I, pages 852-853, 879-889, and Vol. III, pages 169-195; (c) *Chronological Statement of More Important Events Relating to Labor Situation at Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, Kearny, New Jersey, May 8, 1942*, published by the company, containing 150 pages of documents; (d) *Final Report by the Officer-in-Charge, Rear Admiral R. G. Bowen, USN* (rough draft, typescript, corrected in manuscript); in records of the Emergency Plants Operation Section, Executive Office of the Secretary, Job No. 1666, Box No. 36, Naval Records Management Center, South Courthouse Road, Arlington, Va.

Navy during its four months of possession.²⁹

This was the situation when a proposal was made in September, 1941, by Lieutenant Commander (later Captain) George M. Keller, USNR, attached to the Public Relations staff of the Twelfth Naval District. Lieutenant Commander Keller recommended, in a letter forwarded through the Commandant to Assistant Secretary Bard, that the Navy should take the initiative in a program to prevent work stoppages among employees of Navy contractors. He proposed an organization be set up under the cognizance of the Navy's Office of Public Relations, consisting of trained industrial relations experts, to advise contractors in methods of settling grievances and avoiding stoppages and to stimulate morale among employees.³⁰

Captain Fisher told the Assistant Secretary that such a program would "constitute a complete reversal of Navy Department policy and procedure" and took the view that existing arrangements were adequate. Nevertheless, he recommended that Lieutenant Commander Keller be brought to Washington to explain his proposal. This was done, and Lieutenant Commander Keller proceeded not only to persuade Secretary Bard of the value of his proposals but to demonstrate them by sitting in on conferences in Washington and then back on the West Coast at which he settled a Coast-wide strike of welders. As a result of this, Mr. Bard asked Captain Fisher for a detailed proposal incorporating the reserve officer's ideas, and on November 18, 1941, this was submitted. The plan called for establishment of an Industrial Relations Section within the Shore Establishments Division, rather than in Public Relations, and with Lieutenant Commander Keller as its head. Thus the plan was well advanced, though not quite in operation, on Pearl Harbor Day.

AFTER PEARL HARBOR — INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OFFICERS

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, important changes affecting labor relations were made throughout the government. The OPM was abolished, and replaced by the more efficient War Production Board. The National Defense Mediation Board, from which half the labor members had resigned in November 1941, was replaced with the new and stronger National War Labor Board II—backed by a pledge from national representatives of labor and management of no strikes and no lockouts for the duration of the war. In the Navy Department, too, a number of functional changes were made. One of the earliest was the setting up of an Industrial Relations Section, as previously planned, within the Office of the Assistant Secretary. Another was the establishment (on January 30) of an Office of Procurement and Material, headed by Vice Admiral Samuel M. Robinson, USN, in the Office of the Under Secretary. Another development, in which the Navy participated, was the signing of an agreement (on May 22, 1942) by representatives of the procurement agencies and of the building unions for the stabilization of wages on all war construction.

The new Industrial Relations Section and the wage-stabilization program for the construction industry will be taken up in turn.

The Navy's Industrial Relations Section was established on January 19, 1942, by a letter from Assistant Secretary Bard to all continental naval districts, and to all bureaus and offices, setting up the Section within the Shore Establishments Division, and creating a field organization of one or more Industrial Relations Officers in each of the naval districts.³¹

The District Industrial Relations Officers (DIRO's) were carefully selected by Commander Keller on a basis of previous experience.

²⁹*Final Report of the Officer-in-Charge, op. cit.*

³⁰Ordway, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pages 430-438.

³¹*Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for the Fiscal Year 1942*, page 14. Ordway, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pages 438-441. NPD, Para. 13,501.

rience in labor relations, familiarity with industrial conditions in their districts, and reputations for integrity and fair play among both unions and management. Most of them were above the age of 35. They were to report directly to the Commandants of their districts and to have no duties other than as labor-relations officers. The fact that they were part of the Shore Establishments Division, however, resulted in their being placed, for a brief period, under the direction of the District Civilian Personnel Officers. They were of service frequently to these officers, but the two duties were distinct.³²

Unlike the representatives of Bu Ord in World War I, the DIRO's represented no one bureau, but, like the Inspectors of Naval Material, served all of them. Their relations with the inspection forces—including INM's, Bureau of Aeronautics Representatives and Supervisors of Shipbuilding—had to be worked out with tact and patience, but the inspection officers gradually found that these labor experts could be of great assistance in a highly specialized phase of the contractors' work.³³

The DIRO's in the field and the Industrial Relations Section in Washington served under Rear Admiral Fisher until his retirement in January 1944 upon the merger of the Shore Establishments Division, which he had headed for ten years, with the competing Division of Personnel Supervision and Management. The new chief of the merged divisions was Rear Admiral Frederick G. Crisp, USN. Shortly before this, the name of the Section and its officers had been changed from Industrial Relations to Labor Relations; the abbreviation DIRO became DLRO. Captain Keller continued as head of the Section.³⁴

³²Ordway, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pages 446, 449-455, 486-488. NPD, Para. 13,522.

³³Ordway, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pages 450-451. NPD, Para. 13,523.

³⁴Ordway, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pages 55-57, 411. NPD, Para. 13,522.

A year later, in February 1945, the Labor Relations Section was made, at last, a part of the procurement-supervision program. When H. Struve Hensel, an expert in the legal phases of procurement, moved up from general counsel to Assistant Secretary, the Office of Procurement and Material was moved into his Office, and the Division of Shore Establishments and Civilian Personnel was moved out of it—to the Under Secretary. In a directive dated February 12, Mr. Hensel said: . . . in recognition of the fact that problems arising out of the labor relations of private contractors are more intimately connected with the procurement functions of the Navy than with those having to do with personnel administration of the Navy's own shore establishments, it has been determined that the office exercising cognizance in these matters should be attached to the Office of Procurement and Material rather than to the Division of Shore Establishments and Civilian Personnel. For this reason, effective February 15, 1945, the duties, functions and personnel of the Labor Relations Branch, SECP Code 500, will be transferred to the Office of Procurement and Material.³⁵

This move had a lasting effect. After VJ-Day, when OP&M was abolished (August 20, 1945) and a new Materials Division set up to replace it, still in the Office of the Assistant Secretary, the Labor Relations Section continued to be treated as a part of procurement and was incorporated in the new Materials Division.³⁶

LABOR RELATIONS IN BUILDING CONSTRUCTION

In addition to setting up a Labor Relations section and field service immediately after Pearl Harbor, the Navy also took part in the formation of a Wage Adjustment Board designed to stabilize wages in building construction for all government agencies.

³⁵NPD, Para. 13,536.1. See also Ordway, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pages 493-494; and Admiral S. M. Robinson, USN, "Procurement and Production," in *Public Administration Review*, August 1945; reprinted in *The Navy: A Study in Administration*, Public Administration Service Publication No. 95, 1946 (pamphlet).

³⁶NPD, Paras. 10,141a; 10,149a.

An agreement was reached on May 22, 1942, between the Building and Construction Trades Department of the American Federation of Labor and the government agencies charged with war construction,³⁷ the Navy and War Departments and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The agreement provided that on all Federal building projects, the wage rates paid under collective bargaining contracts as of July 1, 1942, were to remain in force for at least one year or until such rates were modified by a Wage Adjustment Board to be created under the agreement.

After the approval of President Roosevelt had been obtained, Secretary of Labor Perkins set up the Adjustment Board on May 29, 1942. There were seven members of the Board, distributed very much as in the old Cantonment Adjustment Commission of World War I, that is, equal representation from the unions and from the procurement agencies, with a chairman representing the "public." In this case, however, the chairman was *not* selected by one of the procurement agencies but by Secretary Perkins, who designated Daniel W. Tracy, the Assistant Secretary of Labor. There was again no representative of the employers.

The Navy member of the Board was Lieutenant Charles D. Pennebaker, USNR, and his alternate was Lieutenant Leon B. Kromer, USNR.³⁸ They were designated by the Office of the Assistant Secretary through the new Labor Relations Section.

The stabilization agreement was voluntary

³⁷The history of the wage stabilization agreement is given in Arthur D. Hill, "The Wage Adjustment Board, Wage Stabilization in the Construction Industry," in *The Termination Report of the National War Labor Board*, Vol. I, Part II, Chap. 26 (pages 1197-1205), and Vol. III, Appendix MM (pages 817-826). See also Ordway, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pages 467-469, and the excellent history by John T. Dunlop and Arthur D. Hill, *The Wage Adjustment Board*, Harvard University Press, 1950, published subsequently to the preparation of this paper.

³⁸Hill, *op. cit.*, in *Termination Report*, Vol. I, pages

and one of the earlier steps aimed at keeping wages and prices steady and so avoiding inflation. It followed the World War I pattern of collective bargaining between the government and the unions, but in this case the government representation was split between the procurement agencies and another department having very different responsibilities. Its effectiveness was limited also by lack of jurisdiction over non-Federal projects. Hence there was a three-way conflict of jurisdiction: (a) all Federal contractors working on a cost-plus basis were to be reimbursed for allowable costs, the nature and level of these costs (including wages) to be determined by the procurement agencies; (b) all Federal building contractors were required by Congress (Davis-Bacon Act of 1931, amended in 1935) to pay at least the rate of wages prevailing in each locality for each skill, the prevailing rates to be determined by the Secretary of Labor;³⁹ (c) all non-Federal construction was outside the scope of the agreement, hence questions of wages and working conditions on these projects were subject to the Regional War Labor Boards.⁴⁰

Within the Wage Adjustment Board, this conflict of authority and responsibility was evidenced in the differing viewpoints of the representatives of the Secretary of Labor and of the purchasing agencies. The Navy, Army and RFC generally sought to keep costs as low as possible and to have the work completed as soon as possible. The Department of Labor more frequently favored the approval of union requests for wage increases. However, if the Navy and other procurement agencies were outvoted on the WAB, they could exercise, in effect, a veto by refusing to reimburse contractors for the resulting higher costs. This produced an awkward situation,

1197-1198 note.

³⁹Harold W. Metz, *Labor Policy of the Federal Government*, Brookings Institution, 1945, pages 195-197.

⁴⁰Hill, *op. cit.*, in *Termination Report*, Vol. I, page 1200.

as may be seen from the following statement by Arthur D. Hill, Assistant Solicitor of the Department of Labor and Vice-Chairman of the Board:

A serious problem was encountered in the attitude maintained by the government agencies toward wage adjustments granted upon union request. The adjustment would be given effect on a going project only if the agencies considered it advisable to place the adjustment in effect. The result of this attitude was to transform a sincere joint attempt at stabilization to a one-sided agreement, to partially oust the Board of jurisdiction, and to discriminate against the unions' interests.⁴¹

The demands for inflation-control on a national basis became so insistent that President and Congress took drastic action. As authority for stabilization of wages in all industries was gradually given by the President to the National War Labor Board, the duties of the Wage Adjustment Board were brought within the terms of the national stabilization policy and made subject to the authority of the NWLB. After December 1942, the government contracting agencies felt obliged to approve as reimbursable costs any wage orders of the Wage Adjustment Board.⁴²

EVOLUTION OF NAVY POLICY

By the end of 1942, Navy policy toward the labor relations of its contractors had evolved considerably from the "hands off" policy of early 1941. Changes had occurred in four areas:

1. The Navy was participating, along with other procurement agencies, in wage stabilization procedures of two expanding industries, shipbuilding and general construction. It sought the standardization of wages to eliminate the causes of labor piracy among employers and of dissatisfaction among employees. It sought also to provide cooperation with others in determining what costs were allowable for reimbursement by the Navy. The Navy had become, in effect, a participant in collective bargaining.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, page 1198.

⁴²*Ibid.*, page 1199.

2. A corps of expert labor-relations officers was on duty to assist both contractors and unions, in avoiding disputes which might interrupt military production. Although still officially seeking to avoid meddling in labor troubles, they served as liaison officers and unofficially promoted better understanding between unions and management.

3. A third change in policy arose in 1942 when the Navy was directed by the President to take possession of the General Cable Corporation's strike-bound plant at Bayonne, N. J. Whereas the Secretary had not enforced the Mediation Board's decision in the Federal Shipbuilding case, he did so against the General Cable strikers, establishing a pattern of enforcement of government labor rulings to which the Navy adhered in other seizures throughout the war.⁴³

4. A fourth change came when the Navy discovered soon after Pearl Harbor that management in several firms was so inefficient or so arbitrary as to require intervention under the special war powers of the President. The degree of intervention depended on the cooperation shown by the contractor in making important changes in production methods or in supervisory personnel. On a few occasions, however, the Navy was obliged to insist upon the removal of inefficient executives. Where such changes were not made upon Navy request, the drastic step of seizure of the contracting firm usually followed. In such cases, the Navy became the employer, in a special sense, with full responsibility for the establishment of successful labor relations.

⁴³See Bureau of National Affairs, *War Labor Reports*, Vol. 2, pages 228-236, and in *Termination Re-* including the final report of R. Adm. Harold G. Bowen, USN, to Secretary Knox; files of EXOS, Fiscal Year 1943, P8-1(3), "General Cable Corpn." Naval Records Management Center, Arlington, Va.; also in the records of the Labor Relations Section, Materials Division, EXOS, Job No. 1990, Box No. 10, Naval Records Management Center, Arlington, Va.

CIVIL WAR SIGNALS

By GEORGE RAYNOR THOMPSON*

MILITARY signals in the Civil War began when the Army's one and only signal officer, A. J. Myer, was sent to Washington on orders dated 5 May 1861.¹

To go back of that date a bit, Myer had been an army surgeon, with an interest in the deaf and in sign language. He had worked out a system of visual signaling using a flag by day and torches by night. War Department interest in the system won Congressional approval and \$2,000. On 2 July 1860 the Army appointed "assistant surgeon Albert J. Myer to be Signal Officer with the rank of Major to fill an original vacancy."² Signal Officer Myer at once began service in his new capacity in the Navaho campaigns in the American Southwest. The officers and men with whom he worked were detailed from other arms and services. One was Lieutenant William J. Nicodemus, of the 5th U. S. Infantry, who would later replace Myer himself as the Chief Signal Officer of the Union Army, in consequence of a disagreement over who should control wire telegraph trains in the field, whether the Signal Corps

should exercise control, or civilian telegraphers answerable only to the Secretary of War. Two others of Myer's students became prominent Confederate officers. They were E. P. Alexander, of the Engineer Corps, and J. E. B. Stuart.³

When Major Myer arrived in Washington on 3 June 1861, his basic equipment needs required flag kits—a white flag with a red square in the center for use against a dark background; a red flag with a white square for use against a light background—and torches for night use (these of course are the elements which make up the familiar Signal Corps insignia). Telescopes were necessary for reading the flag or torch wigwag motions at long distances, up to twenty miles. The most pressing need facing the lone signal officer was the necessity to get officers and men detailed to him wherever signals might be required and to train them in the motions of wigwag, which entailed the mastery of codes and ciphers.⁴

The first need for military signals arose at

*Dr. Thompson, Chief of the Signal Corps Historical Division, Washington, D. C., presented this paper at the January 1954 meeting of the Civil War Round Table of Washington. It subsequently appeared in two parts in *Signal*, VIII (Mar.-Apr. and May-June 1954), without documentation. The illustrations are by courtesy of *Signal* magazine.

¹[A. J. Myer, *Report of the Operations and Duties of the Signal Department of the Army, 1860-1865*] (n. p., n. d.), p. 10. The only copy of this *Report* which has come to the author's attention is the one filed in the Army Library. It was Myer's personal copy, deriving from a trunk filled with the General's papers, which a member of his family presented to the Signal Corps early in the 1940's. The trunk and its contents are now

in the Signal Corps Museum, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.

²J. Willard Brown, *The Signal Corps, U.S.A., in the War of the Rebellion* (Boston, 1896), pp. 21-22. Brown wrote with the assistance of the U. S. Veteran Signal Corps Association, which published the book. A high degree of comradeship led the Signal Corps veterans to organize, forming a society which continues today as the Armed Forces Communications Association. (See Col. George P. Dixon, "A Short History of the A.F.C.A.," 22 Oct. 1951. SigC Hist. Sec. file.) Brown drew heavily upon Myer's *Report*, cited above. In fact he repeats whole paragraphs and pages, *verbatim*, without acknowledging his debt to Myer.

³J. W. Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-25.

⁴See Myer's *Manual of Signals* for the motions and the codes. The first edition appeared in 1864, followed by others in 1866, 1868, 1874, 1877, and 1879. A good

the important Federal fortress in the lower Chesapeake Bay, at Fort Monroe. Early in June Myer arrived there, obtained a detail of officers and men, and began schooling them. Soon his pupils were wigwagging messages from a small boat directing the fire of Union batteries at Fort Wool, on the Rip Raps islet in Hampton Roads, against Confederate fortifications near Norfolk.⁵ Very soon, too, Myer began encountering trouble with commercial wire telegraphers in the area. General Ben Butler, commanding the Federal Department in Southeast Virginia, ordered that wire telegraph facilities and their civilian workers be placed under the signal officer. The civilians, proud and jealous of their skills in electrical magic, objected in no uncertain terms and shortly an order arrived from the Secretary of War himself countermanning Butler's instructions. The Army's signal officer was to keep hands off the civilian telegraph, even when it served the Army.⁶

Within a few weeks the Army's signal needs at Fort Monroe were overshadowed by a much greater requirement. The forces being marshaled in Northern Virginia threatened battle. Arrangements for Federal Signals, at least for wigwag lines, were begun too late, when on 17 July 1861 Major Myer was ordered back to Washington to serve with General McDowell. The Battle of Bull Run was fought four days later, before Myer could get together and train any signalmen or set up any signal stations in the field.⁷

On the fateful day, Sunday, 21 July, the

lone signal officer of the Federal Army was entangled with a balloon. The government had previously taken steps to acquire a balloon for observation. The balloon had been inflated in Washington from the city's gas mains, and it fell to Major Myer commanding a detail of 20 men and a wagon from the 26th Pennsylvania to tow the big bag to the front so that an observer in its basket might survey the battlefield and make reports to General McDowell. The procession started along Pennsylvania Avenue in the wee small hours that Sunday morning, thirty hours later than McDowell had intended. Holding down a sizable balloon and moving it forward proved difficult, more so for these raw recruits tramping along tree-lined rural roads into Virginia than for the trained ground crews which serve Macy's Thanksgiving Day parade down Broadway. By noon the strange retinue had gotten little nearer the noted battleground than Fairfax Courthouse when the big bag became hopelessly entangled in tree tops. Major Myer hurried on alone to report to General McDowell's headquarters, where he served with distinction through the remainder of the action.⁸ It was no doubt experiences such as these, in particular a still more unfortunate carelessness regarding signals in the Chancellorsville campaign, which led Myer to specify in his *Manual of Signals* that the Signal Officer must always be informed beforehand about his General's battle plans if he is to be able to make appropriate signal arrangements.⁹

Signal Corps accounts scarcely mention this balloon fiasco. Yet considerable evidence exists that the War Department originally intended to make great use of balloon ob-

general description is contained in John D. Billings, *Hardtack and Coffee* (Boston, 1887), chap. xxi.

⁵ J. W. Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-42.

⁶ William R. Plum, *The Military Telegraph during the Civil War in the United States* (2 vols.; Chicago, 1882), I, 71-72; and Myer's *Report*, p. 30. Myer did not mention the Secretary's countermanning.

⁷ Myer asked that a lieutenant and two flagmen be transferred from Fort Monroe, but they could not report in Washington in time, so that no use was made of flag signals on the Federal side. J. W. Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 42 and 48; and Myer's *Report*, p. 14.

⁸ F. Stansbury Haydon, *Aeronautics in the Union and Confederate Armies* (Baltimore, 1941), pp. 68-71.

⁹ On page 119 of the 1864 edition of Myer's *Manual*, we read: "On the eve of a battle, the chief signal officer should report to the General commanding, and he should learn so nearly as may be the plan of the lines for the engagement."

servation and reporting. This particular bag had been built on War Department orders by an experienced aeronaut, John Wise, of Lancaster, Pennsylvania. There is some evidence that General McDowell planned that the balloon should ascend in Centerville by dawn of 20 July, carrying a signal officer to observe the Confederate lines and to signal his observations to the General's headquarters. In fact Myer himself had asked that he be put in charge of handling the signals from the balloon's basket, saying that whether wire telegraph or flag methods were used, it was his duty to arrange for them.¹⁰ Possibly it was because McDowell expected to use the balloon and one signal officer in it that the General failed to make any other preparations to provide ground flag and torch stations. As matters turned out, the balloon train met disastrous delay and entanglement. The Union Army engaged with the Confederates without adequate communications on the field and with inadequate civilian telegraph, the nearest station being considerably in the rear, at Fairfax Courthouse.

On the Confederate side of that battle, Myer's system of signals succeeded very well in the hands of E. P. Alexander, formerly a student of Myer and now a captain in grey. Having arrived in Manassas early in July, Alexander had had time to drill signalmen and to set up signal stations along Bull Run. He himself early on the morning of the battle stood at his main signal station near Union Mills Ford. As he watched through his telescope a station which he had placed on the Confederates' left wing near Stone Bridge, he glimpsed the gleam of a brass field piece several miles farther along Bull Run, north of Sudley's Ford. Closer inspection revealed an advancing Federal column. Alexander wigwagged at once to the Stone Bridge station warning that the left wing

was being turned. Next he signaled to Generals Beauregard and Johnston who were several miles downstream from Stone Bridge. These warning messages impelled the Confederates to send up the troops which later in the day helped drive the flanking Federals back in defeat.¹¹

Thus the fortunes of war in this battle saw Myer's system of signals succeed, ironically, on the side hostile to Myer. Because of general unpreparedness and also some disinterest and ignorance, the North had neither wigwag signals nor balloon observation. What then of the telegraph, which Myer called the electric telegraph in contrast to what he termed "aerial" telegraph, meaning flag or torch wigwag?

Telegraph communications since their invention some 25 years earlier had developed through the cities along the eastern seaboard under the American Telegraph Company. They had developed along the railroads serving towns through the Alleghenies and were extending westward under the Western Union Telegraph Company.¹² To the facilities and the skilled operators of these companies the War Department turned for its telegraph communications. Thereupon the Military Telegraph took form in the hands of civilians, their services hired by the War Department. The skill of the civilian telegraphers at once became so valuable that the men were exempted from conscription.¹³ Throughout the war it was the firm policy of the War Department chiefs that both the telegraph facilities and their operators remain civilian, free from military constraint or Signal Corps control. The Secretary of War and the President himself placed great de-

¹¹E. H. Cummins, "The Signal Corps in the Confederate States Army," *Southern Historical Society Papers*, XVI, 94; and J. W. Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-45.

¹²W. R. Plum, *op. cit.*, I, 63.

¹³F. A. Shannon, *The Organization and Administration of the Union Army, 1861-1865* (2 vols.; Cleveland, 1928), I, 279.

¹⁰F. S. Haydon, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-68 and 181-82.

pendence upon the telegraph system which kept the seat of Government very well posted and by which the government sometimes interfered with campaigns in the distant field. A number of the top men in the military telegraph organization received commissions. Their chief, Anson Stager, general superintendent of the Western Union, was made a colonel. Such commissions were perfunctory, solely to make it possible for the officials to receive and disburse funds and property under the Quartermaster of the Army.¹⁴

During the first great battle of the Civil War at Bull Run the only communication system which succeeded in serving the Union Army was the civilian telegraph. Civilian telegraphers accompanying the Union Army into Virginia opened the first telegraph office at Falls Church. Next, on the 19th, they opened the office at the Springfield Station of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and offices at Fairfax Station and at Fairfax Courthouse on the 20th. The telegraph wires and their operators went no farther. All communications to and from the advancing Federals as they moved on to Centerville seven miles beyond were conveyed by mounted couriers.¹⁵ On the day of battle, 21 July, the couriers raced messages every few minutes from McDowell's headquarters back to Fairfax Courthouse, where telegraphers put them on the wire to the War Department. Late in the afternoon, the telegrams describing the conflict suddenly conveyed news of defeat and rout. In the early morning hours of 22 July the civilian telegraphers closed the Courthouse station and withdrew with the retreating soldiery to Washington.¹⁶

The Confederate Signal Corps, off to a

good start at Bull Run, throughout the war performed duties in electric telegraph and especially in secret service as well as in visual signaling. Since Captain E. P. Alexander was soon made Chief of Ordnance, one Captain William Norris, later Major, became the Chief Signal Officer of the Southern armies. One of his duties was to wait upon Jefferson Davis each morning with cipher dispatches from the generals of the armies and the commanders of the departments. The Confederates thought highly enough of their Signal Corps to establish it on an official basis less than a year after Bull Run. Legislation on 19 April 1862, specified that the Confederate Signal Corps be set up as a separate corps or as an activity attached either to the Adjutant and Inspector General's Department or to the Engineer Department. The Confederate Secretary of War by General Order on 29 May 1862, attached his Signal Corps to the Adjutant and Inspector General. He authorized one major, ten captains, ten first and ten second lieutenants and 20 sergeants. Privates were to be detailed as needed from other branches of the army. The Confederate Signal Corps was thus established nearly a year earlier than its Federal counterpart. It was nearly as large, numbering some 1,500, most of the number, however, serving on detail. The Confederate Signal Corps used Myer's system of flags and torches. The men were trained in wire telegraph, too, and impressed wire facilities as needed.¹⁷ But there was nothing in Richmond or in the field comparable to the extensive and tightly controlled civilian military

battle-field itself, it is difficult to state," wrote Plum, but it was probably because the idea of a telegraph train, the equipment carried in wagons to the field, did not take form until Major Myer initiated it later in the year. The first such train was delivered to the Signal Corps in January, 1862.

¹⁷E. H. Cummins, "The Signal Corps in the Confederate States Army," *loc. cit.*, pp. 98-100; and J. W. Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 207-09.

¹⁴D. H. Bates, *Lincoln in the Telegraph Office* (New York, 1939), p. 27; and W. R. Plum, *op. cit.*, I, 129-33.

¹⁵Even the courier service was organized by the Military Telegraph, according to D. H. Bates, *op. cit.* p. 88.

¹⁶W. R. Plum, *op. cit.*, I, 75-78. "Just why the telegraph was not carried on to Centerville, if not to the

telegraph organization which Secretary Stanton ruled with an iron hand from Washington.¹⁸

In the Northern army the Signal Corps carried on through the first two years of the Civil War as a one-man unit, Major Myer, supported by details of officers and men. The Corps was not authorized nor organized as an independent activity until the year after the Confederates had so recognized their signalmen. Myer had repeatedly petitioned the Secretary of War to put Federal signals on a permanent legal foundation. He particularly wished to end the evils of getting his officers and men on detail. He wanted his men to be recognized with permanent standing in their own right, subject to the honors and promotions of other soldiers. Finally, on 3 March 1863, Congress established the Signal Corps, the Chief Signal Officer to be a colonel, assisted by one lieutenant colonel and two majors. For each army corps or military department Congress authorized one captain and not over eight lieutenants, who were to receive the pay and emoluments of cavalry officers of equal grade. Each officer was authorized to have one sergeant and six soldiers, who would receive the pay of similar grades of the Engineers. Thereupon the Signal Corps of the United States Army began its career. Myer, the first signal officer in any army, had laid good foundations. He had established a Signal Corps school on Red Hill in Georgetown in August 1861, where it flourished throughout the war. By the war's end the Corps numbered some 300 officers and over 2,000 men.¹⁹

Throughout the war after the Bull Run

¹⁸W. A. Plum, *op. cit.*, I, 135-36; and Lt. William A. Glassford, "Historical Sketch of the Signal Corps," reprinted from the *Journal of Military Service Institution* (n. d.), p. 14.

¹⁹Myer's *Report*, pp. 139-40; Gen. A. W. Greely, "The Signal Corps," p. 314, in F. T. Miller (ed.), *The Photographic History of the Civil War* (New York, 1911), VIII; and J. W. Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-77 and 141-62.

fiasco, Myer and his signalmen provided visual signals along march routes, in campaigns and in encampments wherever needed. In the watch along the Potomac and during the Maryland invasions, Myer set up valuable wigwag stations, as at Maryland Heights overlooking Harper's Ferry, at Point of Rocks along the river, and especially atop Sugar Loaf Mountain in the valley of the Monocacy. Messages could and often did pass day and night by rapid signaling and




From Myer's *Manual of Signals*, this drawing shows torch signal procedure. Here the foot torch is replaced by a wood fire, providing the reference or center point of light, to the right and left of which wigwag motions are made by means of the flying torch.

efficient relay over the lines of Myer's aerial telegraph to and from Washington. These elevated stations and the telescopes of the signal officers of course provided invaluable observation services too. Again and again during the Maryland campaigns of 1862 and 1863 Confederate movements were discovered through the glasses of Signal Corps observ-

ers. Thus was discovered Lee's first crossing of the Potomac in 1862. The approaches and ford of the river were closely watched by Lieutenant Miner, atop Sugar Loaf. Miner stayed at his post, determining and reporting the Confederates' objectives until he was captured by the advancing troops.²⁰

Some days later, during the battle of An-

formed during the battle. In the afternoon, General Burnside, becoming concerned over a maneuver of the Confederates before him, sent a message by wigwag to the mountain station asking that the signal officers scrutinize the area in question. Gloskoski soon signaled back, "Look well to your left. The enemy are moving a strong force in that di-



Myer's *Manual* pictures a complete kit, wrapped and ready to carry, containing staffs, torches and 7 flags: two flags six feet square, two, two feet square, and three, four feet square. The extra flag in the four-foot size was black with a white square for use against snow or sky. Other items included were turpentine, scissors, matches.

tietam on 17 September, 1862, a signal station on Elk Mountain gave valuable service. The Signal Corpsmen scanned the field and in particular aided the fire of Federal batteries. The value of their observations and wigwagged messages were noted by a correspondent of a Richmond newspaper. He wrote that Lee's Confederate troops "could not make a maneuver in front or rear that was not instantly revealed by keen lookouts; and as soon as the intelligence could be communicated to their batteries below, shot and shell were launched against the moving columns. It was information," he explained, "conveyed by the little flags upon the mountain-top, that no doubt enabled the enemy to concentrate his force against our weakest points and counteract the effect of what ever similar movements may have been attempted by us."²¹ Signal officers Camp, Gloskoski, and Herzog kept the Union generals well in-

rection." It was this message which enabled Burnside to take timely steps against a reinforcement which General A. P. Hill was bringing from Harper's Ferry.²²

When Jeb Stuart's Confederate cavalry swept through Maryland a few weeks later, the officer at Point of Rocks signal station, First Lieutenant J. H. Fralich, detected and reported his crossing back to Virginia, on 12 October 1862.²³ Stuart's daring raid into Maryland had been a gamble with the hilltop posts. Douglas Freeman, author of *Lee's Lieutenants*, described these Federal flag stations as "well placed." Freeman noted, too, that Stuart's raiders on their way north had taken pains to avoid observation (especially in the vicinity of Sugar Loaf) and had sought out obscure roads and the cover of woods. But as the Confederate cavalry returned south, the signal officer on Sugar Loaf sighted them. Very early on the morning of the 12th he wigwagged: "We can see

²⁰Myer's *Report*, pp. 95-96, which are repeated, with some additional details, by J. W. Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 240-41 and 325.

²¹Gen. A. W. Greely, "The Signal Corps," *loc. cit.*, p. 321; and D. Donald, *Divided We Fought, A Pictorial History of the War 1861-1865* (New York, 1952), p. 120.

²²Myer's *Report*, pp. 101-02, repeated *verbatim*, without acknowledgement, by J. W. Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 332-33; and Gen. A. W. Greely, "The Signal Corps," *loc. cit.*, p. 321.

²³*Ibid.*, p. 319.

a heavy body of troops near Hyattstown." But he failed to report their identity till nearly noon, when he wigwagged again stating that the troops were Confederate.²⁴

While visual signals, the flag and torch, were thus proving their worth, Major Myer stubbornly fought for electric telegraph lines in the field. He insisted upon the need for temporary lines, close to battle, under military compulsion and control, in short, controlled by the Signal Corps. Visual signals obviously could not be used in murky weather, or in heavily wooded flat terrain. As early as the summer of 1861 Myer asked for and got authorization to purchase what he called a telegraph train, that is, wagons loaded with telegraph especially designed for the purpose of providing quick temporary wire lines in the field.²⁵ Myer described the train as the "flying" telegraph. He drew up the specifications for the equipment: hand-carried reels bearing several miles of light wire; light-weight lance poles, iron shod, and fitted with insulators; telegraph sets and tool kits. This was a Signal Corps innovation and experiment. Myer pushed it with conviction and determination. He accomplished it in the face of apathy and opposition, especially on the part of the civilian telegraphers. The operators jealously guarded their skills and the telegraph companies were concerned to keep all telegraph activities to themselves. The chief technical difficulties confronting Myer arose from the fact that the established commercial-type telegraph required heavy, complicated storage batteries and skilled Morse code operators. Combat conditions, then as now, called for equipment as light-weight as possible, as simple and rugged as possible, and easy enough to operate so that relatively unskilled soldiers could use it. But

the first of Myer's flying telegraph trains, delivered in January, 1862, was not as simple as Myer wished. The train employed storage batteries and Morse code keys and sounders, all of which called for skilled operators. Myer persisted in seeking something better suited to military limitations upon weight and skill. Early in 1862 he believed he had found the solution. It was a new piece of telegraph equipment, the Beardslee magneto-electric telegraph instrument. The device was developed by George W. Beardslee of New York, specifically as a portable telegraph, especially intended for military use. The instrument required no batteries. It employed magnetos which generated current when hand-turned, like the ringers on army field telephones or on old-fashioned civilian phone boxes.²⁶ As Myer himself described the device, its "working current . . . when placed on a telegraph line is generated by a pile of magnets, a part of the instrument itself. The letters of the alphabet are plainly marked on the dial. To cause the letters to be indicated at either end of the line, or to read them, are operations so simple as to be within the power, with little practice, of almost any soldier who can easily read or write. The instrument is used without fluids, without galvanic batteries of any kind, and is compact, strong and portable."²⁷

A flying telegraph train equipped with

²⁴D. S. Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants* (3 vols.; New York, 1942), II, 295 and 305.


²⁵J. W. Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-50; and Myer's *Report*, p. 16.

²⁶Myer's *Report*, pp. 30-34, repeated, without acknowledgement, by J. W. Browne, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-76. Myer mentioned in a letter to the Adjutant General, 30 Oct. 1861 (quoted by Brown, p. 63), that he was hopeful for the successful construction of a simple dial and crank telegraph instrument. Myer was therefore already in touch with Mr. Beardslee, who had been working on magneto-electric devices, particularly with a view to substituting them for storage batteries as a source of electric current. See the article entitled "Improved Magneto-Electric Battery," *Scientific American*, Vol. V (23), New Series, 7 Dec. 1861, pp. 1-2.

²⁷Myer's *Report*, pp. 53-54, repeated *verbatim*, without acknowledgement, by J. W. Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 176-77. A detailed description and diagram are given by W. R. Plum, *op. cit.*, II, 90-96. The manner of its operation is also described by R. W. Chambers, in his novel about Civil War telegraphers, *Whistling Cat* (New York, 1932), pp. 143-44.

these new instruments and with several miles of wire coated with gutta percha insulation (of rather inferior quality, wrote Myer) reached the Union Army during the Peninsular Campaign in 1862. Its first service began on 24 May 1862, when it provided a line from General McClellan's headquarters several miles away.²⁸ Thereafter the new Beardslee telegraph instruments worked rath-

5 July 1862, "I am satisfied with my trials of the instruments. . . ." He added, "Occasions must often occur with an active army when none but portable telegraph trains can be used."²⁹ Such occasions had already occurred in the flat woodlands of the Peninsula. They occurred again in the Fredericksburg campaign in December 1862 when visual signals were hindered by fog and smoke.



A drawing from Myer's *Manual of Signals* illustrating the field, or flying, telegraph. It shows the wagon with batteries and instruments. The wire (in this case presumably bare copper, since it is being strung on insulators on poles) is being run out from a reel carried by two men. The linesmen are using a crowbar to open holes to receive the lance poles. Myer estimated that $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles of such wire line could be put up in an hour.

er well within their limitations, despite much subsequent ridicule from advocates of the civilian telegraph. For nearly three weeks this first Beardslee-operated wire line carried many dispatches. On one occasion Lieutenant Milton Benner, commanding the telegraph train, reported that he transmitted 18 messages which averaged about 40 words each in less than two hours. Benner felt certain, and so did Myer, at this time, that the portable magneto field telegraph had passed its test and proven its practicability. Myer wrote on

Three Signal Corps telegraph trains equipped with the Beardslee sets accompanied the Federal Army to Fredericksburg. The trains were now commanded by the son of the inventor, Captain Frederick Beardslee. Myer first set up five visual wigwag stations along the north bank of the Rappahannock. Fog blanketed the area through the morning of 11 December, hampering visual signaling. On the next day smoke from the burning

²⁸Myer's Report, p. 54.

²⁹*Beardslee's Military Telegraph* (New York, 1863), photostatic copy of pamphlet (original in the Library, U.S.M.A.), pp. 6-10. SigC Hist. Sec. file.

town engulfed a wigwag station which had been set up in the Courthouse steeple. Meanwhile, the men of the flying telegraph trains were running wires from General Burnside's headquarters to the Federal left wing. Before dawn on 11 December Captain Beardslee and three men carrying one reel of wire and 25 lance poles, extended the line across the river. Beardslee wrote his father on 14 December, the day after the main battle, stating that the wire line had been of greatest service to General Burnside. The General, he wrote, has often thanked us for the promptness with which dispatches were sent and answers received and has one of his aides in our tent almost all the time to receive dispatches for him." Myer described the working of the field wire telegraph in this campaign as "superb."³⁰

But in the next campaign, in the spring of 1863, around Chancellorsville, the Beardslee device and Signal Corps flying telegraph trains did not prove out so well. Myer attempted to explain certain failures on grounds that the insulated wire had deteriorated after months of rough usage.³¹ He also attributed failures to the fact that curious soldiers were continually cutting the insulated wire to see what it was made of.³² Actually, the Beardslee instrument was a short-range device. It could not generate enough electricity to signal through more than a few miles of wire. It was of course no match at all for the established commercial-type telegraph, of the type represented by Myer's first battery-

equipped train. And now the civilian military telegraph organization was adopting Myer's field telegraphic train procedure. Loading their batteries and Morse sets into wagons, along with reels of bare wire which they strung on hastily erected poles, they were increasingly providing field communications in competition with the Signal Corps, at longer ranges and with greater speed of transmission. In one case, a ten-mile line which the Signal Corpsmen had laid and worked with Beardslee sets proved so slow that General Hooker turned the line over to the military telegraphers, who connected their batteries and worked this Signal Corps wire line more effectively with their Morse keys.³³

Throughout the Chancellorsville Campaign, signals suffered in other ways also. Colonel Myer complained that he was not informed of battle plans and that his men were sometimes left idle. Reasons of security helped to cause visual flag and torch signaling to lapse. Visual signals, like modern radio, are of course readily intercepted by the enemy. The signals themselves reveal positions and they may even betray their messages if the enemy knows the cipher system. The Confederates did know it in early 1863. Myer explained that although he several times changed the wigwag cipher system, the enemy quickly solved the changes until the Union Army adopted the cipher disc which Myer invented. Meanwhile, fearing that the

³⁰Myer's Report, pp. 107-09; Beardslee pamphlet, pp. 13-14; and J. W. Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 178-80 and 339-42. Pages 339-42 repeat, word for word, Myer's Report, pp. 107-09.

³¹Myer's Report, p. 142.

³²Lt. W. Glassford, "Historical Sketch of the Signal Corps," *loc. cit.*, p. 2.

Glassford believed Myer was unreasonably stubborn in defense of the dial signal telegraph train, that is, using Beardslee sets, saying Myer could not be made to see the inherent inefficiency of an apparatus that could not work over ten miles of wire even if uncut.

³³W. R. Plum, *op. cit.*, I, 363. On several occa-

sions when the military Morse telegraph lines and the Signal Corps Beardslee system ran side by side, the Signal Corps operators were worsted. See, for example, the report of Capt. C. S. Bulkley to Col. A. Stager, 7 Nov. 1863, quoted in Sen. Doc. No. 251, 58th Cong., 2d Sess., 1903-04, *Relief of Telegraph Operators Who Served in the War of the Rebellion*, p. 15. Plum reports (II, 97) that the civilian telegraphers could transmit as much in five minutes as the Signal Corpsmen in an hour. Of course the range of the military telegraph was almost infinite, through the use of repeaters. In the Peninsular Campaign civilian telegraphers operating in the basket of Prof. Lowe's observation balloon transmitted directly to Fort Monroe and thence to the War Department in Washington. F. S. Haydon, *op. cit.*, p. 325.

Confederates would intercept and read important dispatches, the Union generals actually ordered that wigwag signals be discontinued. Myer wrote that "after the suspension of all signal duty, the officers remained idle, some acting as aides, others awaiting recall to active service."³⁴ Douglas Freeman, in his *Lee's Lieutenants*, took note of the bad Federal communications, remarking that in addition to equipment difficulties, the generals were at fault in withholding information which would have speeded communications, and, in the case of General Sedgwick, confidence was lacking in the security of the signal service. The report of the signal officer at Chancellorsville, Freeman added, deserves more consideration than it has hitherto received from historians.³⁵

In the next campaign, up through Maryland to Gettysburg in June and July 1863, aerial signals again played a large part. And in the great battle itself the Union chief, General Meade, quite in contrast with former Federal commanders, recognized the place of the Signal Corps in the military household. He called upon it, as upon other staff corps, to aid in the battle plans and he summoned Signal Corps officers to his war councils.³⁶ Consequently, visual communications, flag and torch, received much use at stations atop the Lutheran Seminary and along Cemetery Ridge. Signal Corpsmen occupied Little Round Top and opened torch communications with Emmitsburg at 11:00 p.m. 1 July.³⁷

³⁴Myer's Report, pp. 141-43, repeated verbatim by J. W. Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 348-51.

³⁵D. S. Freeman, *op. cit.*, II, 645.

The signal report, written by Capt. S. T. Cushing, Commissary of Subsistence, U.S. Army, Acting Chief Signal Officer, is printed in *The War of the Rebellion, Official Records* (Washington, 1889), Series 1, Vol. XXV, Pt. 1, pp. 217-23.

³⁶Lt. W. Glassford, "Historical Sketch of the Signal Corps," *loc. cit.*, p. 9; and Myer's Report, pp. 146-47 (Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 360).

³⁷Myer's Report, p. 147.

This signal station on Little Round Top leaped into utmost significance on the next day, 2 July. Captain James S. Hall, the Signal Officer stationed there, on the extreme left of the Federal line, was alone far into the afternoon. No Union troops were on the hill. Sickles' Corps in the foreground below the hill was being outflanked by Confederate units maneuvering undetected through the woods. That Little Round Top was a key position was not realized till late in the day; then both sides reached for it. General Warren, Meade's chief engineer, is generally given credit for saving Round Top from capture. Warren subsequently wrote that it was at his own suggestion that Meade sent him "to the left to examine the condition of affairs." But the accounts of Signal Corps officers indicate that it was messages of warning from the signalmen on Little Round Top which led Meade to send Warren.³⁸ Nine years after the battle, Warren wrote that he rode to the left "till I reached Little Round Top. There were no troops on it and it was used as a Signal Station. I saw that this was the key of the whole position. . . ." He then sent a dispatch to Meade for the troops which would arrive barely ahead of the flanking Confederates. Soon the attack began. "While I was still all alone with the signal officer," Warren reminisced, "the musketballs began to fly around us and he was about to fold up his flags and withdraw, but remained at my request and kept waving them in defiance."³⁹

Whether or not Signal Corpsman Hall had earlier wigwagged messages which led to the sending of Warren and troops to Little Round Top, it does appear that the very presence of the lookout and the conspicuous flag station had delayed the Confederates long enough to enable the Federals to seize the hill

³⁸J. W. Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 365-67; and Gen. A. W. Greely, "The Signal Corps," *loc. cit.*, p. 328.

³⁹O. W. Norton, *The Attack and Defense of Little Round Top* (New York, 1913), pp. 309-10.

first. E. P. Alexander, now a Confederate General, later made this interesting comment: "That wretched little signal station upon Round Top that day," he wrote, "caused one of our divisions to lose over two hours and probably delayed our assault nearly that long." As Alexander explained it, he had been directed, in moving his artillery, to keep out of sight of the Signal Corpsmen on Little Round Top.⁴⁰

Meanwhile the use of the electric telegraph, the flying wagon trains equipped with the simple Beardslee instruments and operated by the Signal Corps, was precipitating a crisis. The first application in the Peninsular and Fredericksburg campaigns had looked good. But thereafter it is evident there were disappointments. Even so, the Signal Corps ordered more trains built, some 30 in all. Five were assigned to the Army of the Potomac, four were placed in Signal Corps training camps and the rest were distributed among the several Departments.⁴¹

The skilled civilians of the Military Telegraph were contemptuous of the Beardslee device, frictional electric telegraph they called it.⁴² Indeed, the new instrument had limitations of range and operation. The range was short and the operation was slow. Further, if the devices at the two ends of a line fell out of synchronization, they garbled the messages. Myer himself no doubt recognized their limitations. But he could not obtain experienced Morse operators in the army. Besides, the maintenance and transport of the wet batteries had their disadvantages

in the field, as Myer well knew since his first telegraph train had included batteries. But now, taking a leaf from Myer's telegraphic efforts, the civilian telegraph organization, the so-called Military Telegraph, was entering into the field increasingly with portable Morse equipment. The situation confronted the Signal Corps with a crucial alternative. Either Colonel Myer would have to take over all wire telegraph in the field, whether Beardslee or Morse, or he would lose wire telegraph operation altogether to the Military Telegraph, headed by Anson Stager, who in effect reported to no general of the army but only to the Secretary of War himself, Secretary Stanton in Washington.

In September 1863 Myer made an effort to obtain experienced telegraphers, offering them commissions. At the same time he urged his officers in the Signal Corps to resist any attempt to take away its wire telegraph trains and lines. The attempt came and was accomplished very soon. In October Stager complained to Stanton of the embarrassment and trouble occasioned by the presence of two wire telegraph organizations in the field. On 10 November 1863, Stanton sided with Stager. He ordered that all telegraph trains in the Army be turned over to Stager and his military telegraph organization. At the same time Secretary Stanton relieved Myer as the Chief Signal Officer and put Major William Nicodemus in charge of the Corps, which was now limited to aerial, that is, visual, signals only.⁴³

The Military Telegraph organization never made use of the Beardslee instruments, though the civilian linemen did employ the insulated wire. Insulated wire of course was

⁴⁰J. W. Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 367.

Alexander observed further, regarding Federal observation balloons: "I have never understood why the enemy abandoned the use of military balloons early in 1863 after having used them extensively up to that time. Even if the observers never saw anything, they would have been worth all they cost for the annoyance and delays they caused us in trying to keep our movements out of their sight."

⁴¹W. R. Plum, *op. cit.*, II, 89.

⁴²*Ibid.*; and R. W. Chambers, *op. cit.*, pp. 143-144.

⁴³Myer's *Report*, pp. 151-52; J. W. Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 180-81; and W. R. Plum, *op. cit.*, II, 99-103.

Colonel Myer was of course returned as Chief Signal Officer in 1866 after having been brevetted brigadier general. He remained chief of the post-war Signal Corps until his death in 1880.

easier to lay than bare wire. It could be laid on the ground or along fences while bare wire had to be strung on insulators on poles.⁴⁴ The civilian employees of the organization accompanied the Federal armies in the field, and strung some 15,000 miles of wire during the war, laying out the lines and taking them up as the situation demanded. The civilian telegraphers, with their wagons, tents and instruments serving army and corps headquarters, came close enough to battle to experience all its dangers. Their routine labors were heavy. Stager estimated that the telegraphic traffic during Fiscal Year 1863 averaged 3,300 messages a day, some messages running to thousands of words. A number of the civilians performed extremely hazardous and valuable missions, tapping Confederate wire lines in Confederate territory. A great many of the some 1,200 civilian telegraphers suffered casualties from disease, accident, or enemy action. All this they did without the benefits of military service, not without some bitterness for their lack of reward. That they remained unrequited with military status, even when they took over the field telegraph of the Signal Corps, was the consequence, it seems, of Secretary Stanton's passion for civilian control, for control by himself.⁴⁵

Edwin M. Stanton before the war had been a director in, and an attorney for, the Atlantic and Ohio Telegraph Company. He recognized the value of an extensive telegraph net and of strong control over it and he perceived the essence of security, of protecting

the telegraphic code. He allowed no general, nor even the President, to interfere. As a result the Union generals did not control the telegraph lines and operators. General Grant tested Stanton's authority several times, once forcing a civilian telegrapher to hand over the code to one of his staff officers. But Stanton soon compelled Grant to hand it back.⁴⁶

The military telegraph, under Secretary Stanton the Autocrat, has been described as the "perfect autocracy." One historian termed his control of telegraph as "peculiarly autocratic and independent." Not allowing his telegraphers to be attached to any military command, Stanton made them answerable to himself only and he saw to it above all that the safety of the code was insured. And it was. The Military Telegraph code was uncompromised and secure throughout the war. Further, of course, this sort of control, all telegraph lines ultimately terminating in the War Department telegraph office next to Stanton's own rooms, put the Secretary of War at the very pinnacle of intelligence and surveillance. No wonder Stanton thought highly of his telegraph and described it as "his right arm watching and guarding his armies everywhere, night and day, and keeping constantly before his eyes a perfect but ever changing panorama of the vast battlefield of the Union."⁴⁷

But the stripping away of wire telegraph, including the Beardslee sets, was a shock to the Signal Corps. Myer regarded the act as crippling army signals in the field. In subsequent campaigns there often were two communication agencies in the Union Army.⁴⁸ There were the Signal Corps flag and torch

⁴⁴See, e.g., R. W. Chambers, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-69 and 196.

⁴⁵W. R. Plum, *op. cit.*, I, Preface and 62; *ibid.*, II, 337-75; Gen. A. W. Greely, "The Military Telegraph Service," pp. 342-68 in F. T. Miller (ed.), *loc. cit.*; and *Sen. Doc. No. 251*, 58th Cong., 2d Sess., 1903-04, pp. 1-62.

The bitterness of the civilian telegraphers over lack of recognition is well brought out in a historical novel by F. W. Chambers, *op. cit.*, pp. 316-17. See also p. 169.

⁴⁶W. R. Plum, *op. cit.*, I, 60, and II, 170-74.

⁴⁷F. A. Flower, *E. M. Stanton The Autocrat* (N. Y., 1905), pp. 216-222. See also Lt. Col. W. R. Matheny, "Military Telegraph in the Civil War," *Signal Corps Bulletin* No. 58 (Jan.-Feb. 1931), pp. 36-40.

⁴⁸See, e.g., R. W. Chambers, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-72 and 198.

wigwag men with their visual stations, and there were the lines of the Military Telegraph people. In some campaigns, too, there was the Signal Corps only, and no kind of wire telegraph. In the Gulf Department, for example, one Signal Corps officer complained:

During this campaign I have had constant cause for regret that the instrument formerly known as the Signal Telegraph was no longer in our hands or in operation in the field. Many opportunities arose where its service would have been invaluable. I have laid these facts before the major general commanding the Department with the request that if the American Telegraph Company did not intend to use the instruments they might be turned over temporarily to the Signal Corps.⁴⁹

Myer did not doubt the place of the civilian telegraph in what we would now call the Zone of the Interior, but civilian telegraph with the fighting troops was another matter.⁵⁰ It was wrong for the civilians who suffered the hardships and dangers of war without the compensations soldiers receive. And it was a wrong to the officers and men of the Signal Corps. Myer kept hammering the point, as in a vigorous letter he wrote to Secretary Stanton a year after Stanton had ejected Myer and turned over the field telegraph trains to Stager. Myer wrote:

The introduction of the use in the Army of the United States of portable Field Telegraph Lines, as distinguished from the permanent lines of the Quartermaster's Department, is an achievement of the Signal Corps of that Army. . . . It was planned for them. It was assigned to them. It was first brought into use in the Army of the United States by them, and taken by them, as a branch of their military duty, it has been carried by them to its present proven; usefulness. Without this action of the officers and men of the Signal Corp of the Army, this duty would probably not have been at all introduced into our service.⁵¹

Subsequent practice has proven that Myer was right. Field telegraph, field communication, is of course an army obligation, not civilian. General Greely, most renowned of Chief Signal officers, wrote years later: "Beneficial and desirable as were the civil cooperation and management of the telegraphic service in Washington, its forced expansion to armies in the field was a mistaken policy."⁵²

After Myer's departure in November 1863 (to return as the Chief Signal Officer in the post-war period), Major Nicodemus headed a somewhat shorn, yet still vigorous Signal Corps. The Corps remained vigorous even when Nicodemus, like Myer before him, fell under Stanton's potent displeasure late in 1864, because he had distributed to his officers in the field his annual report without clearing it with the Secretary of War. The order dismissing Nicodemus charged that the report contained "information useful to the enemy and prejudicial to the service of the United States." Stanton further sent men and an officer to the signal bureau to seize the press and every copy of the report.⁵³ Such action makes it appear possible that code or cipher information may have been involved. If so, it points up Stanton's emphasis on security, which may have been a major factor in the Secretary's autocratic control of the Military Telegraph. Nicodemus, incidentally, was returned to the Signal Corps in March 1865 with the rank of lieutenant colonel and was honorably mustered out of service the following August.⁵⁴

⁵²Gen. A. W. Greely, "The Signal Corps," *loc. cit.*, p. 362.

⁵³J. W. Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 87 and 164.

⁵⁴Nicodemus may also have offended Stanton because he had urged that the field telegraph trains be returned to the Signal Corps. See the *Historical Sketch of the Signal Corps (1860-1941)* (Eastern Signal Corps Schools Pamphlet No. 32; Ft. Monmouth, N. J., 1942), pp. 14-15. Glassford regarded the charge against Nicodemus, that his report might give comfort to the enemy, as "ostensible," in short, trumped up. Lt. W. Glassford, "Historical Sketch of the Signal Corps," *loc. cit.*, p. 13.

⁴⁹Myer's Report, pp. 157-58 and 226.

⁵⁰J. W. Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 143; and Col. A. J. Myer, *Manual of Signals* (Washington, 1864), p. 119.

⁵¹A. J. Myer, *The Memorial of Albert J. Myer* (n. p., n. d.). The letter, the last paper in the booklet (in L. of C.) was dated 26 Nov. 1864.

After the dismissal of Nicodemus in November 1864, Colonel Benjamin F. Fisher acted as the Chief Signal Officer for the remainder of the Civil War. Signal flag and torch, Myer's aerial telegraph, continued to distinguish themselves in innumerable campaigns. The system was used not only on land but on ships as well in the combined land and water operations along the southern coasts and waterways. In fact the Navy during the war adopted Army's signal system. The apathy and disinterest which signals early encountered gradually yielded to general acceptance. An army officer had said on one occasion "Oh, the telegraph will do. We can't bother with these balloons and whirlingig flags, and colored lamps and fourth-of-July fireworks!"⁵⁶ But he was thoroughly refuted. Colored light signals were part of the Signal Corps' indispensable equipment. On one occasion at the siege of Knoxville roman candles intended for signaling, were put to use to illuminate a night attack, in the manner of star shells of subsequent wars, enabling the

⁵⁶L. D. Ingersoll, *A History of the War Department of the United States* (Washington, 1880), p. 154.

defenders to mow down the Confederates before they reached the breastworks.⁵⁸ And the effort to adapt the telegraph to field needs, the first gropings toward what later became tactical army communications,⁵⁷ led to the Beardslee magneto-electric telegraph instrument. This deserves especial notice because it was the very first electrical device designed and built specifically for army signals. The concept of the field telegraph train grew from Albert Myer's determination to serve the army with a Signal Corps equipped with all possible communicational aids. Thanks to General Myer and the Military Telegraph during the Civil War, both the Union Army and the Federal Government enjoyed communications on a scale surpassing that of any previous conflict.

⁵⁸J. W. Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 503.

⁵⁷"It should be borne in mind," Myer wrote in the first edition of his *Manual* (1864), "that portable lines and parties . . . should accompany an army, precisely as does its artillery, to be used successfully for only one day or one battle, provided they may, by successful use on that day, or at that battle, contribute to a victory. . . . The service of light and portable field lines has never been developed to its full extent in our Army." A. J. Myer, *Manual of Signals* (1864), pp. 120-21.

MAJOR LAWSON'S SLIDES

Major Alexander R. Lawson of Thorofare, New Jersey, has made an extensive collection of slides covering various topics and personalities of American history, more particularly military history. Some four hundred of these slides are lent to interested persons or groups merely for the cost of the insured parcel post. The slides portray items such as Continental Artillery of 1780, the McPherson Blues of 1799, the Philadelphia State Fencibles of 1844, the Louisiana Zouaves, Stuart's Cavalry Division, Captain Theodore Roosevelt of 1885, Denver City Troop, United States Marines of various periods, the Canadian Cameron Highlanders, and the like. Address inquiries to Major Lawson, not to this publication.

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THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Editor: GEORGE J. STANSFIELD

REVIEWS

Strategy. By B. H. Liddell Hart. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. Pp. 420. \$5.95.)

Liddell Hart's book will doubtless gain many converts to the creed of the American Military Institute. The Institute, since its birth in 1933, has encouraged the study of military history as the best kind of intellectual preparation for solving the problems of war. Liddell Hart has devoted his fruitful years of study to the same proposition. He considers "military history as the basis of military education" because of "its preponderant practical value in the training and mental development of a soldier."

Today, however, it is not only the soldier who needs to know military history. No statesman can pretend to guide a nation's destiny without an awareness of the principles of grand strategy. This book is for him; and also for the layman who would prepare himself to contribute intelligently to the problems of war and peace in a democracy.

Decisive wars and campaigns of the past twenty-five hundred years have provided the laboratory in which Liddell Hart has distilled the essence of strategy and grand strategy. He comes up with a major conclusion and a number of other findings which are the usual and well known principles of strategy. But in his opinion the greatest of these—and it is the thesis of this book—is that the indirect approach is the essential ingredient for success in both purely military and grand strategy. In his own words he is convinced "that, throughout the ages, effective results in war have rarely been attained unless the approach has had such indirectness as to insure the opponent's unreadiness to meet it. The indirectness has usually been physical, and always psychological. In strategy, the longest way round is often the shortest way home."

Sometimes in reading this survey of many of the decisive campaigns and wars of recorded history we may be tempted to say our author "doth protest too much." In the examples cited the indirect approach is always there but perhaps success was occasionally due more to superior morale or greater fire power, or just plain luck, than to the unquestioned fact that the approach was assuredly indirect. Incidentally, Liddell Hart sees the indirect approach as "a law of life in all spheres." He might have suggested the Socratic method as an example where the frontal attack for reaching the truth is always avoided in favor of the indirect approach.

Whenever, following indirect approach, psychological dislocation has won a campaign or a war without a pitched battle, the author is particularly gratified, as he might well be. The success gained by the Theban general Epaminondas in upsetting the foundations of Spartan power without a victory in battle and Caesar's achievement at Ilerda are early experiences in war proving that the indirect approach is the most economical form of strategy. On this continent, Wolfe's Quebec campaign is shown to have been "an illuminating example of the truth that a decision is produced even more by the mental and moral dislocation of the command than by the physical dislocation of its forces. And these effects transcend the geographical and statistical calculations which fill nine-tenths of the normal book on military history."

When we recall Stonewall Jackson's visit to the Quebec battlefield on his wedding trip and the deep impression it made on him, we may conclude that Wolfe's maneuvers probably influenced strongly the Civil War strategy of the famous Valley campaign.

More than a third of the book is needed for an inquiry into the strategy and grand strategy of the two World Wars. The discussion of the fundamentals of the two forms of strategy is consequently based on an extensive series of historical evidence, much of it in the twentieth century. Probably evidence in this aspect of warfare is more reliable than the data on numerical forces, on the plans of campaign and the confused action of battle which can readily be tampered with after the event. Major moves in a campaign are not easily falsified.

Liddell Hart's book is required reading for soldiers and statesmen even if there is occasional disagreement with his findings and conclusions. It is of course well written and readable and it should appeal as much to the specialist in military history as to the layman who will find it a superior introduction to the annals of warfare.

DONALD ARMSTRONG
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Communist Guerrilla Warfare. By Brigadier C. Aubrey Dixon, O. B. E. and Dr. Otto Heilbrunn. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1954. Pp. 229, \$4.50.) **Irregulars, Partisans and Guerrillas.** Edited and with commentaries by Irwin R. Blacker. (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1954. Pp. 503, \$5.00.) **The Communist Struggle in Malaya.** By Gene Z. Hanrahan. (New York, International Secretariat Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954. Pp. 146, mimeographed, \$2.00.)

Guerrilla warfare is a paradox. It is manifested in every form and degree throughout military history. The Allies used it with success in every theater during World War II. Based on its successful use by Communists against China and Germany it has been developed by them into a major politico-military technique. By its use, the Communists have won parts of Indo-China and continue to threaten Malaya. By its threatened use, thousands of troops of free nations are pinned down elsewhere. All this is accomplished without the commitment of a single Russian or Chinese soldier. We undoubtedly will use guerrillas in a future war. The enemy most certainly will.

Yet, information on guerrilla warfare is sparse, books on it are few. The professional soldier knows little about it and most don't care to know more. This is perhaps understandable because of the very nature of guerrilla warfare. It is gen-

erally conducted by non-professionals in a amateurish way. There are few professional careers to be made or laurels to be won in a guerrilla campaign. It is extremely difficult and vicious and the usual laws of war do not apply. Small wonder is it that so little attention is paid its study or practice in professional circles. Therefore, to those interested in guerrilla warfare, the simultaneous publication of three excellent works on this subject is a major event.

Communist Guerrilla Warfare bears a somewhat misleading title which indicates a greater scope than it actually possesses. A more accurate title might be "Guerrilla and Anti-Guerrilla Warfare on the Eastern Front" for Russia's guerrilla effort and German attempts to counter it are the subjects exhaustively treated.

Brigadier Dixon and Dr. Heilbrunn were members of the war crimes tribunal at Nuremberg. In that capacity they had the opportunity to interrogate German officials and generals and to search captured archives for material on partisan and anti-partisan warfare on the Eastern Front. Based on these captured German and Russian documents (which by the way are quoted at length) and the interrogations and testimony of German officers plus extensive use of contemporary published sources and the authors' own scholarship and keen insight they have produced a valuable, accurate and exhaustive, yet quite readable text on these aspects of guerrilla warfare.

Specific techniques of guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare as well as their broader aspects are treated. Both sides had their successes and failures. Both are objectively covered. For the first time, to the reviewer's knowledge, the legal status of guerrillas under various international conventions and in practice is realistically discussed. Psychological and moral problems of guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare are dealt with. To round out the book, excerpts from Russian guerrilla and German anti-guerrilla instructions are included in an appendix. Dixon and Heilbrunn, by this study, have made a definite contribution to the literature of guerrilla warfare.

In contrast, *The Irregulars* is a general anthology on guerrilla warfare. Irwin Blacker, erstwhile soldier, journalist and English professor and presently a free lance writer, has assembled 32 true guerrilla stories. He prefaces them with his own perceptive introduction to guerrilla warfare and to each story he adds his own editorial comment on background, personalities, sources and principles.

The accounts begin in Colonial America—Morgan's march on Panama and Rodger's Rangers—and end with the Haganah's activities in post-World War II Palestine. The World War II period is represented by an aggregation of oddly-named guerrilla groups that spelled death to the invaders—Commandos, Chetniks, Maquis, Chindits, Jedburghs, Long Range Desert Group, Popski's Private Army and Coastwatchers. From other periods are included accounts of Russians against Napoleon, Greeks against Turks, Mosby's Confederate Rangers, Apaches against Americans and Mexicans, Caucasians against Russians, Boers against British, Lawrence's Arabs and Mao's Communists.

Of course, everyone's favorite guerrilla action couldn't be included. Nevertheless, Blacker's stories are well chosen and he accomplishes his aim of presenting interesting, exciting and honest accounts illustrating all phases of guerrilla activity. By covering all phases, he attempts no strict definition of guerrilla warfare. Rather, in addition to the classic indigenous guerrilla fighting force, he includes accounts of the saboteur, the resistance movement, the reconnaissance agent, guerrilla strategy and politics and the regular raiding troops such as Commandos. Blacker's anthology certainly belongs in any military library.

The Communist Struggle in Malaya by Gene Z. Hanrahan does for the Chinese Communist guerrillas in that country what *Communist Guerrilla Warfare* does for Russian guerrillas in World War II, and more. This study is not a comprehensive study of Communism in Malaya but is concerned principally with the tactics and strategy of the revolutionary movement—the ways and means of a militant Bolshevik revolution. Consequently, such topics as armed insurrection, revolutionary techniques, labor activities and guerrilla warfare per se, rather than purely ideological or social manifestations of the movement, are stressed.

Chronologically the study covers twenty-nine years of conspiracy and open revolt—from 1924 through 1953. The early years, up to the Japanese invasion, were spent in organizational and propaganda work. With the war came a temporary rapprochement with the British and the two conducted guerrilla warfare together against the Japanese. The tragic fallacy of Allied aid to Communist guerrillas opposing the Axis was manifest in Malaya as elsewhere. The arms, explosives, organization and techniques provided by the British were turned against them after the war. Although progress in suppression has been made

the Chinese Communist guerrillas in Malaya are still strong and continue to pin down thousands of British troops. Hanrahan, by confining his study to one country and spotlighting the militant aspects of the Communist revolutionary movement, reveals this conspiracy for what it is—an all-out struggle for power with naked force as the means.

Gene Z. Hanrahan, a World War II Marine, is perhaps this country's keenest student of Communist guerrilla warfare. His book is equally as readable and as scholarly as Dixon and Heilbrunn's study of Russian guerrillas. It is completely documented from primary sources and an appendix includes several translations of Communist guerrilla policy and instructional documents. Mr. Hanrahan is the author of a report for the U. S. Army on Chinese Communist Guerrilla Tactics and has contributed articles to the professional journals on this and related subjects. He is working on a study of the evolution of the Chinese Communist Army and a history of guerrilla warfare.

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The Fighting Sudanese. By H. C. Jackson.
(London, Macmillan & Co. New York; St. Martins Press, 1954. Pp. 85. \$2.00.)

This very brief book was written by an old Sudan hand, a former governor of the provinces of Berber and Halfa. His object in writing the book was to praise the courage and fighting efficiency of the Sudanese soldier, and to stress his past loyalty to the British. The first part of the volume recounts the turbulent military past of the Sudan, which reached its high point in the "River War" of 1898, when at Omdurman the Khalifa's army was blown away by British firepower.

But most of *The Fighting Sudanese* is devoted to World War II, when a handful of these intrepid soldiers kept a large Italian army so upset that the Sudan was never conquered by the soldiers of Mussolini. Perhaps the latter thought Britain would surrender and the whole area would fall into his hands without a fight. Or perhaps the Italians just weren't interested in fighting.

Mr. Jackson's book is a welcome study of a little known but important phase of World War II.

ROBERT WALKER DAVIS
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Ideas and Weapons. Exploitation of the Aerial Weapons by the United States during World War I: a Study in the Relationship of Technological Advance, Military Doctrine, and the Development of Weapons. By I. B. Holley, Jr. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953. 222 pp., \$3.75.)

Writings on the history of aviation, with a few exceptions, fall easily into one of two categories, the adventure yarn or the homily on air power. In both cases aviators are shining knights. In the one they battle the elements and in the other the assorted dragons of military conservatism, usually identified as battleship admirals or horse generals. Mr. Holley has chosen to be one of the exceptions, and, although the title appears a little over-presumptuous, his book is certainly the most significant volume on the history of American aviation to appear during the semi-centennial year of powered flight.

The reader will not find here a retelling of the furious air battles over the Western Front, nor will he learn much about the detailed development of air frames, engines, and armaments. Instead he will be given a thoughtful analysis of the effort by the United States Army to translate experience into doctrine and doctrine into plans for the development and production of the types of aircraft so urgently needed in France.

The failure of the Army's air program was a scandal at the time, and its echoes have not yet entirely died away as was revealed when the name of the incumbent Secretary of the Air Force was presented to the Senate for confirmation in 1953. Mr. Holley identifies the real source of the failure not among the manufacturers but in the Army itself, not in the corruption and malevolence of individuals but in the inexperience of officials and the lack of machinery to develop and integrate a new weapon into the existing system. The Army had no adequate organization for either the collection and analysis of information or the promulgation of firm decisions at the necessary levels. The result was inevitably changes of plans and programs, orders, cancellations, and reorders of aircraft. The author points out the need for a good organization to evaluate both operational and technical information, to develop sound doctrine, and to make the decisions without which firm plans cannot be drawn for the development and production of machines and equipment. Believing, as he does, that victory in any conflict is more closely related to weapon superiority than to any other

factor, he is concerned that the lessons of World War I may be forgotten and his country fall behind in the present crisis.

It is not so much, however, for his general thesis, which by now should be fairly obvious, as for the historical insights into World War I that his book is valuable. In what has passed for the history of aviation too little attention has been paid to the wealth of material in official records. Mr. Holley has exploited but a small segment of this material and produced significant results. It is to be regretted that he did not extend his researches into the contemporaneous activities of the Navy where he would have found interesting parallels and contrasts and have better justified his ambitious title. From scanning his excellent bibliography, it is apparent that he did not consult Turnbull and Lord's *History of United States Naval Aviation*, and he has curiously neglected the Aeronautical Board even though a thoroughly documented monograph by A. C. VanWynen is available.

Obviously the reader does not have to accept all the author's generalizations, but he will do well to consider them carefully. For example, this reviewer does not believe that a much improved organization would have produced significantly better results in World War I. Experience in another conflict has indicated how long, even under more favorable conditions, it takes to develop, test, and build aircraft. In the future more than ever nations will fight with the types of equipment already well advanced before the shooting begins. This places a high value not only on intelligence and command organizations but also on the rare quality of imagination that can grasp, at least partially, the conditions of the future.

The many references to strategic bombing seem to read back into the past a concept that was embryonic in 1918, if it really existed at all. Yet, we must allow a trail-breaker some shortcomings. *Ideas and Weapons*, whatever its faults, remains an important, almost a unique, book. Mr. Holley should be encouraged to broaden his investigations and continue them into the era of Billy Mitchell. His background and analytical method seem ideally suited to assessing the contribution of ebullient Mitchell to the development of aviation and, what is more important, to rescue the General not so much from the calumny of his enemies as from the over-adulation of his friends.

HENRY M. DATER
Department of Defense

N.A.T.O. and Its Prospects: A Study of the Defense Organization for Western Europe. By J. D. Warne. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1954. Pp. 110. \$3.00.)

If a tally were made of the books and articles written about NATO during its first five years, the contributions of military officers connected with the organization would comprise a large share of the total. Their special familiarity with the subject has served to make their reports informative and usually authoritative. The study of Wing-Commander Warne, formerly on the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, is of this genre, and as such makes an important contribution to NATO historiography.

The most useful sections of the book are those that carry on the story of NATO's evolution from the point where the Royal Institute of International Affairs' *Atlantic Alliance* stopped in 1952. The inability of NATO to meet the force goals set at Lisbon, the effects of Soviet tactics upon the development of the Alliance, and the new emphasis on long-term planning are all well handled. Without minimizing the problems facing NATO today, he feels that the progress symbolized by the Lisbon meeting in 1952 resulted not from the formulation of any program designed to solve all of NATO's troubles but from the fact "that member governments had submitted to a searching examination of all but their innermost secrets and had in the main accepted an independent judgment as to the course of action to be followed." (p. 37) His recommendations for improving the command organization of SHAPE and his criticisms of United States policies reflect the considerations of a professional soldier and the feelings of a British subject. Despite these reservations the author concludes that NATO can be made militarily secure if the critical lack of forces can be remedied.

The designated objective of the author, however, is to do more than generalize from his experiences and observations as a staff officer. In addition to covering the growth of NATO as a military entity he examines the prospects of NATO's becoming a political community and speculates on the causes and cures of the Cold War. In this area the results leave much to be desired. In the beginning of his study Commander Warne claims that NATO's growth was partly the result of external events and partly the result of natural processes of evolution. While there is ample evidence for the first part of his statement,

his discussion of the evolutionary processes is not enlightening. For example, he suggests that the idea of a supra-national community will develop from the gradual whittling down of national bonds, but little thought is given to the type of community that might evolve in the future. The volume is also marred by a superficial and misleading analysis of the East-West cleavage. Much of this section is devoted to an oversimplified and often irrelevant discussion of Russian history with the aim of showing that Bolshevism is primarily a consequence of Russia's alienation from Western society and that Communist expansionism is essentially Russian imperialism in modern dress. On the basis of his assumptions the author comes to the conclusion that the West might eventually live with the Soviet rulers just as it had lived with the Czars.

The contrast between Warne's mastery of tactical and strategical matters and his amateurish investigations of the sources of international tensions induces the observation that the author might have profitably confined his study to the military aspects of NATO. Reduced in size and restricted in scope, it would have made a suitable article for publication in *The Army Quarterly*, which sponsored the volume.

LAWRENCE S. KAPLAN
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Cavalry of the Sky: The Story of U.S. Marine Combat Helicopters. By Lynn Montross (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. Pp. 270, \$3.00.)

It took the Marine Corps more than twenty years to perfect the amphibious doctrines and techniques that played the major part in winning World War II, but the first atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima rendered these obsolete in less than twenty seconds. And any lingering doubt on this score was rudely dispelled by the atomic tests in Bikini Lagoon in the summer of 1946, with their terribly destructive effects on massed shipping.

No one saw the handwriting on the wall more clearly than Marine officers, whose Corps had been assigned amphibious warfare as its special province and responsibility. In face of this new destructive power, the basic concept of concentrated assault power and supporting arms in the target area "had been relegated to the wastebasket of history." Clearly, the new problem called for tactical dispersion during the approach, followed by swift concentration of assault elements on the ob-

jective, the latter impossible to effect by any means yet devised for landing troops against strongly prepared defenses.

Lynn Montross' *Cavalry of the Sky* is a straightforward, factual account of the Marines' tactical development of the helicopter as both an assault and logistical implement to fill the above lack: a refinement of the airborne concept of vertical envelopment. They started about as close to scratch as men could get; in 1946 the helicopter was barely beyond the experimental stage aerodynamically, its military potentialities wholly conjectural. And they commissioned their first experimental squadron in 1947 without a helicopter to their name, "doing business on a basis of hope, faith, and enthusiasm."

These men employed imaginative thinking to an amazing degree. At the outset any helicopter capable of lifting more than one or two combat-equipped troops was nothing more than a gleam in some inventor's eye; yet the Marines grounded their doctrines on craft powerful enough to move smaller units without violating their tactical integrity: squads, platoons, etc., not to mention artillery and motor transport, in the manner of World War II landing craft. Yet when they received their first tiny helicopters, they did not even know how susceptible these might be to accidental damage in flight, until June 1948 when an "absent-minded osprey" tangled with the supposedly fragile rotor of one of them—with no serious consequences to anybody except the obliging fishhawk.

The helicopters received their baptism of fire in Korea and provided what will likely prove to be the greatest tactical development to come out of that conflict. But some time passed before they could be employed at what the Marine Corps had conceived as their primary mission. From the beginning commanding officers used them as generals had used the horse in the Civil War and the jeep in World War II: for reconnaissance, liaison and command missions—and discovered that they could go where neither horse nor jeep could penetrate, and get there very much faster. They also saw extensive service supplying outposts in difficult terrain, evacuating casualties from similar spots, and rescuing downed airmen at sea and behind enemy lines.

With the arrival of a helicopter transport squadron in the late summer of 1951, the Marines began troop lifts on a sizable scale, culminating with the relief of an entire battalion in the front lines. Supply and evacuation missions continued

on an increased scale to the end of the struggle, the "workhorses of the 1st Marine Division" carrying on a dozen other uniquely useful functions as well.

Mr. Montross tells a story of men and machines and ideas without frills or purple prose, but with a wealth of drama, incidents and personalities. He sustains reader interest throughout in dealing with a subject which in less expert hands might easily have lapsed into dullness.

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Gekämpft, gesiegt, geschlagen. By Lothar Rendulic. (Wels-Heidelberg, Verlag Welsermühl, 1952. Pp. 384.)

The author of this book was a Generaloberst in the German Wehrmacht. He began his military career on the Habsburg general staff and later became one of the few military writers of post-war Austria. Despite this background, he is far less critical of Hitler and the Nazis than the many German generals who recently published their memoirs. Yet, usually, the author departs from objectivity only in those cases where his knowledge of events outside of Germany is deficient.

General Rendulic shows that not all professional soldiers who, after the war, have been execrating Hitler for his strategy have come forth with valid criticism. Guderian's idea that during August-September 1941 Hitler made a mistake when he wheeled his central armies southward and fought the battle of Kiev instead of going directly to Moscow is opposed on the ground that it would have been too risky to drive a deep wedge into the Russian lines without first destroying a major threat to its right flank and bases. If the Ukrainian armies had been left intact, Hitler might or might not have taken Moscow, but a counterattack from the south and southeast would have cut off the German forward positions at the Russian capital. In other words, Guderian's strategy would have produced a Stalingrad within three months from the start of the Russian war.

Likewise, General Halder's point that in December 1941 Hitler should have ordered a deep retreat from Moscow is revealed as unrealistic. Against the intense cold and the piled-up snow, the troops could not have moved faster than they did anyhow. It was physically impossible to withdraw for 200 or more miles and in any event, a substantial withdrawal would have entailed the abandonment of all heavy material, a "solution"

which would have been followed by the early destruction of the German army. While this point may be granted, Hitler's error in ordering the attack on Moscow just before the onset of cold weather should not have been overlooked. Nevertheless, Rendulic's argument throws some doubts on the fashionable theory that Hitler was nothing but a military dilettante.

During the course of the war the author became a specialist in defensive fighting. He is inclined to side with Hitler against the proponents of "elastic defense." His own experience on the Russian front proved to him that it often may be more advantageous to hold on to a fixed defense line rather than withdraw and counterattack and, in the process, lose equipment and organizational cohesion. He claims that, given adequate supplies, it usually was possible to oppose a four or fivefold Russian superiority successfully, not because the Russian soldier is not a good fighter but because he frequently lacks initiative and adaptability, and because field ranks and most Russian commanders were tactically unskillful.

General Rendulic was the commander who, after the Russo-Finnish armistice, led the German army from Northern Finland into Norway, a feat which Hitler and the OKW believed to be impossible of achievement. The author's analysis of the topographical and military conditions of the Scandinavian Arctic and of the unprecedented problems which had to be solved on that front should arrest the attention of Arctic specialists. There seems to be little question that most of the territory is impassable for modern ground forces, yet even under such extreme conditions, ingenious logisticians can find new and useful solutions. In order to keep open those parts of the road which habitually are buried under huge snow drifts, the Germans, during summer, constructed large snow tunnels of several miles' length. These tunnels were built from heavy timber brought in by sea. They covered the road completely and after snow had fallen, allowed traffic to move without interruption *below* the deep snow cover. What targets such tunnels would have been! If the Soviet Air Force had understood its business, the German army would have been unable to withdraw from Finland. So Rendulic lived to tell his tale and to display pride in the prowess of his forces and the effectiveness of his own leadership. His book is a valuable contribution to the history of the Second World War.

STEFAN T. POSSONY
Arlington, Va.

Modern Germany, Its History and Civilization. By Koppel S. Pinson. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1954. Pp. XV, 637. \$10.00.)

This clear, scholarly, and well-documented volume is a highly creditable achievement in the field of historical writing. Based on the findings contained in the best monographic literature published to date, and utilizing the vast amount of German source material made available in the last thirty years, this work presents a broad synthesis of German history and culture from 1800 to the present.

In general, Professor Pinson has succeeded in meeting a long-standing demand for a more balanced and liberal interpretation of German history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as a contrast to that presented by the many scholars dominated by the conservative and nationalist schools of German historians. The wars and diplomacy of the period are given minimum treatment, while internal political, constitutional, economic and social developments receive much wider and more extensive coverage. The most notable feature of this study is the integration of developments in German thought into the process of historical development.

In presenting this work to the public Professor Pinson makes "no claim to Olympian aloofness or to *absolute* scientific objectivity." He freely admits that the emphasis and evaluation which he has given to the materials used, as well as the criteria which he has employed in gauging the historical significance of men and events, may be colored by his strong leanings toward liberal democracy, humanitarianism, and the ethical ideals of the Judeo-Christian tradition.

The core of the volume is the account of the tragic efforts of liberalism and democracy to assert themselves in modern German history, and the submersion of these elements time and again in a wave of nationalism and militarism. Professor Pinson is meticulous in demonstrating how a liberal political thought began to flower in Germany in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, based on a combination of French Revolutionary ideology and Kantian ethics, and influenced by English political ideas and institutions. It looked upon the free development of the individual as the highest goal of society, and advocated the establishment of parliamentary institutions, constitutionalism, and ministerial responsibility. Unlike the case in England and France, however, the unresolved issue of German national

unity was thrust upon this pattern of thought, and in the mind of the German liberal *Freiheit* (freedom) and *Einheit* (unity) came to be regarded as inseparable.

Much of Professor Pinson's narrative focuses, therefore, on the futile attempts of Germans to create a synthesis of freedom and unity. He reveals that when Germans were forced ultimately to make a choice between the two alternatives, they tended to sacrifice freedom to unity. Thus, in the Frankfurt Assembly in 1848-49 the means of attaining unity, and the instrument for achieving it, proved the object of greater attachment, while the cause of liberal constitutional and social institutions suffered. Again, these latter issues were submerged and virtually lost in the wave of nationalist and patriotic sentiment engendered by Bismarck's successes in 1864, 1866, and 1871.

Nor can one escape the ominous implications for contemporary world politics contained in this interpretation of modern German history. Today the German attempt to set up a democratic state is complicated once more by the issue of German national unity, and there is considerable evidence to support the view that the attainment of national unity may be of the greater interest to the German people.

DR. HAROLD J. CLEM
Washington, D. C.

Decisive Battles of the Western World, Volume I, by Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, B. A. ret. etc. (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company. Pp. 615, \$6.00.)

General Fuller is an experienced soldier and in the opinion of this reviewer the most distinguished analyst of war. In November, 1917, as Chief of Staff of the British Tank Corps he was the chief planner and one of the chief executives of the Cambrai operation which achieved complete surprise, broke clear through the German Front and would have put the Germans out of much of their occupied territories in the West had Allied Reserves been available. Since 1918 he has given us at least thirty books of military history and theory. The Germans were quick to acknowledge that the basic idea of the lightning successes of their Plane-Tank teams in '39 and '40 was taken from his published works.

The full title of the present book is "The De-

cisive Battles Of The Western World And Their Influence Upon History From The Earliest Times To The Battle Of Lepanto." A future second volume will continue the story through Waterloo and a third will bring it down to our own time.

It has been well said that those who write books "stand up to be shot at" from all sides. Since the present volume begins with Thothmes III's victory at Armageddon in Palestine in 1479 B. C. and covers more than three thousand years with short connecting chapters on general history between battles, it might be said that its author has made himself a conspicuous target for battalions of historical specialists. For instance one might sketch the military aspect of the decline of Rome in very different fashion. Again one might question the choice of particular battles. In the Medieval field for example some might argue that Muret and Bouvines should not have been left out whereas Sluys should not have been put in. On the other hand one welcomes the emphasis laid on the Christian reconquest of Spain from the Moors and the insistence on the importance of Turkish pressure from the East during the early stages of the Reformation era.

While tactics change with technique, the strategy of long past wars still has lessons for us while the problems of military policy hardly change at all. General Fuller's lucid sketch of Greek strategy against Xerxes shows the commanders of those days reasoning much as intelligent moderns would have done in their place. His account of the Roman civil wars in which ancient self government perished has many a modern touch, for instance as to the possible importance of treachery in most civil wars, perhaps also in conflicts of the near future. Thus Brutus and Cassius at Philippi had to fear that subordinates of theirs who had once served under Caesar might serve as a "Fifth Column" in favor of Caesar's heirs Antony and Octavius. Some years later we find propaganda setting the stage for strategy when Octavius launches a successful propaganda against Cleopatra and then declares war against her and not directly against Antony. Consequently the latter could not have invaded Italy in alliance with her without further weakening his status as a "hundred per cent Roman."

Readers will await impatiently the subsequent volumes of this book.

HOFFMAN NICKERSON
Oyster Bay, New York

From Flintlock to MI. By Joseph W. Shields, Jr. (with illustrations by the author.) (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1954. Pp. 213. Including Glossary of Firearms Terms, Bibliography, and Index. \$7.50.)

This 7½" x 10" volume promptly calls to mind others of comparable, but not identical, coverage. When we bear in mind that Shields deals only with *long* US martial shoulder arms for the period over which these have been officially produced (1795 to date) it becomes apparent by comparison that while much of his treatise duplicates material in pre-existing publications, he has carefully avoided following an outline identical with any one of these.

But the question arises: does Shields present enough that is new and different on topics already many times covered to warrant another volume in the field of which he treats? I believe that he does. His approach is new, his comments refreshing and obviously based on deep knowledge of his subject. The scores of illustrations, all by his own hand, are most attractive. Not since André Jandot's masterful drawings in Hicks' volumes, (done in a different medium) have we seen any so well done.

Shields does not by any means confine himself to a simple recitation of specifications and characteristics of the different models which he depicts and describes. He undertakes to block in a background which gives a hint, sometimes a broad view, of the social, political, military and industrial conditions which prompted the development and issue of new models of American shoulder weapons. And he paints an interesting, often an arresting, picture. I gleaned many bits of pertinent and colorful information from his volume, for which I am more than grateful. It will make a valuable accession to any arms library.

By way of criticism, our author repeats on p. 11 of his work the erroneous translation of a passage from the Gentoo Code of Laws which was exposed as recently as 1904 by Hime in his book *Gunpowder and Ammunition*. This translation, made by V. B. Halhed in 1776, confers upon artillery and firearms an antiquity dating to pre-Christian times. Hime, a very careful researcher, managed to secure a translation from the original text,—in which no mention of cannon or explosives appears.

With some other statements I also take issue. Shields says (p. 13) that the pan cover on a snap-haunce lock had to be displaced *manually* before

firing. However, Pollard describes *all* snaphaunce pan covers (see p. 35 of his *History of Firearms*, N. Y., 1926) as "actuated, i.e., moved forward to uncover the pan, by a long lever inside the lock which bears against the tumbler of the hammer." For my money, however, the truth lies in between. Some pan covers were moved manually, some mechanically.

I also question the position of the flint in the jaws of the cock as it appears in various of Shields' drawings (e.g., those on p. 25). He shows it with front bevel sloping forward and downward. All the old timers I have known, notably Major Jerome Clark of blessed memory, sited their flints with the bevel sloping forward and *upward*. They in turn learned this from men who had used flintlocks in their youth because these were all they had available.

Shields is a bit weak on his history when he describes (p. 42) the "intrenched (American) riflemen" who defended Baltimore in Sept. 1814 as "protected by the bastions of Ft. McHenry." The bombardment of McHenry (13 Sept. 1814) was quite separate and distinct from the infantry action which took place the same day at North Point, miles distant and on the *opposite* bank of the Patapsco. In both instances, the defenders tasted victory, but that gained by the field forces was in no wise due to "the bastions of Ft. McHenry."

On p. 47, Shields ascribes to the "Kentucky" (Pennsylvania) rifle a "combination of low muzzle velocities and spherical bullets." The matter of velocities attained by projectiles from these weapons was carefully investigated some years ago by the late Philip P. Quale of the Peters Cartridge Company. My recollection is that they normally ran from 1600 f.s. to well over 2000 f.s., not so terribly "low" even in these days of ultra high speeds. As a result I surmise that Shields' estimate of a drop of 3 feet at 150 yds. for a Kentucky bullet (presumably from a piece of average bore and barrel length) is definitely excessive, even granted the high air-resistance experienced by its spherical projectile.

On p. 57, Shields sets up an hiatus in the use of the rod bayonet from the time of the Hall carbine (1838) to 1901 when the cal. .30 Springfield M1903 was under development. In so doing he passes over several models of the .45/70 Springfield single-shot, produced both experimentally and in quantity, during the 1880's.

We learn on p. 77 that when our Civil War

commenced "the flintlock and all thought of using it had passed out of existence." Not so, dear author. During the early days of that conflict, many Confederate troops carried these relics. Indeed, they were being issued as late as Feb. 1862 (see *Firearms of the Confederacy* by Fuller and Steuart, 1944, p. 304), though all were eventually replaced by pieces of more modern vintage.

The poor maligned pinfire cartridge is accorded on p. 93 its hereditary reputation for being dangerous "because of the protruding pin. . . ." They are considered dangerous because if dropped, *one might land on its pin*, and so be discharged. But an object heavier at one end (bullet) than at the other (powder) invariably lands on its *heavy* end, and will, until gravity ceases to be.

On p. 94 Shields intimates that the rim fire cartridge in sizes above cal. .22 is no longer made. As a matter of fact, it still trips merrily along in .25 and .32 calibers and in yet greater variety overseas. On p. 118 the .44 Henry rifle is described as having "the entire frame" made of bronze. This holds for most specimens, but the *iron frame* model is far from unknown, and even my modest collection contains one. At the bottom of p. 121 is an amusing printer's error by which all parts of the Spencer rifle become "glued" instead of *blued*. Unfortunately, the successful use by Federal troops of the Spencer carbine in the Civil War is passed over. It was one weapon that Johnny Reb feared and respected, and loved to get his hands upon.

I query the statement on p. 142 that very large charges of black powder produce "pressures—dangerously high." Consider Mordicaï's experiments at Washington Arsenal where he found it impossible to burst a cannon even when loaded from breech to muzzle with one charge atop another. Page 164 tells us that the "deep-bellied" cal. .30 Enfield magazine "held six cartridges and could be so loaded if necessary." Government Printing Office Document No. 1917, "Description and Rules for the Management of the U. S. Rifle Caliber .30, Model of 1917" (pub. 1918) states (p. 37) "clip holds five cartridges, *which is the capacity of the magazine.*" (Italics mine.)

A statement on p. 172 would suggest that when W.W. II broke Russia, like the USA, had adopted the policy of arming *all* its foot troops with semi-automatic rifles. This is far from correct. On the same page, the appearance of the (self-actuated) machine gun is credited to the early 1890's. As a matter of fact Maxim's, the first successful weapon of this type, was perfected in

1884. On p. 179 and again on p. 195, the context is broken when a sentence commenced on one line is continued, not on the line following, but *nine* lines lower in the first instance, *20* lines lower in the second. One wonders whether these pages (and perhaps others?) were ever scanned by a proofreader.

The 15 p. glossary of firearms terms which follows the general text is the most comprehensive of its kind I recall seeing in any publication such as this. It is full of information—with some of which I disagree.

I like the book. It is pleasingly written, delightfully illustrated. No true lover of "the levelled tube" should fail to secure a copy.

CALVIN GODDARD
Col. USAR (Ret.)
Washington, D. C.

The Assassination of President Lincoln and The Trial of The Conspirators. Compiled by Benn Pittman. (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1954. Pp. 421, \$7.50.)

This recent volume is a facsimile, reproduced photographically, of the rare 1865 edition which was compiled and arranged by Benn Pittman, recorder to the military commission which tried the eight conspirators charged with the assassination of the President. This new edition contains an excellent introduction by Philip Van Doren Stern, a well known Lincoln specialist, which describes Booth's escape and death and the trial and punishment of the conspirators.

Pittman's edited account of the trial is the most useful version as it provides an index to all witnesses and their testimony on important subjects. It will satisfy all but the most thorough Lincoln scholar.

We might ask why read this long ago testimony today? The answer is that the events surrounding the assassination and trial have raised many unanswered questions. If the assassination had not taken place soon after the fall of Richmond who can tell how different our history would have been?

Also a trial by a military commission is very rare in American history, the best recent example being the wartime trial of the "German Saboteurs."

This important documentary volume will help one to recreate the drama enacted not too long ago. "Truth is stranger than fiction."

G. J. STANSFIELD

SHORT REVIEWS

The following books are among those secured for review by *Military Affairs*. Space does not allow a more detailed discussion of their value to our readers. The cooperation of their publishers is called to the attention of all those interested in this field.—G. J. S.

THE ROMMEL PAPERS, edited by B. H. Liddell Hart, with the assistance of Lucie-Marie Rommel, Manfred Rommel and General Fritz Bayerlein; translated by Paul Findlay (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1953. Pp. 545. 24 maps, 25 plates. \$6.00.)

This is the definitive military history of Rommel's campaigns told in his own words and is the first entirely contemporary World War II memoirs to be published. Rommel's own sketch plans for the battles of Tobruk and Gazala are included as end papers and many of the photographs were taken by him.

Captain Liddell Hart's incisive introduction evaluates General Rommel as a "Great Captain" and points out that his account is "remarkably objective as well as graphic," and as a military leader he was a "brilliant tactician" as well as having a deep sense of strategy. His effect on the British Army caused by his dynamic generalship's creation of a "Rommel legend" was hard to overcome even after his military defeat in North Africa.

The *Rommel Papers* should be in the hands of all those interested in the military history of the War, desert warfare, and in armored war. In terms of its thought-provoking context of what makes for leadership, this outstanding volume should be used by all those who are concerned with its development as part of their permanent working library.

CRAIG, GORDON A., and FELIX, GILBERT, editors—*The Diplomats, 1919-1939*. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1953. Pp. 700. \$9.00.)

This outstanding study deals with the development of foreign affairs in terms of the point of view of envoys in the field and the officials in the Foreign Offices rather than from a more general perspective. The basic problem with which it is concerned is that of the significance which traditional diplomacy possessed in a period in which its institutions were assailed from the democratic as well as from the totalitarian side, but during which time such traditional diplomacy was continually employed by all Powers as an instrument for obtaining national objectives.

It is organized on the basis of 21 chapters, each by an authority in his special field, and is carefully documented and indexed. For the military student it provides a most valuable background to the events of World War II.

SAVATH, EDWARD, editor: *Understanding the American Past, American History and Its Interpretation*. (Boston; Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1954. Pp. 613. \$6.00.)

A collection of essays by outstanding American historians including "the Sitting Ducks of Clark Field" by Louis Morton, reprinted from his *The Fall of the Philippines* (Washington, G.P.O., 1953. Pp. 77-90.)

His first chapter "Historical Understanding in Democratic America" contains a section on Political History, Military history and the Individual's role (pp. 45-50).

The notes supporting each essay contain references; for example: Paul J. Scheips, "The Historian and the Nature of History; some reflections for Air Force Historians," *Military Affairs* XVI, Fall, 1952. Pp. 123-131.

"How We got into World War I," by Walter Millis is reprinted from the *New Republic*, July 31, 1935, originally titled "How We Entered the Last One."

HAINES, C. GROVE, editor: *The Threat of Soviet Imperialism*. (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954. Pp. 402, \$5.00.)

This volume is based upon the August 1953 School of Advanced International Studies Conference in Washington on "The Problems of Soviet Imperialism." It comprises top-ranking experts' papers, and discussion of many aspects of the problem resulting in a material contribution to a sound appraisal of the Communist challenge.

LIAS, GODFREY, ed., *I Survived*. (New York: John Day, 1954. Pp. 255. \$3.75.)

An eminent English journalist tells the story of the adventures of a German Army Lieutenant from his capture at Stalingrad in January 1943 to his return to Vienna in December 1952. It seems a fairly believable account describing the atmosphere in which ordinary people and prisoners of war lived their daily lives during this eventful decade. Both for those who like a good adventure story as well as a first hand account of post-war Russia it is of value.

DE VIGNY, ALFRED: *The Military Necessity; an English translation of Servitude et Grandeur*

Militaires by Humphrey Hare. (New York: Grove Press, 1953. Pp. 209. \$3.00.)

A modern translation of three stories of military life which first appeared in 1835 by the great romantic French poet who served as a junior officer from 1814 to 1827. They describe the military code: Honor, Loyalty, Duty, Self-sacrifice.

COOMBS, CHARLES: *Skyrocketing into the Unknown*. (New York: William Morrow, 1954. Pp. 256. \$4.00.)

This popularly written volume tells in 141 magnificent photographs and text the story of significant rocket and jet plane developments in the United States and their bearing upon the possibility of space travel in our lifetime. It is recommended as an introduction to this important field.

BRADLEY, LT. COL. FRANCIS, and WOOD, LT. COL. GLEN H.: *Paratrooper*. (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1954. Pp. \$3.50.)

An excellently presented, primarily photographic, volume which presents the military story of the paratrooper to the American citizen.

GIBBONS, EDWARD: *Floyd Gibbons, Your Headline Hunter*. (New York: Exposition Press, 1953. Pp. 350. \$4.00.)

This is a very enjoyable biography, by his brother, of the outstanding war correspondent who covered nine major wars and revolutions until his death in 1939. His adventurous life is well worth reading by those interested in writing military history.

MOLONEY, JAMES C.: *Understanding the Japanese Mind*. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. Pp. 252. \$3.50.)

An American psychoanalyst discusses the Japanese culture from this special point of view in a thought-provoking study.

WELLS, CARVETH: *Introducing Africa*, rev. and enlarged edition. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1954. Pp. 244. \$5.00.)

This volume is of particular value to the reader who wishes to obtain a general perspective of the continent of Africa. Such books are extremely few in number and Mr. Wells has prepared an excellent survey. A bibliography and index are included, which are not always to be found.

SMITH, D. MARK: *Cavour and Garibaldi, 1860; a study of political conflict*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1954. Pp. 458. \$8.50.)

This volume was designed as a "study in revolutionary politics during a civil war." It is highly

recommended as an excellent scholarly monograph for those who are concerned with problems in this area of civil-military relations and in political institutions, especially of Italy since 1860. Very few books have been written on this subject beyond Mrs. Chorley's *Armies and the Art of Revolution* (London, Faber, 1943).

DODSON, KENNETH: *Away All Boats*. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1954. Pp. 508. \$3.95.)

This novelized history of the life of the attack transport *Belinda* in the Pacific in World War II is considered to be one of the best sea books ever written. It is well recommended as an authoritative narrative for those who are particularly interested in amphibious warfare.

FRANKLIN, EDWARD: *The Foster Brothers*. (New York: John Day, 1954. Pp. 310. \$3.95.)

Eleventh Century England is vividly and competently portrayed in this very readable novel and the introduction by Arnold J. Toynbee attests to the scholarship behind its action packed story. Recommended for military historians' reading.

REMARQUE, ERICH MARIA: *A Time to Live and a Time to Die*, tr. from the German by Denver Lindley (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1954. Pp. 378. \$3.95.)

The author of *All Quiet on the Western Front* has written an accurate evaluation of the historical experiences of a German soldier who returns on leave from the Russian front to his bombed-out home, his love, marriage, and return to death at the front during the later stages of World War II. This novel is well worth reading for its history as well as for the author's philosophy of life.

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"Why Bother Collecting," by C. Meade Patterson, in *American Rifleman*, March 1954. A discussion of gun collecting, by a specialist on the subject.

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

THE DISTRICT CWRT ROUNDUP

The 1954 fall program of the District of Columbia Civil War Round Table has been unfolding with unabated zest. While in former years attendance was full now it is overflowing. At the current rate of growth the Army and Navy Club will be completely outgrown, and long before the one hundredth anniversary of Fort Sumter rolls around they will have to hire the ball park. All this despite the loss of Bruce Catton who moved to New York as the new editor of the enlarged *American Heritage*. His place as editor of the CWRT *News Letter* was taken by Colonel Gene Gempel who, apparently totally oblivious of the big shoes he is filling, is doing a whale of a job. As program chairman, Karl Betts took the baton passed by Ralph Donnelly without either runner losing a step. In short, every position in the District CWRT appears to be at least three deep. That is the sort of condition most organizations dream about but few achieve.

On the evening of September 14th, nearly one hundred diners listened to Daniel O'Flaherty's address on General Jo Shelby, a noted Confederate horseman whose biography was authored by Mr. O'Flaherty, a Richmond, Virginia, newspaperman. Saturday, October 2nd, the CWRT spent the day at Gettysburg, roaming over the various cavalry actions of that battle, guided by the indefatigable Dr. Frederick Tilberg, and welcomed by Dr. J. Walter Coleman, Superintendent of the Gettysburg National Military Park. Harnett T. Kane of New Orleans, Louisiana, author of *Spies for the Blue and Gray*, packed 'em in so tight on the evening of October 11th, that the Army and Navy Club management had to take care of the overflow in a separate dining room on another floor.

With inimitable humor, Author Kane highlighted an otherwise very serious and somber subject, giving delectable insights into the unorthodox situations created by the then prevalent chivalrous and romantic attitudes of the professional military toward the presumably lady-like female, particularly toward those females (be they ever-so spying) dubbed Southern Belles. It was indeed the heyday of the belle. Lt. Colonel Henry Pleasants, Jr., of West Chester, Pennsylvania, capably filled the November 1st engagement with an inside account of the tragic story of the Petersburg Crater. Ralph Donnelly will finish the calendar year by moderating a panel discussion on December 7th, 1954.

SEMINAR ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF WAR

Jointly sponsored by St. John's College of Annapolis, Maryland, and The American Military Institute, seminars on the philosophy of war are being held during the academic year in both Annapolis and Washington, D. C. The seminar consists of reading assignments and meetings for the discussion of the attitudes toward war of the great classical writers, and of the lessons taught by history on the relations of war to politics, and on the ethics, logic, and science of warfare. Leaders guiding the Washington seminar are Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, formerly of the faculty of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and George J. Stansfield, reference librarian at the National War College and also the Institute's Librarian. The leaders of the Washington seminar work in collaboration with those of the Annapolis seminar, Professor William H. Russell of the Department of English, History, and Government of the Naval Academy, and Dr. Philip A.

Crowl of the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Further information may be obtained by writing Admiral Hayes, 1970 Fairfax Road, Annapolis, Md., or the Office of Adult Education, St. John's College.

AMI HOLDS SUCCESSFUL FALL MEETING

The American Military Institute held the first of its current schedule of meetings for the fall, winter, and spring seasons, on Tuesday, 19 October, 1954. The luncheon meeting was held in the Officers' Club of the Naval Gun Factory, Washington, D. C., with over seventy AMI members in attendance, including a number of distinguished flag officers of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Some of the local historical units, particularly that of the Marine Corps, turned out *en bloc*. Though we itch to mention names, for fear that some may be overlooked we shall merely add that some old but still virile faces were seen there that haven't been noted at AMI gatherings for years. Our genial past president, General Donald Armstrong, a known culinary connoisseur, was so happy about the fine turnout that he forthwith demolished a succulent fried chicken; whilst his lean and ascetic successor, Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, presided with his usual aplomb. The sole person apparently not fully enjoying the premier luncheon was Honest Ralph Donnelly, the puissant AMI Treasurer, who found his door collection was short one reservation (later discovered to be merely that of the guest speaker, Dr. Roy P. Basler of the Library of Congress). Dr. Basler, the editor of the definitive edition of Abraham Lincoln's papers, gave an interesting research talk on the topic of "Lincoln and His Generals." The question-and-answer period terminating the affair was especially lively and indicated better than any ovation the audience's keen response to the speaker. The meeting set a high standard.

GENERAL BEUKEMA'S NEW CAREER

One of the most respected officers of the American Military Institute, Vice President Herman Beukema, retired from the United States Military Academy after twenty-six years of notable service, and was concurrently promoted to Brigadier General. Shortly thereafter, before the opening of the 1954 fall term, he was appointed director of the University of Maryland's European educational program, with headquarters in Heidelberg, Germany. Long known as Colonel Beukema, his educational work was recognized by a number of colleges and universities with honorary degrees of doctor of laws and doctor of science. He is the author of several books and numerous scholarly articles, and, as the West Point Academic Board stated, "His reputation and contributions to the national interest extended far outside the Military Academy in contacts with both military and civilian fields." Dr. Beukema was a classmate of President Eisenhower at West Point who was also formerly a member of the American Military Institute. He has assured us that he will, in his new career, ever keep in mind the aims and progress of the Institute. The Institute, in turn, proudly wishes one of its outstanding scholars the best possible success in his new field of endeavor. In this connection it may be noted that the overseas program of the University of Maryland, which Dr. Beukema will henceforth administer, is the only one of its kind conducted by an American university. There are some nine thousand students enrolled at ninety military institutions in sixteen countries. Good hunt ing, old member and friend!

AMI LAPEL EMBLEMS

These beautiful emblems are still available at the nominal price of one dollar. Write the Secretary.

THE HISTORY OF CIVIL AND MILITARY RELATIONS

An examination of the recently published *Harvard Guide to American History* is evidence of the fact that the military account of the American past has not been given the attention that its importance warrants. This should be a matter of concern to all Americans and especially to members of the American Military Institute.

War and preparation for war are now everyday facts of life for Americans. Events of the turbulent twentieth century have ordained that the military element assume a position in our society such as it never held before. As a consequence there is a rush to investigate the subject of military policy, to define a new social science of civil and military relations, and to find out just what is the American Philosophy of War.

The dilemma is that the parts of our past which offer the best lessons in civil-military relations are those historically most neglected. Our Indian Wars are an example. In these, the settlers, government agents, and military personnel were all forced into intimate contact, but there is little definitive history of the two and a half centuries of this warfare.

Another important but historically neglected area is the peacetime administration of the armed services. From 1881 to 1916 the problem of national security was not unlike what it is today. A large navy had to be built and maintained within the frame-work of the normal peacetime economy. The organizational growth of the Department of Defense might have been less painful had we been more familiar with the Navy Department's troubles of half a century ago.

The reasons for this historical void are many. We hope to discuss them here from time to time. The basic cause, no doubt, is the lack of a tradition of American historiography, such as exists in Great Britain. This manifests itself in the paucity of bibliographical material. The last comprehensive naval bibliography, compiled by Robert W. Neeser, was published in 1909. So far as is known an extensive bibliography of the American Army has never been produced.

There is also a need for an index of military periodical literature. Most of the good military thought committed to writing is in periodicals. People concerned with military affairs within and outside the profession usually have had neither the time nor the inclination to write books. Military magazines, however, have been published for over a century but the material in them is not catalogued in *Poole's* or the *Readers' Guide* or other sources to which aspiring historians turn for their initial guidance. A first requirement for a long range study of civil-military relations is a compilation of such material.

General Emory Upton's *Military Policy of the United States* remained in manuscript for twenty-five years until the Secretaryship of Elihu Root. A complete administrative history of the U.S. Navy lies fallow in the back numbers of *MILITARY AFFAIRS* and the *Proceedings* of the Naval Institute. Bringing such material to the attention of the historical profession and the people of the United States was the purpose for which the American Military Institute was founded twenty-two years ago. The reasons for doing so are even more valid today. We of the present membership have a big job cut out for us.

J. D. H.

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